Nerac, Inc. v. Meehan

690 A.2d 440, 44 Conn. Super. Ct. 328, 44 Conn. Supp. 328, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 311, 1995 WL 912000
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 27, 1995
DocketFile 375219
StatusPublished

This text of 690 A.2d 440 (Nerac, Inc. v. Meehan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nerac, Inc. v. Meehan, 690 A.2d 440, 44 Conn. Super. Ct. 328, 44 Conn. Supp. 328, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 311, 1995 WL 912000 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

BLUE, J.

This case involves the heaven and the earth. The plaintiff, NERAC, Inc. (NERAC), claims that it is an instrumentality of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and that the state of Connecticut is consequently prohibited from taxing certain purchases that it has made. For the reasons set forth below, this contention is correct.

The parties have submitted an extensive factual stipulation. In addition, some relevant facts are contained in official government documents, and the background of this case in the space race and the cold war is a matter of well-known historical fact.

The launching of the sputnik satellite by the former Soviet Union on October 4, 1957, had a galvanic effect on the United States. It became imperative, or at least so it was thought, for our nation to catch and overtake the Soviet Union in matters of technology and space science. This plainly required a tremendous effort. The Congressional response to this perceived crisis was the enactment of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 426 (NASA Act) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2451 et seq.).

The hopes and fears that inspired the NASA Act are vividly set forth in the House Report that accompanied it: “The Soviet sputniks have been a visible symbol, warning that the United States may not be leading in the vital field of space research and in the development of astronautics. This country is not unmindful of what *332 these Soviet achievements mean in terms of military defense, of international prestige, and of general scientific advance. At the same time, a properly developed United States program to explore the potential uses of space must and can stand on its own rights. The program must be soundly conceived and soundly administered. It must not falter, then rush ahead only when prodded by some spectacular Soviet success, but rather must advance as a broad-based, sustained, long-range effort to use the properties of space, and to explore space either by proxy through instruments, or by sending man himself. ... It would be unfortunate, to say the least, for the United States to renounce an opportunity for sharing in astronautics discoveries which are bound to be made. Yet this unfortunate result could follow from current failure to organize a sound program to exploit easily proven techniques which can carry men and instruments into outer space. The Soviet lead in astronautics has made clear that ‘business as usual’ is not going to close the gap between United States and Soviet capabilities. Nor can even an intensive program of ‘me too’ do more than keep this country following behind the Soviet Union. This is particularly true when one considers the long lead times required for many astronautics programs, and the series of surprises the Soviets have already accomplished in the scientific area. The United States must leapfrog these Soviet accomplishments. This will take some years, and will require a genuine mobilization, on a national scale, of the vast scientific and technical capabilities of this country. It would be a most serious mistake, and self-defeating in results, to choose some few isolated projects with the hope of influencing world opinion as to the superiority of our technology. Although the Soviet demonstrations in one sense could be viewed as tricks designed to sway world opinion, such an assessmenet *333 tragically underestimates the Soviet approach to astronautics. The Soviet advance presupposes abroad scientific effort of many years’ standing. It is based on a long-range plan of scientific education and research. It has combined, since World War II, the military development of rockets and missiles with the scientific resources of the countiy. In 1955, 3 years ahead of the United States, the Soviet Union set up a strong civilian astronautics agency, able to command all the resources of the nation. That agency in the Academy of Sciences, which sits at the same level as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, announced detailed plans for its satellites of varying weights, and also announced its plans for moon exploration and instrumented probes of Mars and Venus. These announcements were made 2 or 3 years ago. We have similar plans, still under discussion or only this year being specifically authorized for the years ahead. Whatever the United States may think of other aspects of the Soviet political system, there is little doubt that a single coordinated agency offers tremendous advantages over the fragmented, uncoordinated effort which the United States has made to date. A haphazard effort involves the dangers of duplication and incompleteness, together with competition for funds and headlines, to the detriment of rapid attainment of national goals. This is not to say that there is not room for alternative approaches, and for the development of different teams and facilities, but all these should be pointed toward the fulfillment of a well-rounded, comprehensive national plan.” (Emphasis in original.) H.R. Rep. No. 1770, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3160, 3161, 3163-64.

In passing the NASA Act, “Congress expected that NASA would invoke the participation of private industry and of educational institutions in embarking on the *334 nation’s space effort.” Lodge 1858, American Federation of Government Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496, 501 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927, 99 S. Ct. 311, 58 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1978). “Congress gave NASA a specific, giant task in need of quick fulfillment . . . .” Id., 503. It was anticipated from the start that NASA would utilize private industry and educational institutions in obtaining these goals. The nature of these goals is important. One of these goals was the defeat of the Soviet Union in the space race, but a broader — and vitally important — goal was the establishment of American technological superiority. Congress saw the NASA Act as an “opportunity for science and technology” to obtain “the ultimate economic benefits of technological progress.” 104 Cong. Rec. 9917 (1958), remarks of Representative John McCormack.

These goals are reflected in the text of the NASA Act itself. “The aeronautical and space activities of the United States” are to “be conducted so as to contribute materially to . . . [t]he preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (d) (5) (codifying NASA Act). In 1988, Congress added the goal of “[t]he preservation of the United States preeminent position in aeronautics and space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes.” 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (d) (9) (codifying National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act, Fiscal Year 1989, 102 Stat. 4083, 4093 [1988]).

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690 A.2d 440, 44 Conn. Super. Ct. 328, 44 Conn. Supp. 328, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 311, 1995 WL 912000, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nerac-inc-v-meehan-connsuperct-1995.