Nelly Fiallos-Munoz v. Pamela Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 15, 2026
Docket19-72336
StatusUnpublished

This text of Nelly Fiallos-Munoz v. Pamela Bondi (Nelly Fiallos-Munoz v. Pamela Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nelly Fiallos-Munoz v. Pamela Bondi, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NELLY FIALLOS-MUNOZ, No. 19-72336 Agency No. Petitioner, 089-100-637 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 15, 2026**

Before: GOULD, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Pro se Petitioner Nelly Fiallos-Munoz seeks review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of her applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). petition.

“We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations,

for substantial evidence,” and we review legal questions de novo. Bhattarai v.

Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d

785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014)). We “reverse the BIA’s [credibility] decision only if the

petitioner’s evidence was ‘so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could find

that [s]he was not credible.’” Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)). Where, as here,

the BIA reviewed the IJ’s credibility determination for clear error, we “look to the

IJ’s decision ‘as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion.’” Kalulu v.

Bondi, 128 F.4th 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th

1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2022)).

The record evidence does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner testified

credibly. Assessing the “totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors,”

Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (alteration

omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)), the BIA identified material

omissions and inconsistencies in Petitioner’s testimony and the written declaration

appended to her asylum application. Most notably, Petitioner’s testimony focused

on an incident in November 2008, after she and her partner separated, in which he

publicly abducted her at gunpoint as she left her workplace, beat her, and locked

2 21-1129 her in a room for three days, causing her to miscarry. But her previously executed

written declaration does not mention an abduction at gunpoint; the most similar

incident discussed is an interaction in which, when her partner became angry that

she did not give him money to buy drugs, he punched her, “dragged [her] by [her]

hair to a dark room,” and “locked [her] in for two days.”

Although “not all omissions . . . support an adverse credibility finding . . .

omissions are probative of credibility to the extent that later disclosures, if

credited, would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum application.” Iman

v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2020). The fact that Petitioner did not

mention the abduction at gunpoint in her written declaration but later made it the

focus of her claims of persecution indicates that the disclosure bolstered her

previously weaker application for relief. Therefore, the omission is probative of

credibility. “An IJ must consider and address all plausible and reasonable

explanations for any inconsistencies that form the basis of an adverse credibility

determination.” Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). But the agency reasonably concluded that

Petitioner’s explanation for the omission, that she tried to forget the incident, was

not credible because it was a major traumatic event.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that there were

additional inconsistencies within Petitioner’s testimony and between her testimony

3 21-1129 and her asylum application, particularly with respect to the timing and

circumstances of her miscarriage and a complaint she may have filed with police

through an attorney. Petitioner argues that these inconsistencies do not “go to the

heart” of her claims for relief, which is the severe physical abuse she suffered at

the hands of her partner. But under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as

amended by the REAL ID Act, inconsistencies that do not “go to the heart” of a

petitioner’s claim may support an adverse credibility finding. Shrestha v. Holder,

590 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).

Additionally, the agency correctly determined that Petitioner did not produce

sufficient documentary evidence to rehabilitate her credibility. In the absence of

credible testimony or sufficient corroborating evidence, the agency properly

concluded that Petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of

removal. See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Without

credible testimony or sufficient corroborating evidence,” petitioner could not meet

his burden to show the required persecution based on a protected ground for

purposes of asylum and withholding).

The agency also properly denied Petitioner’s claim for CAT relief, because

that claim was based on the same allegations that the agency did not find credible.

Petitioner does not point to any other evidence in the record that would compel a

conclusion that she would likely be tortured if removed to Honduras. See Farah,

4 21-1129 348 F.3d at 1157 (affirming denial of CAT protection because petitioner’s CAT

claim was “based on the same statements . . . that the BIA determined to be not

credible,” and petitioner “point[ed] to no other evidence that he could claim the

BIA should have considered in making its determination . . . .”).

PETITION DENIED.1

1 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.

5 21-1129

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Related

Jamal Ali Farah v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
348 F.3d 1153 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Kin v. Holder
595 F.3d 1050 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Shrestha v. Holder
590 F.3d 1034 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Rita Carrion Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr.
749 F.3d 785 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Ai Zhi v. Eric Holder, Jr.
751 F.3d 1088 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Nishchal Bhattarai v. Loretta E. Lynch
835 F.3d 1037 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Ibrahim Iman v. William Barr
972 F.3d 1058 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Keness Mukulumbutu v. William Barr
977 F.3d 924 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Morshed Alam v. Merrick Garland
11 F.4th 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)

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