Ned L. Siegel, Georgette Sosa Douglas v. Theresa Lepore, Charles E. Burton

234 F.3d 1163

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction.

The Republican candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States, along with several registered Florida voters, filed suit in federal court in Miami, seeking to enjoin four Florida counties from conducting manual recounts of ballots cast for President of the United States in the November 7, 2000, election. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunc-tive relief, and Plaintiffs appeal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I.

On November 7, 2000, Florida voters cast ballots for several offices, including votes for the twenty-five electors for President and Vice-President of the United States. The following day, the Division of Elections for the State of Florida reported that the Republican Party presidential ticket received 2,909,135 votes, and the Democratic Party presidential ticket received 2,907,351 votes, for a margin of difference of 1,784, or 0.0299% of the total Florida vote.

Under Florida law, county canvassing boards are responsible for determining the number of votes cast for each candidate. See Fla. Stat. § 102.141. If a candidate for office is defeated by one-half of one percent or less of the votes cast for such office, the canvassing board must order a recount. See id. § 102.141(4). Pursuant to this statute, because the Presidential vote returns reflected that the Democratic ticket was defeated by less than one-half of one percent, the canvassing boards conducted automatic recounts of the votes. After the automatic recounts, the Republican ticket retained the majority of votes, although by a slimmer margin.

Under Florida law, a manual recount may be requested by any candidate whose name appeared on the ballot, a political committee that supports or opposes an issue that appeared on the ballot, or a political party whose candidates’ names appeared on the ballot. See Fla. Stat. § 102.166(4)(a). Such a request must be filed with the canvassing board within 72 hours after midnight of the date the election was held, or before the canvassing board has certified the challenged results, whichever is later. See id. § 102.166(4)(b). The canvassing board may, but is not required to, grant the request. See id. § 102.166(4)(c); Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So.2d 508, 510 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992) (“The statute clearly leaves the decision whether or not to hold a manual recount of the votes as a matter to be decided within the discretion of the canvassing board.”). The statutory manual recount provision applies to all Florida counties. Therefore, the procedure for requesting a manual recount is the same in all counties, although the decision of whether to conduct a manual recount would, of course, be made separately by each county’s canvassing board.

Once authorized by a county canvassing board, a manual recount must include “at least three precincts and at least 1 percent of the total votes cast for such candidate.” Id. § 102.166(4)(d). The person requesting the recount chooses three precincts to be recounted, and, if other precincts are recounted, the canvassing board chooses the additional precincts. See id. If the results of the manual recount indicate “an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election, the county canvassing board shall: (a) Correct the error and recount the remaining precincts with the vote tabulation system; (b) Request the Department of State to verify the tabulation software; or (c) Manually recount all ballots.” Id. § 102.166(5).

Florida law specifies the procedures for a manual recount. Section 102.166(7) of the Florida Statutes provides that:

(a) The county canvassing board shall appoint as many counting teams of at least two electors as is necessary to manually recount the ballots. A counting team must have, when possible, members of at least two political parties. A candidate involved in the race shall not be a member of the counting team.

(b) If a counting team is unable to determine a voter’s intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be presented to the county canvassing board for it to determine the voter’s intent.

In this ease, the Florida Democratic Party filed requests for manual recounts in Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties on November 9, 2000, within the 72-hour statutory deadline. The stated reasons for the requests included the closeness of the statewide race and a concern that the vote totals might not reflect the true will of Florida voters. The apparent practical effect of a manual recount is that some ballots which were unreadable by machine due, for example, to voters’ failure to mark or punch the ballots in a machine-legible fashion, might be read by human counters; and these votes could be added to the totals for each candidate.

II.

On November 11, 2000, registered voters Ned L. Siegel from Palm Beach County, Georgette Sosa Douglas from Broward County, Gonzalo Dorta from Miami-Dade County, Carretta King Butler from Volusia County, Dalton Bray from Clay County, James S. Higgins from Martin County, and Roger D. Coverly from Seminole County, along with the Republican candidates for President and Vice-President, George W. Bush and Richard Cheney (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in the district court for the Southern District of Florida. Plaintiffs sued members of the county canvassing boards of Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties.¹ Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleged that the manual recounts violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection, and deny and burden the First Amendment’s protection of votes and political speech.

Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief in their Complaint included the following:

(a) Declaring that Defendants may not subject any vote totals to manual recounts;

(b) In the alternative, declaring that Florida Statute § 102.166(4) is unconstitutional to the extent it does not limit the discretion of Defendants to conduct manual recounts in this case;

(c) Declaring that Defendants should certify and release forthwith all vote totals that have been the subject of two vote counts since November 7, 2000;

(d) Declaring that the form of ballot used in Palm Beach County was valid;

(e) Declaring that any ballot punched or marked for two Presidential candidates not previously counted cannot now be counted;

(f) Consolidating or removing to this Court any and all actions filed across the State of Florida purporting to challenge the results of the November 7 statewide election or otherwise delay the certification and release of those results; and

(g) Granting such other and further relief as this Court shall deem just and proper.

(Complaint at 16-17.)

The Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction which Plaintiffs filed with their Complaint asked, inter alia, that the district court prohibit the county canvassing boards from proceeding with manual recounts of the November 7th election results. Like the Complaint, this motion contended that the manual recounts violate the First Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The district court heard oral argument on the motion on November 13, 2000, and Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction was denied. On November 14, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal.²

During the pendency of this appeal, several Florida cases were appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. In these cases, some plaintiffs challenged Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris’s decision to refuse to accept the results of manual recounts submitted by county canvassing boards after the statutory deadline of 5:00 p.m. on November 14, 2000. On November 21, 2000, in the consolidated cases of Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, Volusia County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, and Florida Democratic Party v. Harris, the Supreme Court of Florida decided that Florida Secretary of State Harris must accept the late-reported results of manual recounts from these counties submitted by the evening of November 26, 2000. The Florida Supreme Court expressly stated that neither party had raised as an issue on appeal the constitutionality of Florida’s election laws, and it did not address federal constitutional issues in its opinion.³

On appeal, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal, asking this Court to prohibit the county canvassing board Defendants from proceeding with manual ballot recounts. This motion was denied without prejudice on November 17, 2000. Among other things, we then said:

Both the Constitution of the United States and 3 U.S.C. § 5 indicate that states have the primary authority to determine the manner of appointing Presidential Electors and to resolve most controversies concerning the appointment of Electors. The case law is to the same effect, although, of course, federal courts may act to preserve and decide claims of violations of the Constitution of the United States in certain circumstances, especially where a state remedy is inadequate. In this case, the State of Florida has enacted detailed election dispute procedures. These procedures have been invoked, and are in the process of being implemented, both in the form of administrative actions by state officials and in the form of actions in state courts, including the Supreme Court of Florida. It has been represented to us that the state courts will address and resolve any necessary federal constitutional issues presented to them, including the issues raised by Plaintiffs in this case. If so, then state procedures are not in any way inadequate to preserve for ultimate review in the United States Supreme Court any federal questions arising out of such orders.

Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs moved this Court to expedite the underlying appeal, which motion we granted. This case is now before us on the appeal of the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs ask this Court either to reverse the district court’s decision, enjoin the canvassing board Defendants from conducting manual recounts or certifying election results that include manual recounts, or order the deletion and/or non-inclusion of final vote tabulations that reflect the results of manual recounts.⁴

This Court has carefully considered Plaintiffs’ appeal, as well as the other documents filed, and has conferred en banc on numerous occasions. We heard oral argument on December 5, 2000. Recognizing the importance of a resolution to this case, a prompt decision on the appeal is required.

III.

We first consider whether Rooker-Feldman bars our exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, have no authority to review the final judgments of state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1317, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The doctrine extends not only to constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315 n. 16; Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir.1997). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment “if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1533, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring).

In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision vacating the Florida Supreme Court’s November 21, 2000, decision, it is unclear at the moment that any final judgments giving rise to Rooker-Feldman concerns now exist. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canv. Bd., — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 471, — L.Ed.2d - (2000). No party has called to our attention any final judgments in the Florida state courts upon which a Rooker-Feld-man bar reasonably could be based as to these Plaintiffs.⁵ Thus, we conclude that Rooker-Feldman does not bar Plaintiffs from bringing these particular constitutional challenges to the implementation of Florida’s manual recount provision.

Defendants Broward, Palm Beach, and Volusia County Canvassing Boards also argue that this case is moot because the manual recounts have been completed and the boards have filed their certified vote tabulations with the Elections Canvassing Commission. However, we conclude that this case is not moot.

Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to live cases or controversies, and the “case-or-controversy” requirement “subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). This Court has held that “[a] claim for injunctive relief may become moot if; (1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 102 F.3d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir.1997).

We conclude that neither of these elements is satisfied in this case. The Democratic candidate, Vice President Gore, and others are currently contesting the election results in various lawsuits in numerous Florida state courts. There are still manual recount votes from at least Volusia and Broward Counties in the November 26th official election results of the Florida Secretary of State.⁶ In view of the complex and ever-shifting circumstances of the case, we cannot say with any confidence that no live controversy is before us.⁷

IV.

Defendants argue that we should abstain from hearing this case under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), or under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). We conclude that abstention is not appropriate in this case.

The Burford abstention doctrine allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar, or if its adjudication in a federal forum would disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern. See Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir.2000) (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2514, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989)). A central purpose furthered by Burford abstention is to protect complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 362, 109 S.Ct. at 2515. The case before us does not threaten to undermine all or a substantial part of Florida’s process of conducting elections and resolving election disputes. Rather, Plaintiffs’ claims in this case target certain discrete practices set forth in a particular state statute. Further, Burford is implicated when federal interference would disrupt a state’s effort, through its administrative agencies, to achieve uniformity and consistency in addressing a problem. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727-28, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1727, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). This case does not threaten to undermine Florida’s uniform approach to manual recounts; indeed, the crux of Plaintiffs’ complaint is the absence of strict and uniform standards for initiating or conducting such recounts. Finally, we note that Burford abstention represents an “extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.” County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959). We do not believe that the concerns raised by Defendants in this case justify our abstention under this narrow doctrine.

Perhaps the most persuasive justification for abstention advanced by Defendants is based on Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971; however, we conclude that abstention under this doctrine would not be appropriate. Under the Pullman abstention doctrine, a federal court will defer to “state court resolution of underlying issues of state law.” Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1181, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965). Two elements must be met for Pullman abstention to apply: (1) the case must present an unsettled question of state law, and (2) the question of state law must be dispositive of the case or would materially alter the constitutional question presented. See id. at 534, 85 S.Ct. at 1182. The purpose of Pullman abstention is to “avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state functions, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional adjudication.” Id. Because abstention is discretionary, it is only appropriate when the question of state law can be fairly interpreted to avoid adjudication of the constitutional question. See id. at 535, 85 S.Ct. at 1182.

Plaintiffs claim that Florida’s manual recount provision is unconstitutional because the statute does not provide sufficient standards to guide the discretion of county canvassing boards in granting a request for a manual recount or in conducting such a recount. There has been no suggestion by Defendants that the statute is appropriately subject to a more limited construction than the statute itself indicates.

Our conclusion that abstention is inappropriate is strengthened by the fact that Plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation of their voting rights. In considering abstention, we must take into account the nature of the controversy and the importance of the right allegedly impaired. See Edwards v. Sammons, 437 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1971) (citing, as examples of cases where the Supreme Court referred to the nature of the right involved in upholding a refusal to abstain, Harman, 380 U.S. at 537, 85 S.Ct. at 1183 (voting rights); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) (school desegregation); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (First Amendment rights)). Our cases have held that voting rights cases are particularly inappropriate for abstention. See Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 697 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (stating that while an alleged denial of voting rights does not preclude federal abstention, Supreme Court precedent indicates that a federal court should be reluctant to abstain when voting rights are at stake); Edwards, 437 F.2d at 1244 (stating the general rule that abstention is not appropriate “in cases involving such a strong national interest as the right to vote”). In light of this precedent, the importance of the rights asserted by Plaintiffs counsels against our abstention in this case; although, as discussed below, we are mindful of the limited role of the federal courts in assessing a state’s electoral process.

We therefore conclude that abstention is not appropriate.

V.

This is an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs state two main claims. First, Plaintiffs argue that Florida’s manual recount scheme, and particularly Fla. Stat. § 102.166(7), is unconstitutional because it contains no standards for when a ballot not read by the machine may be counted. They describe their claim as an “as-applied” challenge based on the allegedly standardless and partisan application of the (allegedly facially standardless) statute in Palm Beach, Broward, Dade, and Volusia Counties. Plaintiffs’ chief objection is that different criteria used by different counties, or by different election officials within a county, may mean that the same ballot rejected in one instance is accepted in another instance, or vice versa. They contend that such unequal treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause and that the lack of standards by itself violates the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs also contend that the absence of statutory standards for when a manual recount occurs permits arbitrary and partisan decision-making, exacerbates the potential for unequal treatment of ballots, and thus warrants a federal court’s intervention.

Second, Plaintiffs assert that they are denied due process and equal protection because, under Fla. Stat. § 102.166(4), ballots in one county may be manually recounted while ballots in another county are not. They contend that, as a result, similarly situated voters will not be treated similarly based purely on the fortuity of where they reside; a ballot that would be counted in one county pursuant to a manual recount may not be counted elsewhere because that voter’s county did not conduct such a recount.

Defendants, as well as the Intervenor-Appellee, dispute all of these contentions. They argue that Florida law does contain constitutionally adequate standards for evaluating when a manual recount should occur and for evaluating the ballots during such a recount, and that Plaintiffs’ as-applied claim fails because no record evidence shows that those standards have been employed in an arbitrary or partisan fashion. They also maintain that allowing decisions to be made on whether a manual recount occurs on a county-by-county basis is reasonable and consistent with the approach taken by other states, and that in any event no constitutional violation is present for many reasons, such as there is no record evidence indicating that a recount request was made and accepted in one Florida county while a request made in a different county was rejected. More generally, they raise a series of arguments for the proposition that Plaintiffs’ challenge to Florida’s election laws does not rise to a level that would warrant federal intervention.

The district court, weighing the parties’ arguments, determined that Plaintiffs had failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. We have reviewed the competing arguments. To some extent, our consideration of these arguments is shaped by the practical difficulties of marshaling an adequate record when ongoing and unexpected events continually alter the key facts. In this case, only limited affidavits and a few documents were introduced into the record before the district court. No formal discovery has been undertaken, and, as yet, no evidentiary hearing has been held in this case. Many highly material allegations of facts are vigorously contested. Preliminary injunction motions are often, by necessity, litigated on an undeveloped record. But an undeveloped record not only makes it harder for a plaintiff to meet his burden of proof, it also cautions against an appellate court setting aside the district court’s exercise of its discretion.

However, we need not decide the merits of the case to resolve this appeal, and therefore, do not decide them at this time. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion not only because it found no likelihood of success on the merits, but also on the separate and independent ground that Plaintiffs had failed to show that irreparable injury would result if no injunction were issued. We may reverse the district court’s order only if there was a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Carillon Importers, Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Int’l Group Ltd., 112 F.3d 1126, 1126 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam); Revette v. International Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 740 F.2d 892, 893 (11th Cir.1984) (“The district court’s decision will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.”); Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir.1982). Because Plaintiffs still have not shown irreparable injury, let alone that the district court clearly abused its discretion in finding no irreparable injury on the record then before it, the denial of the preliminary injunction must be affirmed on that basis alone.

A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.1998) (citing All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir.1989)). In this Circuit, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ ” as to each of the four prerequisites. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1975) (grant of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule,” and plaintiff must clearly carry the burden of persuasion).⁸

A showing of irreparable injury is “ ‘the sine qua non of injunctive relief.’ ” Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Frejlach v. Butler, 573 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir.1978)); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975) (“The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury.”); Robertson, 147 F.3d at 1306 (plaintiff must show “irreparable injury will be suffered”); Harris Corp., 691 F.2d at 1356-57 (concluding that district court “did not abuse its discretion in finding a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury to [the plaintiff] absent an injunction”); Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir.1981) (to be granted a preliminary injunction plaintiffs must show “a substantial likelihood that they would suffer irreparable injury”).⁹

Significantly, even if Plaintiffs establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper. See Snook v. Trust Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, N.A., 909 F.2d 480, 486 (11th Cir.1990) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction even though plaintiff established likelihood of prevailing because plaintiff failed to meet burden of proving irreparable injury); City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d at 1285 (reversing preliminary injunction based solely on plaintiffs failure to show irreparable injury); Flowers Indus, v. FTC, 849 F.2d 551, 552 (11th Cir.1988) (same); United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 540 (11th Cir.1983) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction and stating that a plaintiff’s “success in establishing a likelihood it will prevail on the merits does not obviate the necessity to show irreparable harm”). As we have emphasized on many occasions, the asserted irreparable injury “must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d at (quoting Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir.1989)); accord, Chacon v. Granata, 515 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir.1975) (“An injunction is appropriate only if the anticipated injury is imminent and irreparable.”).

At this time, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a threat of continuing irreparable harm. At the moment, the candidate Plaintiffs (Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney) are suffering no serious harm, let alone irreparable harm, because they have been certified as the winners of Florida’s electoral votes notwithstanding the inclusion of manually recounted ballots. Moreover, even if manual recounts were to resume pursuant to a state court order,¹⁰ it is wholly speculative as to whether the results of those recounts may eventually place Vice President Gore ahead. See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.1994) (“a party has standing to seek injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and immediate — as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical — threat of future injury”). At the moment it also remains speculative whether such an order may be forthcoming. Indeed, the Florida Circuit Court in Leon County considering the Vice President’s contest to the final certification has now denied the Vice President’s request for resumption of manual recounts as part of its broader judgment in the entire contest action. This development reinforces that the candidate Plaintiffs are suffering no serious harm. Moreover, as noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court has now vacated the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, raising still further doubt about the likelihood of any substantial injury.

Nor are the voter Plaintiffs (all of whom allege that they voted for Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney) suffering serious harm or facing imminent injury. No voter Plaintiff claims that in this election he was prevented from registering to vote, prevented from voting or prevented from voting for the candidate of his choice. Nor does any voter claim that his vote was rejected or not counted. The cases called to our attention by the parties that have warranted immediate injunctive relief have involved these kind of circumstances. Even assuming Plaintiffs can assert some kind of injury, they have not shown the kind of serious and immediate injury that demands the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction. Additionally, any alleged voter injury, unrelated to the outcome of the election certified by the Florida Secretary of State, can be adequately remedied later. And although these Plaintiffs assert that Florida’s existing manual recount scheme must be invalidated for now and in the future, no one suggests that another election implicating those procedures is underway or imminent.

Plaintiffs’ other allegations of irreparable injuries to justify a preliminary injunction are unconvincing. The candidate Plaintiffs contend that if the manual recounts are allowed to proceed, simply rejecting the results of those recounts after the conclusion of this case will not repair the damage to the legitimacy of the Bush Presidency caused by “broadcasting” the flawed results of a recount that put Vice President Gore ahead. But the pertinent manual recounts have already been concluded, and the results from those recounts widely publicized. Moreover, we reject the contention that merely counting ballots gives rise to cognizable injury.

Plaintiffs also contend that a violation of constitutional rights always constitutes irreparable harm. Our case law has not gone that far, however. See, e.g., City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d at 1285 (“No authority from the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit has been cited to us for the proposition that the irreparable injury needed for a preliminary injunction can properly be presumed from a substantially likely equal protection violation.”); Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 821-22 (11th Cir.1987) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction in action alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations, and finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s rejection of the plaintiffs argument that “irreparable injury will be presumed where there has been a violation of substantive constitutional rights”); see also Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir.1989) (“Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.”). The only areas of constitutional jurisprudence where we have said that an on-going violation may be presumed to cause irreparable injury involve the right of privacy and certain First Amendment claims establishing an imminent likelihood that pure speech will be chilled or prevented altogether. See City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d at 1285 (citing Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1189 (11th Cir.1983) and Deerfield Med. Ctr., 661 F.2d at 338); see also Hohe, 868 F.2d at 72-73 (“[T]he assertion of First Amendment rights does not automatically require a finding of irreparable injury, thus entitling a plaintiff to a preliminary injunction if he shows a likelihood of success on the merits. Rather, ... it is the ‘direct penalization, as opposed to incidental inhibition, of First Amendment rights [which] constitutes irreparable injury.’ ”) (quoting Cate, 707 F.2d at 1188). This is plainly not such a case. Cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1505, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (constitutional right to vote, and the principle of equality among voters, is conferred by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)).

Simply put, this principle is the law: we may reverse a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction if and only if we find that the court clearly abused its discretion.¹¹ Our review, therefore, must be highly deferential. See, e.g., Carillon Importers, 112 F.3d at 1126 (“The review of a district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is extremely narrow in scope.”); Revette, 740 F.2d at 893 (“Appellate review of such a decision is very narrow.”). As we have explained:

This limited review is necessitated because the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is almost always based on an abbreviated set of facts, requiring a delicate balancing of the probabilities of ultimate success at final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable injury which could possibly flow from the denial of preliminary relief. Weighing these considerations is the responsibility of the district court.

Id. (quoting Gray Line Motor Tours, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 498 F.2d 293, 296 (5th Cir.1974)) (internal quotation marks and additional citation omitted). The abuse-of-discretion standard, therefore, serves an important and vital purpose.

In the case now before us, the district court expressly found that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing that immediate irreparable harm would result if preliminary injunctive relief were not entered. It did so largely because the limited record before it did not support Plaintiffs’ claims of harm. That critical finding remains just as compelling, and the irre-parability of the alleged injury is no more established, today.

Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its broad discretion in finding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing at least a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury. Because proof of irreparable injury is an indispensable prerequisite to a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction at this time; and the district court’s order must be affirmed. See, e.g., Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 574 (5th Cir.1974) (“[WJhere no irreparable injury is alleged and proved, denial of a preliminary injunction is appropriate.”). The Court does not at this time decide the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments.¹²

AFFIRMED.

1

. There are no state defendants in this case. In addition to the parties mentioned above, the district court granted a motion by the Florida Democratic Party to intervene, and the Florida Democratic Party is an interve-nor-appellee in this case on appeal. The Attorney General also appeared as an amicus at oral argument to defend the constitutionality of the statute.

2

. The documents in this case were lodged in this Court as they were filed in the district court. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, this Court ordered that this case be heard initially en banc. See Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc).

3

. The United States Supreme Court recently vacated the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion. See Bush v. Palm Beach Canv. Bd., - U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 471, - L.Ed.2d -(2000).

4

. Plaintiffs’ request on appeal is thus broader than their request for an injunction pending appeal, which asked only that we halt manual recounts then underway. To the extent that Plaintiffs’ request on appeal represents a petition for permanent relief, we must decline to convert this appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction into a final hearing on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. Our review of such a case is normally limited to whether the district court abused its discretion; however, we recognize that an appellate court under some circumstances may decide the merits of a case in connection with its review of a denial of a preliminary injunction. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755-56, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2176, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986).

In Thornburgh, the Supreme Court said that "if a district court's ruling rests solely on a premise as to the applicable rule of law, and the facts are established or of no controlling relevance, that ruling may be reviewed even though the appeal is from the entry of a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 757, 106 S.Ct. at 2177. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision to review the merits, rather than merely determine whether the district court had abused its discretion by entering a preliminary injunction, where it had the benefit of " 'an unusually complete factual and legal presentation from which to address the important constitutional issues at stake.' ” Id. (quoting American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 290 (3d Cir.1984)). Additionally, the Supreme Court observed that appellate review was aided by three recent decisions from the same circuit on the constitutional issues. See id. at 753-54, 757, 106 S.Ct. at 2174-75, 2177. Thus, it stated that "when the unconstitutionality of the particular state action under challenge is clear,” an appellate court need not abstain from addressing the merits. Id. at 756, 106 S.Ct. at 2176. In so holding, however, the Supreme Court noted that "[a] different situation is presented, of course, when there is no disagreement as to the law, but the probability of success on the merits depends on facts that are likely to emerge at trial.” Id. at 757 n. 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2177 n. 8 (citations omitted).

This case clearly falls within this latter category, and thus represents the very situation in which the Supreme Court held that appellate review was not appropriate. The answer to the constitutional questions is anything but clear. And, in stark contrast to Thornburgh, we have before us a factual record that is largely incomplete and vigorously disputed. The district court based its ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction solely on limited affidavits and the submission of few documents, including news media reports. Moreover, there was no discovery in this case, much less a trial or a plenary hearing, and none of the scant evidence presented to the district court was tested by the adversarial process of cross-examination. The controlling relevant facts are fervently contested by the parties. These evidentiary infirmities are especially problematic given that Plaintiffs’ major claims are as-applied challenges to the Florida statutes, arguments the validity of which depends upon the development of a complete evidentiary record. Mere expediency does not warrant this Court reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' claims in the absence of the necessary evidence by which to do so. Therefore, applying the reasoning of Thorn-burgh, the circumstances of this case as it currently stands require us to deny their request.

5

. For similar reasons, we conclude that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel bars our consideration of the issue of the constitutionality of Florida's statutory manual recount provision. We look to Florida law to determine the application of these preclusive doctrines. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (holding that under the Full Faith and Credit Act, a federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as another court of that state would give). Florida adheres to the traditional requirement of mutuality of parties in its application of res judicata. See Albrecht v. State of Florida, 444 So.2d 8, 11 (Fla.1984); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251, 253 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000) (citing Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla.1956)). The parties to this case are not the same parties that appeared before the Florida Supreme Court. Florida similarly requires mutuality of parties in the application of collateral estoppel. See Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So.2d 917, 919-20 (Fla.1995). Further, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars identical parties from relitigating only those issues that have previously been decided between them. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977). Where, as here, the issue in dispute has not been fully litigated, the doctrine is inapplicable. We therefore conclude that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel bars our review of the constitutionality of Florida’s manual recount provision.

6

. There may also be some manual recount votes in those results from a number of other Florida counties, such as Seminole, Gadsden, and Polk.

7

. Read broadly, Plaintiffs' request for injunc-tive relief can be interpreted as a request that Defendants be ordered to certify only those vote totals that resulted from machine recounts. Because Florida Secretary of State Harris has certified the election results and because she is not yet a party to this appeal, we note that there is some question whether this Court could order the requested relief once the Defendant canvassing boards have completed their manual recounts and have certified their vote totals to the state Elections Canvassing Commission. However, because we deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, we need not address this issue.

8

. The Eleventh Circuit, in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.

9

. We have occasionally spoken of requiring a substantial "threat” of irreparable harm. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Balter, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam). We do not read those opinions, however, as intending to relax the traditional standard— stated by the Supreme Court — that a plaintiff must show either that he will suffer, or faces a substantial likelihood that he will suffer, irreparable injury. See e.g., Doran, 422 U.S. at 931, 95 S.Ct. at 2568. In any event, the outcome is the same even using substantial "threat” as the benchmark.

10

. This case involves discretionary recounts ordered by county canvassing boards. A recount ordered by a state court under state law in a contest proceeding might be a substantially different case, raising different legal issues.

11

. The district court did not peg its finding of no irreparable harm to any incorrect legal principle. On the contrary, the district court found that, on the record presented to it, no irreparable harm had been proved. See Siegel v. LePore, 120 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1052-53 (S.D.Fla.2000) ("In addition, we find Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries on an as-applied basis to be speculative, and far from irreparable, at this stage in the electoral recount process .... The inconclusive state of these recount processes coupled with their different factual postures counsels against preliminary uniform injunctive relief at this time.”).

12

. A decision by the Court on the likelihood of success would require the Court to reach, in some sense, constitutional questions. Even for those of us who believe that the record will not support a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, it is a "fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint ... that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1323, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). Given our view on the issue of injury, no necessity is present here.