Byrdsong v. Marvin (INMATE 2)

• Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama
• Decided: May 18, 2020
• Docket: 2:20-cv-00301
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

STEVEN BYRDSONG, #194 947, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-301-ECM ) [WO] JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Plaintiff, a state inmate incarcerated at the Hamilton Aged & Infirmed Facility in Hamilton, Alabama. In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks to challenge the constitutionality of actions taken against him during his incarceration at the Kilby Correctional Facility on January 3, 2020. On that date, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to excessive force and suffered injuries for which he was provided inadequate medical care. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. He seeks to enjoin Defendants from subjecting him to violence and threats. Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the court recommends the motion under Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, be denied. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of the district court....” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). This court may grant a preliminary injunction only if Plaintiff demonstrates each of these prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the potential damage the requested injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id.; McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1983). “In this Circuit, ‘[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the "burden of persuasion"" as to the four requisites.” McDonald’s, 147 F.3d at 1306; All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (a preliminary injunction is issued only when “drastic relief” is necessary); Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179

(5th Cir. 1975) (grant of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule,” and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” may defeat the party’s claim, regardless of the party’s ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper”). “ ‘The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.’ ” Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990). III. DISCUSSION In the case at bar, Plaintiff has not met his burden of persuasion on all four prerequisites for obtaining injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to show that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. Plaintiff is incarcerated at Hamilton A & I

Facility and is, thus, no longer housed at the Kilby Correctional Facility, which is where the actions about which he complains occurred. In a § 1983 action filed by a prisoner, a request for injunctive and declaratory relief becomes moot upon the transfer or release of that prisoner from the facility where his cause of action arose. Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[t]his court has clearly stated the following: ‘[a]bsent class certification, an inmate’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a § 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred.’”). Moreover, “[e]quitable relief is a prospective remedy, intended to prevent future injuries.” Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997). For that reason, “[w]hen the

threat of future harm dissipates, the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief become moot because the plaintiff no longer needs protection from future injury.” Id. Here, Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief seeking to prohibit Defendants from threatening him and subjecting him to violence. Any request for a preliminary injunctive relief against the Kilby Correctional Facility employees is moot because Plaintiff has been transferred from that facility.1 The court, therefore, finds that the second factor necessary for preliminary injunctive relief—a substantial threat that Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury absent issuance of a preliminary injunction—does not now exist. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176. Thus, the request for preliminary injunctive relief is moot. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 1. The motion for preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiff (Doc. 1) be DENIED as moot; 2. This case be referred to the undersigned for additional proceedings. It is

1 The court notes that Defendant Dunn, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, is not involved in daily prison operations. ORDERED that on or before June 2, 2020, Plaintiff may file an objection to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. This Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989). DONE, on this the 18th day of May, 2020. /s/ Susan Russ Walker Susan Russ Walker United States Magistrate Judge