Neal v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Neal v. State

354 S.E.2d 664, 182 Ga. App. 37, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1612

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 4, 1987

Docket73090

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 354 S.E.2d 664 (Neal v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Neal v. State, 354 S.E.2d 664, 182 Ga. App. 37, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1612 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinions

Beasley, Judge.

The court does not have jurisdiction to decide this case.

The order appealed from simply states that because defendant did not timely answer, the case is in default and that a default judgment be entered. No amount of judgment is mentioned, and it has yet to be established.

The complaint, filed by the district attorney as authorized by OCGA § 19-11-23, was an action created primarily by OCGA § 19-11-7. It alleged that a debt had been created by the payment of public assistance under OCGA § 19-11-5 and that assignment to the department had occurred by virtue of OCGA § 19-11-6.

The complaint sought an establishment of paternity, reimbursement for monies advanced, an order for current support, a judicial inquiry into defendant’s ability to provide medical support, and an order for the payment of all sums into court for transmittal to the department’s child support recovery office.

The order appealed from (which did not involve a verdict), did not determine all of the issues which are to be resolved in the action. In fact, in moving for default judgment, plaintiff only claimed entitlement at that stage to what it regarded as the liquidated damages in its complaint, that is, the debt created by monies advanced. And it freely acknowledged that “It is entitled to a hearing on unliquidated damages (current support) so that a determination can be made by the Court on that issue.” (Parenthetical words in original.) As to liquidated versus unliquidated damages, see Hazlett & Hancock Constr. Co. v. Virgil Womack Constr. Co., 181 Ga. App. 25 (351 SE2d 218) (1986).

This not being a final judgment, the interlocutory appeal procedure was mandated. OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). It not having been followed, the appeal must be dismissed. Bowers v. Price, 168 Ga. App. 125 (308 SE2d 420) (1983); English v. Tucker Fed. Savings &c. Assn., 175 Ga. App. 69 (332 SE2d 365) (1985). Such is a matter of jurisdiction. State v. Crapse, 173 Ga. App. 100 (325 SE2d 620) (1984).

Appeal dismissed.

Birdsong, C. J., Banke, P. J., Carley, Sognier, and Pope, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Benham, J., dissent.

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Beasley, Judge.

The court does not have jurisdiction to decide this case.

The order appealed from simply states that because defendant did not timely answer, the case is in default and that a default judgment be entered. No amount of judgment is mentioned, and it has yet to be established.

The complaint, filed by the district attorney as authorized by OCGA § 19-11-23, was an action created primarily by OCGA § 19-11-7. It alleged that a debt had been created by the payment of public assistance under OCGA § 19-11-5 and that assignment to the department had occurred by virtue of OCGA § 19-11-6.

The complaint sought an establishment of paternity, reimbursement for monies advanced, an order for current support, a judicial inquiry into defendant’s ability to provide medical support, and an order for the payment of all sums into court for transmittal to the department’s child support recovery office.

The order appealed from (which did not involve a verdict), did not determine all of the issues which are to be resolved in the action. In fact, in moving for default judgment, plaintiff only claimed entitlement at that stage to what it regarded as the liquidated damages in its complaint, that is, the debt created by monies advanced. And it freely acknowledged that “It is entitled to a hearing on unliquidated damages (current support) so that a determination can be made by the Court on that issue.” (Parenthetical words in original.) As to liquidated versus unliquidated damages, see Hazlett & Hancock Constr. Co. v. Virgil Womack Constr. Co., 181 Ga. App. 25 (351 SE2d 218) (1986).

This not being a final judgment, the interlocutory appeal procedure was mandated. OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). It not having been followed, the appeal must be dismissed. Bowers v. Price, 168 Ga. App. 125 (308 SE2d 420) (1983); English v. Tucker Fed. Savings &c. Assn., 175 Ga. App. 69 (332 SE2d 365) (1985). Such is a matter of jurisdiction. State v. Crapse, 173 Ga. App. 100 (325 SE2d 620) (1984).

Appeal dismissed.

Birdsong, C. J., Banke, P. J., Carley, Sognier, and Pope, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Benham, J., dissent.

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Bluebook (online)

354 S.E.2d 664, 182 Ga. App. 37, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1612, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neal-v-state-gactapp-1987.

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