nCap Licensing v. Apple

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJuly 14, 2023
Docket2:17-cv-00905
StatusUnknown

This text of nCap Licensing v. Apple (nCap Licensing v. Apple) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
nCap Licensing v. Apple, (D. Utah 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

NCAP LICENSING, LLC., et al., MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiffs, CONSTRUING DISPUTED CLAIM PHRASE v. Case No. 2:17-CV-905 APPLE, INC., Howard C. Nielson, Jr. Defendant. United States District Judge

The parties previously agreed that the phrase “radiating antenna element” means “an element of the antenna that transmits electromagnetic radiation.” Dkt. No. 269-1 at 2. But as the litigation proceeded, it became clear that the parties interpret this language very differently. In particular, the parties dispute whether a component of an antenna system that functions as part of a ground plane can be a radiating antenna element. After providing the parties the opportunity to present briefing and argument on the issue, the court determined that it was necessary to reopen claim construction to clarify the meaning of “radiating antenna element.” See Dkt. Nos. 473–75. The court then allowed the parties to present briefing and argument on the proper construction of this phrase. See Dkt. Nos. 487, 489, 493, 495, 501–03. After carefully considering the parties’ briefing and arguments, the court refines the parties’ previously stipulated claim construction to the extent necessary to resolve their interpretive dispute. The court construes the term “radiating antenna element” as follows: a part of an antenna, other than a ground plane, that emits electromagnetic radiation. The phrase “radiating antenna element” is commonly used to refer to the active or driven element—the part of the antenna that is connected to the transmitter directly or through the signal part of a feed line—though in certain antenna structures it may also be used to refer to other parts of the antenna system. The phrase is not used to refer to a part of an antenna system that functions as part of the ground plane, however. I. Before turning to the proper construction of the phrase “radiating antenna element,” the court first addresses nCap’s renewed argument that the court should retain the previously stipulated construction and have the jury decide whether the portion of the accused devices that nCap characterizes as a radiating antenna element in fact “transmits electromagnetic radiation.”

To be sure, the court initially assumed that the parties’ disagreement regarding this question reflected their different factual positions. See Dkt. No. 305 at 9. But as the court has previously explained, it has become clear that the parties’ disagreement regarding the meaning and application of their previously agreed-upon construction is not solely—or even primarily—a factual dispute. See Dkt. No. 485 at 4:11–6:17. The parties agree, and the science leaves no room for dispute, that in many antenna systems the ground plane plays an essential role in transmitting radio waves. It is also undisputed that in many antenna systems the alternating current in the active or driven antenna element—the part of the antenna connected directly, or through the signal portion of a feed line, to the transmitter—induces electrical currents in portions of the

ground plane and that these induced currents emit electromagnetic radiation. Rather, the parties’ dispute is interpretive. Initially, nCap appeared to advance the broad argument that because a ground plane plays a role in transmitting radio waves, it transmits electromagnetic radiation and is a radiating antenna element. In response to Apple’s summary judgment arguments, however, nCap appeared to narrow its position to argue (perhaps in the alternative to its initial argument) that at least those parts of the ground plane in which currents are induced by an active antenna element “radiate” and thus are radiating antenna elements. Apple, on the other hand, notes that in the patents-in-suit, the prior art, the relevant scientific literature, and even nCap’s own statements outside the context of this litigation, the phrase “radiating antenna element” is never used to refer to a ground plane. To the contrary, it is consistently used in contradistinction to a ground plane. Noting also that the phrase is commonly used to refer to active or driven antenna elements, Apple asks the court to construe the phrase to refer only to such elements. For these reasons, asking the jury to apply the previously stipulated construction of

“radiating antenna element” to the accused device would almost certainly require the jury to do more than resolve a factual dispute. Rather, it would require the jury to choose between the parties’ competing interpretive arguments. This a jury cannot do. Supreme Court precedent is unequivocal: determining what the claims mean is “exclusively” for “the court.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (emphasis added). Despite the parties’ previous stipulation, this court thus has an “independent obligation to determine the meaning of the claims.” Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995). To avoid the reversible error of submitting an interpretive dispute to the jury, the court will follow the well-trodden path of reopening claim construction. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva

Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 350 F.3d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enterprises, Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). II. The court accordingly proceeds to construe the phrase “radiating antenna element” as used in the patents-in-suit. “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In construing patent claims, courts “look first to the language of the claims, followed by the language of the specification and prosecution history.” Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., 935 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “The prosecution history . . . consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. The language of the claims and specification, together with the prosecution history, are called the

“intrinsic record.” Id. Although “evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises” can also be helpful, such “extrinsic evidence” is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “there is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.” Id. at 1324. The court reviews the available sources to determine “what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.” Renishaw PLC v.

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nCap Licensing v. Apple, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ncap-licensing-v-apple-utd-2023.