Naveda v. Post Office at 250-10 Northern Blvd.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 8, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-03292
StatusUnknown

This text of Naveda v. Post Office at 250-10 Northern Blvd. (Naveda v. Post Office at 250-10 Northern Blvd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Naveda v. Post Office at 250-10 Northern Blvd., (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MIRYAM HAVEDA OR MYRIAM HAVEDA, Plaintiff, 24-CV-3292 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND POST OFFICE AT 250-10 NORTHERN BLD.; MANAGER MR. HAIM – INDIAN CHEROKE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her rights, possibly in connection with her employment. Named as Defendants are the Post Office located at 250-10 Northern Blvd. in Little Neck, Queens County, and its manager Mr. Haim, whom Plaintiff describes as “Indian Cheroke.” (ECF 1, at 1, 3.) The Court construes the complaint as attempting to assert claims under federal employment discrimination laws. By order dated May 9, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings her claims using the court’s general complaint form. She checks the box on the form to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction. In response to the question asking which of her federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, Plaintiff writes, “Harassment personal smoking metadone at the office [illegible] called me at the office. Stalking of my 6.M. daughter. From my [illegible]. I took me car to be fix.” (ECF 1, at 2.)1 Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to her claims occurred “a year ago” at the post office on Northern Boulevard in Queens. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that she was “forced to retire[]” because her boss was “smoking drugs” in the office. (Id.) Plaintiff appears to state that her boss “smoked” with a union representative

and other staff members who are “illegal aliens working with [Plaintiff’s] SS card.” (Id.) These individuals “smoked metadone” and sold drugs at the Post Office. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she “stud[ies] drugs” but does not use them, and that her co-workers used to “chase[] [her] out of the office before the time to deliver[] the mail.” (Id.) In the section of the complaint form to describe her injuries, Plaintiff states that she was “run over by a car outside of the post office with [her] uniform crossing the street to eat,” suggests that $500 may have been stolen from the bank, and states that she is “living from the welfare dep[artment].” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff appears to seek money damages as compensation for a “low salary for 52 years

of work” without pay for vacation, holidays, or sick time. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Claims Because Plaintiff sues her former employer, alleges facts related to her job, and references being forced to retire, the Court liberally construes the complaint as attempting to assert a claim under one of the federal employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, or the Age

1 Plaintiff’s handwriting is difficult to read. The Court quotes the complaint verbatim, to the best of its ability. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. Discrimination in Employment Act. These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, such as race, color, sex, disability, age, and national origin, see Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when

it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against [her], and (2) [her protected characteristic] was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that

directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a viable claim under any of the federal employment discrimination statutes.

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