Naumes, Inc. v. Alimentos Del Caribe

77 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21146, 1999 WL 1216679
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedMay 3, 1999
DocketCV 98-1025-HU
StatusPublished

This text of 77 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (Naumes, Inc. v. Alimentos Del Caribe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Naumes, Inc. v. Alimentos Del Caribe, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21146, 1999 WL 1216679 (D. Or. 1999).

Opinion

ORDER

PANNER, District Judge.

Magistrate Judge Dennis J. Hubei filed his Findings and Recommendation on March 19, 1999. The matter is now before me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). When either party objects to any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of that portion of the Magistrate Judge’s report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920, 102 S.Ct. 1277, 71 L.Ed.2d 461 (1982).

Plaintiff has filed timely objections. I have, therefore, given the file of this case a de novo review. I ADOPT Magistrate Judge Hubei’s Findings and Recommendations. Defendant’s motion to dismiss this *1160 action for lack of personal jurisdiction (#22) is granted, defendant’s motion to strike portions of the Thiessen affidavit (included within defendant’s reply brief) is denied, and plaintiffs motion to change venue to Medford (# 26) is denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

HUBEL, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff filed this action against defendant seeking to recover the balance of money owed for a shipment of Bartlett pears plaintiff sold to defendant. Plaintiff is an Oregon corporation which shipped the pears from its facility in Medford, Oregon. Defendant is a Colombian corporation who moves to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiff seeks to change the place of trial from Portland to Medford. For the reasons which follow, I recommend that defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted and that plaintiffs motion to transfer venue be denied as moot.

Background

The following facts are undisputed. In September of 1996, plaintiff traveled to Colombia in South America and initiated contact with defendant about the sale of pears. Subsequent negotiations took place between the parties by telephone and facsimile transmissions. Defendant ultimately placed three orders for pears which arrived in two shipments. The first shipment arrived in two separate containers in a substandard condition and had to be sold at a loss; the second shipment arrived shortly thereafter and was accepted. The second shipment is not at issue. Both shipments were FOB Long Beach, California and ultimately destined for Bogota, Columbia.

Plaintiff claims that the pears were in perfect condition when they were packed and shipped in Medford and that any damage must have occurred due to temperature control problems after the shipments arrived in Los Angeles. Defendant claims that the damage occurred prior to the pears’ arrival in Los Angeles.

Discussion

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Farmers Ins. Ex. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir.1990). Where the court decides the jurisdictional issue based on affidavits and written discovery materials, the plaintiff “is only required to make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts in order to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 912 (citation omitted).

To establish personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show both that the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant and that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with federal due process. Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1990). The Oregon long-arm statute confers jurisdiction “to the extent permitted by due process.” Id. at 760; see O.R.C.P. 4 L. Thus, the “jurisdictional inquiries under state law and federal due process merge into one analysis.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir.1991).

Due process requires that a defendant have a “minimum level of contacts with the forum before personal jurisdiction may be exercised.” Farmers Ins. Ex., 907 F.2d at 913, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). If a nonresident defendant’s activities in the forum state are substantial or continuous and systematic, the court may assert general jurisdiction over a claim, even if the claim is unrelated to the defendant’s forum activities. If the defendant’s contacts are neither substantial nor continuous and systematic, the court must determine if “specific” or “limited” jurisdiction exists. Farmers Ins. Ex., 907 F.2d at 913.

Plaintiff does not claim that general jurisdiction exists over this defendant. It is undisputed that, other than its receipt of *1161 two shipments of pears from the plaintiff, defendant has never done any business in Oregon, nor does defendant advertise or have any agents in Oregon. None of defendants employees have ever been to Oregon. Thus, the issue presented is "limited to a determination of whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case that defendant should be subject to the court’s specific jurisdiction.

In order to meet this burden, plaintiff “must demonstrate that defendants had purposeful contacts with [the forum], that the present cause of action arose out of those contacts, and that exercising jurisdiction over defendants would not be unreasonable.” Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 446, 142 L.Ed.2d 401 (1998). All three prongs of the minimum contacts test must be satisfied to establish specific personal jurisdiction. McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817-18 n. 10 (9th Cir.1988).

1. Purposeful Availment

The Ninth Circuit has specifically distinguished tort and contract cases when applying the purposeful availment prong of the specific jurisdiction test to a given set of facts.

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Related

International Shoe Co. v. Washington
326 U.S. 310 (Supreme Court, 1945)
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471 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1985)
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783 F.2d 1124 (Fourth Circuit, 1986)
Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc.
140 F.3d 1313 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Wyoming Department of Transportation v. Straight
119 S. Ct. 446 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc.
937 F.2d 1444 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
Roth v. Garcia Marquez
942 F.2d 617 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)
Charlton v. Cortez Development Corp.
455 U.S. 920 (Supreme Court, 1982)

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77 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21146, 1999 WL 1216679, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/naumes-inc-v-alimentos-del-caribe-ord-1999.