Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency

529 F.2d 755, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20413, 8 ERC (BNA) 1913, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12015
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 2, 1976
Docket72--2402
StatusPublished

This text of 529 F.2d 755 (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 529 F.2d 755, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20413, 8 ERC (BNA) 1913, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12015 (5th Cir. 1976).

Opinion

529 F.2d 755

8 ERC 1913, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,413

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., Project on Clean
Air, Save America's Vital Environment, Inc., Janey
Weber and Susanne Allstrom, Petitioners,
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 72--2402.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

April 2, 1976.

Richard E. Ayres, Washington, D.C., Ogden Doremus, Savannah, Ga., for petitioners.

Kent Frizzell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edmund B. Clark, John D. Helm, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Charles W. Shipley, Pollution Control Section, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Joe Resweber, County Atty., Harris County, Charles J. Wilson, Asst. County Atty., Houston, Tex., for Harris County amicus curiae.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Robert S. Stubbs, II, Don A. Langham, Robert S. Bomar, Robert E. Hall, Atlanta, Ga., for intervenors.

On Motion for Contempt Citation and/or to Show Cause.

Before WISDOM, DYER and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

The Clean Air Amendments of 19701 established a national program of air pollution control administered jointly by the states and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). A realistic approach to the problem of effective enforcement of that statute by reduction of air pollution compels recognition of the fact that national air quality standards cannot be attained except at significant cost to industry. This case deals with the extent to which the EPA must accept that fact, yet may allow some equitable accommodation for companies earlier committed to a tall smokestack policy on the false assumption that tall smokestacks dispersing pollution over a broad area are an acceptable substitute for emission control of industrial pollution.

The petitioners in this case, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the State of Georgia, intervenor, filed separate motions for an order to show cause why the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator and certain other designated EPA officials should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with an order of this Court issued February 8, 1974.2 That order arose out of litigation begun almost two years earlier, when the NRDC challenged EPA approval of the State of Georgia's plan for implementing the goals of the Clean Air Act.

BACKGROUND

In the original suit, the NRDC challenged EPA approval of Georgia's State Implementation Plan (SIP) for achieving compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)3 of the Clean Air Act. The Georgia plan sought to reduce the ground level intensity of sulphur dioxides and particulate matter emitted from its power plants by the use of a 'tall stack' strategy of 'dispersion enhancement'.4 Under this strategy, Georgia power plants could, by constructing tall smoke stacks, disperse harmful pollutants over a wider area, thereby reducing the ground level concentration of pollutants in the immediate vicinity of the facility to comply with the NAAQS.5 We found that this method of dispersion enhancement, which reduced the ground level intensity of pollutants at a given source but did nothing to reduce the overall amount of pollutants in the atmosphere, was inconsistent with the nondegradation policy of the Clean Air Act. 489 F.2d at 408. We interpreted § 1857c--5(a)(2)(B) to require that states utilize all possible emission limitation techniques6 to achieve national ambient air standards. We found that Congress intended emission reduction (as opposed to mere dispersion) to be the preferred control method,7 and intended to permit 'such other measures' as specified in the Act8 'only if emission reduction sufficient to (achieve the national standards) in the time specified (were) unavailable or infeasible--or, in the words of the Act, only if . . . 'necessary'.'9

Accordingly, we held that control strategies such as Georgia's tall stack dispersion strategy, may be included in a state's plan only '(1) if it is demonstrated that emission limitation regulations included in the plan are sufficient standing alone, without the dispersion strategy, to attain the standards; or (2) if it is demonstrated that emission limitations sufficient to meet the standard are unachievable on infeasible, and that the state has adopted regulations which will attain the maximum degree of emission limitation achievable.'10

Noting that the EPA Administrator had never suggested that the second condition could be applied to validate the Georgia plan, we ordered him to make a determination whether the Georgia regulations were, standing alone, sufficiently stringent to guarantee attainment of the national standards. The EPA's original approval of the Georgia plan in May 1972 stated merely that the state plan, with its combination of emission limitations and tall stack dispersion strategy, would guarantee attainment of the national standards. The Administrator's second letter of May 1973 established only that the tall stack regulations had since been determined inappropriate under the Agency's emerging policy against dispersion enhancement as a substitute for emission limitations. What had never been determined however, was whether the emission limitations prescribed in the Georgia plan, considered independently of the tall stack dispersion strategy, were sufficient to attain the national standards.

To resolve this issue, we directed the Administrator to make an explicit determination on the question 'as promptly as is administratively feasible'.11 It is this order (and the Administrator's failure to respond after more than a year) which prompted the motions for contempt now before the Court.

THE INSTANT SUIT

In March and April 1975, both the State of Georgia and the NRDC sought orders holding the EPA Administrator and certain designated officials12 in contempt for their failure to comply with the Court's order of February 8, 1974. The NRDC charged that the Administrator not had only failed to submit the required evaluation to the Court, but had, in the interim, issued proposed guidelines for evaluating the Georgia plan which would have effectively undermined the clear import of this Court's directive. The State of Georgia asserted that the Administrator had, in fact, evaluated and approved the Georgia plan following this Court's decision, but had failed to so inform the Court.

The EPA thereupon submitted to the Court a document entitled 'Evaluation of the Georgia Control Strategy', bearing an original date of June 1974, and a revised date of March 31, 1975 (four days after the State filed its motion for contempt).

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529 F.2d 755, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20413, 8 ERC (BNA) 1913, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12015, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/natural-resources-defense-council-inc-v-environmental-protection-agency-ca5-1976.