[Cite as Nationstar Mtge., L.L.C. v. Krehnbrink, 2025-Ohio-4445.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, d.b.a. : APPEAL NO. C-240511 MR. COOPER, TRIAL NO. A-1804213 : Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. JUDGMENT ENTRY : LESLIE RUPPERT KREHNBRINK, : and : ROBERT G. KREHNBRINK, : Defendants-Appellants. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 9/24/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Nationstar Mtge., L.L.C. v. Krehnbrink, 2025-Ohio-4445.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, d.b.a. : APPEAL NO. C-240511 MR. COOPER, TRIAL NO. A-1804213 : Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. OPINION : LESLIE RUPPERT KREHNBRINK, : and : ROBERT G. KREHNBRINK, : Defendants-Appellants. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 24, 2025
McGlinchey Stafford, James W. Sandy and John P. Murray, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Leslie R. Krehnbrink and Robert G. Krehnbrink, pro se. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} In this appeal, defendants-appellants Leslie Ruppert Krehnbrink and
Robert G. Krehnbrink (collectively “the Krehnbrinks”) challenge the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, d.b.a. Mr.
Cooper (“Nationstar”) on the Krehnbrinks’ counterclaims against Nationstar involving
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), unjust enrichment, and breach
of contract.
{¶2} We affirm. The Krehnbrinks failed to submit authenticated evidence in
opposition to summary judgment and accordingly failed to carry their reciprocal
summary-judgment burden. Further, the Krehnbrinks raise arguments on appeal that
they did not present to the trial court and are forfeited on appeal. Finally, the
Krehnbrinks’ challenge to the trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) certification finding no just
reason for delay fails because the trial court’s judgment resolved all of the
Krehnbrinks’ claims against Nationstar, and the Krehnbrinks have failed to perfect
service on the remaining counterclaim defendants. We overrule the Krehnbrinks’
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. Procedural history
{¶3} In July 2018, Nationstar filed a complaint for foreclosure against the
Krehnbrinks. The Krehnbrinks answered and asserted counterclaims against
Nationstar and Nationstar’s counsel, Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, Olivia Earls,
Carson Rothfuss, Bethany Suttinger, and Tammy Stickley (“the law firm defendants”).1
1 The trial court docket does not reflect that the law firm defendants were served with the Krehnbrinks’ counterclaims. The law firm defendants have never appeared in the case, and the trial court has not dismissed them under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) or 4(E).
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
The counterclaims alleged (1) Nationstar improperly force-placed insurance on the
Krehnbrinks’ home, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) breach of a loan-modification
agreement, and (4) a RESPA violation.
{¶4} Nationstar voluntarily dismissed its foreclosure complaint without
prejudice and moved for summary judgment on the Krehnbrinks’ counterclaims. After
a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued a decision granting Nationstar summary
judgment on the Krehnbrinks’ counterclaims. The trial court’s decision did not include
a Civ.R. 54(B) certification that there was no just cause for delay.
{¶5} The Krehnbrinks filed an appeal, which this court dismissed for lack of
a final appealable order. We explained that the trial court’s summary judgment did
not resolve all claims as to all parties and did not include Civ.R. 54(B) language.
{¶6} Nationstar asked the trial court to “reissue” its summary-judgment
order and include a Civ.R. 54(B) certification. The Krehnbrinks opposed Nationstar’s
request. The trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry, which was identical to its
previous summary-judgment decision in all respects except that it included a Civ.R.
54(B) certification.
{¶7} The Krehnbrinks appealed.
B. Facts
{¶8} The Krehnbrinks’ memorandum in opposition to Nationstar’s
summary-judgment motion did not include any Civ.R. 56(C) evidence—it included
only unauthenticated documents. Thus, the facts in this section are derived from
evidence attached to Nationstar’s summary-judgment motion.
{¶9} In February 2006, the Krehnbrinks purchased a home in Cincinnati
with a loan from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., secured by a mortgage on the home.
The mortgage was later assigned to Nationstar, which also acted as the loan servicer.
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶10} The mortgage and loan documents (“Loan Documents”) required the
Krehnbrinks to make monthly payments, which covered (1) principal and interest on
the loan, and (2) taxes and insurance premiums—this portion was placed into an
escrow account. The Loan Documents required the Krehnbrinks to maintain home
insurance. If the Krehnbrinks failed to insure the home, Nationstar could “obtain
insurance coverage, at Lender’s option and Borrower’s expense.”
Nationstar purchased an insurance policy to cover the home
{¶11} In April 2017, Nationstar sent the Krehnbrinks a letter requesting they
provide proof of current insurance coverage on the home. It explained that the
Krehnbrinks could provide proof of insurance by mail or online and warned that if the
Krehnbrinks failed to provide proof of insurance, Nationstar would purchase an
insurance policy to cover the home, which could “be more expensive than insurance
you can buy yourself.” Nationstar did not receive a response from the Krehnbrinks.
{¶12} Nationstar sent a second letter to the Krehnbrinks in May 2017
containing the same information as the first letter. Again, Nationstar did not receive a
response from the Krehnbrinks.
{¶13} In June 2017, Nationstar purchased an insurance policy to cover the
Krehnbrinks’ home (“force-placed policy” or “force-placed insurance”) and charged
the Krehnbrinks for the cost of the premiums.
{¶14} In September 2017 and February 2018, Nationstar sent letters to the
Krehnbrinks regarding the lapse of insurance. Nationstar received no response to
either letter. It again purchased a force-placed policy in April 2018 and charged the
Krehnbrinks for the premiums.
{¶15} In July 2018, the Krehnbrinks provided Nationstar proof of insurance
coverage for the periods during which Nationstar had charged the Krehnbrinks for
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
premiums to pay for the policies it purchased. Nationstar canceled the April 2018
policy and reimbursed the Krehnbrinks’ account.
Nationstar denied a permanent loan modification
{¶16} In January 2018, because the Krehnbrinks were behind on their loan
payments, Nationstar offered them a Trial Modification (“the Trial Modification
Offer”) to cure their default. Under the Trial Modification Offer, if the Krehnbrinks
paid three consecutive monthly payments to Nationstar in the manner Nationstar
required, the parties would enter into a “final modification agreement,” which would
permanently modify the Krehnbrinks’ and Nationstar’s loan and mortgage
agreements. The Trial Modification Offer required the Krehnbrinks to mail payments
to a specified PO box.
{¶17} The Krehnbrinks accepted the Trial Modification Offer and timely made
the first two payments. But the Krehnbrinks failed to send the third payment.
Nationstar sent a “Trial Modification Denial” letter in May 2018, which informed the
Krehnbrinks that Nationstar would not offer them a permanent loan modification.
The Krehnbrinks allege they sent a customer complaint letter
{¶18} The Krehnbrinks alleged that in May 2018, they sent Nationstar a
customer-complaint letter related to the Trial Modification Offer. The purported letter
stated that the Krehnbrinks had attempted to make the final payment under the Trial
Modification Offer over the phone, were rerouted to a voicemail, and never received a
return call. The purported letter also challenged charges for the force-placed policy
premiums.
{¶19} Nationstar stated that when it receives customer complaints, its internal
procedures require it to scan the complaint into its intranet site and forward the
complaint to a customer-complaint inbox. Then, Nationstar’s customer-relations
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
department creates a case for the complaint and sends the complainant an
acknowledgement letter. Nationstar asserted that it has no record of receiving the
Krehnbrinks May 2018 customer-complaint letter.
{¶20} Nationstar initiated a foreclosure action in July 2018.
II. Analysis
{¶21} As an initial matter, the Krehnbrinks acted pro se below and in this
appeal. But self-represented litigants are “‘required to comply with the rules of practice
and procedure just like members of the bar.’” Brock v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 2025-Ohio-717, ¶ 54 (1st Dist.).
{¶22} On appeal, the Krehnbrinks raise a single assignment of error
challenging the trial court’s summary-judgment order involving four of the
Krehnbrinks’ counterclaims: (1) improperly charging the Krehnbrinks for the force-
placed policy; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of the Trial Modification Offer; and
(4) violation of RESPA. The fifth challenge asserts that the trial court improperly
certified that there was no just reason for delay under Civ.R. 54(B). We address the
Civ.R. 54(B) issue first.
A. Civ.R. 54(B) certification
{¶23} Ohio appellate courts have jurisdiction to review trial courts’ final
judgments or orders. Lycan v. City of Cleveland, 2016-Ohio-422, ¶ 21, quoting Ohio
Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(2). Generally, an order is not “final” unless it “determines the
action and prevents a judgment.” Fuller v. Quality Casing Co., 2025-Ohio-361, ¶ 7 (1st
Dist.), quoting R.C. 2505.02(B).
{¶24} Although the Krehnbrinks do not raise this issue, for any order to be
final and appealable, it must meet R.C. 2505.02’s requirements. Id. at ¶ 9, quoting
Lycan at ¶ 21.
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
1. Actions involving multiple claims and parties
{¶25} Relevant here, in addition to meeting R.C. 2505.02’s requirements, a
trial court’s orders in actions involving multiple parties have another finality hurdle.
When an action involves multiple parties, the trial court must expressly determine that
there is no just reason for delay before it enters a final judgment involving some, but
not all, of the parties. Civ.R. 54(B). In such actions, the trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) “no
just reason for delay” certification is necessary to invoke the appellate court’s
jurisdiction. Internatl. Managed Care Strategies, Inc. v. Franciscan Health
Partnership, Inc., 2002-Ohio-4801, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.), quoting Civ.R. 54(B).
{¶26} A trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) certification that an interlocutory appeal will
promote sound judicial administration is “essentially a factual determination.”
Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co., 67 Ohio St.3d 352 (1993), paragraph one of the
syllabus. We may not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s “where some
competent and credible evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings.” Id. at 355.
2. The trial court’s summary judgment was a final order
{¶27} First, the trial court’s summary-judgment order met R.C. 2505.02(B)’s
requirements. See id. at 355 (trial court’s nunc pro tunc order adding Civ.R. 54(B)
language to earlier summary-judgment decision granting judgment on all claims
against one party was final).
{¶28} Second, we hold that the trial court properly certified that there was no
just reason for delay under Civ.R. 54(B) because its certification was supported by the
record. The Krehnbrinks never perfected service on the law firm defendants. While the
trial court should have dismissed those defendants under Civ.R. 4(E) and 41(B)(1),
resolving this appeal on the merits, rather than sending it back to the trial court again,
this time to dismiss the remaining defendants, serves judicial economy.
8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶29} Second, the Krehnbrinks’ claims against the law firm defendants relate
only to Nationstar’s litigation conduct, whereas their counterclaims against Nationstar
involve the events leading to Nationstar’s foreclosure filing. As such, the claims
decided by the trial court and the remaining claims are not factually related.
{¶30} We hold that the trial court properly certified under Civ.R. 54(B) that
there was no just reason for delay, and we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of
this appeal.
B. Nationstar was entitled to summary judgment
{¶31} This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo.
Weckel v. Cole + Russell Architects, Inc., 2024-Ohio-5111, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.).
{¶32} Under Civ.R. 56(C), a trial court shall grant summary judgment where
“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact” demonstrate that (1) there are
no genuine issues of material fact, (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, and (3) when viewing the evidence most strongly in the nonmovant’s favor,
reasonable minds can come to one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the
nonmovant.
{¶33} The summary-judgment movant bears the initial burden of informing
the trial court of the basis of its motion and must explain what evidence in the record
demonstrates the “‘absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential
element(s) of the nonmoving party’s claims.’” Id. at ¶ 34, quoting Dresher v. Burt, 75
Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). If the movant satisfied this burden, the burden shifts to
the nonmovant, who must “‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Id., quoting Dresher at 293.
{¶34} When a party seeks to support or oppose a summary-judgment motion
9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
by relying on documents of a type not listed in Civ.R. 56(C), the party must ensure that
the documents are sworn, certified, or authenticated by an affidavit. Nuckols v.
CONRAIL, 2024-Ohio-1070, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.). If a party fails to authenticate a
document that is not specifically authorized by Civ.R. 56, the document generally has
no evidentiary value, and the trial court should not consider it when determining
whether to grant summary judgment. Id., quoting Kent’s Excavating Servs. v.
Leneghan, 2017-Ohio-1371, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). But a trial court has discretion to consider
unauthenticated documents in a summary-judgment decision, unless the other party
objects to the admission of those documents. Beatley v. Fisher (In re Estate of
Beatley), 2024-Ohio-5109, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.).
{¶35} When ruling on a summary judgment motion, courts may not weigh the
evidence or evaluate credibility. Weckel, 2024-Ohio-5111, at ¶ 35 (1st Dist.).
1. Force-placed insurance
{¶36} The Krehnbrinks challenge the trial court’s determination that
Nationstar properly force-placed insurance policies on the Krehnbrinks’ home after
the Krehnbrinks failed to provide proof of insurance.
{¶37} RESPA controls a loan servicer’s ability to force-place insurance. 12
C.F.R. 1024.37. Under RESPA, “force-placed insurance” is “hazard insurance obtained
by a servicer on behalf of the owner or assignee of a mortgage loan that insures the
property securing such loan.” 12 C.F.R. 1024.37(a)(1). Before a loan servicer charges a
borrower a premium or fee related to force-placed insurance, the servicer must
reasonably believe that the borrower did not comply with the contract’s requirement
to maintain hazard insurance. 12 C.F.R. 1024.37(b). And the lender must send the
borrower two written notices. 12 C.F.R. 1024.37(c)(2). The notices must (1) inform the
borrower of the requirement to maintain hazard insurance, (2) that the servicer lacks
10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
proof that the borrower has hazard insurance, (3) how the borrower may provide this
proof, and (4) absent proof of coverage, the servicer will obtain coverage at the
borrower’s expense. Id.
The Krehnbrinks’ new arguments are forfeited on appeal
{¶38} For the first time on appeal, the Krehnbrinks argue, “Nationstar failed
to reasonably investigate whether the [Krehnbrinks’] oral representations were
corroborated by existing records, violating the spirit of the regulation.” Nationstar
asserts that the Krehnbrinks failed to raise this argument below and has forfeited it on
appeal. We agree.
{¶39} A party who fails to raise an argument for the trial court’s consideration
forfeits or waives that argument on appeal. West v. Bode, 2020-Ohio-5473, ¶ 43; see
Sycamore Twp. v. Carr, 2022-Ohio-1337, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). Appellate courts may review
such arguments only for plain error, which is an error that is obvious and affects a
substantial right. Ravenscraft v. Durrani, 2025-Ohio-2900, ¶ 149 (1st Dist.). But the
plain-error doctrine is disfavored in the civil context, and we may find plain error “only
in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances,” where the error
“seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.”
Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122-123 (1997).
{¶40} The party asserting plain error bears the burden on appeal to
demonstrate that the trial court made an obvious error that affected the party’s
substantial rights. R.E.S. v. M.J.M., 2025-Ohio-546, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). But the
Krehnbrinks have not developed a plain-error argument on appeal. Appellate courts
need not develop a plain-error argument on an appellant’s behalf. See In re G.W.,
2024-Ohio-1551, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.); see also State v. Patton, 2021-Ohio-295, ¶ 25 (1st
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Dist.). We decline to do so in this case and reject the Krehnbrinks’ new arguments.
RESPA requires written proof of insurance
{¶41} Attached to its summary-judgment motion, Nationstar presented
evidence showing that in 2017, after determining that the Krehnbrinks lacked
insurance on the property, it sent the Krehnbrinks the two notices required by federal
law. Nationstar’s evidence showed that it received no response from the Krehnbrinks.
And Nationstar provided evidence showing that it followed this same procedure when
it force-placed insurance in 2018. Nationstar met its initial summary-judgment
burden to establish that in 2017 and 2018, it properly force-placed insurance policies
to cover the property.
{¶42} In one memorandum opposing summary judgment, the Krehnbrinks
submitted an affidavit stating that, beginning in January 2018, they called Nationstar’s
customer-service department “to correct the insurance overpayment. [Nationstar’s]
customer service department acknowledged the error and acknowledged that
insurance had always existed and canceled the additional insurance in March of 2018,
but did not make the adjustments for the overcharges.”
{¶43} The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s official interpretation of
12 C.F.R. 1024.37(c)(1)(iii) establishes that that a borrower must provide written proof
of insurance:
As evidence of continuous hazard insurance coverage that complies with
the loan contract’s requirements, a servicer may require a copy of the
borrower’s hazard insurance policy declaration page, the borrower’s
insurance certificate, the borrower’s insurance policy, or other similar
forms of written confirmation. A servicer may reject evidence of hazard
insurance coverage submitted by the borrower if neither the borrower’s
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
insurance provider nor insurance agent provides confirmation of the
insurance information submitted by the borrower.
(Emphasis added.) 12 CFR 1024.37, Supp. I at 37(c)(1)(iii).
{¶44} The Krehnbrinks were required to respond to Nationstar’s letters with
written confirmation that the home was covered by an appropriate insurance policy.
Their phone calls were insufficient to provide proof of insurance. As such, they have
not established a genuine issue of material fact, and the trial court did not err by
granting summary judgment to Nationstar on the Krehnbrinks’ counterclaim related
to force-placed insurance.
2. Second issue for review: unjust enrichment
{¶45} The Krehnbrinks assert that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on their unjust-enrichment claim.
The Krehnbrinks forfeited new arguments
{¶46} In challenging the trial court’s summary-judgment order regarding
their unjust-enrichment claim, the Krehnbrinks assert that Nationstar took actions
that were “outside the scope of the contract or violated public policy.” The Krehnbrinks
failed to raise this argument below and do not present a plain-error argument, so they
have forfeited the argument on appeal.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the unjust-enrichment claim
{¶47} To establish their unjust enrichment claim, the Krehnbrinks had to
show (1) they conferred a benefit on Nationstar, (2) Nationstar knew of the benefit,
and (3) it would be unjust for Nationstar to retain the benefit. Gilman v. Physna, LLC,
2021-Ohio-3575, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.). But as a general rule, “unjust-enrichment claims are
only available in the absence of an enforceable contract.” Id.
{¶48} The Krehnbrinks assert that Nationstar’s “force-placement of
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
overpriced insurance policies led to financial gains unjustly obtained from
Defendants.” The Krehnbrinks, however, failed to provide any evidence to oppose
summary judgment on their unjust-enrichment claim. Instead, they attached only
unauthenticated documents. As discussed above, documents offered in opposition to
summary judgment must be “‘properly sworn, certified or authenticated by affidavit,’”
Nuckols, 2024-Ohio-1070, at ¶ 23 (6th Dist.), quoting Kent’s Excavating Servs., 2017-
Ohio-1371, at ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). And where, as here, the opposing party objects to the
admission of unauthenticated documents, the trial court is prohibited from
considering them. Beatley, 2024-Ohio-5109, at ¶ 48 (10th Dist.).
{¶49} Moreover, the loan documents specifically provided for the purchase of
force-placed insurance. Therefore, an express contract governed force-placed
insurance, so the Krehnbrinks cannot maintain an unjust-enrichment claim. The trial
court properly granted summary judgment on the unjust-enrichment claim.
3. Third issue for review: breach of contract
{¶50} The Krehnbrinks challenge the trial court’s summary judgment in
Nationstar’s favor on their breach-of-contract claim, which asserted that Nationstar
breached the Trial Modification Offer. To prove a breach-of-contract claim, a party
must establish (1) the existence of a valid contract between the parties, (2) the other
party’s failure to perform where performance is due, and (3) damages. Gilman, 2021-
Ohio-3575, at ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). A condition precedent is an act or event that must be
completed before a party’s obligation to perform arises. Id. at ¶ 19. A party’s failure to
satisfy a condition precedent excuses the other party’s performance. Id.
{¶51} The Trial Modification Offer required the Krehnbrinks to make three
consecutive monthly loan payments to Nationstar by mailing the payments to a
specific PO Box. The letter explaining the Trial Modification Offer contained a chart
14 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that laid out when each of the three payments were due. It also informed the
Krehnbrinks that “[t]o successfully complete the Trial Period Plan, you must make the
[] payments as set forth in the chart above.”
{¶52} Nationstar argued that the Krehnbrinks’ successful payment of all three
payments was a condition precedent to the permanent-loan-modification offer, and
because the Krehnbrinks failed to make the final payment, the condition precedent
was not fulfilled, so Nationstar had no obligation to grant the permanent modification.
{¶53} We agree that the Krehnbrinks did not fulfill a condition precedent to
the permanent modification because they did not complete the final payment as
required by the Trial Modification Offer. Because the Krehnbrinks failed to satisfy the
Trial Modification’s condition precedent, Nationstar was not obligated to grant the
permanent modification. See Romero v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6600, *12 (D.Kan. Jan. 21, 2015) (“The uncontroverted facts establish that plaintiff
made only two of the three required trial plan payments . . . Under the terms of that
Agreement, plaintiff’s failure to satisfy those conditions terminated the HAMP
Agreement, and defendant had no obligation to make any modification to the loan
documents.”).
{¶54} The Krehnbrinks assert that they attempted to make the final payment
over the phone. But they submitted no evidence to support this assertion, so their
argument fails.
{¶55} The Krehnbrinks argue that because they “attempted compliance in
good faith and substantially complied with the modification terms, minor deviations
should not preclude relief.” First, as they submitted no evidence to support their
breach-of-contract claim, they cannot demonstrate substantial compliance or good
faith. Second, the Krehnbrinks cite “Bell v. Horton, 142 Ohio App.3d 694, 699 (7th
15 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Dist. 2001)” and assert that the case “allowed claims when substantial performance
was demonstrated.” While the citation results in a case captioned Bell v. Horton, it is
a Fourth District case in which the court dismissed the appeal for a lack of a final
appealable order.
{¶56} Because the Krehnbrinks fail to support their argument with any
evidence or law, we reject their argument. See App.R. 16(A)(7). The trial court properly
granted summary judgment in Nationstar’s favor on the Krehnbrinks’ breach-of-
contract claim.
4. Fourth issue for review: RESPA claim
{¶57} Finally, the Krehnbrinks argue that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment to Nationstar on their RESPA claim, which alleged that they sent
Nationstar a written complaint involving Nationstar’s denying a permanent loan
modification and being charged for the force-placed insurance policy. The trial court
found that the Krehnbrinks failed to submit a written customer complaint as required
by RESPA and that accordingly, “no obligations to Nationstar were triggered.”
{¶58} The purpose of RESPA is “‘to insure that consumers throughout the
Nation are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs
of the settlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high settlement
charges caused by certain abusive practices that have developed in some areas of the
country.’” Marais v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 736 F.3d 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2013), quoting
Vega v. First Fed. S. & L. Assn. of Detroit, 622 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1980).
{¶59} When a loan servicer “receives a qualified written request from the
borrower (or an agent of the borrower) for information relating to the servicing of such
loan, the servicer shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt of the
correspondence within 5 days.” 12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1)(A). A “qualified written request”
16 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
is a “written correspondence” that
(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name and
account of the borrower; and
(ii) includes a statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to
the extent applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient
detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the
borrower.
12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1)(B).
{¶60} The trial court determined that the Krehnbrinks failed to submit a
written communication. Nationstar’s vice president, A.J. Loll, submitted an affidavit
in support of Nationstar’s summary-judgment motion. Loll testified in the affidavit
that, as vice president, Loll had personal knowledge of Nationstar’s procedures for
creating and maintaining records related to residential mortgages. The affidavit
explained Nationstar’s procedures for handling customer complaints: when
Nationstar receives a written complaint, it scans the complaint and forwards it to
Nationstar’s “Customer Complaint Inbox.” The customer-relations division creates a
“Case Detail Form,” which includes when the complaint was received, when a response
is due, and the subject of the complaint. Then, under Nationstar’s policies and
procedures, Nationstar first sends a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt
of the complaint and later sends a formal response. Loll testified in the affidavit that
Nationstar had no record of the Krehnbrinks submitting a written complaint.
{¶61} The Krehnbrinks submitted no admissible evidence showing that they
submitted a complaint. The letter they assert is a written complaint that they sent to
Nationstar was never authenticated and lacks anything indicating that the letter was
mailed.
17 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶62} The Krehnbrinks also argue that “Nationstar’s internal processes were
deficient, preventing them from recognizing the written complaint. Nationstar’s
internal failure to process mailed complaints does not absolve it of compliance with 12
CFR § 1024.35.” But they do not present evidence showing that Nationstar’s processes
are deficient or otherwise explain how the process was deficient.
{¶63} Finally, the Krehnbrinks assert that “[o]ral complaints coupled with
mailed notices might suffice to trigger a servicer’s obligations under RESPA if the
service failed to reasonably communicate the requirement for written notice.” But the
Krehnbrinks failed to advance this argument below and it is accordingly forfeited on
appeal. Moreover, their argument contradicts the plain language of REPSA, which
only obligates a servicer to respond to a “qualified written request.” (Emphasis
added.) 12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1)(A).
{¶64} The trial court properly granted summary judgment in Nationstar’s
favor on the Krehnbrinks’ counterclaims. We overrule their assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶65} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the Krehnbrinks’ assignment of
error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.