National Labor Relations Board v. Standard Oil Co.

124 F.2d 895, 9 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 629, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2599
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedNovember 11, 1941
DocketNo. 2188
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 124 F.2d 895 (National Labor Relations Board v. Standard Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Standard Oil Co., 124 F.2d 895, 9 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 629, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2599 (10th Cir. 1941).

Opinion

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board1 filed a petition for enforcement of its order against Standard Oil Company,2 an Indiana corporation, and Stanolind Oil and Gas Company,3 a Delaware corporation.

Standard has its principal offices in Chicago, Illinois, and Whiting, Indiana. It is engaged in refining and marketing petroleum and petroleum products. Together with its subsidiary and affiliated corporations, it constitutes an integrated oil company. Stanolind has its principal office in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and is one of Standard’s two principal producing subsidiaries. Standard owns and operates a refinery at Casper, Wyoming.

Oil Workers International Union filed separate charges against Standard and Stanolind. The Board entered an order consolidating the cases and on January 12, 1938, filed its complaint against Standard and Stanolind charging that the former dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of Standard Employees Collective Bargaining Association 4 and that Stanolind dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of Stanolind Employees Collective [897]*897Bargaining Association5 contrary to the provisions of § 8(1) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(1,2).6 Standard and Stanolind interposed their respective answers denying the alleged unfair labor practices. The Standard Association intervened and filed an answer in which it alleged that its membership embraced a majority of all the workers employed at the Standard refinery at Casper, and denied that it was dominated by Standard. Hearings were had and thereafter in September, 1938, an order was made transferring the proceedings to the Board and directing that no intermediate report issue. Thereafter, the Board found that Standard had dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of, and contributed to the support of the Standard Association, and that Stanolind had dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of, and contributed to the support of the Stanolind Association in violation of §8(1) and (2) of the Act, and that Stanolind had maintained surveillance over the concerted activities of its employees in violation of § 8(1) of the Act.

The Board made appropriate orders requiring Standard and Stanolind to cease and desist from the practices, withdraw recognition from the Associations, disestablish them, and post appropriate notices. It further required Standard to cease and desist from giving effect to any contracts with the Standard Association.7

The Standard Case

The record discloses these facts: In 1919, Standard established at its Casper plant an Employees’ Representation Plan, known as Industrial Relations Plan.8 The Plan operated under the supervision of Standard’s Director of Industrial Relations and his assistants and through a Joint General Committee on Industrial Relations,9 consisting of employee representatives elected annually in the several departments and natural divisions of the plant and an equal or lesser number of management representatives appointed by Standard.10 Company officials and employees having the power to hire, discharge, or discipline were neither eligible to act as employee representatives nor qualified to vote. Any other employee who had been in the company’s service for at least sixty days prior to the date fixed for nomination was entitled to vote for employee representatives. Any other employee who had been in the company’s service for a period of one year immediately prior to nomination, who was 21 years of age or over, and an American citizen, was qualified for nomination and election as an employee representative. Elections were regularly conducted under the supervision of the Director of Industrial Relations on company time and property. All Plan expenses, including those incident' to elections and for pay of employee representatives for time spent on Plan business, were borne by Standard. The Plan made no provision for dues or [898]*898for meetings of the body of employees. The Joint Committee met monthly and was presided over alternately by an employee and a management representative. The meetings were generally attended by the Assistant Director of Industrial Relations. Digests of minutes of the meetings reported by a stenographer of Standard'were mimeographed by Standard and posted on plant bulletin boards. The Plan could only be amended by a two-thirds vote of employee representatives and the approval of the Director of Industrial Relations and Standard’s board of directors.

When the Act was sustained by the Supreme Court on April 12, 1937, in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352, Standard took steps to dissolve the Plan.

On April 26, 1937, a special meeting of the Joint Committee was called by Standard and a letter from Standard’s president, Edward G. Seubert, was read. The letter was addressed to the employees of Standard.

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Bluebook (online)
124 F.2d 895, 9 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 629, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-standard-oil-co-ca10-1941.