FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board found that Southern Health Corporation, operator of a nursing home at Corydon, Indiana, refused to bargain with its employees’ certified bargaining agent in violation of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (a)(1)). The company concedes refusal to bargain but challenges the certification.
On May 19, 1972 a consent election was conducted by the Board. The vote was 12 to 9 in favor of the union, with two challenged ballots. On May 26 the company filed objections to certain pre-[1123]*1123election conduct of the union which allegedly affected the outcome of the bal-' loting. The Regional Director conducted an administrative investigation of the company’s objections and made a report recommending that the objections be overruled. The Board, after considering the company’s exceptions, adopted the Regional Director’s recommendations and certified the union as exclusive bargaining agent. In the complaint proceeding, the general counsel moved for summary judgment on the pleadings, asserting that all matters presented by the company as justification of its refusal to bargain had been previously raised and rejected in the representation proceeding. In response, the company, for the first time, demanded a hearing with respect to the factual issues raised by its objections to the election. The Board granted summary judgment, concluding that “[a]ll issues raised by Respondent in this proceeding were or could have been litigated in the prior representation proceeding, and the Respondent does not offer to adduce at a hearing any newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, nor does it allege that any special circumstances exist herein which would require the Board to reexamine the decision made in the representation proceeding.” In resisting enforcement the company contends that in the representation proceeding the Board should have denied certification as a matter of law, or at least that the Board should have conducted a hearing into the company challenges.
I.
It is well established that under the statutory scheme of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board is entrusted with the responsibility of conducting elections and of supervising the conduct and actions of the parties therein concerned to insure a free, unfettered exercise of self-determination. See generally, N.L.R.A. Part 9; N.L.R.B. v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 328, 67 S.Ct. 324, 91 L.Ed. 322 (1946). This function is essentially administrative in nature, and the courts have, therefore, evidenced reluctance to interfere. “The conduct of representation elections is the very archetype of a purely administrative function, with no quasi about it, concerning which courts should not interfere save for the most glaring discrimination or abuse.” N.L.R.B. v. Olson Bodies, Inc., 420 F.2d 1187, 1189 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954, 91 S.Ct. 966, 28 L.Ed.2d 237 (1971).
Considerable latitude must be given the Board where an election is challenged, even for substantial misrepresentations. N.L.R.B. v. Mar Salle, Inc., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 425 F.2d 566, 570-571 (1970). The Act does not specifically require post-election examination of such matters. Rather, the Board, as an administrative decision designed to effectuate its primary task of insuring an acceptable democratic labor election process, has determined that flagrant and substantial pre-election misconduct may so impair the integrity of the ballot result that invalidation of the election is necessary. Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962).
In applying this policy, the Board has emphasized that the election environment itself produces many instances of campaign impropriety which employees frequently ignore or discount. Id. Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 1973, C.C.H. N.L.R.B. (125,352) p. 32,667, enforced 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. •1974). Thus, before resorting to the serious remedy of invalidating an election, with its attendant dangers of delay, administrative over-extension, and frustration of the. goal of self-determination, the Board relies upon its experience and expertise in labor elections to determine, under all of the peculiar circumstances present, “whether the conduct could reasonably be expected to have an impact on the election.” Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., supra, 140 N.L.R.B. at 224. See generally, Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1965).
The courts have been mindful of the competing considerations present in [1124]*1124such a determination and thus deference is given to the Board’s expert and considered opinion. In reviewing a Board decision in this area “[t]he substantial evidence test enunciated in Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), has no applicability. Rather, we must defer to the Board’s expertise unless we are prepared to say that the discretion residing in the Board was abused.” Follett Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 397 F.2d 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1968).
II. MISREPRESENTATIONS
a. The Union’s Power to Fine
On May 8, 1972 company president Ragland wrote to the employees urging votes against the union. In the letter he said, among other things, “Even more shocking is the very great power which unions have to fine and discipline their members and make it stick.” He cited examples of fines of employees who went back to work during a strike and of those who crossed a picket line.
On May 17 the organizing committee of the union wrote to the employees challenging as misleading, statements in three of Mr. Ragland’s letters. The letter said in part:
“Mr. Ragland stated in his letter to you of May 8 that the Union fined people for crossing a picket line. What Union was he talking about? It was not this Union because under our Union Constitution we cannot fine anyone. If he tells you that it was this Union, then he is lying again. We are going to bring this mistruth and other lies that have been told to the attention of the National Labor Relations Board (U.S. Government).”
The company, in its objection to certification, presented copies of the constitutions of the international and its local unions, pointing out that there is no express prohibition against fines, and each constitution provides for a disciplinary procedure, the international referring to “fining” as one type of discipline, and the local referring to exacting “an appropriate penalty.” No assertion was made as to the union’s practice in fact with respect to fines for strike breaking or crossing picket lines.
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FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board found that Southern Health Corporation, operator of a nursing home at Corydon, Indiana, refused to bargain with its employees’ certified bargaining agent in violation of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (a)(1)). The company concedes refusal to bargain but challenges the certification.
On May 19, 1972 a consent election was conducted by the Board. The vote was 12 to 9 in favor of the union, with two challenged ballots. On May 26 the company filed objections to certain pre-[1123]*1123election conduct of the union which allegedly affected the outcome of the bal-' loting. The Regional Director conducted an administrative investigation of the company’s objections and made a report recommending that the objections be overruled. The Board, after considering the company’s exceptions, adopted the Regional Director’s recommendations and certified the union as exclusive bargaining agent. In the complaint proceeding, the general counsel moved for summary judgment on the pleadings, asserting that all matters presented by the company as justification of its refusal to bargain had been previously raised and rejected in the representation proceeding. In response, the company, for the first time, demanded a hearing with respect to the factual issues raised by its objections to the election. The Board granted summary judgment, concluding that “[a]ll issues raised by Respondent in this proceeding were or could have been litigated in the prior representation proceeding, and the Respondent does not offer to adduce at a hearing any newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, nor does it allege that any special circumstances exist herein which would require the Board to reexamine the decision made in the representation proceeding.” In resisting enforcement the company contends that in the representation proceeding the Board should have denied certification as a matter of law, or at least that the Board should have conducted a hearing into the company challenges.
I.
It is well established that under the statutory scheme of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board is entrusted with the responsibility of conducting elections and of supervising the conduct and actions of the parties therein concerned to insure a free, unfettered exercise of self-determination. See generally, N.L.R.A. Part 9; N.L.R.B. v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 328, 67 S.Ct. 324, 91 L.Ed. 322 (1946). This function is essentially administrative in nature, and the courts have, therefore, evidenced reluctance to interfere. “The conduct of representation elections is the very archetype of a purely administrative function, with no quasi about it, concerning which courts should not interfere save for the most glaring discrimination or abuse.” N.L.R.B. v. Olson Bodies, Inc., 420 F.2d 1187, 1189 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954, 91 S.Ct. 966, 28 L.Ed.2d 237 (1971).
Considerable latitude must be given the Board where an election is challenged, even for substantial misrepresentations. N.L.R.B. v. Mar Salle, Inc., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 425 F.2d 566, 570-571 (1970). The Act does not specifically require post-election examination of such matters. Rather, the Board, as an administrative decision designed to effectuate its primary task of insuring an acceptable democratic labor election process, has determined that flagrant and substantial pre-election misconduct may so impair the integrity of the ballot result that invalidation of the election is necessary. Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962).
In applying this policy, the Board has emphasized that the election environment itself produces many instances of campaign impropriety which employees frequently ignore or discount. Id. Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 1973, C.C.H. N.L.R.B. (125,352) p. 32,667, enforced 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. •1974). Thus, before resorting to the serious remedy of invalidating an election, with its attendant dangers of delay, administrative over-extension, and frustration of the. goal of self-determination, the Board relies upon its experience and expertise in labor elections to determine, under all of the peculiar circumstances present, “whether the conduct could reasonably be expected to have an impact on the election.” Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., supra, 140 N.L.R.B. at 224. See generally, Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1965).
The courts have been mindful of the competing considerations present in [1124]*1124such a determination and thus deference is given to the Board’s expert and considered opinion. In reviewing a Board decision in this area “[t]he substantial evidence test enunciated in Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), has no applicability. Rather, we must defer to the Board’s expertise unless we are prepared to say that the discretion residing in the Board was abused.” Follett Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 397 F.2d 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1968).
II. MISREPRESENTATIONS
a. The Union’s Power to Fine
On May 8, 1972 company president Ragland wrote to the employees urging votes against the union. In the letter he said, among other things, “Even more shocking is the very great power which unions have to fine and discipline their members and make it stick.” He cited examples of fines of employees who went back to work during a strike and of those who crossed a picket line.
On May 17 the organizing committee of the union wrote to the employees challenging as misleading, statements in three of Mr. Ragland’s letters. The letter said in part:
“Mr. Ragland stated in his letter to you of May 8 that the Union fined people for crossing a picket line. What Union was he talking about? It was not this Union because under our Union Constitution we cannot fine anyone. If he tells you that it was this Union, then he is lying again. We are going to bring this mistruth and other lies that have been told to the attention of the National Labor Relations Board (U.S. Government).”
The company, in its objection to certification, presented copies of the constitutions of the international and its local unions, pointing out that there is no express prohibition against fines, and each constitution provides for a disciplinary procedure, the international referring to “fining” as one type of discipline, and the local referring to exacting “an appropriate penalty.” No assertion was made as to the union’s practice in fact with respect to fines for strike breaking or crossing picket lines.
The Regional Director assumed ar-guendo that the union was authorized by its constitution to fine members for breaking a strike, but concluded that the union’s ability to fine its members for breaking a strike was a minor issue and that it is contrary to common experience to consider it a determinative issue in deciding an employee’s vote. In addition, he concluded that propaganda of the nature complained of was well within the ability of the electorate to evaluate, considering the company’s forewarning to discount union claims and common knowledge of the fact unions do have disciplinary procedures for infractions.
The Board adopted the Regional Director’s recommendation. Chairman Miller, concurring separately on this point, said, on the basis of his own observations and experience, “I would exercise great restraint in those matters and would set aside elections only in those relatively rare instances in which a readily ascertainable pattern of the most egregious kind of clearly identifiable misrepresentations permeated the campaign so significantly that one would be compelled to conclude that voters of ordinary intelligence would have been incapable of forming a rational judgment on the basic issue of whether they wish to be represented by a labor organization (and, when appropriate, by which of the competing organizations they would prefer to be represented).”
We are not persuaded that the Board abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in determining that the misrepresentation concerning the constitutional power to fine did not have a significant impact on the election. N.L.R.B. v. Red Bird Foods, Inc., 399 F.2d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 1968).
b. The Comparison Sheet
In the May 17 letter, the organizing committee referred to a May 11 [1125]*1125statement of Mr. Ragland that the union could not give the employees anything, and continued: “I am enclosing a comparison sheet of two places of business whose employees we represent in Cory-don, Indiana. Compare the information listed with your present wages and benefits. Wouldn’t you like to be making these wages and have these benefits at only a cost to you of $1.25 per week? IT DIDN’T TAKE A STRIKE TO GET THESE WAGES AND BENEFITS AT EITHER OF THESE TWO COMPANIES LISTED ON THE COMPARISON SHEET, EITHER!”
The comparison sheet listed wage rates and benefits in three columns, one headed Corydon Nursing Home and the others headed with the names of other employers in Corydon. At the bottom of the sheet, there appeared: “Don’t you think that it is worth a $1.25 per week to receive the Union wages and benefits that the Union Companies of Corydon, Indiana pay their employees?” The company’s objections stated there were various misrepresentations, including the fact that the union agreement with one of the employers had not been approved by government authorities and the benefits were not in effect.
The Regional Director reviewed the contracts in question and found that the comparison sheet was a substantially accurate reflection of the contracts. One of the contracts was fully implemented. The other apparently exceeded wage stabilization guidelines and was being renegotiated in order to conform. The Regional Director interpreted the comparison sheet as no more than a representation of negotiated benefits. It surely can be read as a representation that the other employers were then paying and their employees receiving the benefits set forth. As to one of the employers, then, it failed to disclose a fact necessary to make the other facts not misleading, and was a misrepresentation to that limited extent. Nevertheless we find no abuse of discretion in deciding that it was not “an objectionable misrepresentation within the Hollywood Ceramics rule.”
This case is not one in which the union is allegedly claiming credit for a contract increase which has never in fact been agreed to, N.L.R.B. v. Producers Cooperative Ass’n, 457 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 1972), or is substantially inflated, N.L.R.B. v. Millard Metal Service Center, Inc., 472 F.2d 647, 650-651 (1st Cir. 1973), Gallenkamp Stores v. N.L.R.B., 402 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1968); nor is it a case in which the increase claimed by the union was in fact obtained by a second union, N.L.R.B. v. Maine Sugar Industries, 425 F.2d 942, 945 (1st Cir. 1970), or, by the terms of the agreement, not to be received by the employees for a substantial period of time, Cross Baking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 453 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st Cir. 1971). Rather, the company here complains only that the terms represented by the union as being paid A & P employees, while having been agreed to by both parties, were not in effect due to a failure to comply with federal wage and price guidelines.
We agree with the Sixth Circuit that “[information about the wage freeze was not within the special knowledge of the union. It had been widely publicized and debated. And, the federal government had established places where answers to specific questions about the freeze could be obtained.” Harlan # 4 Coal Co. v. N.L.R.B., 490 F.2d 117, 125 (6th Cir. 1974).
c. Closeness of the Vote
The closeness of a vote may play a part in assessing the effect of a misrepresentation upon the results of an election. Follett Corporation v. N.L.R.B., supra, 397 F.2d at 95, n. 3. But the mere fact that the vote is close will not compel the conclusion that a misrepresentation probably had an impact on the election result. N.L.R.B. v. Red Bird Foods, supra, 399 F.2d at 603; N.L.R.B. v. Visual Educom, Inc., 486 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1973).
III. LACK OF HEARING
It is well established that in a refusal-to-bargain unfair labor practice [1126]*1126proceeding, there need be no evidentiary hearing to establish facts on which a certification is challenged if the company’s objections have been adequately litigated and determined in the prior representation proceeding. Macomb Pottery Co. v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1967); Baker Canning Co. v. N.L.R.B., 505 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1974).
The underlying facts as to the misrepresentations are virtually undisputed. The only question which approaches being an issue of fact is whether the misrepresentations had a significant impact on the outcome of the election, and that is more a question of reasonable probability than one of fact. The answer is one as to which the Board has wide discretion and is legitimately influenced by administrative experience and expertise.
Testimony by voters as to their motivation in voting is likely not to be satisfactory or useful. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969); N.L.R.B. v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89, 93-94 (3rd Cir. 1963). The more likely character of evidence tending to show that a particular statement probably had an impact on the outcome would be evidence that an issue to which it related was hotly contested and an important concern of the electorate, evidence bearing upon the degree to which the relevant facts are known among the group involved, and evidence tending to establish the magnitude of the alleged misrepresentation. The company failed to suggest that it could offer such evidence either at a hearing in the representation proceeding or in the complaint proceeding. No hearing was required under the circumstances.
The Board order will be enforced.