NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Secretary of the Treasury James Baker (in his official capacity on behalf of the United States), Citicorp International Co., Inc. (Citicorp), and RAJ Chemicals, Inc. (RAJ) appeal the decision of the Court of International Trade, No. 85-08-01151, 9 CIT 571, 623 F.Supp. 1262 (1985), arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Upon examination of the complete record and decisions below, this court holds that the Court of International Trade indeed lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. We reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs-cross-appellants/appellees’ suit with prejudice.
[1549] BACKGROUND
In 1983, Congress added a new temporary provision to the Tariff Schedule of the United States (TSUS), imposing a sixty-cent per gallon (60<t/gallon tariff on ethanol “provided for in item 427.88.” Section 901.50 provides:
Ethyl alcohol (provided for in item 427.-88, part 2D, schedule 4) when imported to be used in producing a mixture of gasoline and alcohol or a mixture of a special fuel and alcohol for use as fuel, or when imported to be used otherwise as fuel * * *. 60fl> per gal.
TSUS 901.50 (1984)
TSUS 427.88 previously imposed a three percent (3%) ad valorem duty on imports of ethanol. In September 1984, the Customs Service (Customs or Service), through the Commissioner of Customs, established a practice that certain mixtures of ethanol would not be dutiable under TSUS 901.50, but only 427.88. Upon various importers’ request, Customs issued several private ruling letters as to mixtures of ethanol, with as little as 7.5 percent other additives.
Domestic producers, hearing of this, filed informal objections with Customs and began an intense lobbying campaign to convince Customs to revoke the existing policy. Objections by Senators Robert Dole and Richard Lugar, among others, reinforced the domestic producers’ arguments that exemption from the 60c duty resulted in a subsidy of sorts for importers of non-pure ethanol. On August 2, 1985, such domestic producers, including appellees, National Com Growers Association (NCGA), New Energy Company of Indiana (NECI) and others, achieved their goal. The Department of the Treasury announced Commissioner William von Raab’s decision to apply the 60c/gallon duty to “ethanol imports mixed with other additives.” The announcement clearly stated that the change “revers[ed] a previous Customs ruling.”
After thus revoking the September 1984 rulings, Customs notified various importers by letter, among them Citicorp and RAJ, that the additional TSUS 901.50 60c/gallon duty would apply to mixed ethanol imports. In order to avoid unfairness, attention was invited to the sixth paragraph of the August 2, 1985, revocation which provided the importers the opportunity to present evidence indicating reliance on ruling letters issued prior to the policy revocation. Specifically, Customs stated:
With respect to any entries made after the effective date of the instant [August 2, 1985] ruling, Customs will consider all facts and evidence in connection with claims of reliance on the ruling previously issued.
Both Citicorp and RAJ submitted evidence arguably showing reliance on rulings issued before August 2, 1985, though the scheduled imports were to enter the United States after the August 2 deadline. Based on each company’s submission, Customs issued new ruling letters — pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 177.8 — in August of 1985, permitting the importation of certain shipments of mixed ethanol under the pre-August 2, 1985, practice — i.e., the 60$/gallon duty would not apply. The letters to Citicorp were issued on August 7 and August 27, 1985. The letter to RAJ was dated August 27, 1985.
Relying on the Customs rulings, as they say, RAJ imported the permissible number of gallons stated in the ruling letters prior to the deadline set by Customs, ie., November 1, 1985, 5:00 p.m. Citicorp imported its allotted number of gallons prior to the November 1 deadline also, ceasing all shipments after their October 28 and 29, 1985, entries. Citicorp has not entered mixtures since then.
Appellees, distressed at the continued importation of exempted ethanol and without waiting for all the actual entries or the filing by them of formal protests, filed suit against the government for injunctive relief in the Court of International Trade on August 29, 1985, challenging the post-August 2 ruling letters issued to Citicorp and RAJ. Appellees questioned the Customs Service’s authority to exempt appellants from payment of duties because of appellants’ reliance on previously stated Customs’ policies. “Appellees sought * * * a declaration that the Service’s grandfather [1550] decisions were unlawful and that the full statutory duties were owing on all ethanol blends entered after August 2 * * (Appellees’ brief at 8.) Judge Carman denied appellees’, then plaintiffs in the action, motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions on September 20, 1985. The motions before Judge Car-man specifically sought a suspension of the liquidation of the shipments authorized by the August 1985 ruling letters to both Citi-corp and RAJ.
Appellees renewed their motion for preliminary injunction which was denied on November 26, 1985, by Court of International Trade Judge Aquilino. On the same day, Judge Aquilino granted Citicorp’s motion to intervene, having previously granted RAJ’s motion to intervene. On December 4, 1985, the trial court held a pre-trial conference at which a trial schedule developed. The case was tried before Judge Aquilino on December 16, 1985, and January 6-7, 1986. The court took the case under advisement on January 22, 1986.
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NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Secretary of the Treasury James Baker (in his official capacity on behalf of the United States), Citicorp International Co., Inc. (Citicorp), and RAJ Chemicals, Inc. (RAJ) appeal the decision of the Court of International Trade, No. 85-08-01151, 9 CIT 571, 623 F.Supp. 1262 (1985), arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Upon examination of the complete record and decisions below, this court holds that the Court of International Trade indeed lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. We reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs-cross-appellants/appellees’ suit with prejudice.
[1549] BACKGROUND
In 1983, Congress added a new temporary provision to the Tariff Schedule of the United States (TSUS), imposing a sixty-cent per gallon (60<t/gallon tariff on ethanol “provided for in item 427.88.” Section 901.50 provides:
Ethyl alcohol (provided for in item 427.-88, part 2D, schedule 4) when imported to be used in producing a mixture of gasoline and alcohol or a mixture of a special fuel and alcohol for use as fuel, or when imported to be used otherwise as fuel * * *. 60fl> per gal.
TSUS 901.50 (1984)
TSUS 427.88 previously imposed a three percent (3%) ad valorem duty on imports of ethanol. In September 1984, the Customs Service (Customs or Service), through the Commissioner of Customs, established a practice that certain mixtures of ethanol would not be dutiable under TSUS 901.50, but only 427.88. Upon various importers’ request, Customs issued several private ruling letters as to mixtures of ethanol, with as little as 7.5 percent other additives.
Domestic producers, hearing of this, filed informal objections with Customs and began an intense lobbying campaign to convince Customs to revoke the existing policy. Objections by Senators Robert Dole and Richard Lugar, among others, reinforced the domestic producers’ arguments that exemption from the 60c duty resulted in a subsidy of sorts for importers of non-pure ethanol. On August 2, 1985, such domestic producers, including appellees, National Com Growers Association (NCGA), New Energy Company of Indiana (NECI) and others, achieved their goal. The Department of the Treasury announced Commissioner William von Raab’s decision to apply the 60c/gallon duty to “ethanol imports mixed with other additives.” The announcement clearly stated that the change “revers[ed] a previous Customs ruling.”
After thus revoking the September 1984 rulings, Customs notified various importers by letter, among them Citicorp and RAJ, that the additional TSUS 901.50 60c/gallon duty would apply to mixed ethanol imports. In order to avoid unfairness, attention was invited to the sixth paragraph of the August 2, 1985, revocation which provided the importers the opportunity to present evidence indicating reliance on ruling letters issued prior to the policy revocation. Specifically, Customs stated:
With respect to any entries made after the effective date of the instant [August 2, 1985] ruling, Customs will consider all facts and evidence in connection with claims of reliance on the ruling previously issued.
Both Citicorp and RAJ submitted evidence arguably showing reliance on rulings issued before August 2, 1985, though the scheduled imports were to enter the United States after the August 2 deadline. Based on each company’s submission, Customs issued new ruling letters — pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 177.8 — in August of 1985, permitting the importation of certain shipments of mixed ethanol under the pre-August 2, 1985, practice — i.e., the 60$/gallon duty would not apply. The letters to Citicorp were issued on August 7 and August 27, 1985. The letter to RAJ was dated August 27, 1985.
Relying on the Customs rulings, as they say, RAJ imported the permissible number of gallons stated in the ruling letters prior to the deadline set by Customs, ie., November 1, 1985, 5:00 p.m. Citicorp imported its allotted number of gallons prior to the November 1 deadline also, ceasing all shipments after their October 28 and 29, 1985, entries. Citicorp has not entered mixtures since then.
Appellees, distressed at the continued importation of exempted ethanol and without waiting for all the actual entries or the filing by them of formal protests, filed suit against the government for injunctive relief in the Court of International Trade on August 29, 1985, challenging the post-August 2 ruling letters issued to Citicorp and RAJ. Appellees questioned the Customs Service’s authority to exempt appellants from payment of duties because of appellants’ reliance on previously stated Customs’ policies. “Appellees sought * * * a declaration that the Service’s grandfather [1550] decisions were unlawful and that the full statutory duties were owing on all ethanol blends entered after August 2 * * (Appellees’ brief at 8.) Judge Carman denied appellees’, then plaintiffs in the action, motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions on September 20, 1985. The motions before Judge Car-man specifically sought a suspension of the liquidation of the shipments authorized by the August 1985 ruling letters to both Citi-corp and RAJ.
Appellees renewed their motion for preliminary injunction which was denied on November 26, 1985, by Court of International Trade Judge Aquilino. On the same day, Judge Aquilino granted Citicorp’s motion to intervene, having previously granted RAJ’s motion to intervene. On December 4, 1985, the trial court held a pre-trial conference at which a trial schedule developed. The case was tried before Judge Aquilino on December 16, 1985, and January 6-7, 1986. The court took the case under advisement on January 22, 1986.
In the meantime, Customs liquidated the remaining imports of ethanol in issue belonging to Citicorp and the 90-day period for finality of liquidation began to run. 19 U.S.C. § 1514. Judge Aquilino entered judgment and issued his decision on May 28, 1986, after all entries relevant herein had been liquidated, and the entries had become final pursuant to section 1514. See the appendix for the full text of relevant statutes. We understand that Customs did reliquidate when the finality period had not run. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, regardless of ap-pellees’ failure to protest Customs’ rulings pursuant to section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516, and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b), which govern such complaints by domestic manufacturers. The court reviewed the circumstances of each entry and challenged them as not made in reasonable reliance, but it also held that Customs had no authority to issue ruling letters exempting Citicorp, RAJ, and others from the August 2, 1985, imposition of the 60$/gallon duty, regardless of any reliance proven by the parties involved. As appears from the language used, it took the position that once Customs had determined that mixed ethanol was dutiable under section 901.50, any liquidation of any entry whenever made at a lower rate was lawless behavior. It took no notice of any possible right to limit the retroactive effect of any change of practice. Lastly, the court held that the parties were not entitled to rely on the Customs’ ruling letters permitting entry of ethanol shipments at a lower duty. It ordered RAJ and Citicorp to pay into the Treasury the amounts the Commissioner’s alleged malfeasance had enriched them, no reliquidation of the entries being needed in the court’s view.
Upon filing and denial of appropriate post-trial motions, this appeal ensued.
ISSUES
The threshold issue to dispose of before all others in this appeal is whether the Court of International Trade appropriately claimed jurisdiction of the present suit under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) or the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. If, as we hold, it did not, all other issues are preempted however extensively the parties have discussed them.
OPINION
I. Jurisdiction
A. Congressional Protection for Domestic Industry
Appellees allege that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Customs Commissioner behaved in a lawless manner in not applying to RAJ’s and Citicorp’s shipments of ethanol the tariffs imposed by TSUS 901.50. It may be noted that appellees’ whole case is for a retroactive application of the change of practice. There is no issue about prospective application. Appellees contend that their allegations could not be properly reviewed under section 1516 because the complaints in question include matters other than rate of duty and classification. Section 1516(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Request for classification and rate of duty; petition
[1551] (1) The Secretary shall, upon written request by an interested party furnish the classification and the rate of duty imposed upon designated imported merchandise of a class or kind manufactured, produced, or sold at wholesale by such interested party. If the interested party believes that the appraised value, the classification, or rate of duty is not correct, it may file a petition with the Secretary setting forth—
(A) a description of the merchandise,
(B) the appraised value, the classification, or the rate of duty that it believes proper, and
(C) the reasons for its belief.
(2) As used in this section, the term “interested party” means a person who is—
(A) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States;
(B) a certified union or recognized union or group of workers which is representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or wholesale in the United States; or
(C) a trade or business association a majority of whose members are manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers in the United States, of goods of the same class or kind as the designated imported merchandise. Such term includes an association, a majority of whose members is composed of persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
The trial court upheld appellees’ interpretation of section 1516 as inapplicable in this case and exercised jurisdiction under section 1581(i), although the trial judge did note in his factual recitation that appellees questioned the application of a lesser rate of duty to appellants. It seems obvious to us that the rulings did involve classification and rate of duty. However, the trial judge made no further statements regarding ap-pellees’ assertions of incorrect duty and classification application. We disagree with the trial judge’s interpretation of the applicability of section 1516 and his subsequent determination that jurisdictional authority rested under section 1581(i).
Section 1516 deals with several possible eventualities, and a reading of section 1516 will show that the domestic industry can obtain only prospective relief under section 1516, whatever eventuality occurs. The exhaustion of administrative remedies, as the “primary jurisdiction” rule, was established in order to limit judicial review of strictly administrative judgments. The Supreme Court in Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1493, 91 L.Ed. 1796 (1947) clearly defined the scope of . judicial review in this context:
Where Congress has clearly commanded that administrative judgment be taken initially or exclusively, the courts have no lawful function to anticipate the administrative decision with their own, * * *. It would nullify the congressional objects in providing the administrative determination * * * including] securing uniformity of administrative policy and disposition, expertness of judgment, and finality in determination.
Id. at 767-68, 67 S.Ct. at 1501 (footnote omitted).
Congress established a clear administrative process through which domestic industry could object to the importation of merchandise at specific tariff levels, 19 U.S.C. § 1516, and through which the Court of International Trade could review protests by domestic industry that were not sustained by the Secretary, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b). This was done in the precursors of the present law after Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 34 S.Ct. 938, 58 L.Ed. 1506 (1914), had established and applied to Customs duties the general rule that no one can have standing to litigate the application of a tax to another. Congress felt an exception was needed for the case of a domestic industry injured by competition of imports on which lawful duty was not collected.
Assuming without deciding that section 1516 might not be the domestic industry’s avenue of relief for fraudulent or otherwise void decisions, this is not such a case. McAdoo establishes the authority of the Secretary in actions such as those of the instant case. Id. at 632, 34 S.Ct. at 940 [1552] (discussing the disfavor in which suits against the Secretary of the Treasury for charging too low a tariff were viewed). Clearly Commissioner von Raab may have been mistaken, but did not make a void decision in interpreting the Customs law in question or in permitting reliance on then-established Customs’ practice to be considered in assessing the appropriate duties for RAJ and Citicorp, as he must interpret all Customs law in performing his duties subject to appropriate judicial review. Ap-pellees cite to Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 9 L.Ed. 354 (1836), for the proposition that the Secretary and the Commissioner must collect the duties appellees deem appropriate. Justice McLean points out that:
The secretary of the treasury is bound by the law; and although in the exercise of his discretion he may adopt necessary forms and modes of giving effect to the law: yet, neither he nor those who act under him, can dispense with, or alter any of its provisions.
Id. at 94.
Appellees’ reliance on this language is misplaced since, in point of fact, the Secretary did collect the duties he or his delegatee, the Commissioner, deemed required under the law applicable to RAJ’s and Citicorp’s imports. Appellees are, in essence, attempting to enforce a retroactive collection of duties from RAJ and Citicorp on the basis of a changed interpretation. Nothing in 19 U.S.C. § 3, or Swartwout and its progeny, mandates the Secretary of the Treasury or the Commissioner to make retroactive changes in duties if he makes any change at all. Such a requirement will appear to many minds to be unfair, and Congress did not intend the statute to be construed in such a fashion. Appellees misread the holdings and import of Swartwout.
Here, Citicorp and RAJ premised their hope of importing free of the extra charge on policies they supposed in existence at the time their requests for clarification were made and new ruling letters were issued. Persons should not be penalized for following the law as stated by Customs at the time of the transaction if Customs later has a change of heart. See, e.g., Heraeus-Amersil, Inc. v. United States, 795 F.2d 1575 (Fed.Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 949, 93 L.Ed.2d 998 (1987); Siemens America, Inc. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1382, 2 Fed.Cir. (T) 9 (1982). Assertion of authority by the Treasury to issue ruling letters selecting delayed effective dates falls within the scope of permitted activity. McAdoo, 234 U.S. at 633, 34 S.Ct. at 941, is instructive in establishing that the authority represents a discretionary act on the part of the Secretary. “The duties imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury in the collection of sugar tariffs are not ministerial. They are executive and involve the exercise of judgment and discretion.” Id. The actions in question were the product of the executive branch’s discretionary powers in interpreting Customs’ laws, and not simple ministerial tasks for which enforcement can be sought in the courts. Id. Therefore, they could not be reviewed by mandamus. Appellees were incorrect in attacking the validity of the Secretary’s or the Commissioner’s actions. As McAdoo holds: “the courts will refuse to substitute their judgment or discretion for that of the official entrusted by law with its execution. Interference in such a case would be to interfere with the ordinary functions of government.” Id. Both the Court of International Trade and appel-lees fail to accord the proper and required deference to the Secretary’s or the Commissioner’s actions by refusing to confine judicial review to the channels and the relief Congress intended. As such, the Court of International Trade’s decision cannot be sustained.
The House Report to the Customs Court Act of 1980 detailed that section 1516 permits American manufacturers to protest administrative determinations regarding imported merchandise, citing to former section 1582(b) defining the scope of such protests. 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 3729, 3756, H.R. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 45. After much debate, Congress determined that any relief forthcoming from such objections could only be [1553] prospective in nature. Section 1514(a) defines the finality of Customs liquidations:
(a) Finality of decisions; return of papers
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, section 1501 of this title (relating to voluntary reliquidations), section 1516 of this title (relating to petitions by domestic interested parties), section 1520 of this title (relating to refunds and errors), and section 1521 of this title (relating to reliquidations on account of fraud), decisions of the appropriate customs officer, including the legality of all orders and findings entering into the same, as to—
(1) the appraised value of merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a demand for redelivery to customs custody under any provision of the customs laws, except a determination appealable under section 1337 of this title;
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or any modification thereof;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; and
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under section 1520(c) of this title,
shall be final and conclusive upon all persons (including the United States and any officer thereof) unless a protest is filed in accordance with this section, or unless a civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, is commenced in the United States Court of International Trade in accordance with chapter 169 of Title 28 within the time prescribed by section 2636 of that title. When a judgment or order of the United States Court of International Trade has become final, the papers transmitted shall be returned, together with a copy of the judgment or order to the appropriate customs officer, who shall take action accordingly.
Section 1514 establishes the finality of Customs liquidations not properly protested, except in limited situations not including American manufacturers’ protests. Going back to the original legislative history of sections 1514 and 1516, the committee established that importers and domestic producers deserved certainty in the conduct of their affairs, a certainty which was the overriding policy behind section 1514 and section 1516 entitling importers to rely on the enacted statutes and stated congressional policy:
The effect of [section 1516] is to give the American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler the opportunity and the right to protest against any or all importations by any importer or importers. The importers, on the other hand, have no notice that such protest may be made as to their importations until after their merchandise has arrived in the United States, has been entered, and the entries liquidated. It is believed that an importer should be to some extent protected in his reliance upon an existing practice or an interpretation of the law by the Government. [Emphasis supplied.]
House Ways & Means Committee Report to Accompany H.R. 2667, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., May 9, 1929, at 180.
The various committee reports defining the scope of and policies behind the Tariff Act of 1930 also more than adequately sustain this court’s view that appellees were bound to pursue a section 1516 action in order to protest the Custom Service’s treatment of RAJ’s and Citicorp’s imports, even though their relief would be prospective only. The Senate Finance Committee expressly recognized the special nature of this route through which American industry could voice its objections to international trade-related matters.
Section 516 for the first time recognized that the American producer has an interest in appraisement and classification of imported merchandise. It was there provided that the domestic manufacturer might protest against the appraisement or classification of merchandise of a [1554] class or kind produced by him. [Emphasis supplied.]
Senate Finance Committee Report to Accompany H.R. 2667, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 4, 1929, at 73-74.
With utmost clarity, Congress evinced its intent that section 1516 provide the exclusive remedy for American industry protests. Appellees’ actions in bypassing the statutory procedure fly in the face of both the plain meaning of the statute and congressional intent.
Appellees failed to follow the carefully prescribed framework Congress established, because invocation of section 1516 could not have prevented the completion of appellants, RAJ’s and Citicorp’s importation of ethanol mixtures prior to November 2 free of 901.50 duty. But, section 1516 was not designed to provide domestic industry with such authority. The entire procedure of section 1516 could not have resulted in anything but a prospective decision and application regarding value and/or classification. What section 1516 could do, and would have done if invoked, was to prevent future RAJ or Citicorp shipments of ethanol from entering the country at the lower TSUS rate, supposing the reviewing court agreed with the later Customs view. As to the shipments already begun, appel-lees had no remedy and the law sometimes affords no remedies for injurious actions taken. See, e.g., Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510, 43 S.Ct. 437, 438, 67 L.Ed. 773 (1923); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hickel, 435 F.2d 440, 447, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 368 (1970) (“if [an agency] issue[s] and interprets] regulations which are rational and supportable in their general application, [the agency] cannot necessarily be charged with unreasonableness because in particular applications the regulations and general interpretations may grind with a rough edge”). It may be noted, moreover, even if appellees could impose 901.50 on the involved shipments, no payments to appellees would ensue, and they would continue to suffer whatever injury they have suffered now from the few tanker loads that RAJ and Citicorp brought in at the old rate. Retroactive assessment upon RAJ and Citicorp would not take those loads out of the United States market or return them to the country of origin, and their impact on the United States domestic market would remain unchanged. Because appellees sought retroactive assessment of duty which is impermissible within the statutory framework of section 1516 or any other trade law, their relief would be consistently inappropriate to make them whole.
The trial court may have supposed that section 1516 was only for litigation of nonfrivolous issues as to rates of duty applicable, and not for lawless failure by Customs officers to obey any law. He recognized, as we have said, no right to limit the retroactive effect of a change in practice. Once Customs had determined that 901.50 applied to mixtures including ethanol, any Customs’ action thereafter excusing any importer from paying such duty was to the court a blatantly lawless act. Whatever validity there might be to a view that section 1516 is not the remedy in some cases of that kind, this is not one. We take judicial notice that the practice of limiting the retroactive effect of changed rulings is very old in the history of the United States revenue services, and is at least respectable. There is nothing to show the Commissioner did not act in good faith in reliance on regulations and practices he would have been obliged to consider regular.
As with any other agency, Customs may and has established uniform practices upon which importers may rely. 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(b)-(e). Customs may also, through its Commissioner or the Secretary of the Treasury, interpret the Customs laws regarding the collection of duties. 19 U.S.C. § 3. Section 3 provides: “The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the superintendence of the collection of the duties on imports as he shall judge best.” (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously the Secretary and the Commissioner, through powers delegated by the Secretary, have discretionary authority to determine when, how, and how much duty is to be collected. Id. See also Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 153, 9 L.Ed. 373 (1836); Tracy v. Swartw-[1555] out, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 94, 9 L.Ed. 354 (1836); Arbuckle Bros. v. United States, 3 Ct.Cust.App. 105, 107, TD 32362 (1912).
Any action taken by these executive branch administrators with respect to such uniform practices represents the applicable law until changed or modified. 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(a)-(c). Included in the types of uniform practices which may be affected is the effective dates of assessing and collecting tariffs. 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(e). As Justice Lamar of the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 35 S.Ct. 309, 59 L.Ed. 673 (1915), when discussing both the flexibility accorded executive branch officials and the establishment of a uniform custom:
[ ] It may be argued that while these facts and rulings prove a usage they do not establish its validity. But government is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department — on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself —even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.
Id. at 472-73, 35 S.Ct. at 313.
Appellants in the instant case looked to the executive branch’s actions to determine the law applicable to their import transactions. They relied on what it said and should have done so, regardless of possible questions being raised concerning the propriety of Customs’ interpretation. The law is the law at the time of its existence, whether wrong or not, and “practical men” have a right to rely on it at the time they perpetrate their actions.
B. Section 1581
Appellees’ brief urges that not section 1581(b), but section 1581(i) is the proper statute through which the Court of International Trade may entertain jurisdiction over the present suit. Appellees predicate this view on the assertion that section 1516 was not the channel through which suit could be brought, but rather that the Customs Service’s actions were reviewable under the general authority of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the catch-all jurisdictional grant of section 1581(i). Appellees argue that section 1581’s specific grant of review does not preclude general judicial review of actions supposedly not covered by the statute.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The general jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade is defined under 28 U.S.C. § 1581. Congress expressly stated that the jurisdiction accorded the Court of International Trade was limited to “those civil actions which arise directly out of an import transaction and involve one of the many international trade laws.” Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-417, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3729, 3745, citing House Report No. 96-1235, at 33.
Each section 1581 subsection delineates particular laws over which the Court of International Trade may assert jurisdiction. In the instant case, domestic producers sought to object to the importation of merchandise at what they considered an unlawfully low rate, a matter for section 1516 determination. See section A, supra. Subsection 1581(b) establishes jurisdiction in the Court of International Trade for such situations:
“(b) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.”
28 U.S.C. § 1581(b).
The House and Senate reports on section 1581 state that there exist certain current prerequisites for the filing of a civil action under section 1581 which are preserved by the legislation. See Customs Court Act of 1979, Senate Judiciary Committee Report to Accompany S. 1654, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 7, 1979 at 7. In discussing the prerequisites generally under an analysis [1556] of subsection (a), the reports find that “the filing and denial of a protest will continue as prerequisites to the commencement of a civil action.” Id.; House Report No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 44, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 8729, 3755. Such prerequisites naturally and logically carry over to the interpretation of subsection (b) and every other subsection under 1581, unless otherwise stated. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report notes that the prerequisites preserved include an exhaustion of the procedures specified in section 1516.