EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552
et seq.
The National Commission on Law Enforcement and Social Justice (NCLE) has appealed from the district court’s summary judgment that records withheld from it by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are exempt from disclosure under the Act’s Exemptions One and Three, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1) and (3). We conclude that the requested materials are specifically exempted from disclosure by Exemption Three as triggered by the statutes which specifically exempt disclosure, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) and 403g.
FACTS:
NCLE requested release of documents concerning the CIA’s relationships with the International Criminal Police Organization.
The Agency released one document but told NCLE that it had no others responsive to portions of the request and that the rest fell within FOIA Exemptions One and Three.
After exhausting its administrative remedies, NCLE sued to compel release of the allegedly exempt materials.
Following limited discovery, the CIA filed affidavits and a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION:
Exemption Three authorizes nondisclosure of materials specifically exempt by statute. As originally enacted, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) simply provided:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
..... (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
Courts construed this provision to include statutory provisions granting broad discretion to withhold information. In
Administrator, F.A.A.
v.
Robertson,
422 U.S. 255, 95 S.Ct. 2140, 45 L.Ed.2d 164 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court held that § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1504, was an exempting statute within the meaning of Exemption Three. Section 1104 permits the FAA administrator to withhold aviation systems analyses when he determines that disclosure “would adversely affect” the report’s subject and is not “in the interest of the public.”
To eliminate such broad administrative discretion,
Congress amended Exemption Three in 1976
to read:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (as amended by P.L. 94-409, Sept. 13, 1976).
In considering the CIA’s claim that the requested materials are exempt from disclosure under Exemption Three, our inquiry is twofold: (a) Is there a statute of the kind described by the exemption?
and (b) Is the withheld material within the disclosure exemption contemplated by that statute?
(a)
Is There An Exemption Statute?
The CIA asserts that its refusal to release the documents in question is justified under Exemption Three and the following provisions:
[T]he Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure .
50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (third proviso).
In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of any other law which require[s] the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency
50 U.S.C. § 403g.
NCLE concedes that these statutes justified nondisclosure under the previous version of Exemption Three.
See, e. g., Weiss-man v. CIA,
184 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 119, 565 F.2d 692, 694 (1977);
Phillippi v. CIA,
178 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 249, 546 F.2d 1009, 1015 n.14 (1976). It argues that the 1976 amendment legislatively overruled
Weissman
and
Philiippi
and removed 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) and 403g from the ambit of the exemption. We disagree.
In unambiguous terms, Exemption Three authorizes nondisclosure of materials specifically exempted by statutes which refer to “particular types of matter to be withheld.” We conclude that the statutes under which the CIA justifies its nondisclosure describe with sufficient particularity the types of information to be withheld.
We find support for our conclusion in the history of the 1976 amendment. The House Report expressly refers to § 403(d)(3) as an exempting statute:
This would clarify the fact that statutes such as 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) concerning security information . . . are included [within amended Exemption Three].
H.R.Rep. No. 94-880, Part II, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 14-15, n.2, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2225. Representative Abzug, primary House sponsor of the Government in the Sunshine Act, also noted that § 403 was intended to survive the amendment. 122 Cong.Rec. H9260 (daily ed. Aug. 31, 1976).
We hold that the district court concluded correctly that 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3)
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EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552
et seq.
The National Commission on Law Enforcement and Social Justice (NCLE) has appealed from the district court’s summary judgment that records withheld from it by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are exempt from disclosure under the Act’s Exemptions One and Three, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1) and (3). We conclude that the requested materials are specifically exempted from disclosure by Exemption Three as triggered by the statutes which specifically exempt disclosure, 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) and 403g.
FACTS:
NCLE requested release of documents concerning the CIA’s relationships with the International Criminal Police Organization.
The Agency released one document but told NCLE that it had no others responsive to portions of the request and that the rest fell within FOIA Exemptions One and Three.
After exhausting its administrative remedies, NCLE sued to compel release of the allegedly exempt materials.
Following limited discovery, the CIA filed affidavits and a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION:
Exemption Three authorizes nondisclosure of materials specifically exempt by statute. As originally enacted, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) simply provided:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
..... (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
Courts construed this provision to include statutory provisions granting broad discretion to withhold information. In
Administrator, F.A.A.
v.
Robertson,
422 U.S. 255, 95 S.Ct. 2140, 45 L.Ed.2d 164 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court held that § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1504, was an exempting statute within the meaning of Exemption Three. Section 1104 permits the FAA administrator to withhold aviation systems analyses when he determines that disclosure “would adversely affect” the report’s subject and is not “in the interest of the public.”
To eliminate such broad administrative discretion,
Congress amended Exemption Three in 1976
to read:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (as amended by P.L. 94-409, Sept. 13, 1976).
In considering the CIA’s claim that the requested materials are exempt from disclosure under Exemption Three, our inquiry is twofold: (a) Is there a statute of the kind described by the exemption?
and (b) Is the withheld material within the disclosure exemption contemplated by that statute?
(a)
Is There An Exemption Statute?
The CIA asserts that its refusal to release the documents in question is justified under Exemption Three and the following provisions:
[T]he Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure .
50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (third proviso).
In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of any other law which require[s] the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency
50 U.S.C. § 403g.
NCLE concedes that these statutes justified nondisclosure under the previous version of Exemption Three.
See, e. g., Weiss-man v. CIA,
184 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 119, 565 F.2d 692, 694 (1977);
Phillippi v. CIA,
178 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 249, 546 F.2d 1009, 1015 n.14 (1976). It argues that the 1976 amendment legislatively overruled
Weissman
and
Philiippi
and removed 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) and 403g from the ambit of the exemption. We disagree.
In unambiguous terms, Exemption Three authorizes nondisclosure of materials specifically exempted by statutes which refer to “particular types of matter to be withheld.” We conclude that the statutes under which the CIA justifies its nondisclosure describe with sufficient particularity the types of information to be withheld.
We find support for our conclusion in the history of the 1976 amendment. The House Report expressly refers to § 403(d)(3) as an exempting statute:
This would clarify the fact that statutes such as 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) concerning security information . . . are included [within amended Exemption Three].
H.R.Rep. No. 94-880, Part II, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 14-15, n.2, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2225. Representative Abzug, primary House sponsor of the Government in the Sunshine Act, also noted that § 403 was intended to survive the amendment. 122 Cong.Rec. H9260 (daily ed. Aug. 31, 1976).
We hold that the district court concluded correctly that 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3) and 403g remain specific exempting statutes under Exemption Three.
See also Baker v. CIA,
No. 76-0516 (D.C.Cir. May 24, 1978), slip op. at pp. 4-5, 7 (§ 403g & 403(d)(3) are within amended Exemption Three);
Goland v. CIA,
No. 76-1800 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 1978), slip op. at 17-19 (same);
Fonda v. CIA,
434 F.Supp. 498, 504 (D.D.C.1977) (discussing § 403(d)(3)).
(b)
Is The Withheld material Within The Exempting Statute? ■
NCLE argues that the material it requested was improperly considered subject to the Agency’s statutory duty of nondisclosure. However, the CIA’s affidavits explained thoroughly its reasons for resisting release of these documents.
The affidavits contained detailed information from which the district judge could conclude that release of the withheld documents “can reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources [or] methods.”
Phillippi,
178 U.S.App.D.C. at 249, 546 F.2d at 1015 n.14. NCLE does not allege, nor did it offer any proof, that the CIA’s decision to withhold the material was made in bad faith. We shall not attempt to second-guess the CIA Director who is entrusted with the responsibility and authority to make that decision.
We hold that the requested material was properly withheld under the applicable statutory provisions and Exemption Three. Appellant’s contentions raised no issue of material fact and summary judgment was proper. We need not consider the Agency's claim that the material is also exempt from disclosure under Exemption One of the FOIA.
The judgment is affirmed.