Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jackson

213 S.W.2d 116, 187 Tenn. 202, 23 Beeler 202, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 425
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedJune 12, 1948
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 213 S.W.2d 116 (Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 213 S.W.2d 116, 187 Tenn. 202, 23 Beeler 202, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. 1948).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Tomlinson

delivered the opinion of the Court.

A passenger train of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Bailway Company collided on April 2, 1943 with another of its trains at Bruce ton. L. P. Jackson, who [204]*204was a passenger on the Nashville bound train, instituted this suit for personal injuries alleged to have been received in this collision. The railroad assumed liability for any injuries proximately resulting therefrom, but has consistently taken the position in this case that there is no causal connection between the injuries or afflictions with which Jackson claimed to he suffering and the collision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for $2,750 based on the jury’s verdict. The railroad files this petition for certiorari.

Jackson suffered from what he says is a hernia and an affliction of the penis called peyronie’s disease, described by the doctors as being “similar to a callus under the skin”. The opinion is expressed by some of these doctors that the latter ailment could have been caused by a lick.

It is the insistence of the railroad that all the pain and suffering, if any, of Jackson and his loss of time came from these two ailments and, pursuant to its position that there is no evidence of a causal connection between these alleged afflictions and the collision, assigns as error the action of the Court of Appeals in not sustaining its assignment of error directed to the proposition that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for the defendant, as requested, because, so the railroad alleges, there is no competent evidence that the injuries for which damages are sought were the result of the collision. An assignment of error going to the same point asserts as error the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury that no award of damages may be made on acount of the alleged hernia or penis trouble “because there is no evidence upon which such an award of damages can be based”.

[205]*205The Court of Appeals, in considering the railroad’s in-sistences above stated, quoted from Adams v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 24 Tenn. App. 171, 141 S. W. (2d) 930, wherein it is held that in cases involving a hidden disease with respect to which a layman could have no knowledge the Court must depend upon expert testimony; and, in such case, in the absence of such evidence to establish causal connection, it is improper to submit the issue to the jury. In connection with what the Court of Appeals conceived to be the applicable rule as stated in the above mentioned case, it held that it had looked in vain through the record for evidence of a substantial nature connecting this alleged hernia and penis injury with the collision. So it is that the Court of Appeals held the law to be that in this case it could look only to expert testimony as to whether the alleged hernia and penis injury are the direct consequence of the collision and that there is no expert testimony connecting the afflictions stated with the collision; that, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that no recovery could be had for these two afflictions.

However, the Court of Appeals further held that after excluding evidence of the two alleged injuries above stated “we find ample evidence of excruciating physical pain and suffering, and mental anguish, and loss of wages, as hereinabove outlined, the aggregate amount of the actual pecuniary damages suffered being far in excess of the amount of the verdict and judgment of $2750.00. The actual loss of wages for the first year suffered by plaintiff was in excess of $4,000.00, to say nothing of the pecuniary loss sustained during the other years prior to this trial.”

[206]*206Thereupon, the Court of Appeals applied code section 10654, upon the theory that it did not affirmatively appear that the railroad was prejudiced by the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury that no recovery could be had by reason of the hernia or injury to the penis.

In its petition for certiorari the railroad insists that there is no evidence of any pain, suffering or loss of wages, other than that which came from the alleged hernia and alleged penis injury and, therefore, the Court of Appeals was in error in holding that it was not prejudiced by the erroneous failure of the trial judge to give the jury instruction in question.

There was expert testimony in this record that the hernia affliction could be remedied by a minor operation. There was other such evidence that, this was a major operation. By reason of this testimony, the trial judge instructed the jury that if the alleged hernia could have been remedied by an operation to which a person acting with ordinary care would have submitted, then any damages which resulted from a neglect or failure to submit to such an operation could not be awarded Jackson. The jury, after considering its verdict for a while, returned into Court and inquired as to whether that instruction meant that Jackson could not recover at all. After receiving'a negative reply and after having further considered as to its verdict, the jury again returned into Court and requested the judge to again read to it this special instruction as to mitigation" of damages. The instruction was again read and thereafter the jury returned into Court with the verdict stated.

■ Thus, it-is made manifest that the jury in awarding its verdict did take into consideration the hernia. Therefore, if the trial court was in error, as the Court of Ap[207]*207peals has held, in failing to give specific instructions that no recovery could be had on account of the hernia, it was prejudicial error and entitled the railroad to a reversal. Nashville & C. Railroad Co. v. McDaniel, 80 Tenn. 386, 389, 390.

The result just stated would follow since Jackson, or rather his administrator (Jackson having died since this trial) has filed no petition for certiorari or assigned error to the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that there is no competent evidence of a causal connection between the hernia and the collision, Kenner v. City Nat. Bank, 164 Tenn. 119, 124, 46 S. W. (2d) 46; Lloyds America v. Duck, 174 Tenn. 520, 522, 128 S. W. (2d) 625, unless the Court of Appeals erred, as a matter of law, in holding that only expert evidence under the facts of this case could be looked to in ascertaining whether there is any substantial evidence of a causal connection between the hernia and the collision. In the latter event, if the Court of Appeals made a mistake of law but reached the right conclusion upon an erroneous view, its conclusions will be upheld based upon the correct rule of applicable law, notwithstanding respondent’s failure to file petition for certiorari or assign error. Sheafer v. Mitchell, 109 Tenn. 181, 193, 71 S. W. 86.

So, this suit is reduced to a consideration of the question as to whether the Court of Appeals committed error, as a matter of law, under the evidence in this case in holding that only expert evidence could be examined in ascertaining whether there was any substantial evidence of a causal connection between the hernia and the collision. Consideration of that question necessitates some review of the evidence.

[208]*208Mr. Jackson was approximately fifty-seven years of age at the time of this collision.

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Bluebook (online)
213 S.W.2d 116, 187 Tenn. 202, 23 Beeler 202, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 425, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nashville-c-st-l-ry-co-v-jackson-tenn-1948.