Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Roach

94 S.W.2d 63, 19 Tenn. App. 661, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedNovember 16, 1935
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 94 S.W.2d 63 (Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Roach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Roach, 94 S.W.2d 63, 19 Tenn. App. 661, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

Opinion

DeWITT, J.

On January 11, 1933, Margie Roach, an unmarried woman twenty-five or twenty-six years of age, was fatally burned from an explosion in the kitchen of rooms which she and two other-young ladies rented and occupied in a frame residence in McMinn-ville. The explosion occurred when the deceased was in the act of making a fire in the cooking stove by pouring from a can upon some-live coals a liquid which had been purchased as coal oil from H. M. Green, a retail merchant, who had purchased it from the Standard Oil Compaq of Louisiana. In this action the father of Margie Roach, as administrator, obtained a -verdict and judgment against said company for $5,000 for negligence in selling and causing to be placed upon the market a liquid containing* gasoline or some other highly volatile and dangerous liquid which exploded with fire and caused the death of the young lady. The merchant, Green, was also sued, but the action was dismissed as to him upon motion for a directed verdict in his favor.

The sole question presented upon this appeal in error is whether or not the motion made in behalf of the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana at the close of all the evidence should have been sustained upon the ground that there was no material evidence upon which a verdict for the plaintiff could be predicated, taking the most favorable view of it for the plaintiff. The evidence has been carefully examined and considered.

It appears without dispute that the three young ladies worked at a silk mill; that they rented the house and subrented rooms in it to Mr. and Mrs. Simon and their daughter; that about 2 o’clock in the afternoon the deceased came home from her work, went into Mrs. Simon’s room, took a shovel, and got some live coals to make a fire in her stove, but stood there and talked a few minutes, then took the coals from the front room through the middle room into her own kitchen; that two or three minutes later Mrs. Simon heard *664 a noise like that of an explosion, which shook the house, accompanied by a, scream; that upon hurrying to the kitchen she found it all afire; that the smoke in the room was dense, but the noise of the flames could be heard; that city firemen came and found the kitchen and the next room in a solid flame, and the body of the young' lady was found in the front room with her clothes burned' nearly off and her body burned over her chest and abdomen; that the cooking stove was lying on its side on the floor; that this was a little box stove that stood on pine blocks about three feet from the floor, having four “eyes,” a door across the front with small holes in it, an apron in front fastened to the stove with a pin, the door having small holes in it and being fastened with hinges and pins; that after the fire Mr. Simon found the stove with one leg broken off, one side burst, the caps and crossbars scattered to different parts of the room from four to six feet; that he also found a five-gallon oil can about six feet from the stove, about eighteen inches from the door from the kitchen to the bedroom in the line from the stove to the front window where the body of the deceased was found; that the can had a large spout and a small spout; the large spout was closed and the small spout was open. Mr. Simon testified without contradiction that the can was in the same condition at the trial as it was when thus found, and was the same can the young ladies used and the same in which he saw the liquid placed on the Monday afternoon preceding the explosion on Wednesday. This can is exhibited with the transcript as a part of the record before us.

The can is of galvanized iron. On the middle of the top is a small cap (for reception of liquid) screwed on tight. The can is mashed into an oval shape. It has a dent in one side. The bottom of it is torn loose about halfway and hangs down about eight inches. Whether this condition was due to an internal explosion of its contents, and, if so, when it occurred; or it was due to external force when the stove collapsed — are questions difficult to determine from any evidence. It was on Monday afternoon, January 9th, that the liquid one gallon was purchased by the young ladies and poured into the can by an employee of Green’s — the employee a boy named Hale, who was dead at the time of the trial. It was the liquid obtained by Green from the Standard Oil Company prior to that Monday afternoon that contained this one gallon. On Saturday, January 7th, the company delivered to Green in his tank fifty gallons as kerosene.

The can was found after the fire, among débris. The witness T. J. Keenan, a technician of the gasoline inspection unit of :the state, who visited the house the day after the fire, testified without contradiction that he found the can under débris, and that “possibly” it was under pieces of timber; that he brought the can to the laboratory at Nashville.

*665 Tbe jury manifestly found that tbe defendant company bad furnished to tbe merchant as kerosene a liquid containing gasoline or some other highly volatile and dangerous substance; that it was some of this liquid which caused the explosion; and that the deceased was not negligent, because she thought that she was using kerosene in the ordinary'way to kindle a fire. This verdict was based upon circumstantial evidence, for no living person could testify as to just how the explosion occurred. It is strongly urged that the verdict was based on mere guess or conjecture. There must be more than a mere probability that the defendant was negligent. But the plaintiff is not bound to exclude the possibilty1 that the accident might have happened from some other cause than that alleged. He is only required to satisfy the jury by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it resulted from the cause alleged. The facts must tend to exclude any other cause, but the inference of exclusion of any other cause than that alleged need not be urged beyond mere doubt; and where, after a fair consideration of the circumstantial evidence, the more reasonable probability is in favor of negligence, the case is for the jury. 45 C. J., p. 1267, sec. 835; Nashville Railway & Light Co. v. Harrison, 5 Tenn. App., 22. A theory cannot be satisfactorily established by circumstantial evidence in a civil case, unless the facts and circumstances shown are not only consistent with such theory, but inconsistent with any other reasonable theory, and such must be shown by the preponderance of the evidence. See Crowe v. Birmingham & N. W. Railroad Co., 2 Tenn. App., 634. However, the rule as to guess or conjecture does not contemplate that the evidence shall exclude the possiblity that the injury might have resulted from a cause other than that alleged. Such possibility is not to be allowed to defeat a recovery, where the evidence discloses sufficient facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that the thing charged was the prime cause. Nashville Railway & Light Co. v. Harrison, supra. In view of the issue before us, all of the evidence admitted by the trial court has been carefully examined, for in the disposition 'of the assignment that it was error to overrule the motion for a directed verdict, it is our duty to take into consideration the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff and such parts of the evidence introduced on behalf of the defendant as are not in conflict with 'the evidence for the plaintiff, disregarding all of the defendant’s evidence that is contradicted by or inconsistent with the evidence for the plaintiff. Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. Phillips, 17 Tenn.

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Bluebook (online)
94 S.W.2d 63, 19 Tenn. App. 661, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-oil-co-of-louisiana-v-roach-tennctapp-1935.