Napolitano v. Synthes USA, LLC

297 F.R.D. 194, 2014 WL 346820, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11170
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJanuary 30, 2014
DocketCiv. No. 3:09CV828 (TLM)
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 297 F.R.D. 194 (Napolitano v. Synthes USA, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Napolitano v. Synthes USA, LLC, 297 F.R.D. 194, 2014 WL 346820, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11170 (D. Conn. 2014).

Opinion

DISCOVERY RULING

HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is a product liability case involving a medical implant device called a locking reconstruction plate (“LRP”), designed for use [197]*197on the human jaw.1 [Amend. Compl. Doe. # 188]. Plaintiff alleges that defendant negligently and recklessly manufactured and sold the plate; failed to provide adequate warnings/instructions; and breached an implied warranty of merchantability and express warranties. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-572m, et seq. [Doc. # 188]. As a result of a fractured plate, plaintiff alleges she suffered an exacerbation of her pre-existing mandibular condition, suffered and continues to suffer emotional distress, pain and suffering, and has incurred medical and hospital expenses for the replacement of this defective plate and the consequential medical care arising therefrom. [Doe. # 188 at ¶¶ 7-10].

The plate at issue was sold by Synthes on August 4, 2003; implanted in Ms. Napolitano on May 1, 2006; and fractured approximately six weeks later. [Doc. # 188 at ¶ 3]. On July 27, 2007, plaintiff underwent surgery to replace it. Id. at ¶ 4.

Pursuant to the Court’s order dated October 29, 2013, [doc. # 131], plaintiff filed a Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Synthes’ Responses to Requests for Admissions [Doc. # 146] and Motion to Compel Production [Doc. # 147], also referred to as omnibus discovery motions, to wrap-up all outstanding discovery issues. Oral argument was held on January 13, 2014.

Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Synthes’ Responses to Requests for Admissions [Doc. # 146]

Pending are plaintiffs Requests for Admission (“RFA”), dated April 30, 2012 and October 2, 2013. Defendant served its responses on May 10, 2013, and January 9, 2014. [Doe. # 161]. The matter was briefed and is ripe for decision. [Doc. # 146, 161].

Requests for Admission dated April 30, 2012

Outstanding are RFAs Nos. 71, 74, 77, 81, 134, 145, 149, 156-58, 168, 170, 198, 205-06, 214-15, 219-20, 224-25, 230-32, 236-38, 242-44, 246, 248, 251, 253, 261, 264, 266, 269, and 270-75. At oral argument, plaintiff withdrew RFA Nos. 106, 139, and 169. Defendant “acknowledges that it erroneously denied that the exhibit document described in admission request No. 121 could be imputed to Synthes, and will serve an amended response stating that Synthes, through Mr. Simpson, a former Synthes employee, had knowledge of the contents of the document.” [Doc. # 161 at 2].

Imputed Corporate Knowledge from Synthes Documents

Most of the RFAs at issue relate to requests asking defendant to admit or deny imputed corporate knowledge from Synthes documents. These are RFAs Nos. 71, 74, 77, 81, 134, 145, 156-158, 168, 170, 198, 205-06, 214-15, 219-20, 224-25, 230-32, 236-38, 242-244, 248-53, 261, 266.

-Documents Where No Synthes Employee is Identified

Defendant states that many of the RFAs relate to documentary exhibits for which no Synthes employee is identified as an author or recipient. These are RFAs Nos. 71, 74, 77, 81, 134, 145, 156-58, 168, 170, 198, 248, 253, 261, and 266. “Consequently, it impossible to tell which Synthes employee(s) had knowledge of the documents, and whether such employee(s) had power to bind Synthes or had a duty to give information to Synthes. All but one of the Synthes employees who were identified in exhibits to admission requests as recipients of documents have been deposed, but none were questioned regarding the scope of their authority with respect to such documents.” [Doc. # 161 at 2], The documents referenced in these RFAs were appended as defendant’s Ex. 1 to its opposition to plaintiffs motion and were reviewed by the Court. [Doc. # 161, Ex. 1].

Plaintiff contends that “Synthes’ admission that its employees knew of these documents, while denying that such knowledge may be imputable to Synthes is disingenuous ... in particular, each [response] stated a conclusion but did not detail which employee knew, or what their job responsibilities were, and Synthes does not explain why any particular employee’s notice or knowledge is not within [198]*198the scope of his employment or should not be imputed to it.” [Doc. # 146 at 6], The Court is perplexed how Synthes could provide this information in a response to these RFAs when none of the documents identify an author or recipient. Accordingly, the parts of the response denying imputation of knowledge to Synthes are sufficient as to RFAs Nos. 71, 74, 77, 81, 134, 145, 156-58, 168, 170, 198, 247-48, 253, 261, and 266.

-Documents Where a Synthes Employee is Identified

RFP Nos. 205-06 (Stephen Bresina and Mark Michels); 214-15 (David Wheatley and Bryan Griffiths); 219-20 (David Wheatley and Bryan Griffiths); 224-25 (“Acknowledgment Synthes Product Development Team B. Griffiths, Maxillofacial PD, S. Lawrence, Mechanical Testing and D. Wheatley, Mechanical Testing”); 230-32 (Ron Baulista, Charles Beale, Cal Stewart, Ross Hamel); 236-38 (Ron Baulista, Charles Beale, Darrin M. Chastain, Drew DiStefano, Ross Hamel); and 242-44 (Darrin M. Chastain, Cal Stewart) reference documents which identify one or more Synthes employees.

Defendant states that none of the employees deposed by plaintiff were queried on their scope of employment and their ability to bind the corporation and this information is not properly provided in a denial of an RFA under the Rule.2 Defendant contends that most of the documents relate back to the 1990s, and some of the employees are no longer employed by Synthes. Plaintiff has made no showing that these individuals are current Synthes employees or that the information is within defendant’s control. T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 38, 43 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“Generally, a ‘reasonable inquiry’ is limited to review and inquiry of those persons and documents that are within the responding party’s control.”).

“While the basic purpose of discovery is to elicit facts and information and to obtain production of documents, Rule 36 was not designed for this purpose. Instead, requests for admission are used to establish admission of facts about which there is no real dispute.” 7 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 36.02[1] at 36-5 (3d ed. 2012); T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc., 174 F.R.D. at 42 (“Rule 36 is not a discovery device.”). If the responding party intends to deny a portion of a requested admission, it must so state, and must “specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a).

Here, defendant denies that “such knowledge is imputable to Synthes,” rather than stating that after a ‘reasonable inquiry’ it lacks information necessary to admit or deny the request. Synthes may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless it has made such inquiry. T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc., 174 F.R.D. at 43 (citations omitted); Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 91 F.R.D.

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297 F.R.D. 194, 2014 WL 346820, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/napolitano-v-synthes-usa-llc-ctd-2014.