Myers v. McGrady

613 S.E.2d 334, 170 N.C. App. 501, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1087

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 7, 2005
• Docket: COA04-973
• Status: Published

Opinions

WYNN, Judge.

The public duty doctrine is an exception to the Tort Claims Act and shields the State from liability for negligence claims arising from the alleged failure of law enforcement to prevent misconduct by a third party and the alleged failure of a state agency to detect and prevent misconduct of a third party through improper inspections. Here, Third-Party Defendants North Carolina Division of Forest Resources and North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Division of Forest Resources”) argue that the public duty doctrine shields them from liability for claims of negligence arising from a forest ranger’s alleged actions and inactions in dealing with a forest fire. Because this case fits into neither established category of the public duty doctrine’s application, we affirm the trial court’s holding that the public duty doctrine does not shield the Division of Forest Resources.

The record reflects that, on 9 June 2002, a multiple-vehicle accident occurred on 1-95 in Northhampton County, North Carolina, resulting in the death of Darryl Myers, who was a passenger in a vehicle driven by J. C. Myers, also killed in the accident. According to the complaint filed by Gail M. Myers as administratrix of the estate of Darryl Myers, at the time of the accident, a forest fire produced smoke which, combined with fog, obscured the vision of travelers.

Ms. Myers alleged that the accident occurred as a result of the following facts: Upon driving into the 1-95 area obscured by smoke and fog, Shirley McGrady “negligently stopped” a vehicle to switch seats with the owner and passenger in the vehicle, Thomas W. Higgins. Ms. Myers alleged that Higgins “negligently failed to instruct [Ms. McGrady] to get the vehicle out of the travel lane and into the emergency lane.” Thereafter, a chain-reaction of rear-end collisions occurred when Michael P. Murphy drove his vehicle into the rear of the stopped Higgins vehicle; John Foust, driving a tractor-trailer, struck the rear of Murphy’s vehicle; and J. C. Myers, driving the vehicle in which Darryl Myers rode as a passenger, rear-ended the tractor-trailer. Ms. Myers alleged that Foust’s liability was imputed to William A. Spencer, Jr., the owner of the tractor-trailer. She alleged the negligence of all Defendants proximately caused Darryl Myers’ death.

Thereafter, Defendants brought third-party complaints against the Division of Forest Resources and its employee, Michael Bennett. The third-party complaints alleged that Bennett, a county forest ranger, negligently failed to extinguish a forest fire, left a still smoldering forest fire, and failed to protect motorists and warn motorists of the danger of reduced visibility caused by smoke and fog. Third-Party Plaintiffs (Defendants to Ms. Myers’ action) further alleged that any negligence on their part was “secondary to the primary and active negligence” of the Division of Forest Resources, which entitled them to indemnification.

In response, the Division of Forest Resources and Bennett moved for dismissal of the third-party claims. On 24 February 2004, the trial court denied the motion as to the Division of Forest Resources but granted the motion as to Bennett. In March 2004, the trial court allowed Ms. Myers to amend her complaint to add claims against the Division of Forest Resources and denied the Division of Forest Resources’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

This appeal follows from the orders denying dismissal of the claims against the Division of Forest Resources.

Preliminarily, we note that the Division of Forest Resources appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss. These orders are interlocutory, i.e., “made during the pendency of an action which do not dispose of the case, but instead leave it for further action by the trial court to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Carriker v. Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73, 511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999); Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (same). Generally, there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 291, 420 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1992); Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). However, we take this appeal pursuant to North Carolina General Statute section 7A-27(d)(l), allowing review of interlocutory orders affecting a “substantial right,” because the appeal of an interlocutory order raising issues of sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine affects a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(1) (2004); Derwort v. Polk County, 129 N.C. App. 789, 790-91, 501 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1998) (a substantial right was affected where Polk County asserted the public duty doctrine); Hedrick v. Rains, 121 N.C. App. 466, 468, 466 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1996) (‘•‘[W]e have held that orders denying dispositive motions grounded on the defense of governmental immunity are immediately reviewable as affecting a substantial right.”).

On appeal, the Division of Forest Resources argues that the trial court erroneously failed to find that the complaints against it were barred by the public duty doctrine.

Under North Carolina law, the State Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity by permitting actions against the State for negligence committed by State employees in the course of their employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291 (2004); Zimmer v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 87 N.C. App. 132, 134, 360 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1987) (“By enactment of the Tort Claims Act, . . . the General Assembly partially waived the sovereign immunity of the State to the extent that it consented that the State could be sued for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of a State employee acting within the scope of his employment.” (citation omitted)). However, in 1991, our Supreme Court adopted the public duty doctrine, which provides an exception to the Tort Claims Act.

The general common law rule, known as the public duty doctrine, is that a municipality and its agents act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals. This rule recognizes the limited resources of law enforcement and refuses to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability for failure to prevent every criminal act.

Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 370-71, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991) (citations omitted); Lassiter v. Cohn, 168 N.C. App. 310, 315-16, 607 S.E.2d 688, 692 (2005) (same). In Braswell, the decedent’s son sued his father, who killed his mother, as well as the county sheriff. The plaintiffs claims against the county sheriff included negligent failure to protect the decedent, a claim the Supreme Court held was barred by the public duty doctrine.

In 1998, our Supreme Court applied the public duty doctrine to state agencies required to conduct inspections for the public’s general protection. Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711 (1998). In Stone, decedents’ estates brought suit, alleging the Department of Labor breached its statutory duty to inspect a food products plant where, inter alia, exits were inadequate and blocked, and decedents were unable to escape a plant fire. Our Supreme Court held that “[j]ust as we [in Braswell] ‘refused to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability [on law enforcement] for failure to prevent every criminal act,’ we now refuse to judicially impose an overwhelming burden of liability on defendants for failure to prevent every employer’s negligence that results in injuries or deaths to employees.” Id. at 481, 495 S.E.2d at 716. The Supreme Court applied this same reasoning again in Hunt v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 499 S.E.2d 747 (1998). In that case, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries received on an amusement park go-kart. A Department of Labor inspector had approved the go-karts although the seatbelts were not in compliance with State rules and regulations. The Supreme Court held that “[t]o hold contrary to our holding in Stone, in which we held that the defendants’ failure to inspect did not create liability, would be tantamount to imposing liability on defendant in this case solely for inspecting the go-karts and not discovering them to be in violation of the Code[,]” and the Department of Labor “would become a virtual guarantor of the safety of every go-kart subject to its inspection, thereby, exposing it to an overwhelming burden of liability for failure to detect every code violation or defect.” Id. at 198-99, 499 S.E.2d at 751 (quotation omitted).

After Braswell, this Court interpreted the public duty doctrine to apply to public duties beyond those related to law enforcement protection. See Moses v. Young, 149 N.C. App. 613, 616, 561 S.E.2d 332, 334-35 (providing extensive review of the application of the public duty doctrine), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 165, 568 S.E.2d 199 (2002).³

In response to this expansion, in Lovelace, 351 N.C. at 461, 526 S.E.2d at 654, our Supreme Court stated that “we have never expanded the public duty doctrine to any local government agencies other than law enforcement departments when they are exercising their general duty to protect the public” and made clear that “the public duty doctrine, as it applies to local government, is limited to the facts of Braswell,”⁴ Lovelace did not concern state agencies or departments but nevertheless noted that “this Court has extended the public duty doctrine to state agencies required by statute to conduct inspections for the public’s general protection . ...” Id. The Supreme Court underscored its Lovelace holding in Thompson v. Waters, 351 N.C. 462, 526 S.E.2d 650 (2000), filed the same day as Lovelace, by refusing to extend the application of the public duty doctrine to a county for alleged negligent inspection of a private home.

Thus, after Lovelace, it appears that the public duty doctrine applies where plaintiffs allege negligence through (a) failure of law enforcement to provide protection from the misconduct of others, and (b) failure of state departments or agencies to detect and prevent misconduct of others through improper inspections.

The instant case fits into neither of these applications. As to the first application, law enforcement officers have been defined as: “Any officer of the State of North Carolina or any of its political subdivisions authorized to make arrests . . .[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.1 (2004), and “[a]n employee or volunteer of an employer who possesses the power of arrest, who has taken the law enforcement oath . . ., and who is certified as a law enforcement officer under the provisions of Chapter 17C of the General Statutes or certified as a deputy sheriff under the provisions of Chapter 17E of the General Statutes.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115B-1(3) (2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 128-21(llb) (2004) (same).

Here, the third-party complaints assert claims against the Division of Forest Resources based on the alleged negligence of its employee, a county forest ranger. Under North Carolina General Statute section 113-55, which enumerates the powers and authority of forest rangers, a forest ranger is expressly not granted authority to make arrests and is expressly not a criminal justice officer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-55 (2004) (“This subsection may not be interpreted to confer the power of arrest on forest rangers, and does not make them criminal justice officers within the meaning of G.S. 17C-2.”).⁵ Because the employee subjecting the Division of Forest Resources to potential liability was not a law enforcement officer, the application of the public duty doctrine to allegations of negligent failure of a law enforcement officer to provide protection from the misconduct of others is not applicable.

Moreover, the bases of the claims here are the forest ranger’s alleged failure to extinguish a forest fire, failure to protect motorists and warn motorists of reduced visibility due to smoke and fog, and negligently leaving a still smoldering forest fire. There are no allegations of negligence due to the forest ranger’s failure to detect and prevent misconduct of others through improper inspections, and the statutes enumerating forest ranger duties do not indicate that inspection duties akin to the duties in Stone and Hunt exist. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-54 (2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-55.

In sum, after Lovelace, the cases in which the public duty doctrine applies are those in which plaintiffs allege negligence through (a) failure of law enforcement to provide protection from the misconduct of others, and (b) failure of state departments or agencies to detect and prevent misconduct of others through improper inspections. The instant case falls into neither of those categories. Moreover, because our Supreme Court in “Lovelace [] sought to reign in the expansion of the public duty doctrine’s application to other government agencies[,]” Lassiter, - N.C. App. at —, 607 S.E.2d at 692, even if the sought extension in Lovelace was as to local government rather than the State, we decline to extend the public duty doctrine to the Division of Forest Resources in this case. We therefore find the Division of Forest Resources’ argument that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to dismiss the complaints because the complaints were barred by the public duty doctrine to be without merit.

The Division of Forest Resources next argues that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss complaints made under the Tort Claims Act by Third-Party Plaintiffs where the complaints against the forest ranger individually had been dismissed.

Where “[t]he record does not contain anything in the pleadings, transcripts, or otherwise, to indicate that [an] issue ... was presented to the trial court... we refuse to address the issue for the first time on appeal.” Bell v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 146 N.C. App. 725, 728, 554 S.E.2d 399, 402 (2001) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)); Creasman v. Creasman, 152 N.C. App. 119, 123, 566 S.E.2d 725, 728 (2002) (“A contention not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” (citations omitted)). Here, the record reflects that the Division of Forest Resources did not raise this argument before the trial court. Indeed, when, at the hearing, the trial court declined to dismiss as to the Division of Forest Resources but dismissed the claims against the forest ranger individually, the trial court explicitly asked the Division of Forest Resources if they would like to be heard. The only response was, “Thank you, Your Honor.” Because the Division of Forest Resources has not preserved its second argument for appellate review, we do not address it.

The Division of Forest Resources further argues that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss complaints against it where the complaints failed to allege waiver of sovereign immunity.

As discussed above, where “[t]he record does not contain anything in the pleadings, transcripts, or otherwise, to indicate that [an] issue . . . was presented to the trial court.. . we refuse to address the issue for the first time on appeal.” Bell, 146 N.C. App. at 728, 554 S.E.2d at 402. Here, the record reflects that the Division of Forest Resources raised this argument neither in its motions to dismiss nor at the hearing. Because the Division of Forest Resources has not preserved its third argument for appellate review, we do not address it.⁶

Lastly, the Division of Forest Resources argues that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to dismiss Ms. Myers’ complaint against it where the North Carolina General Assembly has failed to waive the State’s immunity from suit for negligence except in the Industrial Commission. The Division of Forest Resources contends that, while the other defendants may be able to bring it in as a third party, Ms. Myers, the original plaintiff, is required to pursue her claim in the Industrial Commission. We disagree.

As this Court recently stated in Batts v. Batts, 160 N.C. App. 554, 557-58, 586 S.E.2d 550, 552-53 (2003):

Under the clear language of Rule 14(a), once a third-party defendant is added to a lawsuit, a plaintiff may assert claims directly against the third-party defendant, subject only to the limitation that the claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s original claim against the original defendant.

The Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity. By the addition of Rule 14(c), the General Assembly created an exception to the general rule that claims against the State under the Tort Claims Act must be pursued before the Industrial Commission as to third-party claims. The 1975 amendment to Rule 14 does not place any limitations on the application of Rule 14(a) to claims against the State. Rule 14 must be construed as a whole and not in separate parts. By adding subsection (c) to Rule 14, the General Assembly waived the State’s immunity to claims brought by a plaintiff under Rule 14(a), subject to the express limitations contained therein. “It is always presumed that the legislature acted with care and deliberation and with full knowledge of prior and existing law.” State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 658-59, 174 S.E.2d 793, 804-05 (1970). Since the claims asserted by plaintiff against NCDOT are identical to those asserted by defendant Batts against NCDOT, and since these claims arise out of the same transaction and occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s original claim, plaintiff is permitted to assert its claims against NCDOT under the provisions of Rule 14.

Similarly, here, Ms. Myers’ allegations as to the Division of Forest Resources are identical to those made by Third-Party Plaintiffs, and the claims arise out of the same transaction and occurrence that was the subject matter of Plaintiffs original claim. Ms. Myers, like Third-Party Plaintiffs, alleges negligence for failing to extinguish a forest fire, leaving a still smoldering forest fire, and failing to protect motorists and warn motorists of the danger of reduced visibility caused by smoke and fog. Ms. Myers contends this negligence proximately caused the death by vehicular accident of Darryl Myers, the transaction and occurrence out of which her original claim arose. We therefore find the Division of Forest Resources’ argument that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the trial court.

Affirmed.

Judge ELMORE concurs. Judge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part.

3 . We note that one such case, Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 457 S.E.2d 902 (1995), extended the public duty doctrine’s application to a town fire department and fire chief, a scenario similar to the case at bar. However, in light of Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000), Davis was explicitly overruled. Willis v. Town of Beaufort, 143 N.C. App. 106, 544 S.E.2d 600 (2001).

4 . In a recent case, Lassiter v. Cohn, 168 N.C. App. 310, 318, 607 S.E.2d 688, 693-94 (2005), this Court applied the public duty doctrine to a law enforcement official’s alleged negligent failure to prevent third-party misconduct not as to criminal acts, as in Braswell, but regarding a traffic accident.

5 . Under North Carolina General Statute section 17C-2, criminal justice officers are:

The administrative and subordinate personnel of all the departments, agencies, units or entities comprising the criminal justice agencies who are sworn law-enforcement officers, both State and local, with the power of arrest; State correctional officers; State probation/parole officers; State probation/parole officers-surveillance; officers, supervisory and administrative personnel of local confinement facilities; State juvenile justice officers; chief court counselors; and juvenile court counselors.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 17C-2 (2004).

6 . The dissent concedes that the Division of Forest Resources failed specifically to state failure to allege waiver of sovereign immunity as a grounds for dismissal in its motions to dismiss and at the hearing. Nevertheless, the dissent deems this issue preserved for appellate review. We disagree. Our courts have made clear that new legal theories may not he raised on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 624, 565 S.E.2d 22, 44 (2002) (Where the defendant, in his pretrial motion to suppress and again prior to sentencing, contended that his plea was not entered freely, voluntarily, and knowingly and did not make arguments based on due process, the defendant “abandoned his due process position at trial and cannot now revitalize it on appeal.” (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10; State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 149, 456 S.E.2d 789, 805 (1995); Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 6, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934) (“[T]he record discloses that the cause was not tried upon [the defendant’s] theory, and the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts to get a better mount in the Supreme Court.”))). Moreover, North Carolina General Statutes section 1A-1, Rule 46, quoted and discussed by the dissent, requires that a party “make[] known” not only the action the party desires the court to make, but also “the party’s grounds for its position.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 46(b) (2004). Here, the Division of Forest Resources failed to make this ground known prior to its appeal, for which it is not preserved.