Mutaz Alshara v. Mastercard Incorporated; Mastercard International Incorporated

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

MUTAZ ALSHARA,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-12016 v. Honorable Brandy R. McMillion United States District Judge MASTERCARD INCORPORATED, MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED,

Defendants. /

OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL

This is a pro se civil case filed by Plaintiff Mutaz Alshara (“Plaintiff”) against Defendants Mastercard Incorporated, and Mastercard International Incorporated (collectively, “Defendants”). See generally ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has also filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without the Prepayment of Fees or Costs. ECF No. 2. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, but this case is SUMMARILY DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim for which relief can be granted, and Plaintiff’s state law claims should be litigated in state court. I.

Plaintiff is seeking civil redress against Defendant relating to an alleged $36.00 fraudulent charge on his debit card. See ECF No. 1, PageID.1. He alleges that Defendants, through their Automatic Billing Updater service, allowed a third- party merchant to continue to charge him a monthly recurring

membership/subscription fee. Id. at PageID.7. Plaintiff claims that he purposefully changed his debit card number so the third-party merchant could not continue to bill him monthly subscription charges. Id. at PageID.1.

Plaintiff brings claims under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (Count I), the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL § 445.901 et seq. (Count II), the Sherman Act, 15 USC §§ 1, 2 (Counts III and IV), Negligence (Count V), Conversion (Count VI), Unjust Enrichment (Count VII), and

Invasion of Privacy – Intrusion Upon Seclusion (Count VIII). See ECF No. 1, PageID.16-24. He seeks actual damages in the amount of $36.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $75,000,000. Id. at PageID.24-25.

II. Plaintiff has filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without the Prepayment of Fees and Costs (in forma pauperis), which based on his financial status, the Court GRANTS. ECF No. 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court

is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Brooks v. Holstege, No. 16-12501, 2016 WL 3667961, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2016). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 325 (1989). The Court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it is based on a meritless legal theory. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his

pleadings liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, pro se pleadings remain subject to summary dismissal. A complaint doesn’t need detailed factual allegations, but it must include enough facts to suggest a plausible claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Put differently, complaints must contain enough factual matter, taken as true, to suggest that the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible when

the facts allow a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is responsible for the alleged misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. III. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), if the “court determines at

any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Houston v. Garland, No. 2:22-cv-13036, 2023 WL 3212335, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May

2, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-1530, 2024 WL 1925936 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024). Federal Courts have jurisdiction to hear two types of cases: (1) cases presenting a federal question arising under the United States Constitution, federal laws or treaties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) cases based on diversity of citizenship where

a citizen of one state sues a citizen of another state or nation and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As an initial matter, the Court notes that it only has federal question

jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff alleges that the Court also has diversity jurisdiction, but that is not so. The allegations of the Complaint place at issue a $36.00 debit card transaction. This certainly is far short of the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement necessary to proceed under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

That Plaintiff also seeks $75,000,000 in punitive damages is insufficient to confer jurisdiction because the Court is not required to consider fictitious or fantastical numbers that would simply manufacture jurisdiction. See e.g., Randall v. Pitzer, 23

F. App’x 532, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (subjective belief that claim is worth more than $75,000, without more, is insufficient to establish the statutory jurisdictional amount). As to Count I, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim under

the EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. The EFTA was enacted as part of the comprehensive Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r

(“CCPA”) and “protects individual consumer rights by ‘provid[ing] a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems.’” Clemmer v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 539 F.3d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b)). However, Plaintiff’s Complaint

fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim, even under the statute’s broad construction. Plaintiff states that Defendants enrolled him in an Automatic Billing Updater service and therefore facilitated the unauthorized electronic funds transfer.

Id. at PageID.17. But what is absent is any factual assertions relating to the cancellation of the underlying service, notice to the Defendants that Plaintiff had done so, or that the third-party merchant was prohibited from continuing to charge the monthly subscription fees. Failure to plead these things with particularity, even

under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints, fails to state a plausible claim for relief. Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a valid claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. Count I is therefore subject to

dismissal. The other federal claims, Counts III and IV, brought pursuant to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 also fail to state a plausible claim for relief. As this Court has previously informed Plaintiff:

“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).

Simply possessing monopoly power is not a violation of § 2. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447–48 (2009).

Alshara v. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, et al., Case 2:26- cv-11934-SJM-CI (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2026) (ECF No. 5, PageID.37-38). Again here, even if the complaint has enough allegations regarding monopoly power, it contains no allegations that Defendants “willfully acquired or maintained its monopoly power as opposed to developed it ‘as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Consequently, these Sherman Act claims are similarly dismissed. That leaves Plaintiff’s state law claims under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL § 445.901 et seq. (Count II), Negligence (Count V), Conversion (Count VI), Unjust Enrichment (Count VII), and Invasion of Privacy –

Intrusion Upon Seclusion (Count VIII). See ECF No. 1, PageID.18-24. District courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Given the dismissal of the alleged federal

claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Therefore, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice and

instructs Plaintiff that he can refile those claims in state court, if he desires. IV. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s alleged federal claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (Count I) and 15 USC §§ 1, 2 (Counts III and IV) are summarily DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The remaining state law claims (Counts II, V-VIII) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, to be refiled in state court, if Plaintiff so

desires. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court finds this action frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and any appeal of this order would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962);

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 610–11. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is reminded that he has been ENJOINED from filing anything further in this Court without seeking leave of the

Court. See Case No. 2:26-cv-11929-MFL-CI (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2026) (ECF No. 9, PageID.64-65). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 27, 2026 s/Brandy R. McMillion Hon. Brandy R. McMillion United States District Judge