Murray v. Beyer Memorial Hospital

Michigan Supreme Court

Murray v. Beyer Memorial Hospital

293 N.W.2d 341, 409 Mich. 217, 1980 Mich. LEXIS 235

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedJune 30, 1980

DocketDocket Nos. 61673, 61674. (Calendar No. 7)

StatusPublished

Cited by28 cases

This text of 293 N.W.2d 341 (Murray v. Beyer Memorial Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Murray v. Beyer Memorial Hospital, 293 N.W.2d 341, 409 Mich. 217, 1980 Mich. LEXIS 235 (Mich. 1980).

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Opinions

Kavanagh, J.

This case involves two complaints, consolidated on appeal, for alleged negligence in the care and treatment of a child at the time of her birth on November 29, 1970. The parents’ complaint was filed on November 28, 1972. The complaint on behalf of the child was filed on February 23, 1973. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary and/or accelerated judgment on the ground that the hospital was engaged in a governmental function and was therefore immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The circuit court granted the hospital accelerated judgment on December 3, 1975. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion on June 12, 1978. Application for leave to appeal to this Court was filed on June 28, 1978.

On December 27, 1978 this Court rendered a decision in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978). Subsequently we granted leave to determine whether the Parker decision should be applied to this case to require reversal and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. We hold it should, and the rule of Parker is to be applied to all cases pending on December 27, 1978 in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved as well as all cases started after that date. See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 662-668; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Pittman v City of [222]*222Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 50; 247 NW2d 512 (1976); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 14; 179 NW2d 390 (1970); Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236; 21 NW2d 105 (1946).

In Parker, four Justices agreed that the activities of a municipally owned general hospital did not constitute a "governmental function” within the meaning of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), and thus were not entitled to governmental immunity. Plaintiffs claim that the rule of Parker should apply to the instant case for several reasons: The injury involved here occurred approximately two months after the injury of Parker; they have disputed the defendant hospital’s claim to immunity at every step of the proceeding; the fortuity that Parker’s case attacking governmental immunity for the day-to-day operation of a hospital was decided first should not deprive plaintiff of the benefit of the rule. (See Placek, supra, 667.)

Defendant, citing Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), argues for the rule adopted in that case and urges that Parker v Highland Park, supra, be applied prospectively from the date the opinion was released and not cover other cases pending on that date.

We are satisfied that the adventitious disposition of Parker while we held plaintiffs’ application in abeyance should not deprive plaintiffs of the benefit of the rule or make available to defendant a defense we will no longer enforce for others.

We acknowledge that whenever a new rule of law is promulgated some unfairness to those who have relied on the old rule may be claimed. Courts, however, do not alter an established rule of law without thorough evaluation of the policy considerations involved. When the decision to overrule precedent is finally made, the Court is satis[223]*223fied that the importance of the result reached outweighs any unfairness to those negatively affected by the decision. Applying the ruling prospectively with the exception of that case and cases pending on appeal in which the issue was raised and preserved is an attempt to limit any such unfairness.

As Justice Moody recognized in his concurring opinion in Parker we have removed a defense, not imposed a liability.

"It also should be noted that a full trial is still forthcoming. At trial, plaintiffs will be required to prove their allegations of malpractice by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant will have a full day in court. Therefore, though the defense of governmental immunity for public general hospitals is removed, all the safeguards of a trial remain.”

Reversed and remanded. No costs, a public question.

Levin, Fitzgerald, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.

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Kavanagh, J.

This case involves two complaints, consolidated on appeal, for alleged negligence in the care and treatment of a child at the time of her birth on November 29, 1970. The parents’ complaint was filed on November 28, 1972. The complaint on behalf of the child was filed on February 23, 1973. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary and/or accelerated judgment on the ground that the hospital was engaged in a governmental function and was therefore immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The circuit court granted the hospital accelerated judgment on December 3, 1975. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion on June 12, 1978. Application for leave to appeal to this Court was filed on June 28, 1978.

On December 27, 1978 this Court rendered a decision in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978). Subsequently we granted leave to determine whether the Parker decision should be applied to this case to require reversal and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. We hold it should, and the rule of Parker is to be applied to all cases pending on December 27, 1978 in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved as well as all cases started after that date. See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 662-668; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Pittman v City of [222]*222Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 50; 247 NW2d 512 (1976); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 14; 179 NW2d 390 (1970); Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236; 21 NW2d 105 (1946).

In Parker, four Justices agreed that the activities of a municipally owned general hospital did not constitute a "governmental function” within the meaning of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), and thus were not entitled to governmental immunity. Plaintiffs claim that the rule of Parker should apply to the instant case for several reasons: The injury involved here occurred approximately two months after the injury of Parker; they have disputed the defendant hospital’s claim to immunity at every step of the proceeding; the fortuity that Parker’s case attacking governmental immunity for the day-to-day operation of a hospital was decided first should not deprive plaintiff of the benefit of the rule. (See Placek, supra, 667.)

Defendant, citing Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), argues for the rule adopted in that case and urges that Parker v Highland Park, supra, be applied prospectively from the date the opinion was released and not cover other cases pending on that date.

We are satisfied that the adventitious disposition of Parker while we held plaintiffs’ application in abeyance should not deprive plaintiffs of the benefit of the rule or make available to defendant a defense we will no longer enforce for others.

We acknowledge that whenever a new rule of law is promulgated some unfairness to those who have relied on the old rule may be claimed. Courts, however, do not alter an established rule of law without thorough evaluation of the policy considerations involved. When the decision to overrule precedent is finally made, the Court is satis[223]*223fied that the importance of the result reached outweighs any unfairness to those negatively affected by the decision. Applying the ruling prospectively with the exception of that case and cases pending on appeal in which the issue was raised and preserved is an attempt to limit any such unfairness.

As Justice Moody recognized in his concurring opinion in Parker we have removed a defense, not imposed a liability.

"It also should be noted that a full trial is still forthcoming. At trial, plaintiffs will be required to prove their allegations of malpractice by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant will have a full day in court. Therefore, though the defense of governmental immunity for public general hospitals is removed, all the safeguards of a trial remain.”

Reversed and remanded. No costs, a public question.

Levin, Fitzgerald, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.

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293 N.W.2d 341, 409 Mich. 217, 1980 Mich. LEXIS 235, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murray-v-beyer-memorial-hospital-mich-1980.

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