Williams, J.
In this case we consider whether to adopt a rule of comparative negligence in Michigan. The factual circumstances involve a close question of the negligence of one or both of two drivers: driver Placek, a layperson who was traveling on a through street and the other, Police Officer Ernst on an emergency run traveling past a stop sign. We do not sit as trier of fact as to whether either, neither or both of these drivers were negligent.
We hold, in the interest of justice for all litigants in this state, that the doctrine of comparative negligence hereby replaces the doctrine of contributory negligence1 and that the standards of comparative negligence are to be applied by the court on remand for new trial in the instant case and on a limited retroactive basis.
I. Facts
On April 8, 1970, plaintiff, Patricia Placek was traveling east on Plumbrook, a two-lane highway, at 30-35 miles per hour. It is uncontested that this was the speed at which plaintiff was traveling and that the posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour.
Plaintiff was following the car of Cabell and Virginia Woods, also traveling east on Plumbrook. As the Woods’ car approached Schoenherr, the driver of that vehicle slowed to execute a right-[651]*651hand turn. At this point Ms. Placek moved her vehicle into the left lane to go around the Woods’ vehicle and pass through the Schoenherr intersection. She collided with the right side of the vehicle driven by Police Officer Ernst a little more than half way across Schoenherr. Ms. Placek testified that she had only become aware of the police vehicle when it was too late to avoid the collision.
Defendant Police Officer Ernst was traveling south on Schoenherr on an emergency run. As he approached the Plumbrook intersection, both his siren and flasher were in operation. Defendant testified that he was aware of the Woods’ vehicle but did not see plaintiffs vehicle. Defendant further testified that he slowed down before he approached the Plumbrook intersection but had begun to speed up again as he entered the intersection. There is disputed testimony as to the speed at which defendant was traveling; defendant told Officer James Porter, the investigating officer at the scene of the accident, however, that he was traveling at 30 miles per hour.
Nothing at the intersection obstructed the view of either driver.
The only non-party witnesses to the accident were Cabell and Virginia Woods. As stated above, their vehicle was traveling east on Plumbrook in front of plaintiffs vehicle, and had begun execution of a right-hand turn onto Schoenherr. Virginia Woods, the passenger, noticed the approaching police car and called it to her husband’s attention. Mr. Woods then brought his vehicle to a stop. Mr. Woods testified that he thought the police vehicle was traveling at 40 miles per hour. Ms. Woods testified that the officer was traveling faster than the posted 35 miles per hour speed limit.
Plaintiff originally filed suit against defendants [652]*652Ernst and the City of Sterling Heights on July 28, 1970. A trial was held in October, 1972, and resulted in a verdict of no cause of action against plaintiff. This verdict was reversed and remanded for new trial by the Court of Appeals on the basis that the trial court had erred in allowing plaintiff to be questioned as to whether she wore a seat belt. Placek v Sterling Heights, 52 Mich App 619; 217 NW2d 900 (1974). The second trial took place in May, 1975, and again resulted in a verdict of no cause of action against plaintiff. This verdict was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished memorandum opinion. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on November 23, 1977.
II. Issues
We granted leave to appeal to consider three issues: (1) whether a comparative negligence standard should be adopted in this state, (2) whether the trial court’s instruction as to plaintiff’s duty of care was prejudicially erroneous and (3) whether reasonable minds can differ as to whether defendant Ernst was negligent.
III. Comparative or Contributory Negligence
There is little dispute among legal commentators that the doctrine of contributory negligence has caused substantial injustice since it was first invoked in England in 1809. 2 Of significance in this regard is that almost every common-law jurisdiction outside the United States has discarded contributory negligence and has adopted in its place a [653]*653more equitable system of comparative negligence.3 Even in this country, considered the only remaining primary location employing contributory negligence,4 32 states and the United States Supreme Court in the case of admiralty law have discarded or rejected it in favor of some form of comparative negligence.5 This precedent is so compelling that the question before remaining courts and legislatures is not whether but when, how and in what form to follow this lead. Therefore, to the properly raised question6 of whether a comparative negli[654]*654gence standard should be substituted for contributory negligence in Michigan, we answer in the affirmative.7
In July, 1977, three Justices on this Court would have established comparative negligence as the [655]*655rule in this state.8 Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585; 256 NW2d 400 (1977), involved a factual situation typical of the potential injustice of the doctrine of contributory negligence.
In Kirby, a defendant, driving north, approached an intersection passing by a car also traveling north which had already come to a stop at the intersection for a changing light. Plaintiff Christine Kirby was a passenger in a car which had been proceeding south on the same street and was stopped at the intersection waiting to make a left-hand turn. Both Kirby and the driver saw the first .vehicle come to a stop and anticipated that defendant, then about three or four car lengths back from the intersection, would do the same.
Plaintiff suggested completion of the turn to the driver, although there was some disputed testimony as to whether this suggestion was made after the driver was already turning the wheel of the car, and the driver proceeded to turn. Defendant’s car, traveling at 25-30 miles per hour, struck the right rear of the car in which plaintiff was a passenger; plaintiff was thrown from the car and seriously injured.
The trial court instructed the jury on contributory negligence:
"* * * if you find that Christine Kirby was personally and contributorily negligent and such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury and damages alleged by her and in that event Christine Kirby cannot recover from the defendant and your verdict therefore would be for the defendant.” Kirby, supra, 595.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant.
Kirby was heard at this Court by six Justices,9 [656]*656and the ultimate disposition included two opinions, each one representing the views of three Justices. The Williams opinion in Kirby found in part III that instructional errors at the trial level required reversal and remand for new trial. Beyond this, through the Williams opinion, the Chief Justice, Justice Levin and Justice Williams would have adopted comparative negligence as a substitute for contributory negligence in Michigan and would have instituted that doctrine as prevailing on remand.
The three other participating Justices in Kirby concurred in part III of the Williams opinion, finding error below necessitating remand and a new trial. Justice Fitzgerald’s opinion, however, signed by Justices Coleman and Ryan, did not find Kirby the appropriate vehicle for adopting comparative negligence. That opinion found the record before this Court inadequate because, unlike the instant case, the parties had not fully briefed and discussed the issue.
Because many aspects of comparative negligence were extensively dealt with in Kirby, only a brief review of certain of these is necessary. The sub-issues specifically discussed under headings "A”, "B” and "C”, infra, are those raised by the parties. A. Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence
In part IX of the Williams opinion in Kirby, a brief analysis was made as to the propriety of judicial versus legislative abrogation of contributory negligence and adoption of comparative negligence.
There is no question that both this Court and the Legislature have the constitutional power to change the common law.
"The common law and the statute laws now in force, [657]*657not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.” Const 1963, art 3, § 7.
This provision has been construed to authorize both judicial change and legislative amendment or repeal. Myers v Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich 1, 7; 133 NW2d 190 (1965).
Further, when dealing with judge-made law, this Court in the past has not disregarded its corrective responsibility in the proper case.
"[O]ur Court has heretofore believed that rules created by the court could be altered by the court. For example, we abrogated the defense of assumption of risk, Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23; 133 NW2d 136 (1965), repudiated the doctrine of imputed negligence, Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), eliminated the privity requirement in actions for breach of an implied warranty, Spence v Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc, 353 Mich 120; 90 NW2d 873 (1958), overruled the common-law disability prohibiting the wife from suing for the loss of her husband’s consortium, Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33; 101 NW2d 227 (1960), overruled the common-law disallowance of recovery for negligently inflicted prenatal injury, Womack v Buchhorn, 384 Mich 718, 724-725; 187 NW2d 218 (1971); and even eliminated charitable immunity from negligence, Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960).” Kirby, 625.
The question then is whether a judicial forum is appropriate for adoption of comparative negligence.10 In three of the states now employing comparative negligence, that rule was judicially [658]*658adopted: Alaska, Kaatz v State, 540 P2d 1037 (Alas, 1975); California, Li v Yellow Cab Co of California, 13 Cal 3d 804; 532 P2d 1226; 119 Cal Rptr 858 (1975); Florida, Hoffman v Jones, 280 So 2d 431 (Fla, 1973).
Points raised against such judicial action include the legislature’s superior power of investigation and ability to handle collateral problems as well as the legislature’s ability to pass statutes which come into effect at some future date thereby providing notice to the bench and bar of impending change.
However, considerations favoring judicial adoption rather than legislative are equally if not more compelling. Professor Fleming analyzes and ably disputes the three main points often asserted in favor of legislative adoption:
"First is the question which of these two bodies is better equipped to understand the nature and implications of the problem and to make an informed choice from available alternatives. It is fashionable to suppose that the investigatory opportunities of the legislature establish its superior credentials in this respect. * * * But on the question of contributory negligence, one cannot very well dispute the unique judicial experience and preoccupation * * *. Moreover, such quantitative data as exist on the impact of comparative negligence on insurance rates [see appendix in Kirby, p 651] and on the processing of claims by settlement or resort to court [see appendix in Kirby, p 648] are at least as well available to judges as to legislators. * * * Nor should one lightly indulge the fancy that because many legislators have enjoyed legal training, they are therefore as sensitive to the need for reform or as well equipped to pass an independent judgment on this issue as are the courts. In a nutshell, this is preeminently lawyer’s law.” (Emphasis added.) Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last — By Judicial Choice, 64 Calif L Rev 239, 279-280 (1976).
[659]*659The next point analyzed by Professor Fleming is the assertion of the Legislature’s superior ability to enact the primary change and simultaneously anticipate and resolve the numerous details and collateral issues at one time. Professor Fleming cites two points in response.
"First, almost all comparative negligence statutes are * * * in the briefest conceivable form and leave the very same ancillary questions likewise to the courts for future solution. Second, courts can * * * anticipate several of the most important of these questions and thus dispose [sic] with the need for having them later explored at the cost of future litigants. Far from deserving rebuke for dealing with hypotheticals, this practice reveals courts as being on occasion at least as well equipped as legislatures in laying down a reasonably comprehensive blueprint of reform.” Fleming, supra, 281.
Finally, Professor Fleming analyzes
"the argument that legislative reform can give affected parties time to prepare themselves for the change of law, for example by procuring liability insurance and by adjusting cost calculations. Thus, statutes abrogating charitable and other immunities have commonly postponed their commencement for that purpose. But courts also have long broken with the Blackstonian fiction that judicial decisions must necessarily be retroactive in operation because they merely declare what the common law should always have been discovered to be.” Fleming, supra, 281.
As is indicated by the above analysis, although the courts have not been the primary agencies for adoption of comparative negligence, they are certainly in as good, if not better, a position to evaluate the need for change, and to fashion that change.
[660]*660Further, as to the final point raised by Professor Fleming regarding the need for advance warning, this is uniquely satisfied in this jurisdiction because the bench and bar were put on notice a year and a half ago when three members of this Court advocated adoption of comparative negligence in Kirby, supra.11
With all these factors in mind, we find adoption of comparative negligence is consistent with this Court’s responsibility to the jurisprudence of this state.
B. Appropriate Form of Comparative Negligence
Extensive discussion in the Williams opinion in Kirby was devoted to an analysis of the most appropriate form of comparative negligence to adopt. Kirby, 629-645. Since that time, we have not altered our view that the doctrine of "pure” comparative negligence most nearly accomplishes the goal of a fair system of apportionment of damages. "Only pure comparative negligence truly distributes responsibility according to fault of the respective parties.” Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (Indianapolis: Allen Smith Co, 1974), § 21.3, p 347.
As stated in Kirby,
"We are convinced, as was the United States Supreme Court and the other courts which have adopted the comparative negligence doctrine, that the 'pure’ form is preferable to any other.
"The 'pure’ form does not 'unjustly enrich’ anyone. For example, if an accident is wholly the fault of one party, then that party would not, of course, recover damages. If an injured plaintiff was 51% to blame, [661]*661there still remains 49% of the fault which was not plaintiffs, and for which therefore the person who caused that much of the injury should be liable.
"The rule preventing recovery if plaintiffs negligence exceeds 50% of the total fault is just as arbitrary as that which completely denies recovery. Is the person who is 49% negligent that much more deserving than the one who is 51% negligent?
"We acknowledge that even under the 'pure’ form of comparative negligence there will be appeals concerning the percentage of award, but it is undoubtedly more compelling to appeal when you have been awarded nothing than when you have received some compensation. However, just as we did not reach our decision on 'contributory negligence because of the anticipated number of case filings, we will not reach our decision on the form of comparative negligence because of an equally unpredictable element, the anticipated number of appeals.
"Commentators acknowledge that the hybrid 50% rule leads to strange results.
"What the hybrid rule does in fact is not eliminate contributory negligence, but merely lower the barrier.
"The doctrine of pure comparative negligence does not allow one at fault to recover for one’s own fault, because damages are reduced in proportion to the contribution of that person’s negligence, whatever that proportion is. The wrongdoer does not recover to the extent of his fault, but only to the extent of the fault of others. To assume that in most cases the plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant is an argument not based on equity or justice or the facts. What pure comparative negligence does is hold a person fully responsible for his or her acts and to the full extent to which they cause injury. That is justice.
"This is the system of comparative negligence judicially adopted in Florida, California, Alaska, and by the United States Supreme Court to replace the equal division rule in admiralty actions. It is the system in the FELA, the Merchant Marine Act, the Jones Act, and Death on the High Seas Act. It is simplest to [662]*662administer where multiple defendants are concerned. The system in operation has not led 'to runaway verdicts for negligent plaintiffs’. Schwartz, Treatise, § 3.2, p 52.
"We recognize that the 50% system has been the most popular among those legislatively adopted. Schwartz, § 3.5, p 73. But it is not the system which we believe will really do justice.” (Footnotes omitted.) Kirby, 642-645.
Recognizing this same rationale, we now adopt the pure form of comparative negligence.12 Hereafter, a special verdict shall be used in any negligence case where the negligence of the plaintiff is at issue.13
C. Appropriate Application
The extent of application of the new rule announced today remains to be determined. Although there are a great variety of ways in which a new rule of law may be given effect, application normally falls within one of three main categories. A new rule can be (1) made applicable to all cases in which a cause of action has accrued and which are still lawfully pending and all future cases, (2) made applicable to the case at bar and all future cases or (3) made to exclude the case at bar but be made applicable to all cases to be filed hereafter or after an arbitrary control date specified herein. See Myers v Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich 1, 11; 133 NW2d 190 (1965).
In Li v Yellow Cab Co of California, supra, 829, the California Supreme Court gave limited retroactive effect to its adoption of comparative negligence. The court stated that its opinion would be
[663]*663"applicable to all cases in which trial has not begun before the date this decision becomes final in this court, but * * * it shall not be applicable to any case in which trial began before that date (other than the instant case) — except that if any judgment be reversed on appeal for other reasons, this opinion shall be applicable to any retrial.”
The Alaska Supreme Court in Kaatz v State, supra, 1050, applied its opinion adopting comparative negligence as follows:
. "The rule will, of course, apply in the retrial of the case in which we have reversed the judgment today. It will also apply to any case in which the trial commences after the date of this opinion. In any case pending on direct appeal in which the application of the comparative negligence rule was requested or asserted in the trial court, and in which the request or assertion was preserved as a ground for appeal, there shall be a retrial under the principle of comparative negligence. Our holding today will be applicable to any trial which has commenced, but has not been submitted for decision by the trier of fact, and in which prior to submission to the trier of fact for decision there has been a request or an assertion that the rule of comparative negligence should be applied.”
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court, in its opinion adopting comparative negligence, Hoffman v Jones, supra, 440, held that the
"* * * opinion shall be applied as follows:
"1. As to those cases in which the comparative negligence rule has been applied, this opinion shall be applicable. [In Hoffman, before the case reached the Florida Supreme Court, the District Court of Appeal had adopted comparative negligence.]
"2. As to those cases already commenced, but in [664]*664which trial has not yet begun, this opinion shall be applicable.
"3. As to those cases in which trial has already begun or in which verdict or judgment has already been rendered, this opinion shall not be applicable, unless the applicability of the comparative negligence rule was appropriately and properly raised during some stage of the litigation.
"4. As to those cases on appeal in which the applicability of the comparative negligence rule has been properly and appropriately made a question of appellate review, this opinion shall be applicable.
"5. This opinion shall be applicable to all cases commenced after the decision becomes final.”
The long-standing rule of law has been in favor of full retroactivity. See Kuhn v Fairmont Coal Co, 215 US 349, 372; 30 S Ct 140; 54 L Ed 228 (1910); Donohue v Russell, 264 Mich 217, 219; 249 NW 830 (1933); 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, § 233, p 562. However, more frequently courts are favoring more flexible approaches which allow determinations on a case-by-case basis.
"The determination of whether an overruling decision shall be applied retroactively or prospectively, is a matter left to state courts for determination on a case-by-case basis. As the Alaska Supreme Court noted:
" 'A state supreme court has unfettered discretion to apply a particular ruling either purely prospectively, purely retroactively, or partially retroactively, limited only "by the juristic philosophy of the judges * * *, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature.” The decision is not a matter of law but a determination based on weighing the merits and demerits of each case. Consideration is given to applying a ruling prospectively "whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted.” ’ Warwick v State ex rel Chance, 548 P2d 384, 393-394 (Alas, 1976).” Jones v Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 608; 570 P2d 284 (1977).
[665]*665See, also, State ex rel Washington State Finance Committee v Martin, 62 Wash 2d 645, 673; 384 P2d 833, 849 (1963). This Court has also recognized the principle,
"This Court has overruled prior precedent many times in the past. In each such instance the Court must take into account the total situation confronting it and seek a just and realistic solution of the problems occasioned by the change.
"It is evident that there is no single rule of thumb which can be used to accomplish the maximum of justice in each varying set of circumstances. The involvement of vested property rights, the magnitude of the impact of decision on public bodies taken without warning or a showing of substantial reliance on the old rule may influence the result.” Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 265-266; 111 NW2d 1 (1961) (opinion of Justice Edwards in which Justices Talbot Smith, T. M. Kavanagh and Souris concurred).
The benefit of flexibility in opinion application is evident. If a court were absolutely bound by the traditional rule of retroactive application, it would be severely hampered in its ability to make needed changes in the law because of the chaos that could result in regard to prior enforcement under that law. When this Court overruled the doctrine of imputed negligence in Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), that decision was applied to pending and future cases. Without the flexibility to so apply the decision, it would be unlikely that much needed change could be effectuated in this state.
We now turn to the question of the proper application in the instant case. In Kirby, supra, 645, the Williams opinion would have followed a course of applying comparative negligence, "* * * [666]*666to the instant case and all cases filed after the date of this decision, where the negligence of plaintiff is an issue * * For two reasons we now find a slightly broader application to be proper.
First, affording limited retroactive effect to the better rule of comparative negligence will not unjustly burden litigants of this state. The limited retroactive application in Bricker, supra (to pending as well as future cases), could not work a hardship because there could be no detrimental reliance on the doctrine of imputed negligence.14 By way of contrast, in Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), this Court overturned the doctrine of charitable immunity. We refused to give that decision any retroactive effect because of possible detrimental reliance placed upon that doctrine by charitable hospitals.
"In the interests of justice and fairness, in view of the new ruling and the reliance that some, albeit few, charitable, nonprofit hospital corporations may have placed on the old ruling, and may have failed to protect themselves by the purchase of available insurance, we believe the new rule should apply to the instant case and to all future causes of action arising after September 15, 1960, the date of the filing of this opinion.” Parker, supra, 28.
Unlike Parker, no similar injustice could result by according some retroactive effect to the instant decision.
It is the second and we believe more unique factor, however, which encourages us to accord a limited retroactive application similar to that ac[667]*667corded by the three other state supreme courts faced with this specific issue.
Since July, 1977, the bench and bar of this state have had clear notice that three Justices of this Court were ready to adopt comparative negligence and that three others might be willing in another case. Since the issuance of Kirby, members of the bar of this state have diligently argued the issue on behalf of their clients. At this Court alone we presently have three cases being held pending this decision in which comparative negligence was raised and argued.15 If no retroactive application is -accorded our decision today, the fortuity that the instant plaintiffs’ case was the first to arrive at this Court would be the sole determinant of who would benefit from the fairer doctrine of comparative negligence. This would be true despite the fact that many litigants had exercised the same diligence exercised by the instant plaintiffs in raising the issue.
Therefore, we hold the rule announced today applicable to the instant case and all appropriate cases in which trial commences after the date of this opinion including those in which a retrial is to occur because of remand on any other issue. Further, we find comparative negligence applicable to any case presently pending on appeal in which application of the doctrine was requested at the trial court and the issue preserved for appeal. Finally, comparative negligence shall be the applicable rule in any case commenced but not submitted to the trier of fact prior to the date of this decision, but in no case shall it apply unless there [668]*668is an appropriate request by counsel prior to submission to the trier of fact.
IV. Instruction on Plaintiff’s Duty of Care
The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury regarding plaintiffs duty of care:
"Now, I want to instruct you jurors that the Supreme Court has said that a so-called right of way is not an assurance of safety, and does not grant an absolute right of way under all conditions. The driver on the street who does have a so-called right of way is still required to exercise due care in driving his car, or her car, in view of the conditions as they existed at that time. The driver on a favored highway, the superior highway, has a right to assume that other drivers will obey properly erected traffic signs, but you must keep in mind here that this accident is with an authorized emergency vehicle which had a right under certain conditions to violate an erected traffic sign. The driver on a through highway may not proceed blindly. The driver is required to remain alert to hazards on the highway and to make reasonable observations of other drivers approaching the intersection and must keep such lookout ahead and to the sides of intersecting highways as a reasonably, prudent, careful person would do in order to discover possible dangers, and he must act carefully with the same care that the ordinary careful and prudent person would act upon the existing conditions that then existed. ” (Emphasis added.)
At trial plaintiffs counsel objected to the instruction on the ground that plaintiff
"had no duty to look to either direction, but had a right to assume other vehicles were going to assume [sic] her the right of way until she knew or should have known that another vehicle was going to interfere with her right of way.”
[669]*669There are several statutes relevant to the resolution of this issue. One is MCL 257.649(f); MSA 9.2349(f), which gives the driver on a through street the right of way paramount to a driver traveling on a stop street,
"Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, the driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
Cases interpreting this statute have held that the standard of care to which the favored driver (driver with the right of way) must adhere is a standard of reasonable or due care under the circumstances. See Koehler v Thom, 285 Mich 593, 598; 281 NW 336 (1938); Beauchamp v Olsen, 42 Mich App 323, 325; 201 NW2d 677 (1972). What is reasonable on the part of the favored driver has been further refined.
”[T]he operator of an automobile proceeding through an intersection controlled by a traffic signal is under no duty to make an independent determination as to whether the traffic approaching a red light will stop. In such a situation the operator of an automobile is not required to observe traffic approaching a red light to determine whether it is safe to proceed. The driver can justifiably rely on what all have come to expect — that traffic approaching a red light will stop.” Buchholtz v Deitel, 59 Mich App 349, 352; 229 NW2d 448 (1975).16 (Emphasis added.)
[670]*670This reliance, of course, does not absolve the favored driver from the need to exercise due care. See Beauchamp v Olsen, 42 Mich App 323; 201 NW2d 677 (1972).
Other statutes must also be considered when, as in the instant case, there is an authorized emergency vehicle involved. MCL 257.653; MSA 9.2353 states in relevant part,
"(a) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle * * *
"1. The driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right of way * * *
"(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway. ” (Emphasis added.)
Further, MCL 257.603; MSA 9.2303, states in relevant part,
"(c) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
"2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation.
"3. Exceed the prima facie speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property.” (Emphasis added.)
Under these statutes it is clear that defendant, like plaintiff, is not absolved of the duty to drive "* * * with due regard for the safety of others * * Kalamazoo v Priest, 331 Mich 43, 48; 49 NW2d 52 (1951). Neither plaintiff nor defendant, therefore, had an absolute right to proceed blindly.
[671]*671We must now determine if the instruction as framed by the trial court correctly set forth the law as to plaintiffs duty of care.
In 1937 this Court was faced with a case similar to the one at bar, Lansing v Hathaway, 280 Mich 87; 273 NW 403 (1937). In that case a fire truck owned by the city of Lansing proceeded through a red stop light while on an emergency run. The fire truck was struck by defendant’s vehicle which was proceeding under benefit of a green light. The city brought suit to recover its damages in repair of the truck and cure of the injured firefighters. The visibility was reduced in that case by a severe rain storm.
The plaintiff city appealed a bench trial judgment in favor of defendant.
This Court, relying on a city ordinance which was consistent with the present statutes on emergency vehicles, set forth the applicable standard.
"We assume, for the purposes of decision, that, under the city ordinance, the fire truck, as an emergency vehicle responding to a fire alarm, had a right to run the red light upon giving 'audible signal’ and having reasonable regard for the safety of others. Defendant had a right, under permission of the green light, to cross the intersection unless, by the reasonable exercise of the senses of sight and hearing, he should have noticed or heard warning to the contrary.” (Emphasis added.) Hathaway, supra, 89.
This same standard was upheld by this Court in Holser v Midland, 330 Mich 581, 584; 48 NW2d 208 (1951), and by the Court of Appeals in Keevis v Tookey, 42 Mich App 283, 287; 201 NW2d 661 (1972).
We again affirm the correctness of the Hathaway standard to the effect that the driver travel[672]*672ing on a through street, as against an emergency vehicle, has a right to cross the intersection unless, by the reasonable exercise of the senses of sight and hearing, he or she should have noticed or heard warning to the contrary.
As quoted above, in instructing as to plaintiffs duties, the court stated:
"The driver on a through highway may not proceed blindly. The driver [Placek] is required to remain alert to hazards on the highway and to make reasonable observations of other drivers approaching the intersection and must keep such lookout ahead and to the sides of intersecting highways as a reasonably, prudent, careful person would do in order to discover possible dangers, and he must act carefully with the same care that the ordinary careful and prudent person would act upon the existing conditions that then existed.”
We find the instructions on the whole to be unfairly and erroneously weighted against plaintiff.
Under the law of this state, plaintiff could proceed unless, by the reasonable exercise of sight and hearing, she should have noticed or heard warning to the contrary. Hathaway, supra, 89. Reasonable exercise includes a duty to be "fairly alert as to potential dangers that may be readily seen or heard”. Holser, supra, 584. There is a discernible difference between remaining fairly alert to readily cognizable potential dangers which she should have noticed or heard under Holser and Hathaway, and being "required to remain alert to hazards”. While the specific language "required to remain alert to hazards” appears in Krause v Ryan, 344 Mich 428; 74 NW2d 20 (1955), the language in Krause is simultaneously tempered by other language similar to that required by Hathaway.17 In the instant case there was no [673]*673such tempering to place plaintiff’s duty in the proper perspective.
Similarly, authority for the trial court’s instruction that the favored driver,
"* * * must keep such lookout ahead and to the sides of intersecting highways as a reasonably prudent careful person would do in order to discover possible dangers, and he must act carefully with the same care that the ordinary careful and prudent person would act upon the existing conditions, that then existed” (emphasis added),
appears in the case of Arnold v Krug, 279 Mich 702, 708; 273 NW 322 (1937). Again, however, the language only appears within the context of other qualifying language.18
[674]*674Adding to the unfair impact of the instruction regarding plaintiffs duties is the fact that the trial court stated in relation to plaintiff and in the course of the objected-to instruction, that the "driver on a through highway may not proceed blindly”. Although the same is true as the law of this jurisdiction applies to the driver of an emergency vehicle, no similar instruction was given as to defendant.
We find the instructions as given constitute error because they unfairly represent the law as to plaintiffs duties.19 The fact that they do not suffi[675]*675ciently define defendant’s duties is not a specific basis for this appeal and is merely noted to preclude similar error and further prolongation of this litigation.
V. Defendant’s Negligence
Prior to the trial court’s submission of the instant case to the jury, counsel for plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on the issue of defendant’s negligence. The motion was denied by the trial court.
[676]*676Plaintiffs claim at this Court that the denial of this motion constituted error because the evidence presented below clearly established that the defendant failed to exercise due care prior to entering the intersection. Plaintiffs contend that this negligence is evidenced by defendant’s excessive speed and by defendant’s act of merely glancing to his right and then observing only the Woods’ vehicle. This issue need not long detain us.
It is clear from the testimony that the speed at which defendant Ernst was traveling is in dispute. Virginia Woods testified that defendant was exceeding the 35-mile-per-hour speed limit, Cabell Woods testified that defendant was traveling at 40 miles per hour, and Officer Ernst told Officer James Porter, the investigating officer at the scene of the accident, that he was traveling at 30 miles per hour. (See Part I, supra.)
Further support for a finding of the existence of a dispute as to both speed and whether defendant did reasonably attempt to observe the surrounding traffic is found in the deposition of defendant Ernst which was read into the record at trial. During that deposition, the following exchange occurred:
"Q. * * * Now, when you entered the intersection did you make an observation of the intersection before you entered it to see if there was any other traffic approaching either from the east or west on Plumbrook?
”A. I observed the intersection as a whole, yes, sir.
"Q. And all you saw was this one car?
"A Yes, sir.
”Q. Now, as you entered the intersection did you make an observation to the right or to the left to see if there was any traffic approaching?
’A. I was primarily interested in that car [Woods’ vehicle]. No traffic to the left, or southwest of Schoen[677]*677herr on Plumbrook, and I was primarily interested to make sure that this car that was at the stop sign remained stopped, wouldn’t pull out in front of me any further.
”Q. Did you make an observation as you entered the intersection to the right to see if there was any other traffic approaching from the west traveling east on Schoenherr?
"A. Yes, sir.
”Q. Let me ask you this: When you stated you were slowing down to enter the intersection of Plumbrook, knowing that Plumbrook was a through street, how much did you slow your car down to?
"A. Like I say, a rolling speed.
”Q. What would that be, rolling speed?
"A. 5 miles, 6, 8 miles an hour, something like that.
”Q. As you approached this intersection of Plumbrook you decelerated your car, braked your automobile until you got down to a speed where you could stop if there was any traffic coming from the east or west on Plum-brook?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Approximately?
"A. Hard to say, 8, 10 miles an hour, somewhere in there, just a rough estimate.
”Q. But it wasn’t 30 miles an hour?
"A. To my knowledge, no, sir.”
Although it is undisputed that defendant did not observe plaintiffs’ vehicle, there remains a question of fact as to whether the failure to observe plaintiffs’ car constituted negligence because of the existence of another potential danger — the Woods’ vehicle.
Plaintiffs claim however, under authority of Kalamazoo v Priest, 331 Mich 43; 49 NW2d 52 (1951), [678]*678that defendant’s negligence is established. In Priest, the city sued a driver who had collided with a fire truck under circumstances similar to the instant case except for the fact that the firefighter driving the truck had seen defendant’s car and had sped up in an effort to pass ahead and avoid the accident. Based on the defense of contributory negligence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant. This Court affirmed because
"plaintiffs driver did not make proper observation nor see seasonably what was plainly there to be seen so as to be able to form a reasonable belief as to whether he could proceed into the intersection in safety.” Priest, supra, 47.
The emergency vehicle statute operative in Priest required the exercise of due regard for the safety of others; plaintiff’s driver, as a matter of law, was held to have violated that statute.
"Inasmuch as the statute has not relieved drivers of fire trucks from the same duties to maintain a lookout, to see and heed what is present to be seen, and, on the basis of such observation, to form a reasonable belief that it is safe to proceed, it follows inescapably that plaintiffs driver must likewise be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, barring plaintiffs right to recovery.” Priest, supra, 48.
We find Priest distinguishable on two grounds. First, in the instant case there remains a question of fact as to the speed at which defendant was traveling. The issue of defendant’s speed is part of plaintiffs’ proofs as to defendant’s negligence. Second, as stated above, there remains a question of fact as to whether the failure to observe plaintiffs’ vehicle was negligent because defendant was focus[679]*679ing his attention on the Woods’ vehicle which could rightfully be considered a potential danger.
We, therefore, agree with the trial court as to this issue. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that defendant breached his duty to proceed with due regard for the safety of others. The issue must be determined by the trier of fact.
VI. Conclusion
The doctrine of contributory negligence in Michigan is hereby replaced with the more just and -equitable doctrine of comparative negligence to be applied in the limited retroactive manner discussed in Part III C, supra.
We find error in the trial court’s jury instruction as to plaintiffs duty of care but affirm the decision of the trial court that defendant’s negligence is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.
Reversed and remanded for new trial. Costs to plaintiffs.
Levin and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Williams, J.