Murphy v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
This text of Murphy v. Liberty Mutual Ins. (Murphy v. Liberty Mutual Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Jesse J. Murphy, et al. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. Misc. No. 5, September Term 2021
Administrative Authority of Chief Judge – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. Under the Maryland Constitution, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is the administrative head of the Judicial Branch of the Maryland State government. In the exercise of its rulemaking authority with respect to administration of, and practice and procedure in, the State courts, the Court of Appeals has adopted rules to guide the Chief Judge’s exercise of that administrative authority in the circumstances of an emergency affecting the court system. Among other things, measures taken should be consistent with actions taken in the other branches of government when the Governor has declared a state of emergency pursuant to the authority granted to the Governor by the General Assembly in the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code. An administrative order of the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic was within the authority of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Rules in light of the state of emergency that had been declared by the Governor. Maryland Constitution, Article IV, §18; Maryland Rules 16- 1001 et seq.
Separation of Powers – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. An administrative order of the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic did not violate the principle of separation of powers of the branches of Maryland State government guaranteed by Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Prohibition Against Suspension of Laws – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. An administrative order of the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic did not violate the prohibition against suspension of laws set forth in Article 9 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 1:20-cv-01961-SAG IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Argument: December 3, 3021 OF MARYLAND
Misc. No. 5
September Term, 2021
JESSE J. MURPHY, ET AL.
V.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
_____________________________________
*Getty, C.J., *McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould,
JJ. ______________________________________
Opinion by McDonald, J. ______________________________________
Filed: April 27, 2022
*Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior Judges, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while active members of Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act this Court; after being recalled pursuant to (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2022-04-27 Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, 10:28-04:00 they also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk On April 24, 2020, then-Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera issued an administrative
order that temporarily tolled statutes of limitations in civil cases for a period of time during
the state of emergency occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic. A commercial dispute is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland between Appellants
J.M. Murphy Enterprises, Inc., and its president Jesse J. Murphy (collectively, “Murphy
Enterprises”) and Appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”). The
timeliness of certain claims alleged in that case, as well as the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal court over that action, may depend on the validity of the Chief Judge’s
administrative tolling order. Pursuant to statute and rule,1 the federal district court has
certified to this Court a question of law as to whether that administrative order exceeded
the powers of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution. As framed by the parties,
the answer to that question turns on whether the Chief Judge’s administrative tolling order
violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights – in particular, Article 8, which guarantees the
separation of powers of the branches of Maryland State government, and Article 9, which
prohibits the “suspension” of laws.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that the Chief Judge acted
within her authority when, in her capacity as administrative head of the Maryland Judiciary,
she issued the administrative tolling order concerning the timeliness of complaints filed in
Maryland courts during the pandemic. Specifically, the administrative order was based on
1 Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §12-601 et seq.; Maryland Rule 8-305. the authority of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution, the Maryland Code, and
the Maryland Rules. In issuing that order, the Chief Judge did not, under the circumstances
that existed at that time, unduly take upon herself – or, in the language of the case law
concerning separation of powers, “usurp” – core functions belonging to either the
Executive or the Legislative branches of State government. Nor did the emergency rules
on which the administrative tolling order was based usurp another branch’s core function.
Finally, the tolling order did not violate the prohibition against the suspension of laws.
I
Background
A. Administrative Authority and Rulemaking in the Maryland Judiciary
The question posed by the federal district court relates to the administrative
authority of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the rulemaking authority of the
Court. Those powers are simply stated in Article IV, §18 of the Maryland Constitution and
elaborated to some extent in the Maryland Code and Maryland Rules.
1. Administrative Authority
The State Constitution provides that the “Chief Judge … shall be the administrative
head of the Judicial system of the State.” Article IV, §18(b)(1). Subsection (b) sets forth
certain aspects of that authority with respect to the assignment of judges. §18(b)(2)-(5). It
further provides that, in the absence of the Chief Judge, the administrative authority
devolves upon the judge of the Court with the most seniority. §18(b)(5). Finally, it states
that “[t]he powers of the Chief Judge set forth in [§18] shall be subject to any rule or
regulation adopted by the Court of Appeals.” Id.
2 The Maryland Rules acknowledge this constitutional delegation of power to the
Chief Judge. See Maryland Rules 16-101 (general administrative structure of the
Judiciary), 16-102 (noting the Chief Judge’s “overall responsibility for the administration
of the courts of this State”).
2. Rulemaking
The State Constitution also confers rulemaking authority on the Court of Appeals
with respect to (1) practice and procedure in the courts and (2) the administration of the
courts. It states that “[t]he Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and
regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate
courts and in the other courts of this State….” Article IV, §18(a). The rules adopted by
the Court “shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of
Appeals or otherwise by law.” Id.2
The General Assembly has acknowledged the rulemaking power of the Court of
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Jesse J. Murphy, et al. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. Misc. No. 5, September Term 2021
Administrative Authority of Chief Judge – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. Under the Maryland Constitution, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is the administrative head of the Judicial Branch of the Maryland State government. In the exercise of its rulemaking authority with respect to administration of, and practice and procedure in, the State courts, the Court of Appeals has adopted rules to guide the Chief Judge’s exercise of that administrative authority in the circumstances of an emergency affecting the court system. Among other things, measures taken should be consistent with actions taken in the other branches of government when the Governor has declared a state of emergency pursuant to the authority granted to the Governor by the General Assembly in the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code. An administrative order of the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic was within the authority of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Rules in light of the state of emergency that had been declared by the Governor. Maryland Constitution, Article IV, §18; Maryland Rules 16- 1001 et seq.
Separation of Powers – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. An administrative order of the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic did not violate the principle of separation of powers of the branches of Maryland State government guaranteed by Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Prohibition Against Suspension of Laws – Emergency Powers of Chief Judge. An administrative order of the Chief Judge temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic did not violate the prohibition against suspension of laws set forth in Article 9 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. United States District Court for the District of Maryland Case No. 1:20-cv-01961-SAG IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Argument: December 3, 3021 OF MARYLAND
Misc. No. 5
September Term, 2021
JESSE J. MURPHY, ET AL.
V.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
_____________________________________
*Getty, C.J., *McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould,
JJ. ______________________________________
Opinion by McDonald, J. ______________________________________
Filed: April 27, 2022
*Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior Judges, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while active members of Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act this Court; after being recalled pursuant to (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2022-04-27 Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, 10:28-04:00 they also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk On April 24, 2020, then-Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera issued an administrative
order that temporarily tolled statutes of limitations in civil cases for a period of time during
the state of emergency occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic. A commercial dispute is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland between Appellants
J.M. Murphy Enterprises, Inc., and its president Jesse J. Murphy (collectively, “Murphy
Enterprises”) and Appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”). The
timeliness of certain claims alleged in that case, as well as the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal court over that action, may depend on the validity of the Chief Judge’s
administrative tolling order. Pursuant to statute and rule,1 the federal district court has
certified to this Court a question of law as to whether that administrative order exceeded
the powers of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution. As framed by the parties,
the answer to that question turns on whether the Chief Judge’s administrative tolling order
violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights – in particular, Article 8, which guarantees the
separation of powers of the branches of Maryland State government, and Article 9, which
prohibits the “suspension” of laws.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that the Chief Judge acted
within her authority when, in her capacity as administrative head of the Maryland Judiciary,
she issued the administrative tolling order concerning the timeliness of complaints filed in
Maryland courts during the pandemic. Specifically, the administrative order was based on
1 Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §12-601 et seq.; Maryland Rule 8-305. the authority of the Chief Judge under the Maryland Constitution, the Maryland Code, and
the Maryland Rules. In issuing that order, the Chief Judge did not, under the circumstances
that existed at that time, unduly take upon herself – or, in the language of the case law
concerning separation of powers, “usurp” – core functions belonging to either the
Executive or the Legislative branches of State government. Nor did the emergency rules
on which the administrative tolling order was based usurp another branch’s core function.
Finally, the tolling order did not violate the prohibition against the suspension of laws.
I
Background
A. Administrative Authority and Rulemaking in the Maryland Judiciary
The question posed by the federal district court relates to the administrative
authority of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the rulemaking authority of the
Court. Those powers are simply stated in Article IV, §18 of the Maryland Constitution and
elaborated to some extent in the Maryland Code and Maryland Rules.
1. Administrative Authority
The State Constitution provides that the “Chief Judge … shall be the administrative
head of the Judicial system of the State.” Article IV, §18(b)(1). Subsection (b) sets forth
certain aspects of that authority with respect to the assignment of judges. §18(b)(2)-(5). It
further provides that, in the absence of the Chief Judge, the administrative authority
devolves upon the judge of the Court with the most seniority. §18(b)(5). Finally, it states
that “[t]he powers of the Chief Judge set forth in [§18] shall be subject to any rule or
regulation adopted by the Court of Appeals.” Id.
2 The Maryland Rules acknowledge this constitutional delegation of power to the
Chief Judge. See Maryland Rules 16-101 (general administrative structure of the
Judiciary), 16-102 (noting the Chief Judge’s “overall responsibility for the administration
of the courts of this State”).
2. Rulemaking
The State Constitution also confers rulemaking authority on the Court of Appeals
with respect to (1) practice and procedure in the courts and (2) the administration of the
courts. It states that “[t]he Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and
regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate
courts and in the other courts of this State….” Article IV, §18(a). The rules adopted by
the Court “shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of
Appeals or otherwise by law.” Id.2
The General Assembly has acknowledged the rulemaking power of the Court of
Appeals with respect to both practice and procedure and judicial administration. In
particular, it has directed that “[t]he power of the Court of Appeals to make rules and
regulations to govern the practice and procedure and judicial administration … shall be
liberally construed.” CJ §1-201(a). That statute further provides that “[w]ithout intending
to limit the comprehensive application of the term ‘practice and procedure,’ the term
2 The Constitution also authorizes other courts of the State to adopt rules of practice and procedure or administrative rules “subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.” Article IV, §18(a). A statute limits the purview of such local rules. CJ §1-201(b).
3 includes the forms of process; writs; pleadings; motions; parties; depositions; discovery;
trials; judgments; new trials; provisional and final remedies; appeals; unification of practice
and procedure in actions at law and suits in equity, so as to secure one form of civil action
and procedure for both; and regulation of the form and method of taking and the
admissibility of evidence in all cases, including criminal cases.” Id.
In the Maryland Rules, the Court has established a Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (“Rules Committee”)3 and a process for the Court’s consideration
and adoption of rules. See Maryland Rule 16-802.
B. Statutes of Limitations
The timeliness of a claim in a civil action is generally measured against the pertinent
statute of limitations or under the doctrine of laches.4 As the label itself indicates, a statute
3 The Rules Committee is appointed by the Court of Appeals to assist the Court in the exercise of its constitutional rulemaking powers. Maryland Rule 16-701. The committee consists of judges, court officials, lawyers, and others with interest and expertise in the subject matter of court rules. Among the Committee’s members are two legislators appointed from the State Senate and House of Delegates, respectively. Id. 4 The doctrine of laches is a judicially-developed doctrine applicable to equitable claims in civil cases under which a court will decline to consider that claim when there has been an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff in asserting it, to the prejudice of the defendant. State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles LP, 438 Md. 451, 585-87 (2014). In applying the doctrine of laches, a court will “look to the General Assembly for guidance” by consulting an analogous statute of limitations or the general period of limitations in CJ §5-101. Id. at 603-04; see also Frederick Road LP v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 117 (2000) (when a case involves concurrent legal and equitable remedies, the deadline set by the statute of limitations is applied).
4 of limitations is a product of legislation enacted by a legislative body5 – in this case, the
General Assembly. A statute of limitations represents “a policy judgment by the
Legislature that serves the interest of a plaintiff in having adequate time to investigate a
cause of action and file suit, the interest of a defendant in having certainty that there will
not be a need to respond to a potential claim that has been unreasonably delayed, and the
general interest of society in judicial economy.” Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, LLC,
454 Md. 680, 691 (2017). In being faithful to that legislative judgment, the courts typically
construe such statutes strictly. Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 475 Md. 4, 38 (2021).
However, a statute of limitations is not immutable. Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692. This Court
has recognized, in both rule and case law, that the deadline for filing an action seemingly
set forth in a statute of limitations may be extended and, in some cases, shortened.
Because a statute of limitations sets a deadline for filing an action in court, it falls
to the courts to interpret and administer that deadline. Some of that work is done by rule.
For example, a court rule details how “any period of time” prescribed by rule or “any
applicable statute” is to be computed. Maryland Rule 1-203.6 Accordingly, that rule
5 Another legislatively-created filing deadline that is a close cousin to a statute of limitations is a statute of repose. See Anderson v. United States, 427 Md. 99, 117-22 (2012) (noting that, while both types of statutes set deadlines for the assertion of a claim, a statute of limitations is triggered by accrual of the claim while a statute of repose may extinguish a claim before it accrues). We need not delve into the differences between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose here. There is no question that the filing deadline at issue in this case is a statute of limitations. 6 That rule appears to be consistent with a statute that also describes generally the computation of time periods in statutes. See Maryland Code, General Provisions Article, §1-302. A Rules Committee Note codified with the rule observes that section (a) of the
5 governs the computation of time for purposes of a statute of limitations. Excluded from
those computations of filing deadlines are, among others, days on which the pertinent
clerk’s office is not open for regular hours. Maryland Rule 1-203(a)(2).
Another court rule provides an additional 30 days for a plaintiff to file suit in a
Maryland court, if the lawsuit was initially filed within the Maryland statute of limitations
in another jurisdiction and dismissed by the court in the other jurisdiction for certain
reasons specified in the rule. Maryland Rule 2-101(b).
Like other statutes, the application of a statute of limitations is also construed in
case law. For example, the question of when a cause of action accrues – and thereby
triggers the start of the limitations period – “is one left to judicial determination.” Cain,
475 Md. at 35. Under that rubric, this Court developed a “discovery rule” that delays
accrual of a cause of action, for purposes of computing the statute of limitations, until the
plaintiff is aware, or reasonably should be aware, of the wrong done by the defendant. See
Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634-38 (1981); Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179
(1917).7
rule supersedes the statute to the extent of any inconsistency. See Maryland Constitution, Article IV, §18(a) (rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Court of Appeals have “the force of law”). 7 The discovery rule was originally developed to apply to medical malpractice cases, see Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179 (1917), and “culminated in Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 (1981), where [the Court] made the discovery rule applicable in all civil suits.” Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 689-90 (1996). There is also now a statute of limitations that includes a discovery rule specific to medical malpractice actions. CJ §5-109.
6 In addition, the Court has applied “judicial tolling” to a statute of limitations when
the tolling would “gratify legislative intent” – in other words, “prevent perversion of the
[legislative] policy and purpose” underlying the statute of limitations. Philip Morris USA,
Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 238-39 (2006), abrogated on other grounds, Mummert
v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207 (2013). Judicial tolling is appropriate in a particular case if a
two-part test is met: “(1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations
supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling
exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes
of limitations.” Id.; see also Cain, 475 Md. at 53-69.
Finally, because a statute of limitations does not affect a court’s jurisdiction over a
claim, parties may generally toll or lengthen a period of limitations by agreement or waiver.
Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692. In some circumstances, they may agree to shorten a statutory
period of limitations in a way that courts will recognize. The courts have, by case law,
established criteria as to when a private alteration of a limitations period will be given
effect. Id. at 692-95.
The bottom line is that a statute of limitations is an expression of legislative policy
to be implemented by and in the courts. In giving effect to a statute of limitations, as in
A related statutory exception, known as the fraud exception, that was enacted in 1868 and that is now codified at CJ §5-203, was based on a judicially-created doctrine that tolled the period for filing an action in equity where the defendant’s fraud had induced the plaintiff not to sue within the applicable period. See Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 316 (1955).
7 construing other statutes and acts of the Legislature, the courts must ascertain and carry out
the legislative purpose underlying the statute of limitations in harmony with other
enactments of the Legislature.
C. Dealing with Emergencies under Maryland Law
1. The Governor and General Assembly
As head of the Executive Branch of State government,8 the Governor inevitably
must take the lead in dealing with state-wide emergencies. The General Assembly has
specifically conferred certain powers on the Governor for that purpose. Several sections
of the Public Safety Article (“PS”) of the Maryland Code pertaining to emergency powers
are relevant here.
The Legislature has authorized the Governor to declare a state of emergency “if
public safety is endangered or on reasonable apprehension of immediate danger to public
safety.” PS §14-303(a)(1); see also PS §14-107(a). The Legislature has further authorized
the Governor to take certain actions for dealing with that emergency, including
promulgation of “reasonable orders, rules, or regulations that the Governor considers
necessary to protect life and property or calculated effectively to control and terminate the
public emergency in the emergency area.” PS §14-303(b). Among other things, those
orders, rules, or regulations may:
8 See Maryland Constitution, Article II, §1 (“The executive power of the State shall be vested in a Governor”), §9 (the Governor “shall take care that the Laws are faithfully executed”); see also Maryland Code, State Government Article, §3-302 (“The Governor is the head of the Executive Branch of the State government and, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise and direct the officers and units in that Branch.”).
8 (1) control traffic, including public and private transportation, in the emergency area;
(2) designate specific zones in the emergency area in which the occupancy and use of buildings and vehicles may be controlled;
(3) control the movement of individuals or vehicles into, in, or from the designated zones;
(4) control places of amusement and places of assembly; [and]
(5) control individuals on public streets; . . . .
PS §14-303(b)(1)-(5). More generally, upon declaring a state of emergency, the Governor
may “suspend the effect of any statute or rule or regulation of an agency of the State or a
political subdivision” after finding such action “necessary in order to protect the public
health, welfare, or safety.” PS §14-107(d)(1)(i). The Director of the Maryland Emergency
Management Agency (“MEMA”) is to “coordinate the activities of the agencies of the State
and of those political subdivisions included in the declaration in all actions that serve to
prevent or alleviate the ill effects of the imminent or actual emergency.” PS §14-107(c)(1).
Other powers conferred on the Governor are triggered by a “catastrophic health
emergency” – defined as a “situation in which extensive loss of life or serious disability is
threatened imminently because of exposure to a deadly agent.” PS §14-3A-01(b). The
phrase “deadly agent” includes, among other things, a “viral agent” or “other biological
agent capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious disability.” PS §14-3A-01(c)(1).
If the Governor determines that a catastrophic health emergency exists in the State,
the Governor may issue a proclamation to that effect and may, among other things, order
(1) “the evacuation, closing, or decontamination of any facility” and (2) “[i]f necessary and
9 reasonable to save lives or prevent exposure to a deadly agent … [that] individuals …
remain indoors or refrain from congregating.” PS §14-3A-03(d). The General Assembly
has authorized the Governor to delegate certain duties to the Secretary of Health during
such an emergency and authorized the Secretary to issue directives concerning the isolation
or quarantine of individuals during the emergency. PS §14-3A-03 through §14-3A-05.
The statutes also specify the content of emergency declarations and certain notice,
duration, and procedural requirements for a declaration of a state of emergency. PS §§14-
107(a)(2)-(b), 14-303(c)-(d), 14-3A-02. The General Assembly has retained for itself the
power to terminate a declared state of emergency by joint resolution “at any time.” PS
§14-107(a)(4)(i).
2. The Judiciary
The Maryland Rules describe the authority of the Chief Judge for dealing with
public emergencies. Maryland Rules 16-1001 et seq.9
The rules concerning emergency powers apply when the Governor has declared a
state of emergency or in the event of “a natural or other event that significantly affects
9 As we shall see, the rules codified in Maryland Rules 16-1001 et seq. were adopted at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Such rules had been previously contemplated, and the rules that the Court adopted are not limited to emergencies caused by a viral pandemic.
Before the pandemic, the Court had adopted other rules related to catastrophic health emergencies. Those rules concern proceedings that might be brought by an individual or group of individuals to contest an isolation or quarantine directive issued by the Secretary of Health under PS §14-3A-05 and Maryland Code, Health-General Article, §18-901 et seq. See Maryland Rule 15-1101 et seq. Those rules do not bear on the issues in this opinion.
10 access to or the operations of one or more courts or other judicial facilities of the State or
the ability of the Maryland Judiciary to operate effectively.” Maryland Rule 16-1001(a),
(b). As described by a Rules Committee Note10 codified with Rule 16-1001(c), the “Rules
recognize that, in the event of an emergency declared by the Governor, the authority
granted under these Rules must be exercised in harmony with lawful directives of the
Governor and other Executive Branch officials to the maximum extent practicable.” Upon
a declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor, the Chief Judge “directly or through
designees, shall, to the extent practicable, consult with the Governor, the Governor’s
designees, the Maryland Emergency Management Agency, and, as appropriate, other
Executive Branch officials, in order to coordinate Judicial and Executive Branch responses
to the emergency.” Maryland Rule 16-1002.
The rules further describe specific actions the Chief Judge may take in an
emergency. Maryland Rule 16-1003(a). Any such actions are to be “to the extent
practicable, … compatible with directives and orders issued by the Governor” in
connection with a declared state of emergency. Maryland Rule 16-1003(b).
Pertinent to this case, the rule authorizes the Chief Judge to:
(2) suspend the operation of Rules that cannot be implemented as intended because of the emergency or event;
***
10 A Rules Committee Note is approved by the Court of Appeals as part of its consideration of rules proposed by the Rules Committee and is an authoritative basis for construing the rule to which it is appended. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 317 (1997); Palmisano v. Baltimore County Welfare Board, 249 Md. 94, 101 (1968).
11 (7) suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines, requirements, or expirations otherwise imposed by applicable statutes, Rules, or court orders, including deadlines for appeals or other filings, deadlines for filing or conducting judicial proceedings, and the expiration of injunctive, restraining, protective, or other orders that otherwise would expire, where there is no practical ability of a party subject to such deadline, requirement, or expiration to comply with the deadline or requirement or seek other relief;
(8) suspend any judicial business that is deemed not essential by the Chief Judge or close a court entirely when necessary;
(9) triage cases and categories of cases with respect to expedited treatment; *** (14) take any other appropriate action necessary to ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, essential judicial business is effectively handled by the courts.
Maryland Rule 16-1003(a). A Rules Committee Note codified with subsection (a)(7)
states: “Granting relief from filing deadlines may take the form of directing relation back
of filings made promptly after termination of the emergency to the day before the deadline
expired.”
Upon termination of an emergency, the Chief Judge is to review any measures taken
under the emergency rules and devise a “reasonable schedule” for rescission of those
measures. Maryland Rule 16-1003(b). A Rules Committee Note accompanying that
section acknowledges that, upon termination of an emergency, some extensions of
deadlines “may need to remain in place for a reasonable time.”
Finally, the rules provide for the publication of any directives or orders of the Chief
Judge on the Judiciary website and for notice of those actions to be given specifically to
12 the Governor, the legislative leadership, the director of MEMA, and (in the case of a
catastrophic health emergency) the Secretary of Health. Maryland Rule 16-1003(d).
II
The Pandemic, the State of Emergency, and the Chief Judge’s Administrative Tolling Orders
The Chief Judge issued the administrative tolling order that is the subject of this
case as part of the State’s response to the Covid-19 emergency that began in early 2020. It
was issued against the backdrop of the pandemic and various measures taken by the
Governor and Legislature in response to that emergency.
A. The Pandemic
Everyone above a very young age is conscious of the Covid-19 pandemic – the
worst public health crisis in a century – that suddenly and pervasively altered life
worldwide during the past two years. For future readers of this opinion on the other side
of the pandemic, the history books will provide the details. For now, it suffices to say that
the pandemic upended the patterns, rituals, and timelines of daily life – how one worked,
shopped, played, and prayed; where one went; when and how one met with others; who
was present for births, deaths, and the major life events in between. Mandated vaccination,
self-testing for the disease, masking, and “social distancing” became commonplace and,
on occasion, controversial.
Some of the most drastic measures were taken in the early days of the pandemic
during the spring of 2020 when its virulence was unknown, and the medical tools to combat
it – vaccination and treatment – were a hope rather than a certainty. Government offices
13 were closed, “non-essential” businesses were shuttered, stay-at-home orders were issued,
and personal interaction of any sort was viewed as risky. At that time, a federal judge in
Maryland, who was presiding over a case concerning anti-Covid-19 measures required to
protect inmates at a local detention center, alluded to grim statistics on the spread of the
virus and the resulting deaths and “struggle[d] to put into words the magnitude of COVID-
19’s devastation.”11
The tide began to turn in early 2021 as vaccines became available. There were
further advances and retreats as variants of the virus emerged, proliferated, and dissipated.
People are resilient and have adapted, but adaptation takes time. The story of Covid-19 is
not yet over, but this account is sufficient for purposes of this opinion.
We turn next to the specific measures taken in Maryland during the late winter and
early spring of 2020.
B. Legal Measures Taken to Combat the Pandemic
1. January – February 2020: Preparation for Arrival of the Virus in Maryland
The response of the Maryland State government to the pandemic began to take shape
in January 2020, when the Governor directed State agencies to plan for a possible outbreak
of Covid-19 in the State. On February 27, 2020, in anticipation of the arrival of the virus
in Maryland, the Governor announced that he had added funds to the State budget for
emergency preparedness, that the Department of Health and MEMA were coordinating the
11 Seth v. McDonough, 461 F.Supp.3d 242, 247 (D. Md. 2020).
14 effort, and that his administration would brief members of the General Assembly, the
Comptroller, the Attorney General, and the Treasurer.12
Also on February 27, the State Office of Personnel Services and Benefit Policy
issued a notice entitled “Pandemic Flu and Other Infectious Diseases – Attendance and
Leave.” The stated purpose of the notice was to “ensure that the State has . . . policies that
facilitate the containment of pandemic flu or other infectious disease while supporting
Executive Branch operations and protecting the health and welfare of employees.” The
notice outlined three “levels” of agency operations during a pandemic flu or other
infectious disease that, depending on the severity of the outbreak, would result in reduced
operations that could include the closure of schools and public buildings.13 The policy
explicitly applied to Executive Branch agencies in the State Personnel Management
12 A list of certain actions taken by the Governor and other Executive Branch officials referenced in this section of this opinion is provided, with links, in Appendix A to this opinion. The appendices to this opinion are available at the following link: https://perma.cc/J237-W89M. It should be noted that this list is hardly exhaustive of the many measures taken by the Governor, other Executive Branch officials, and local governments in Maryland during the early days of the pandemic. 13 At “Level I” – the category for a “low to moderate” number of cases – “absenteeism in agencies may become noticeable and begin to concern the agency as a whole, or affect specific operations.” At Level II, “cases will continue to increase,” “[s]ome schools may have closed,” and “[a]bsenteeism in agencies will be noticeable, and perhaps significant, and will cause disruption in agency operations as a whole, or in specific locations.” Level III, “Emergency Operations,” would be marked by “a high number of pandemic flu . . ., and/or a greater severity of the resulting illness, with the likelihood of increasing mortality rates.” At that level, public schools and public buildings would be closed, either state-wide or in affected areas; “only mission-critical functions” would continue; only essential employees, as designated by their employer, were to report to work; and telework requirements could be relaxed.
15 System. It thus did not encompass personnel in the Judicial Branch, which is not part of
that personnel system. See Maryland Code, State Personnel and Pensions Article (“SPP”),
§6-303 (“All positions in the Judicial Branch of State government are excluded from the
State Personnel Management System except as otherwise provided by law.”); §2-201
(“Except as otherwise provided by law, an employee in the Judicial, Legislative, or
Executive Branch of State government is governed by the laws and personnel policies and
procedures applicable in that branch.”).
2. March 2020: Governor Declares State of Emergency
One week later, on March 5, 2020, a Covid-19 case was reported in Maryland, and
the Governor declared a “state of emergency and catastrophic health emergency” to
“control and prevent the spread of Covid-19 within the entire state of Maryland.” The State
was not alone in taking such actions. On March 11, the World Health Organization
declared the outbreak to be a global pandemic.
Each branch of State government then began taking measures to limit access to
public buildings and reduce interactions among government personnel and members of the
public. In the Executive Branch, the Governor activated the National Guard, closed the
public schools, and issued orders prohibiting large gatherings, closing senior citizen
centers, controlling the movement of people into the State’s ports, and restricting the use
of large government buildings.
The Governor also issued an order in which he found that, “to protect and save lives,
it is necessary and reasonable” to extend expiring “permits, licenses, registrations, and
other governmental authorizations,” not only because of increased employee absences and
16 alternative working arrangements within the State’s workforce, but also because the
renewal of such authorizations “often requires the public to enter public buildings and
interact with State employees and other persons, which may be contrary to prudent social
distancing.” The order authorized the “head of each unit of State or local government” to
suspend “any legal or procedural deadline . . . or other time of an act or event described
within any State or local statute, rule, or regulation that it administers.”
Then in mid-session, the General Assembly announced on the evening of March 12
that its buildings would be closed to the general public.14 The Legislature enacted
emergency legislation targeted at various aspects of the pandemic, including providing the
Governor with enhanced emergency powers for its duration. Chapters 13, 14, Laws of
Maryland 2020. Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly announced that it would adjourn
its session early, reportedly for the first time since the Civil War.15
During the remainder of March 2020, as the virus spread in Maryland and elsewhere
in the country, the Governor issued orders limiting public gatherings and activities in
various ways. On March 23, the Governor issued an order closing “all non-essential
businesses,” finding that, in order to “protect the public health, welfare, and safety, prevent
14 See Bryan Renbaum, Ferguson Urges Calm in Response to Coronavirus (MarylandReporter.com March 13, 2020). 15 See Erin Cox & Ovetta Wiggins, Coronavirus to Shut Down Maryland General Assembly (Washington Post March 16, 2020); Pamela Wood & Luke Broadwater, Maryland Lawmakers to End General Assembly Session Wednesday, with Threat of Coronavirus Looming (Baltimore Sun March 15, 2020).
17 the transmission of the novel coronavirus, control the spread of COVID-19, and save lives,
it is necessary to control and direct the movement of individuals in Maryland, including
those on the public streets” and “to control and direct in Maryland the occupancy and use
of buildings and premises.” One week later, the Governor issued a further directive
“requiring all persons to stay at home.” It stated that, unless specifically excepted, “all
persons living in the State of Maryland are hereby ordered, effective as of 8:00 p.m. on
March 30, 2020, to stay in their homes or places of residences.” That order has been
described as a “shelter-in-place” order. See Duvall v. Hogan, No. CV ELH-94-2541, 2020
WL 3402301, at *3 (D. Md. June 19, 2020).
3. March 2020: Initial Emergency Response of the Judiciary
On March 11, 2020, the Secretary of Health briefed the Judicial Council, an
advisory body to the Chief Judge,16 about the State’s response to the expected pandemic.
The Secretary advised the Council that there was currently no vaccine or therapy to treat
the rapidly-spreading virus and that the Judiciary should plan for courts to be closed for
16 The 21-member Judicial Council includes, among others, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, the Chair of the Conference of Circuit Judges, the Chief Judge of the District Court, the State Court Administrator, the Chair of the Conference of Circuit Court Clerks, the Chair of the Conference of Circuit Court Administrators, the Chair of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the Chief Clerk of the District Court. See Maryland Rule 16-110.
18 some time during the public emergency.17 One member of the Council, noting that most
District Court facilities are in State buildings and that the courts “have a constitutional
requirement to stay open to address certain matters,” suggested that the Governor could
defer to the Chief Judge as to whether courts would close or remain open upon declaration
of a state of emergency.
The Secretary provided the Judicial Council with information about quarantine and
incubation periods. He stated that the “executive branch is experimenting with telework,
to the extent possible, to mitigate exposure to risks,” requested that the courts accept
written reports in lieu of status hearings in certain cases, and expressed a concern that
backlogs in community placement for individuals ready for release would soon develop.
The Chief Judge asked the members of the Judicial Council to maintain “open and constant
communication” with the Department of Health.
On March 12 – the same day that the Governor issued the order restricting use of
government buildings and imposing restrictions on large gatherings and that the General
Assembly closed its buildings to the public – the Chief Judge issued two administrative
orders suspending jury trials and non-essential matters, respectively.18 In those orders, the
17 Minutes of the Judicial Council (March 11, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/judicialcouncil/pdfs/minutes/minutes20200 311.pdf (https://perma.cc/A85U-2NFZ). 18 See Administrative Order on the Statewide Suspension of Jury Trials (March 12, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200312suspensionofjurytrials.pdf (https://perma.cc/GC7U-QDBA); Administrative Order on the Statewide Suspension of Non-Essential Judicial Activities Due to Emergency (March 12, 2020), available at
19 Chief Judge found that the Covid-19 outbreak had caused “an emergency . . . that poses a
threat of imminent and potentially lethal harm to vulnerable individuals, including some
Judiciary personnel, who may come into contact with a court or judicial facility and
personnel.” In light of that emergency, the Chief Judge suspended jury trials and certain
non-essential activities. The next day, March 13, the Chief Judge issued an additional
administrative order that closed courthouses to the public for all but certain emergency
matters.19
In those administrative orders, the Chief Judge invoked her authority under the State
Constitution as administrative head of the Judicial Branch. Simultaneously, the Rules
Committee was drafting rules governing use of that authority for dealing with a public
emergency.
4. Court of Appeals: Adoption of Rules Relating to Emergencies
On March 13, 2020, the Rules Committee considered a set of proposed rules relating
to the emergency authority of the Chief Judge. At that meeting, the Chair of the Committee
explained that the few provisions in statute and rule concerning public emergencies and the
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200312suspensionnonessential.pdf (https://perma.cc/QTF2-5LUJ). 19 See Administrative Order on Statewide Closing of the Courts to the Public Due to the COVID-19 Emergency (March 13, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200313statewideclosingofcourts.pdf (https://perma.cc/BRQ3-PSS2).
20 Judiciary had resulted from specific past emergencies.20 He said that the development of
more general emergency rules had been contemplated, but could be delayed no longer in
light of the rapidly-spreading coronavirus. The Chair noted that the Governor had
comprehensive authority under a number of statutes to deal with emergencies, but that the
statutes made little reference to the Judiciary. He stated that the lack of mention of the
Judiciary was understandable because the responsibility to run the Judicial Branch is vested
by the Maryland Constitution in the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge, to be
implemented primarily through the Court’s rulemaking authority. He noted that the
proposed rules recognized that any emergency actions taken by the Chief Judge must be
taken in harmony with the Governor’s lawful directives.
The Rules Committee approved the proposed rules with minor amendments and
submitted its report to the Court of Appeals that day. The report noted that the authority
of the Chief Judge “to assure, to the extent possible, the continued functioning of the courts
and the judicial system” was “necessarily broad,” but that “its exercise is limited to those
things that prove necessary to assure reasonable access to the courts during and
immediately following an emergency or other disabling event.”21
20 Minutes of Rules Committee Meeting, pp. 12-13 (March 13, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/minutes-rules/minutes20200313.pdf (https://perma.cc/MD6K-TMQ5). 21 204th Report of the Rules Committee, p. 3 (March 13, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/reports/204threport.pdf (https://perma.cc/2F8P-ZA9T).
21 The following Monday, March 16, the Court of Appeals considered the rules in an
open hearing. The Court adopted the proposed rules, which are codified at Maryland Rule
16-1001 et seq. as described in Part I.C.2 of this opinion. As noted there, those rules,
among other things, delegated to the Chief Judge a conditional authority to extend
deadlines that was substantially analogous to the authority that the Governor’s March 12
order had granted to heads of the units of State and local governments for deadlines
imposed by the laws that the agencies in those units administered.
5. Administrative Orders Issued under Emergency Rules
Closing Clerks’ Offices
On March 16, the Chief Judge issued an order that closed clerks’ offices, with
limited exceptions.22 That order, which stated that it was effective immediately, noted the
safety measures that the courts had taken thus far and found that there was “a threat of
imminent and potentially lethal harm to vulnerable individuals who may come into contact
with a … judicial facility and personnel” and that “[f]urther rapid escalation of the
emergency requires more comprehensive measures to protect the health and safety of
Maryland residents and Judiciary personnel.” Citing the new emergency rules, the Chief
Judge ordered that the courts, offices, and units in the Maryland Judiciary, and the offices
of the clerks of the circuit courts and the District Court, “shall be restricted to emergency
22 Administrative Order on Statewide Judiciary Restricted Operations Due to the COVID-19 Emergency (March 16, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200316restrictedoperationsduetocovid19.pdf (https://perma.cc/F8S6-G5CS).
22 operations and closed with limited exceptions as described in this order beginning on
March 17, 2020, through April 3, 2020, or until further order of the Chief Judge . . . .” The
order specified that MDEC – the Judiciary’s electronic case management system –
“continues to be available for electronic filing and is required to be used for all MDEC
counties.”23 Regarding “pleadings not required to be filed electronically,” the order
provided that “filings will be received by mail and may be received via drop boxes installed
at local courthouses.” The order further specified that “[o]ther than as set forth in this
Administrative Order, deadlines established by Maryland statutes or rules remain in
effect[.]”
Extending Filing and Hearing Dates
On April 3, 2020, the Chief Judge issued the initial order extending filing and
hearing dates as a result of the pandemic.24 Finding that the Covid-19 outbreak “continues
to require comprehensive measures to protect the health and safety of Maryland residents
and Judiciary personnel” and citing Article IV, §18 of the Maryland Constitution and Rule
16-1003(a)(7) as authority, she ordered that:
23 At the time of the order, all jurisdictions except Baltimore City, Montgomery County, and Prince George’s County were part of the MDEC electronic filing system. 24 See Administrative Order on Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statute of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters (April 3, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200403emergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesoflimitationsetc.pdf (https://perma.cc/N3QU-UBNT).
23 all statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters required to be filed in a Maryland state court, including statutes of limitations, shall be tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts are closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency by order of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals[.]
The April 3 order further provided that “such deadlines shall be extended by a period to
be described in an order by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals terminating the
COVID-19 emergency period.” The order also tolled deadlines regarding hearings in
pending matters.25
The April 24 Administrative Tolling Order
On April 24, 2020, the Chief Judge issued the order to which the certified question
in this case refers. That order was titled “Amended Administrative Order Clarifying the
Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules
Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines
in Pending Matters.” A copy of that order appears in Appendix B to this opinion.26 It
elaborated on the April 3 order and recited, in a series of “whereas” clauses, the backdrop
against which the tolling order was issued. In particular, it stated that the “comprehensive
measures” required by the Covid-19 emergency, including “the stay-at-home orders
issued by the Governor and restricted operations of the courts and judicial facilities,” were
“causing delays in the processing of routine matters,” that the restrictions were having “a
25 The Chief Judge amended the April 3 order on April 8 in ways not relevant here. 26 Appendix B, as well as the other appendices to this opinion, may be found at the following link: https://perma.cc/J237-W89M.
24 widespread detrimental impact upon the administration of justice, impeding the ability of
parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, gather evidence, and
prepare complaints, pleadings, and responses,” with the greatest impact on impoverished
individuals, and that the impact of the pandemic “is so widespread as to have created a
general and pervasive practical inability for certain deadlines to be met.” The order
reiterated that the tolling period would begin on March 16, 2020 and run for “the number
of days that the courts are closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency.”
The April 24 order made clear that the tolling provision applied to matters in both
the trial and appellate courts27 and contained a new provision explaining that the tolling
provision applied regardless of whether a party made a specific showing of hardship as a
result of the pandemic.28
27 The order amended the language in the April 3 order regarding the tolling or suspending of statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters “required to be filed in a Maryland state court” to read “required to be filed in a Maryland state trial or appellate court.” 28 The order stated:
Justice requires that the ordering of the suspension of such deadlines during an emergency as sweeping as a pandemic be applied consistently and equitably throughout Maryland, and no party or parties shall be compelled to prove his, her, its, or their practical inability to comply with such a deadline if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain the relief that this Administrative Order provides[.]
25 Later Administrative Orders Relevant to Tolling
During May 2020, the Chief Judge issued administrative orders setting forth
additional findings on the impact of the pandemic-related restrictions on the courts.
A May 1, 2020 order concerning “Case Time Standards and Related Reports” stated
that the pandemic “has forced the restriction of court operations and closure of facilities,
requiring postponements of thousands of court events across the state,” that the “restricted
operations have resulted in a backlog of new and pending matters causing heretofore
unforeseen delays in the resolution of cases that must be processed when the courts can be
re-opened to routine operations,” and that “it is anticipated that the courts will be required
to reopen in phases and may continue to be constrained by safety measures . . . .”29
A May 4 order “Expanding and Extending Statewide Judiciary Restricted
Operations”30 addressed the mechanics of filing in the courts and ordered that the clerks of
the various courts “shall continue to process” filings, whether electronic or otherwise, “to
the extent possible with essential staff working onsite, staff teleworking, or both[.]” The
29 Administrative Order on Case Time Standards and Related Reports for Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021 in Light of the COVID-19 Emergency (May 1, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200501casetimestandardsandrelatedreports.pdf (https://perma.cc/9Z2W- 5AER). 30 Fourth Amended Administrative Order Expanding and Extending Statewide Judiciary Restricted Operations Due to the COVID-19 Emergency (May 4, 2020), available at https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200504fourthamendedadministrativeorderexpandingandextendingjudiciaryrestr ictedoperations.pdf (https://perma.cc/89L4-N46A).
26 order further provided that another order issued that day would “control as to statutory and
rules deadlines,” except as to criminal jury trials. The latter order, “Further Clarifying the
Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules
Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines
in Pending Matters,” retained the March 16, 2020 effective date of the earlier tolling orders
and did not change the earlier orders in ways relevant here.
On May 22, the Chief Judge issued an order that superseded the April 24 tolling
order. Among other things, the new order noted that clerks’ offices would be reopened on
July 20, 2020 – which would mark the end of the tolling period established in the previous
orders. The order elaborated on the previous tolling orders by specifying that, for purposes
of tolling the statutes and limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters,
the 126 days during which the clerks’ offices were closed (March 16, 2020 until July 20,
2020) “do not count against the time remaining for the initiation of the matter.” The May
22 order further extended the filing deadlines for the initiation of matters by an additional
15 days past the date on which clerks’ office reopened and provided an example as to how
a new filing deadline would be computed.
From June 2020 through March 2022, the revised administrative tolling order was
amended 11 times. The amendments included some minor changes to the tolling order,31
31 An amended order issued on November 24, 2020, added a definition of “matters” to which the tolling orders would apply “nunc pro tunc” – i.e., the definition applied retroactively. That definition has no bearing on this case and its validity is not before us.
27 but largely consisted of updated cross-references to other administrative orders concerning
the Covid-19 pandemic.32 On March 28, 2022, the Chief Judge issued a “final”
administrative tolling order; it recognized the termination of emergency operations in the
Judiciary as of April 3, 2022.
A list of all the administrative tolling orders, and links to each, is contained in
Appendix C to this opinion.33
6. Informing the Legislature about the Judiciary’s Response to the Emergency
On May 7, 2020, the Chief Judge briefed the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee on the Judiciary’s response to the pandemic and specifically informed the
committee about the various administrative orders, including the order tolling statutes of
limitations and other filing deadlines. On May 28, the Chief Judge provided a similar
briefing to the House Judiciary Committee and again described the administrative orders,
including the tolling orders.
On January 8, 2021, the Chief Judge provided a further briefing to the Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee on “the Courts and Criminal Justice System During the
COVID-19 Pandemic.” Attached to the agenda of that meeting was a timeline of the
32 According to the Judiciary website, a total of 107 administrative orders have been issued concerning various matters related to the pandemic emergency. The vast majority of those orders consist of minor revisions of a relatively small number of distinct orders. See https://mdcourts.gov/coronavirusorders (https://perma.cc/82HA-4Q32). 33 Like the other appendices to this opinion, Appendix C may be found at the following link: https://perma.cc/J237-W89M.
28 Judiciary’s response, including links to the April 3 and 24, 2020 tolling orders and many
of the succeeding ones, and a statement that “[t]he Maryland Judiciary has maintained
ongoing communication with the Maryland Department of Health, the Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services, Department of Juvenile Services, the Department
of General Services, the Maryland State Bar Association and the Governor’s Office of
Legal Counsel.”34
III
The Dispute between Liberty Mutual and Murphy Enterprises
The federal district court’s certification order describes the lawsuit and proceedings
there that gave rise to the certified question of law.
A. Payment and Performance Bonds and Claims for Indemnification
The facts of the underlying dispute do not affect our answer to the certified question.
We describe them briefly for context. As indicated in the federal court’s certification order,
34 Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Briefing on the Courts and Criminal Justice System During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Agenda (Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2021RS/meeting_material/jpr%20- %20132545970372917678%20-%20JPR%20Briefing%20January%208.pdf (https://perma.cc/DZP4-5X4H).
29 Liberty Mutual35 issued payment and performance bonds to Murphy Enterprises,36 a
concrete subcontractor on a construction contract for a Maryland State Police facility at
Martin State Airport. Under a related indemnification agreement, Murphy Enterprises
agreed to indemnify Liberty Mutual in certain circumstances. According to Liberty
Mutual, Murphy Enterprises defaulted on its obligations at the construction project,
resulting in claims against the payment and performance bonds. Liberty Mutual allegedly
made payments to third parties as a result of those claims on five occasions during February
2017 through August 2017. According to Liberty Mutual, it is entitled to indemnification,
including associated legal fees and other costs, from Murphy Enterprises for those
payments.
B. Litigation in Federal Court Concerning the Claims for Indemnification
On July 2, 2020, Liberty Mutual sued Murphy Enterprises in a diversity action in
federal court to recover the amounts allegedly owed. The complaint asserted a breach of
contract claim and alleged that the damages exceeded the jurisdictional amount of $75,000
for purposes of the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jesse
J. Murphy, et al., Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-01961-SAG (D. Md.).
35 According to the complaint filed in the federal district court, Liberty Mutual brought the action as administrator and assignee of another entity that had issued the payment and performance bonds. For simplicity, we refer solely to Liberty Mutual in the text. 36 Jesse J. Murphy, the individual defendant in the underlying case, is identified in the caption of the complaint in the federal district court as the president and resident agent of J.M. Murphy Enterprises, Inc.
30 Murphy Enterprises moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It argued that several of the bond payments
were made more than three years before the complaint was filed, that the claims related to
those payments accrued outside the relevant period of limitations under Maryland law,37
that the amount of those claims should not be included in computing the amount in
controversy, and that the remaining claims did not meet the $75,000 jurisdictional
threshold for a diversity action in federal court. Liberty Mutual countered that the claims
were timely under Maryland law because the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order
had tolled the applicable statute of limitations. In reply, Murphy Enterprises argued that
the tolling order exceeded this Court’s authority under Maryland’s Constitution to “adopt
rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of
the appellate courts and in other courts of the State” and “constituted an unlawful
assumption of legislative power.” Liberty Mutual rejoined that the Court had properly
exercised its emergency powers.
C. Federal Court Certifies Question of Maryland Law
On July 2, 2021, the federal district court issued a memorandum opinion in which
it opined that the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order was “substantive law” that
tolled the statute of limitations under Maryland law and that would apply in a federal
37 The general statute of limitations under Maryland law applicable to breach of contract claims is three years. CJ §5-101.
31 diversity action if “validly enacted.”38 Accordingly, the court concluded that the validity
of the administrative tolling order could be determinative of its jurisdiction over the
litigation. Two weeks later, the federal district court transmitted its certified question of
law to this Court to resolve that issue.
The timeliness of certain claims asserted in Liberty Mutual’s complaint in the
federal court action – and the jurisdiction of the federal court over that action – thus may
turn on whether the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order was a proper exercise of
powers under the Maryland Constitution.39 For that purpose, the federal court has certified
a question of law to this Court, which we rephrase as follows:40
38 Under the “Erie doctrine,” a federal court is to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, including the state’s choice-of-law rules, in an action brought under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 39 While we have no reason to dispute the federal court’s view of how the validity of the administrative tolling order may affect its jurisdiction over the litigation, we express no opinion as to when the various claims asserted by Liberty Mutual actually accrued. 40 The federal district court worded the certified question as follows:
Did the Maryland Court of Appeals act within its enabling authority under, inter alia, the State Constitution and the State Declaration of Rights when its April 24, 2020 Administrative Order tolled Maryland’s statutes of limitation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?
We have reformulated the question to reflect that, as noted in Part II.B of this opinion, the April 24 administrative tolling order and the subsequent tolling orders that revised it were issued by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, not the entire Court, and that those orders invoked rules adopted by the Court in addition to the Chief Judge’s administrative authority as head of the Judicial Branch under the State Constitution. Our rephrasing is simply an effort to present the important issue identified by the federal court more precisely in terms of Maryland law. Our rephrasing also recognizes that the Chief Judge’s administrative orders for criminal matters and other deadlines are not at issue in this matter.
32 Did the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland act within her authority under Maryland law when, in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, she issued Administrative Orders that tolled statutes of limitations related to civil cases?
The certification order designated Murphy Enterprises and Mr. Murphy as appellants in
this Court and so Liberty Mutual is to be treated as appellee. Maryland Rule 8-305(b).
IV
Discussion
A. Certified Questions of Law
Under the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, CJ §12-601 et
seq., this Court may “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States
or by an appellate court of another state or of a tribe, if the answer may be determinative
of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate
decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.” CJ §12-603; see also Maryland
Rule 8-305. For that purpose, we may reformulate the question certified to us, as we have
done in this case. CJ §12-604. In responding to a certification from another court, this
Court resolves only issues of Maryland law, not questions of fact. Parler & Wobber v.
Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 681 (2000).
In responding to the certified question from the federal district court, it is not our
role to decide the timeliness of the claims asserted by Liberty Mutual, to determine whether
the amount in controversy satisfies the minimum for federal diversity jurisdiction, or to
resolve Murphy Enterprises’ motion to dismiss. Those are jobs for the federal court. Our
33 task is simply to answer the question of Maryland law posed to us to assist the federal court
in resolving the questions before it.
The federal district court has asked whether the Chief Judge acted within her
authority under Maryland law, including the Maryland Constitution, in issuing the
administrative tolling order.41 We answer that question in two steps.
First, we address whether there is authority under Maryland law for a Chief Judge
to issue such an order in an emergency. The answer to that question is relatively
straightforward and largely answered in the text of the administrative tolling order itself.
Second, we consider whether, regardless of the authority for issuing such an order,
that order violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Murphy Enterprises contends that
two provisions of the Declaration of Rights precluded that order: (1) Article 8, which
guarantees separation of powers of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the
Maryland State government, and (2) Article 9, which prohibits the suspension of laws.
B. Whether the Chief Judge Had Authority to Issue the Order
The administrative tolling order issued on April 24, 2020 was based on explicit
authority provided by Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7) for the Chief Judge to “suspend, toll,
extend, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines … otherwise imposed by applicable
statutes ….” The Chief Judge’s authority to take such action is triggered under Maryland
41 Although our analysis and answer relate, as does the certified question of law, specifically to the April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order as it affected statutes of limitations governing civil actions, the same analysis applies to the later iterations of that provision in the amended administrative tolling orders issued by the Chief Judge.
34 Rule 16-1001 when the Governor declares a state of emergency – as the Governor had done
in March 2020 prior to the issuance of the administrative tolling order. Those rules were
adopted by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the Court’s rulemaking authority in Article
IV, §18(a) of the Maryland Constitution after notice and a public hearing, albeit on a short
timetable due to the pandemic emergency. There is no contention that the adoption of the
rules was procedurally deficient.
The administrative tolling order also invoked Article IV, §18 of the Maryland
Constitution and alluded to the Chief Judge’s role as the “administrative head” of the
Maryland judicial system. See Part I.A.1 of this opinion. The order was based in part on
the Chief Judge’s administrative responsibility to ensure that the courts were available to
discharge their constitutional duty to adjudicate disputes. As the recitals in the
administrative order indicate, at the time the order was issued in the spring of 2020, the
pandemic had disrupted access to the courts and the ability of the State Judiciary to operate
effectively. See Appendix B (text of April 24, 2020 order). In particular, the Chief Judge
found that the measures the Judiciary had taken to respond to that emergency, in
compliance with directives of the Governor and guidance from the federal Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, had had a “detrimental impact” that “imped[ed] the ability
of parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, gather evidence,
and prepare complaints, pleadings, and responses.” Id. As a result, there was a “general
and pervasive practical inability” to meet certain deadlines. Id. Moreover, the Chief Judge
found that the pandemic had affected not only the ability of litigants to file pleadings – a
35 problem addressed at least in part by drop boxes and MDEC – but also the ability to prepare
them in the first place.
In setting the amount of additional time that would be allowed for the “initiation of
matters,” section (a) of the order stated that the tolling period would run from March 16,
2020 – the date on which access to clerks’ offices was first restricted – and consist of “the
number of days that the courts are closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency.”42
A later administrative order set the end date of the tolling period as July 20, 2020, once the
courts had been reopened.43 Accordingly, the tolling period was explicitly tied to the period
that the courts were closed to the public.
There thus was ample and explicit authority under Article IV of the State
Constitution and the Maryland Rules for the Chief Judge to issue the administrative tolling
order. The remaining issue is whether, as Murphy Enterprises argues, the order – and
presumably the rules on which it was based – overreached the authority of the Judiciary by
offending other provisions of the Maryland Constitution, in particular, Articles 8 and 9 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
42 Other sections of the order applied a similar tolling period to deadlines in pending matters and made clear that the tolling applied universally without a requirement that litigants demonstrate a hardship in a particular case. See sections (b) and (c) of the April 24, 2020 order. 43 Later revisions of the order also added a 15-day grace period to the tolling period. That was apparently based on Rule 16-1003(b), which, according to the accompanying Rules Committee Note, contemplates that some extensions of deadlines might remain in place for a reasonable time after termination of an emergency. See Part I.C.2 of this opinion.
36 C. Whether the Order Violated Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
1. Article 8 – Separation of Powers
The Three Branches
The Maryland Constitution establishes State government in three branches –
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial – that are often referred to as “Departments” in that
document. Article II, entitled “Executive Department,” sets forth the powers of the
Governor as to that branch; Article III, entitled “Legislative Department,” concerns the
General Assembly, its composition, and its powers; and Article IV, entitled “Judicial
Department,” concerns the composition and powers of the Judiciary. Article 8 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights sets forth a principle of separation of powers with respect
to those branches. It states, in its entirety: “That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no
person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the
duties of any other.”
Shared Authority
Read literally, Article 8 appears to presuppose that each branch can, and must, carry
out its functions without performing any of the functions assigned to another branch.
However, this Court has long acknowledged that the “respective powers of the legislative,
executive and judicial branches of government are not ‘wholly separate and unmixed,’”
Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (1829).
37 In a well-known opinion concerning the relationship of the branches of government
under the federal constitution, Justice Robert Jackson described how the principle of
separation of powers does not isolate each branch in its own silo:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
The Maryland Constitution recognizes on its face that the powers of the three
branches of State government are often and inevitably intertwined. For example, the
General Assembly has a role in elections and appointments to positions in the Executive
Branch under Article II. See Article II, §6 (vacancies in offices of Governor and Lieutenant
Governor), §10-11 (Senate confirmation of gubernatorial appointees). The Governor, as
well as the General Assembly, plays a role in the enactment of legislation and in the
organization of the Executive Branch. Article II, §17, 24. The Governor, as well as the
General Assembly, has an important role in the State budget process. See Article III, §52;
Judy v. Schaefer, 331 Md. 239, 261-62 (1993) (describing the Governor’s role in the State
budget process as “a major legislative-type role”).
Other examples of shared authority necessarily occur in practice. The General
Assembly, in enacting a statute, may delegate some legislative-type powers to an Executive
Branch agency charged with administering the statute, so long as the statute provides
38 “sufficient safeguards” to guide the agency’s exercise of those powers. Department of
Transportation v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 72 (1987); see also Department of Natural
Resources v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 218-20 (1975). The authority of one branch may
overlap with those of another in some circumstances “because each branch may be
concerned with different objectives.” Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 677 (2015)
(recognizing the shared authority of the Executive and Judiciary branches to restrict an
individual’s driving privileges).
The separation of powers concept embodied in Article 8 accommodates the fact that,
in addition to the specific powers and functions that the Constitution expressly grants to
the three branches of government, each branch must as a practical matter “possess[]
additional powers perforce implied from the right and obligation to perform its
constitutional duties.” Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 690-91 (1981).
Because each branch has those implied powers, which are also referred to as “incidental”
or “inherent” powers, Article 8 “may constitutionally encompass a sensible degree of
elasticity.” Id. at 689 (quoting Linchester, 274 Md. at 220 (1975) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Accordingly, instead of interpreting Article 8 in a “literal sense,” the Court has
read it to “preserve to the one branch of government its essential functions” and to “prohibit
any other branch from interfering with or usurping those functions.” McCulloch v.
Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 283-84 (1997) (internal punctuation and citations omitted)..
The Limits of Sharing – “Usurping” the Powers of Another Branch
Still, the meaning of Article 8 “cannot be stretched to a point where, in effect, there
no longer exists a separation of governmental power, as the Maryland Constitution does
39 not permit a merger of the three branches of our State government, nor does it ‘make any
one of the three departments subordinate to the other, when exercising the trust committed
to it.’” Merchant v. State, 448 Md. 75, 97 (2016) (quoting Linchester, 274 Md. at 220).
Generally, in determining where that point might lie, the Court has looked to whether the
branch whose power was challenged was “usurping” a power of another branch. See, e.g.,
Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519 (2006) (holding invalid an action taken by the Legislature
that fell within the Executive’s purview). To the same effect, the Court has considered
whether the performance of a function by one branch “encroach[ed]” on the other branch’s
powers, see, e.g., Linchester, 274 Md. at 220, and whether the branch in question had “a
significant role” in the subject of the action, or whether, by contrast, that subject lay “solely
and exclusively within the purview of [a different] branch.” McCulloch, 347 Md. at 284.
In considering whether one branch’s action usurped a function properly belonging to
another branch, the Court has considered not only the respective roles and functions of
each branch as to the particular subject matter, but also the surrounding circumstances.
See, e.g., Schisler, 394 Md. at 542 (recounting the circumstances that led to the General
Assembly’s adoption of legislation that encroached on the Executive appointment power).
2. Application to the Administrative Tolling Order
The certified question in the present case involves the respective powers and
functions of all three branches. The issue here is whether the Judiciary had a “significant
role” in the courts’ application of statutes of limitations during an emergency or whether,
instead, that subject fell solely within the purview of either the Legislative or the Executive
branch such that the administrative tolling order interfered with the performance by the
40 other two branches of their essential functions. In short, did the Chief Judge’s
administrative tolling order “usurp” another branch’s power?
Separation of Powers and the Judiciary
This Court has addressed the Judiciary’s place in Maryland’s system of government
in numerous contexts. The cases can be sorted into four broad categories: (1) those
involving a legislative attempt to assign to the courts a task that had nothing to do with
adjudicating cases, such as approving the accounts that county officers presented to a board
of county commissioners for payment;44 (2) those involving actions taken by, or requested
of, a particular court in a particular proceeding that encroached upon a legislative or
executive function;45 (3) those that concern whether the adoption of a particular rule by the
44 Beasley v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641(1902). Other examples of such statutes include laws requiring a court to find facts, for referral to the Legislature for its action, as to whether a candidate for register of wills had violated the state Corrupt Practices Act, Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 261 (1983); requiring a court to appoint members of a board of visitors to a county jail, Robey v. Prince George’s County, 92 Md. 150 (1900); or requiring the circuit court to receive petitions on whether to permit the sale of liquor in the county and order an election if the petitions met the required threshold, Board of Supervisors Elections v. Todd, 97 Md. 247 (1903).
With regard to legislation that limits the Judiciary’s powers, the Legislature retains authority to limit the Judiciary’s exercise of its powers to the extent that a power is “not an essential [one] inherent in the courts in the discharge of their constitutionally mandated duty to administer justice.” Commission on Medical Discipline v. Stillman, 291 Md. 390, 402 (1981). 45 See, e.g., Getty v. Carroll County Board of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 738 (2007) (holding that the circuit court had exceeded its powers in issuing a consent order implementing an agreement between a county resident and the election board to adopt a particular redistricting plan and explaining that the circuit court had “assumed a role that, in fact, constitutionally belongs to the legislative and executive departments of our government”); Maryland-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n v. Randall, 209 Md. 18, 27
41 Court of Appeals exceeded the Court’s authority under Article IV, §18(a) to adopt rules
and regulations concerning “the practice and procedure” in the courts;46 and (4) those
involving whether a particular rule or other action by the Judiciary exceeded the
rulemaking authority of the Court of Appeals under that same section concerning “the
administration” of the courts.47
The last two categories of cases are the most instructive here. The certified question
of law concerns the validity of an administrative order that invoked the Chief Judge’s
authority under both Article IV, §18(b) and the emergency rules, which themselves were
based on the rulemaking authority of the Court of Appeals under Article IV, §18(a) (“The
Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the
practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other
courts of this State …” (emphasis added)).
(1956) (affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of a petition to enjoin the Secretary of State from transmitting a vetoed bill back to the legislative house of origin). 46 See, e.g., Consol. Const. Servs., Inc. v. Simpson, 372 Md. 434, 448-49 (2002) (provision of rule governing garnishment actions effected a substantive change in the cause of action that exceeded the Court’s rulemaking authority). 47 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368 (1986) (rule granting power to assign cases to a circuit court administrative judge was within the rulemaking power under §18(a)).
42 Whether the rules and administrative tolling order fell within the Court’s rulemaking powers related to “practice and procedure”
The “practice and procedure” category includes cases in which the Court held
invalid either its own rule or a local rule adopted by a circuit court with rulemaking
authority, and cases in which the Court held instead that the rule fell properly within the
Judicial Branch’s role in regulating practice and procedure in the courts. In a case in which
a rule was found to be invalid, the Court held that it had exceeded its power and had
encroached on the General Assembly’s legislative power by adopting a rule that added a
substantive element to attachment and garnishment proceedings. Those proceedings, the
Court explained, are “creatures of statute,” such that the “substance of the statute . . . is the
province of the Legislature and not the courts.” Consol. Const. Servs., Inc. v. Simpson, 372
Md. 434, 451–52 (2002); see also State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183 (1999) (“It is
doubtful that this Court’s rule-making authority would extend to the creation of a separate
cause of action.”).
A statute of limitations, however, neither creates a right of action nor pertains to the
merits of a cause of action; rather, it regulates the plaintiff’s exercise of that right. See
Park Plus, Inc. v. Palisades of Towson, LLC, ___ Md. ___ (March 25, 2022), slip op. at 18
(“Statutes of limitations have historically been considered procedural, not substantive
defenses, and are generally understood to extinguish the remedy for enforcing a right, not
the right itself.”) (emphasis in original); see also Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 38 (1967);
Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md. 635, 639 (1947); Young v. Mayne Realty Co., Inc., 48 Md.
App. 662, 664-66 (1981).
43 The tolling of the statute of limitations thus falls within the field of procedural
matters in which the Court may play a role. Further, as noted in Part I.B. of this opinion,
the Court has played a role on the subject, both by rule and through the development in
case law of doctrines applicable to broad categories of cases. As noted earlier, Rule 2-
101(b) tolls the statute of limitations for filing in a Maryland court for a plaintiff whose
lawsuit was initially filed in federal court or a court of another state, but dismissed in that
forum on jurisdictional or certain other grounds. See Turner v. Kight, 406 Md. 167, 190
(2008) (applying Rule 2-101(b) in conjunction with a federal statute); see also Christensen,
394 Md. at 242 (referring to Rule 2-101(b), stating, “this Court not only has the authority
to adopt rules that alter the operation of existing statutes of limitations, it has exercised its
rulemaking authority to adopt such a rule”). That rule, adopted to preserve a plaintiff’s
ability to litigate an action timely brought in federal court but dismissed there on certain
grounds not bearing on the merits, illustrates that “practice and procedure” may include
generally-applicable measures to ensure that the courts’ procedures are fair to litigants.
Similar policy goals underlie the various judicially-created doctrines that extend the
deadline for filing suit for various categories of claimants, such as the “discovery rule” and
“judicial tolling.” In creating such categorical exceptions, the Court has looked to the
several interests accommodated in a statute of limitations. For example, in extending the
discovery rule to latent disease claims that the plaintiff could not have discovered within
the applicable time period, the Court concluded that “avoiding possible injustice in these
situations outweighed interests in repose and administrative expediency.” Hecht v. Resol.
Tr. Corp., 333 Md. 324, 335 (1994) (recounting the Court’s development of the discovery
44 rule). And, the Court has applied the doctrine of “judicial tolling” when “(1) there is
persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the
tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally
recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes of limitations.” Christensen, 394 Md. at
238.48
Certainly, the tolling of a statute of limitations is a subject that also lies within the
sphere of the legislative branch; as this Court has noted, “the harshness” of the general rule
that the limitations period runs upon the occurrence of the alleged wrong has “led to the
creation of both legislative and judicial exceptions.” Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 634
(emphasis added). One such legislated exception is provided by CJ §5-202, which tolls the
pertinent statute of limitations on the claims against a defendant who files a “petition in
insolvency” for a period of time between “the filing and the dismissal” of such a petition.
See Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 416 Md. 249, 252, 259 (2010) (construing CJ §5-
202). Another is set forth in PS §14-207, which provides for the tolling of the statute
regarding persons in emergency management or, during the emergency period, persons
suffering certain injuries or damages. And, at times, the Legislature has codified a
judicially-created exception by amending a statute to include it, or creating a new statutory
cause of action. See, e.g., Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 316 (1955) (describing a statutory
amendment that extended the judicially-created fraud exception to cases filed at law).
48 The federal district court did not ask, and we express no opinion on, whether judicial tolling would be appropriate in this particular case.
45 Just as certainly, however, the General Assembly’s authority to enact legislation on
the subject of tolling does not deprive the Judicial Branch of its constitutional authority to
adopt rules that regulate the method by which litigants exercise a right of action. The
shared authority of the two branches in that broad field – and the back-and-forth between
the two branches that may occasionally and constitutionally occur – can be seen in Hensley
v. Bethesda Sheet Metal Co., 230 Md. 556 (1963). That case also illustrates the principle
under Article IV, §18 that, when a rule and statute conflict in this area, the last enacted
provision prevails.49
The decision in Hensley concerned the procedure by which a workers’
compensation claimant was to seek judicial review of an adverse decision of the Workers’
Compensation Commission. As of 1959, a claimant was required by a longstanding statute
to serve notice of such an appeal on the Commission as a prerequisite to obtaining judicial
review. That year, the Court adopted a general rule for appeals from administrative
agencies – which would include an appeal of a Commission decision.50 That rule required
a claimant to note an appeal in circuit court and did not require service on the administrative
tribunal. In 1960, in the course of amending the statute pertaining to the Commission, it
49 That principle is akin to the direction that the General Assembly has given for resolving contradictory provisions in its own enactments. See Maryland Code, General Provisions Article, §1-207. 50 At that time, the Maryland Rules referred to an “appeal” of an administrative agency decision. Currently, the rules refer, more accurately, to “judicial review” of such decisions. See Maryland Rule 7-201 et seq.
46 repealed and re-enacted that statute, which still included the requirement that a claimant
note an appeal with the Commission. In 1962, the Court re-promulgated the rules
concerning appeals from administrative agencies, including the rule regarding the
prerequisites for pursuing such an appeal, thereby superseding once again the legislative
provision concerning service on the Commission. Id. at 559-60. In Hensley, a claimant
had followed the statutory procedure while appealing an adverse Commission decision in
1961; the circuit court dismissed that appeal for failing to comply with the court rule. This
Court reversed that decision, holding that the claimant had properly followed the statutory
procedure during the interlude when the statute prevailed over the rule. The Court
explained that it had, “pursuant to the constitutional grant of power, promulgated [the rules]
to govern the method, manner and mechanics of appeals from administrative agencies.”
Id. Just as constitutionally, the Legislature had enacted legislation that overrode the
Court’s rules on that subject.51
The Court’s adoption of rules providing for the tolling of the statute of limitations
in the event of an emergency fell within the Court’s constitutional authority to adopt rules
51 Another example of the concurrent roles of the two branches in procedural matters involved the regulation of appeals of a court’s denial of a request for an injunction. As related in Funger v. Mayor & Council of Town of Somerset, 244 Md. 141 (1966), a statute had made such denials immediately appealable; the Court of Appeals adopted a rule that superseded the statute as to certain actions; and the Legislature then “restored the situation to where it was” before the Rule was adopted. The Court explained, “[i]n enacting [that law,] the Legislature was concerned directly and precisely with the interplay of its statutes and the rules of the Court of Appeals. In that enactment it repealed statutes which were made ineffective or obsolete by the new rules and preserved or newly enacted the statutes it desired to be still effective.” 244 Md. at 150.
47 of practice and procedure. It is also evident that the tolling order itself did not usurp powers
belonging solely to another branch. As set forth in Part II of this opinion, the Chief Judge
issued the administrative tolling order against the backdrop of the rapidly-spreading Covid-
19 outbreak in Maryland. The tolling order addressed the effect of the emergency on the
ability of litigants and attorneys to comply with filing deadlines – a matter that the
Governor had already addressed in substantially similar terms for deadlines administered
by Executive Branch agencies52 – and the ability of Judiciary personnel to process
pleadings – an issue that the Executive Branch had analogously addressed in its policy
applicable to employees in that branch.53 When the Chief Judge’s pandemic tolling order
is viewed in that context, and also viewed against the backdrop of the Governor’s orders
limiting the movements of the public, the Judiciary’s role as to litigants and members of
the bar, the representation of the Legislature on the Rules Committee, and, particularly, the
ongoing communications between the Judiciary and the Executive and Legislative
branches, it becomes apparent that the administrative tolling order did not usurp a function
52 In its brief, Liberty Mutual argues that the Chief Judge acted “under the ambit” of the Governor’s executive order declaring a state of emergency, suggesting that the Governor had delegated authority to issue a tolling order to the Chief Judge. However, as shown by the administrative order, the Chief Judge did not purport to act under a delegation from the Governor; instead, she expressly relied on the constitutional grant of administrative authority to the Chief Judge and of rulemaking authority to the Court of Appeals. As outlined in Part I.C.2 of this opinion, the pertinent rules required the Chief Judge to act “in harmony” with the measures taken in the Executive Branch and to consult with the Governor and other officials in exercising the powers specified in the rules. 53 As a general rule, the Governor’s executive authority does not extend to employees in other branches. SPP §2-201. Nor does the Public Safety Article direct the Executive Branch to coordinate activities in the Judicial Branch in the event of an emergency.
48 solely belonging to another branch. Instead, the order not only comported with the
Executive Branch policy of limiting interactions among the public but also served the
statutory purposes of the statute of limitations by affording litigants adequate time in which
to prepare and file their pleadings and by avoiding the filing of inadequately-investigated
lawsuits in the courts.
Whether the tolling order and enabling rules fell within the Court’s power over the administration of the courts
The second category of instructive Article 8 cases is comprised of those that address
the validity of a rule or other Judiciary action regarding the administration of the courts –
a power that the Constitution grants to both the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge. The
Court described that power in Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368, 375-76
(1986). There, the petitioner challenged the validity of a rule54 that authorized the
administrative judge of each circuit to “assign any judge of his judicial circuit to sit as a
judge of the Circuit Court of any county in the judicial circuit, in any specified case or
cases or for any specified time.” Id. Holding that the rule was consistent with the Court’s
general power under Article IV, §18(a) to adopt rules concerning the administration of the
courts, as well as §18(b) concerning the Chief Judge’s authority to make assignments, the
Court stated that “whether it be by the Court of Appeals directly or the circuit
54 Former Maryland Rule 1202(b)(1). That rule, with minor amendments, has been re-codified and now appears as Maryland Rule 16-108(c). See also Strickland v. State, 407 Md. 344, 360 (2009).
49 administrative judge as its alter ego in the circuit, this power and authority encompasses
all facets of the internal management of our courts.” Id. at 376.
There are many facets of the internal management of the Judiciary, among them the
management of Judiciary personnel, operations, and facilities. Additionally, the Court
holds the incidental (or implied or inherent) power to regulate the legal profession, because
lawyers are officers of the Court. See, e.g., Waldron, 289 Md. 683 (discussing the
Judiciary’s role with regard to members of the Maryland bar). In both areas, the authority
of the Judiciary and, as applicable, its administrative head, is not only inherent, but also
expressly recognized by statute. See, e.g., CJ §1-201(a) (providing that the Court’s power
to issue rules and regulations concerning practice and procedure and judicial administration
in the courts is to be “liberally construed”); SPP §2-201 (stating that employees in the
Judicial Branch are governed by that branch’s personnel policies).
Both the administrative tolling order and the emergency rules fell within the
administrative powers assigned to the Judicial Branch. As noted above, the Chief Judge’s
April 24, 2020 order stated the comprehensive impact that the pandemic-related
restrictions, including the Governor’s stay-at-home orders and the restricted operations of
the courts, were having on logistical matters such as the processing of routine matters and
the ability of parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, and
prepare pleadings. Under those emergency circumstances, the Chief Judge’s order was
within her authority as administrative head of the Courts. And, as noted above, the Chief
Judge issued orders that followed on, and did not contravene, the Executive Branch orders
that governed the general public, State buildings, and Executive Branch personnel.
50 Further, the Judiciary conferred with Executive Branch agencies throughout, and the Chief
Judge reported those actions to committees of both houses of the General Assembly –
which had retained for itself in statute, but did not exercise in these circumstances, the
power to terminate a declared state of emergency.
Whether the order or rules “usurped” the function of another Branch
The Chief Judge’s April 24, 2020 administrative tolling order did not usurp the
Legislative Branch’s powers. The rules on which that order was based fell within the
Court’s “practice and procedure” and administrative functions under the Maryland
Constitution. The order was not an expression of a Judicial policy preference for a period
of limitations different from that set by the Legislature. Rather, in a sense, it was an effort
to respect the period of limitations set by the General Assembly by ensuring that the
administrative obstacles faced by litigants and the courts during the early days of the
pandemic did not effectively and retroactively shorten the period of limitations in those
cases in which the period would expire while the courts were closed. Thus, while an order
tolling a statute of limitations would not ordinarily be an administrative matter, in this
instance there were good grounds for treating it as such. Given the Court’s role regarding
the procedural aspects of the statute of limitations, and given the Judiciary’s coordination
with the Executive Branch with regard to the pandemic response, the rule and order also
did not encroach upon the Executive Branch’s emergency powers.
51 D. Whether the Order Violated Article 9 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
1. Article 9 – Prohibition Against Suspension of Laws
Article 9 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides “[t]hat no power of
suspending Laws or the execution of Laws, unless by, or derived from the Legislature,
ought to be exercised, or allowed.” This provision has been part of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights since 1776 and was derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
See Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Praeger 2006)
20. It has never been construed by this Court.55 An earlier treatise on the Maryland
Constitution suggests why there is a paucity of case law concerning Article 9. See Alfred
S. Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law (Hepbron & Haydon 1915). Niles classified the
various articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights into four different categories. Id. at
12-14. In his view, Article 9 fell into a category of “(d)eclarations of abstract principles
whose sole practical effect is to declare from what standpoint the law shall be considered
and in what spirit interpreted …. [I]n reality they amount to little more than a statement as
to the point of view from which the court is expected to look at any particular concrete
question.” Id. at 12, 22 (emphasis in original).
55 The Court of Special Appeals has had occasion to consider the application of Article 9 on two occasions and held that it did not apply in those cases. See Paula v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 253 Md. App. 566, ___ (2022) (affirming circuit court decision that Article 9 did not confer standing on plaintiff seeking to challenge alleged actions and inactions of police civilian review board); Doctor’s Hospital of Prince George’s County v. Maryland Health Resources Commission, 65 Md. App. 656, 675-76 (1986) (Commission decision not to issue certificate of need to hospital, despite a provision in the State Health Plan contemplating additional beds in the county, was not an “illegal moratorium” that violated Article 9).
52 2. Application to this Case
Murphy Enterprises does not articulate why it believes the administrative tolling
order violated Article 9 other than to quote the language of the constitutional provision.
Even if Article 9 is read literally to provide a specific safeguard as opposed to an abstract
principle of construction, it must be read in harmony with the rest of the State Constitution
of which it is part. A “basic rule of construction” applicable to the principles stated in the
Maryland Declaration of Rights is “that ordinarily the specific prevails over the general.”
State v. Smith, 305 Md. 489, 511 (1986). In other words, a specific power conferred in the
State Constitution prevails over a general principle stated in the Declaration of Rights. Id.56
As outlined earlier in this opinion, the State Constitution specifically assigns to the
Judiciary the power to make rules and regulations to govern the practice and procedure and
judicial administration in the courts of the State.
As explained above, the Court’s adoption of the emergency rules, which authorized
the issuance of an administrative tolling order such as the one that is the subject of the
certified question, was inherently within the Court’s constitutional rulemaking power. The
Constitution also designates the Chief Judge as administrative head of the Judiciary. The
specific constitutional grants of rulemaking and administrative powers to the Court of
Appeals and Chief Judge, respectively, would prevail over the more general principle
56 In Smith, the defendant argued that the issuance of a statement of charges by a District Court Commissioner violated the separation of powers guaranteed by Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court rejected that argument, holding that the specific powers conferred on commissioners under Article IV, §41G of the Constitution prevailed over the general principle of separation of powers stated in Article 8.
53 stated in Article 9. In any event, the adoption of a new rule under the Court’s rulemaking
power, and the issuance of an administrative order based on that rule, do not appear to fit
the description of a “suspension” of the laws.
Furthermore, even if the tolling of a period of limitations could be characterized as
a “suspension” of a law, in the circumstances of this emergency, it was consistent with
legislative policies and actions. The Legislature has granted certain emergency powers to
the Governor that include suspending State and local laws and has specified emergency
exemptions in particular statutes. Constitutionally, however, the Chief Judge, not the
Governor, is the administrative head of the Judiciary. As an incident of its core
constitutional powers, the Judiciary must be able to address emergencies affecting judicial
operations and personnel, whether those emergencies be local and brief, such as a hurricane
or public safety event, or widespread, such as the pandemic. Particularly when such powers
are exercised consistently with the statutorily-authorized actions taken by the Governor
upon the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency and coordinated with the other
branches of State government, including the Legislature, it cannot be said that there is a
“suspension” of laws that is not in some way “derived from the Legislature.”
E. Summary
The certified question of law presents a novel question as to the extent of the
Judiciary’s authority to manage the State’s court system, including its personnel, the public,
and court facilities, during a prolonged state of emergency that, at various times, has
affected many litigants’ ability to marshal facts and find, engage, and meet with lawyers;
has affected lawyers’ ability to meet with clients and assess their cases, gather facts and
54 records, and prepare pleadings; and has affected the ability of the court system to serve and
docket pleadings and set scheduling orders. Under such circumstances, the strict
application of the usual tolling rules in the various statutes of limitations would in many
cases have resulted in the filing of a premature complaint, not founded on sufficiently-
confirmed facts, or in an untimely filing, or in an abandoned cause of action, or in more
interactions among people at risk to the public health. None of these results would have
served the cause of justice; none would have promoted judicial efficiency; none would
have been necessary to effectuate the purposes of such statutes; and all would have had an
impact on the administration of, and practice and procedure in, the judicial system. We
therefore conclude that the tolling order fell within the scope of the Judiciary’s role in
Maryland government, did not usurp another branch’s power, and did not contravene the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
V
Conclusion
The federal district court has asked whether the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
acted within her authority and consistently with the Maryland Constitution when she issued
an administrative order temporarily tolling statutes of limitations under Maryland law with
respect to civil actions during the Covid-19 pandemic.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the answer to that question is “yes.”
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
55 List of and Links to Selected Documents Concerning Actions Taken by the Executive Branch Related to the Covid-19 Pandemic
February 27, 2020 Governor Hogan Announces Additional Steps to Protect Marylanders from Coronavirus https://governor.maryland.gov/2020/02/27/governor-hogan- announces-additional-steps-to-protect-marylanders-from- coronavirus/ (https://perma.cc/5SK3-843F)
February 27, 2020 Office of Personnel Services and Benefits Policy, Pandemic Flu and Other Infectious Diseases: Attendance and Leave https://dbm.maryland.gov/employees/Documents/PandemicFl uAttendanceLeavePolicy.pdf (https://perma.cc/E3ED-U46F)
March 5, 2020 Declaration of State of Emergency and Existence of Catastrophic Health Emergency – COVID-19 https://governor.maryland.gov/wp- content/uploads/2020/03/Proclamation-COVID-19.pdf (https://perma.cc/M45P-7U2B)
March 12, 2020 Order of the Governor Prohibiting Large Gatherings and Events and Closing Senior Centers https://governor.maryland.gov/wp- content/uploads/2020/03/Prohibiting-Large-Gatherings.pdf (https://perma.cc/4TZF-3UJA)
March 12, 2020 Order of the Governor Extending Certain Licenses, Permits, Registrations, and Other Governmental Authorizations, and Authorizing Suspension of Legal Time Requirements https://governor.maryland.gov/wp- content/uploads/2020/03/Licenses-Permits-Registration.pdf (https://perma.cc/P9UB-2PC5)
1 March 23, 2020 Order of the Governor Number 20-03-23-01 Amending and Restating the Order of March 19, 2020, Prohibiting Large Gatherings and Events and Closing Senior Centers, and Additionally Closing All Non-Essential Businesses and Other Establishments https://governor.maryland.gov/wp- content/uploads/2020/03/Gatherings-THIRD-AMENDED- 3.23.20.pdf (https://perma.cc/CZR5-6RET)
March 30, 2020 Order of the Governor Number 20-03-30-01 Amending and Restating the Order of March 23, 2020, Prohibiting Large Gatherings and Events and Closing Senior Centers, and All Non-Essential Businesses and Other Establishments, and Additionally Requiring All Persons to Stay at Home https://governor.maryland.gov/wp- content/uploads/2020/03/Gatherings-FOURTH-AMENDED- 3.30.20.pdf (https://perma.cc/ADA2-7HJZ)
2 List of and Links to the Initial and Amended Administrative Tolling Orders Related to the Covid-19 Pandemic
Initial Tolling Order Setting Date for Beginning of Tolling Period
April 3, 2020 Administrative Order on Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200403emergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesoflimitatio nsetc.pdf (https://perma.cc/N3QU-UBNT)
April 8, 2020 Amended Administrative Order on Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200408emergencytollingorsuspensionofstatuesoflimitatio nsamended.pdf (https://perma.cc/58XN-VEQR)
Detailed Tolling Order and its Amendment
* April 24, 2020 Amended Administrative Order Clarifying the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200424clarifyingemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatuteso flimitationsamended.pdf (https://perma.cc/GC97-6R5Q)
May 4, 2020 Amended Administrative Order Further Clarifying the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200504furtherclarifyingstatutesoflimitations.pdf (https://perma.cc/9C9K-W7PB)
*This order is the subject of the certified question of law. 1 Amended Detailed Tolling Order Setting End Date of Period
May 22, 2020 Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200522revisedemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesofli mitations.pdf (https://perma.cc/T3KQ-J5S3)
Revisions of Tolling Order Largely Changing Cross References to Other Orders
June 3, 2020 Second Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20200603secondrevisedemergencytollingorsuspensionofstat utesoflimitationanddeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/ML58-EEMC)
October 2, 2020 Third Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20201002thirdrevisedorderonemergencytollingorsuspension ofstatutesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/ML8N-CEQ3)
November 12, 2020 Fourth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20201112fourthrevisedorderonemergencytollingorsuspensio nofstatutesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/SJ23-RD4K)
2 November 24, 2020 Fifth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20201124fifthrevisedemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatute soflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/Z4AJ-AYDL)
December 22, 2020 Sixth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20201222sixthrevisedadministrativeorderonemergencytollin gorsuspensionofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.p df (https://perma.cc/Y4YC-CWWL)
February 2, 2021 Seventh Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20210202seventhrevisedadministrativeorderontheemergency tollingorsuspensionofstatutesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadli nesetc.pdf (https://perma.cc/YTB3-GDB2)
February 16, 2021 Eighth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20210216eighthrevisedorderonemergencytollingorsuspensio nofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/Y8N7-3TEK)
3 May 24, 2021 Ninth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders- archive/20210524ninthrevisedorderontheemergencytollingorsuspens ionofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/QM56-PLKQ)
August 6, 2021 Tenth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin- orders/20210806tenthrevisedorderontheemergencytollingorsuspensi onofstatuesoflimitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/EWW5-BHX6)
February 18, 2022 Eleventh Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin- orders/20220218eleventhrevisedonemergencytollingorsuspensionofs tatutesoflimitationsandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/75HL- 8XCF)
March 1, 2022 Twelfth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin- orders/20220301twelfthrevisedonemergencytollingorsuspensionofsta tutesoflimitationsandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/3NNS- HFSY)
4 Final Tolling Order Recognizing Return to Normal Operations
March 28, 2022 Final Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters During the Covid-19 Emergency https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin- orders/20220328finalonemergencytollingorsuspensionofstatutesofli mitationsandstatutoryandrulesdeadlines.pdf (https://perma.cc/5DHT- 5VPX)
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Murphy v. Liberty Mutual Ins., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/murphy-v-liberty-mutual-ins-md-2022.