Murphy v. Brockenborough

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 14, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-0454
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) KEVIN DONNELL MURPHY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00454 (UNA) ) MONIQUE BROCKENBOROUGH, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s IFP

Application is granted, and for the reasons explained below, this matter is dismissed.

Plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, sues the Director of the United States Department of

State’s Washington Passport Agency, the Department of State, the U.S. Secretary of State, the U.S.

Bureau of Consular Affairs and Passport Services, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular

Affairs. See Compl. at 10–12. He alleges that his passport application was wrongfully denied on

July 7, 2022, and then again, on February 7, 2023, “due to alleged child support arrears.” See id.

at 12. He argues that this denial violates several laws, see id. at 13–15, and he demands equitable

relief affording the “immediate restoration of [his] U.S. passport book and card,” see id. at 15.

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata prevents

repetitious litigation involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat'l Pension

Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1983). And a court may dismiss a

claim or issue sua sponte when it is on notice that that the claim or issue has been previously

decided, in an effort to prevent “unnecessary judicial waste.” Walker v. Seldman, 471 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 n.12 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (internal

quotation marks omitted)); see accord Rosendahl v. Nixon, 360 Fed. Appx. 167, 168 (D.C. Cir.

2010) (courts “may raise the res judicata preclusion defense sua sponte”) (citing Brown v. Dist. of

Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (other citation omitted). More specifically,

res judicata and collateral estoppel “are so integral to the administration of the courts that a court

may invoke [them] sua sponte[,]” Fenwick v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.D.C.

2010) (alterations in original) (quoting McGee v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 115, 123

(D.D.C. 2009); citing Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C. Cir.

1997)), because the Court bears a responsibility to “conserve judicial resources, avoid inconsistent

results, engender respect for judgments of predictable and certain effect, and to prevent serial

forum-shopping and piecemeal litigation[,]” Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C.

Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff already unsuccessfully filed a substantially similar, if not identical, lawsuit against

the Director of the United States Department of State’s Washington Passport Agency, 1 in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Maryland. See Murphy v. Brockenborough, et al., No. 24-cv-

0159 (D. Md. filed June 3, 2024) (“Murphy I”), at Amended Complaint, ECF No. 4; see id. at

Memorandum Opinion (Sept. 25, 2025), ECF No. 15; Dismissal Order (Sept. 25, 2025) (dismissing

case with prejudice), ECF No. 16.

Whether a case is duplicative turns on whether the two cases at issue share the same

“nucleus of facts.” Drake v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Page

1 Although Plaintiff sues some additional Defendants in the instant matter, see Compl. at 11–12, the Defendants are all federal entities and officials, and privity exists between the government, its officers, and its agencies. See Lewandowski v. Prop. Clerk, 209 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940)); Wilson v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D.D.C. 2011). v. United States, 729 F. 2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). And a final judgment on the merits of an

action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating claims that “were or could have been

raised in that action.” Drake, 291 F.3d at 66 (emphasis in original), quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449

U.S. 90, 94 (1980); see also Apotex, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 393 F.3d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir.

2004). Upon review, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed in Murphy I unquestionably arises from

the very same facts raised in the Complaint filed in this matter. The final adjudication, with

prejudice, of Murphy I, which was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

on January 26, 2026, see Murphy I at Judgment of USCA, ECF No. 120; Mandate (Mar. 20, 2026),

thus bears preclusive effect on this matter.

For these reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed. 2 A separate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: May 14, 2026 /s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

2 Plaintiff is forewarned that duplicative lawsuits filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP are also subject to dismissal as either frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, No. 09-0699, 2009 WL 1033269, at *1 n.2 (D.D.C. April 16, 2009), aff’d, 108 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 05, 1997); McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir.1995); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994–95 (5th Cir.1993)).