Munford v. MacLellan
This text of 373 S.E.2d 368 (Munford v. MacLellan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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The main question presented by this appeal is whether a nonresident of Georgia may serve as trustee of a trust created in and to be administered in this state and where the trust property is located in this state. This particular trust was established for the benefit of the minor child of Anne Maclellan Munford and Dillard Munford, Jr. Aubrey Munford, guardian of the child, appeals from the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the trustees, Kathrina Maclellan (the [680]*680mother of Anne Maclellan Munford) and Trust Company Bank.
Anne Munford died in 1978. Under the terms of her will, a trust was established for the exclusive benefit of her only child. Her husband, Dillard Munford, Jr., and her mother, Kitty Maclellan, were named as trustees. Dillard Munford, Jr. died in 1987. His will named his sister, Aubrey Munford, guardian of the child. Ms. Munford thereafter brought this action to remove Ms. Maclellan as trustee and, the following day, purported to appoint herself as successor trustee to take her brother’s place. Thereafter, Kitty Maclellan attempted to appoint the bank as an additional trustee.
1. Ms. Munford challenges the trial court’s rejection of her argument that Ms. Maclellan, a nonresident of Georgia, is ineligible from serving as a trustee of the trust, the entire corpus of which is located in Georgia. OCGA § 53-13-8, relied on by Ms. Munford, provides in pertinent part:
When the sole or surviving trustee of any trust has died, removed beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, resigns, or otherwise becomes disqualified, the superior courts of the several counties shall have full power and authority, in a summary manner, upon the petition of two or more of the parties interested in the trust or upon the petition of the sole party at interest and on such notice as the court shall direct, to appoint a new trustee or trustees in the place of the deceased, nonresident, resigned, or disqualified trustee or trustees.
Contrary to Ms. Munford’s argument, this section does not bar Ms. Maclellan from serving as the trustee. “[This section] applies where a trustee has died or removed beyond the jurisdiction of this State. The trustee is in life, and resided in Tennessee when made a trustee. So this section does not apply.” Caldwell v. Hill, 179 Ga. 417, 426 (2) (176 SE 381) (1934). (Compare King v. King, 228 Ga. 818, 819 (2) (188 SE2d 502) (1972) where the trustee, following her appointment, moved from Georgia to New York.)1
[681]*681We find no authority for disqualifying Ms. Maclellan from serving as the trustee merely because she is a nonresident.2 The legislative protections for beneficiaries cited by the dissent severely limiting nonresident fiduciaries apply to executors and administrators of estates. There is good reason to distinguish the functions of executors and administrators from those of trustees. The duties of the former can be characterized as “closing-out” an estate, assuring the distribution of assets, etc., in an expeditious fashion. The duties of a trustee, however, may be, and often are, long-lasting. In many cases, a trustee is named because he has a personal concern for the beneficiary and a motivation to diligently carry out the management of a trust over the time required. In many cases, a nonresident is the only individual with such an interest and motivation. In general, a testator will name as trustee an individual or institution he desires to so serve, and in whom he has confidence, regardless of the residency of that individual or institution. The legislature has not restricted a trustee’s ability to make that choice in the instance of a nonresident, and we find no compelling reason to do so.
2. We find no merit to Ms. Munford’s contentions that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a guardian ad litem for the child in this litigation, OCGA § 29-4-7, or by vacating the default by the bank. OCGA § 9-11-55 (b).
Judgment affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
373 S.E.2d 368, 258 Ga. 679, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 475, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/munford-v-maclellan-ga-1988.