FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 21, 2020 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court EDWARD L. MULCAHY, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-1387 (D.C. No. 1:18-CV-01918-PAB-GPG) ASPEN/PITKIN COUNTY HOUSING (D. Colo.) AUTHORITY, a multi-jurisdictional housing authority,
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Edward Mulcahy, Jr., sued Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority (APCHA)
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due-process and equal-protection violations. The
district court dismissed his claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1 In this appeal, Mr. Mulcahy abandons his claims for
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). relief except those seeking monetary damages. We affirm the judgment as to the
abandoned claims. As to the claims for damages, however, we reverse.
I. Background 2
APCHA administers an affordable-housing program in Pitkin County,
Colorado, where housing has become too expensive for the local workforce.
Through the housing program, APCHA conveys properties to residents (chosen by
lottery) at below-market prices. Mr. Mulcahy bought property through the APCHA
lottery program, accepting deed restrictions on his employment and residency.
After owning the property for several years, Mr. Mulcahy received a letter
from APCHA alleging that he was not complying with the deed restriction. The
letter gave him fourteen days to respond and sixty days to resolve the compliance
issues. Although Mr. Mulcahy promptly communicated with APCHA’s
qualifications specialist, fourteen days after the date of the first compliance letter,
APCHA sent a second compliance letter. And fourteen days after sending the second
letter, APCHA sent an official notice of violation, finding that Mr. Mulcahy had
breached the deed restriction and informing him that he had fifteen days to contest
the finding. But Mr. Mulcahy was traveling, so he did not know about the notice of
violation and did not respond within the fifteen-day period. APCHA then sent him a
final letter demanding that he list the property for sale.
2 We recite the events leading to litigation as Mr. Mulcahy alleges them in his amended complaint. 2 APCHA brought a suit in state court seeking an order forcing Mr. Mulcahy to
sell the property. The state court granted summary judgment to APCHA after
concluding that Mr. Mulcahy failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not
contesting the notice of violation. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 3
Mr. Mulcahy then filed this lawsuit in federal court. His due-process claim
complains that “APCHA failed to follow its own regulations and guidelines” when it
prematurely issued a notice of violation. Aplt. App. at 198. And his equal-protection
claim complains that APCHA refused him a hearing to contest the notice of violation
even though it “has repeatedly granted other individuals” hearings after
administrative response deadlines had passed. Id. at 200. His complaint requests
relief including an order declaring invalid APCHA’s notice of violation, an
injunction requiring APCHA to issue a notice of violation that allows him to request
a hearing to contest its findings, and several forms of damages. The district court
dismissed Mr. Mulcahy’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
3 APCHA moves to supplement the record with documents from the state-court litigation. We grant the motion, exercising our discretion to take judicial notice of public records from “our court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.” United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007).
3 II. Discussion
Mr. Mulcahy pursues only his claims for damages on appeal, arguing that the
district court erroneously dismissed those claims under Rooker-Feldman. 4 “We
review that dismissal de novo.” Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1281
(10th Cir. 2012).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that only the Supreme Court “is
vested, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, with jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court
judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). And so “lower federal
courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court
judgments.” Id.
But “Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.” Id. at 466.
It applies only in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “If a federal plaintiff
presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state
court has reached in a case to which he was a party, then there is jurisdiction and
state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.”
Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). In other words, the
4 Mr. Mulcahy concedes that his request for an order declaring the notice of violation invalid “does appear to conflict with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 25, and that he has “abandoned” his request for injunctive relief, Aplt. Reply Br. at 10. But he maintains that his requests for monetary damages survive. 4 doctrine does not prohibit a federal action “just because it could result in a judgment
inconsistent with a state-court judgment.” Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
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FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 21, 2020 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court EDWARD L. MULCAHY, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-1387 (D.C. No. 1:18-CV-01918-PAB-GPG) ASPEN/PITKIN COUNTY HOUSING (D. Colo.) AUTHORITY, a multi-jurisdictional housing authority,
Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Edward Mulcahy, Jr., sued Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority (APCHA)
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due-process and equal-protection violations. The
district court dismissed his claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1 In this appeal, Mr. Mulcahy abandons his claims for
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). relief except those seeking monetary damages. We affirm the judgment as to the
abandoned claims. As to the claims for damages, however, we reverse.
I. Background 2
APCHA administers an affordable-housing program in Pitkin County,
Colorado, where housing has become too expensive for the local workforce.
Through the housing program, APCHA conveys properties to residents (chosen by
lottery) at below-market prices. Mr. Mulcahy bought property through the APCHA
lottery program, accepting deed restrictions on his employment and residency.
After owning the property for several years, Mr. Mulcahy received a letter
from APCHA alleging that he was not complying with the deed restriction. The
letter gave him fourteen days to respond and sixty days to resolve the compliance
issues. Although Mr. Mulcahy promptly communicated with APCHA’s
qualifications specialist, fourteen days after the date of the first compliance letter,
APCHA sent a second compliance letter. And fourteen days after sending the second
letter, APCHA sent an official notice of violation, finding that Mr. Mulcahy had
breached the deed restriction and informing him that he had fifteen days to contest
the finding. But Mr. Mulcahy was traveling, so he did not know about the notice of
violation and did not respond within the fifteen-day period. APCHA then sent him a
final letter demanding that he list the property for sale.
2 We recite the events leading to litigation as Mr. Mulcahy alleges them in his amended complaint. 2 APCHA brought a suit in state court seeking an order forcing Mr. Mulcahy to
sell the property. The state court granted summary judgment to APCHA after
concluding that Mr. Mulcahy failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not
contesting the notice of violation. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 3
Mr. Mulcahy then filed this lawsuit in federal court. His due-process claim
complains that “APCHA failed to follow its own regulations and guidelines” when it
prematurely issued a notice of violation. Aplt. App. at 198. And his equal-protection
claim complains that APCHA refused him a hearing to contest the notice of violation
even though it “has repeatedly granted other individuals” hearings after
administrative response deadlines had passed. Id. at 200. His complaint requests
relief including an order declaring invalid APCHA’s notice of violation, an
injunction requiring APCHA to issue a notice of violation that allows him to request
a hearing to contest its findings, and several forms of damages. The district court
dismissed Mr. Mulcahy’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
3 APCHA moves to supplement the record with documents from the state-court litigation. We grant the motion, exercising our discretion to take judicial notice of public records from “our court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.” United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007).
3 II. Discussion
Mr. Mulcahy pursues only his claims for damages on appeal, arguing that the
district court erroneously dismissed those claims under Rooker-Feldman. 4 “We
review that dismissal de novo.” Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1281
(10th Cir. 2012).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that only the Supreme Court “is
vested, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, with jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court
judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). And so “lower federal
courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court
judgments.” Id.
But “Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.” Id. at 466.
It applies only in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “If a federal plaintiff
presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state
court has reached in a case to which he was a party, then there is jurisdiction and
state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.”
Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). In other words, the
4 Mr. Mulcahy concedes that his request for an order declaring the notice of violation invalid “does appear to conflict with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 25, and that he has “abandoned” his request for injunctive relief, Aplt. Reply Br. at 10. But he maintains that his requests for monetary damages survive. 4 doctrine does not prohibit a federal action “just because it could result in a judgment
inconsistent with a state-court judgment.” Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
880 F.3d 1169, 1174 (10th Cir. 2018). The federal actions it prohibits are those
seeking “to modify or set aside a state-court judgment because the state proceedings
should not have led to that judgment.” Id.
Mr. Mulcahy’s claims do not complain of injuries caused by the state-court
judgment. Indeed, the alleged constitutional violations underlying his claims—
APCHA’s issuing a notice of violation and refusing to grant a hearing to allow him to
contest it—occurred before the state-court suit began. The constitutional violations
that he alleges are APCHA’s acts “that led to the judgment,” not “the content of the
judgment.” Campbell, 682 F.3d at 1285.
Still, APCHA protests, without the state-court judgment, Mr. Mulcahy “would
have no reason to assert claims for damages against APCHA.” Aplee. Br. at 15. This
point raises a fair question: Does Mr. Mulcahy in fact complain of injury from the
state-court judgment while purporting to complain only of APCHA’s conduct? We
do not think so. A “federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment,
even if it appears to complain only of a third party’s actions, when the third party’s
actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in,
or left unpunished by it.” Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 88
(2d Cir. 2005). The state-court judgment did not produce the actions that
Mr. Mulcahy challenges in his complaint, actions that occurred before the state-court
suit even began.
5 That Mr. Mulcahy complains about conduct predating the state-court suit
distinguishes this case from Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2007). In
Mann we concluded that Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiff’s claims for “monetary
damages against a variety of government actors and private individuals for the
alleged violations of her constitutional rights occasioned by their complicity with the
probate court’s orders.” Id. at 1147. Mr. Mulcahy, in contrast to the plaintiff in
Mann, seeks damages based on alleged constitutional violations that predated any
relevant state-court order, not based on violations that occurred through complicity
with a state-court order.
Williams v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 681 F. App’x 693 (10th Cir. 2017)
(unpublished), on which APCHA relies, does not persuade us that Rooker-Feldman
bars Mr. Mulcahy’s claims for damages. The plaintiffs in Williams sought, in
addition to other relief, “compensation for their home,” which had been sold at an
auction following a state-court foreclosure judgment. Id. at 696 (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). We concluded that Rooker-Feldman barred the
plaintiffs’ damages claims because “their compensation request rest[ed] on the
premise that the foreclosure judgment [was] infirm.” Id. Mr. Mulcahy does not
argue in this case that the state-court judgment is infirm, “that a defect in the state
proceedings invalidate[s] the state judgment,” Mayotte, 880 F.3d at 1175.
Just as Mr. Mulcahy does not argue that the state judgment is infirm, neither
does he seek to set it aside. Because his “claims are based on events predating” the
state-court suit, he “could certainly obtain damages from [APCHA] without setting
6 aside” the state-court judgment. Id. at 1175–76. Rooker-Feldman, then, does not bar
his claims for damages. See id.
APCHA alternatively contends, as it did in the district court, that
Mr. Mulcahy’s claims are barred by claim preclusion. The district court did not rule
on APCHA’s claim-preclusion defense. Although we have discretion to affirm on
any ground that the record supports, Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162
(10th Cir. 2004), we “adopt the better practice of leaving the matter to the district
court in the first instance” on remand, Evers v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 509 F.3d
1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 2007).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims for relief that
Mr. Mulcahy has abandoned—all claims except those seeking damages. We reverse
the district court’s dismissal of the claims for damages. And we remand the case for
further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge