1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-1017-DMS-MSB AMRIDDEN MUKHAMADIEV,
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 14 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND PETITON FOR A WRIT OF SECURITY, 15 HABEAS CORPUS Defendant. 16
17 18 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Mukhamediev’s motion for leave to proceed 19 in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Motion, ECF No. 2), and petition for a writ of habeas 20 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Petition, ECF No. 1). For the following reasons, 21 Plantiff’s IFP Motion is granted and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed 22 with leave to amend. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Amridden Mukhamediev is a citizen of Tajikistan who is currently being detained at 25 the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico. (Petition, at 1, 10). On November 26 21, 2024, Mukhamediev applied for admission into the United States at the Calexico Port 27 of Entry as an undocumented immigrant. (Id. at 10). Mukhamediev applied for asylum 28 and was taken into immigration detention. (Id. at 20). On January 17, 2025, an U.S. 1 Citizenship and Immigration Services officer interviewed Mukhamediev and found that he 2 had a reasonable probability of future persecution due to his religion, his testimony was 3 credible, and he was not subject to any bars to asylum or withholding of removal. (Id. at 4 13–15). Mukhamediev, while still in immigration detention, was scheduled to appear 5 before an immigration judge on February 3, 2025. (Id. at 10). On February 5, 2025, 6 Mukhamediev received a letter from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 7 explaining that ICE declined to parole him from detention at this time because (1) 8 Mukhamediev did not establish to ICE’s satisfaction that he would “appear as required for 9 immigration hearings, enforcement appointments, or other matters” if paroled and (2) 10 Mukhamediev did not establish to ICE’s satisfaction that he “would not pose a danger to 11 the community or U.S. security” if paroled. (Id. at 16–17). The letter invited 12 Mukhamediev to request a redetermination of ICE’s decision in writing, which he lodged 13 with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on April 9, 2025. (Id. at 17–19). 14 To date, Mukhamediev has been in immigration detention for over five months. 15 Mukhamediev filed his pending motions on April 18, 2025. Mukhamediev alleges 16 that his five-month immigration detention without specific justification or bond hearing 17 violates federal or international laws. (Petition, at 6). In support of his motion to proceed 18 IFP, Mukhamediev provided an affidavit stating that he currently has no income or savings 19 in a checking or savings account but does have some undisclosed amount of savings. (IFP 20 Motion, at 1–2). 21 II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP AND FILING FEE 22 All parties instituting an application for writ of habeas corpus in a district court of 23 the United States must pay a filing fee of $5.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may 24 proceed despite a failure to pay the entire fee at the time of filing only if the court grants 25
26 1 In addition to the $5 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 the Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. 2 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 A prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit “a certified copy of the trust 4 fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period 5 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the 6 appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.” 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915(a)(2). A prisoner is defined as a “person incarcerated or detained in any facility 8 who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 9 criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 10 diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). However, an immigrant detained and subject 11 to removal or deportation is not a “prisoner” under § 1915(h) “so long as he does not also 12 face criminal charges.” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2002). 13 The Court finds that Mukhamediev’s IFP Motion complies with 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915(a)(1), (2), and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2b. Because there is no indication that 15 Mukhamediev currently faces criminal charges, Mukhamediev is not required to pay any 16 filing fee under § 1915(a) for his application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the 17 Court GRANTS Mukhamediev’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. The Clerk shall file the 18 petition for a writ of habeas corpus without prepayment of the filing fee. 19 III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) 20 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), the Court must sua sponte dismiss 21 Mukhamediev’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to 22 state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 23 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. 24 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 25 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 26 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 27 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 28 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 3 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 12(b)(6)”). 5 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-1017-DMS-MSB AMRIDDEN MUKHAMADIEV,
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 14 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND PETITON FOR A WRIT OF SECURITY, 15 HABEAS CORPUS Defendant. 16
17 18 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Mukhamediev’s motion for leave to proceed 19 in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Motion, ECF No. 2), and petition for a writ of habeas 20 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Petition, ECF No. 1). For the following reasons, 21 Plantiff’s IFP Motion is granted and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed 22 with leave to amend. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Amridden Mukhamediev is a citizen of Tajikistan who is currently being detained at 25 the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico. (Petition, at 1, 10). On November 26 21, 2024, Mukhamediev applied for admission into the United States at the Calexico Port 27 of Entry as an undocumented immigrant. (Id. at 10). Mukhamediev applied for asylum 28 and was taken into immigration detention. (Id. at 20). On January 17, 2025, an U.S. 1 Citizenship and Immigration Services officer interviewed Mukhamediev and found that he 2 had a reasonable probability of future persecution due to his religion, his testimony was 3 credible, and he was not subject to any bars to asylum or withholding of removal. (Id. at 4 13–15). Mukhamediev, while still in immigration detention, was scheduled to appear 5 before an immigration judge on February 3, 2025. (Id. at 10). On February 5, 2025, 6 Mukhamediev received a letter from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 7 explaining that ICE declined to parole him from detention at this time because (1) 8 Mukhamediev did not establish to ICE’s satisfaction that he would “appear as required for 9 immigration hearings, enforcement appointments, or other matters” if paroled and (2) 10 Mukhamediev did not establish to ICE’s satisfaction that he “would not pose a danger to 11 the community or U.S. security” if paroled. (Id. at 16–17). The letter invited 12 Mukhamediev to request a redetermination of ICE’s decision in writing, which he lodged 13 with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on April 9, 2025. (Id. at 17–19). 14 To date, Mukhamediev has been in immigration detention for over five months. 15 Mukhamediev filed his pending motions on April 18, 2025. Mukhamediev alleges 16 that his five-month immigration detention without specific justification or bond hearing 17 violates federal or international laws. (Petition, at 6). In support of his motion to proceed 18 IFP, Mukhamediev provided an affidavit stating that he currently has no income or savings 19 in a checking or savings account but does have some undisclosed amount of savings. (IFP 20 Motion, at 1–2). 21 II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP AND FILING FEE 22 All parties instituting an application for writ of habeas corpus in a district court of 23 the United States must pay a filing fee of $5.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may 24 proceed despite a failure to pay the entire fee at the time of filing only if the court grants 25
26 1 In addition to the $5 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 the Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. 2 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 A prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit “a certified copy of the trust 4 fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period 5 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the 6 appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.” 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915(a)(2). A prisoner is defined as a “person incarcerated or detained in any facility 8 who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 9 criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 10 diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). However, an immigrant detained and subject 11 to removal or deportation is not a “prisoner” under § 1915(h) “so long as he does not also 12 face criminal charges.” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2002). 13 The Court finds that Mukhamediev’s IFP Motion complies with 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915(a)(1), (2), and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2b. Because there is no indication that 15 Mukhamediev currently faces criminal charges, Mukhamediev is not required to pay any 16 filing fee under § 1915(a) for his application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the 17 Court GRANTS Mukhamediev’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. The Clerk shall file the 18 petition for a writ of habeas corpus without prepayment of the filing fee. 19 III. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) 20 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), the Court must sua sponte dismiss 21 Mukhamediev’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to 22 state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Williams v. King, 23 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. 24 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 25 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 26 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 27 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 28 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 3 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 12(b)(6)”). 5 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed if it 6 “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] 7 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 8 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 9 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 10 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 11 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 12 states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 13 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “Factual 14 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 15 550 U.S. at 555. If Plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged” his “claims across the line from conceivable 16 to plausible,” the complaint “must be dismissed.” Id. at 570. While the court has an 17 obligation “where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in a civil rights case, to construe the 18 pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 19 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 20 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)), it may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were 21 not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 22 Cir. 1982). 23 IV. DISCUSSION 24 Having reviewed Mukhamediev’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court 25 finds that it is deficient in at least three ways: (1) Mukhamediev’s Petition demonstrates 26 that he has not been detained for more than six months; (2) Mukhamediev has not 27 exhausted his administrative remedies; and (3) the proper respondent for Mukhamediev’s 28 1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the warden of the Imperial Regional Detention 2 Facility, not DHS. 3 First, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Mukhamediev may be “detained pending a decision 4 on whether [he] is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This initial 5 detention cannot be for more than six months, after which a bond hearing must be held 6 before the government may detain an immigrant for a longer period of time. See 7 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2013). Mukhamediev’s Petition 8 alleges that he has been in immigration detention since November 21, 2024, approximately 9 five months from the date of this order. Because the government may initially detain 10 Mukhamediev for six months—until May 21, 2025—before holding a bond hearing, 11 Mukhamediev’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not yet supported by Ninth Circuit 12 authority. See, e.g., Garcia–Perez v. Kane, No. 13–01870, 2014 WL 3339794, at *2 (D. 13 Ariz. July 8, 2014) (denying a habeas petition because petitioner “has not been detained 14 for longer than six months”). 15 Second, Mukhamediev appears not to have exhausted his administrative remedies. 16 Mukhamediev’s Petition alleges that, on April 9, 2025, he filed a written appeal to DHS 17 requesting a redetermination of ICE’s initial refusal to grant him parole. (Petition, at 2). 18 “‘The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional for habeas claims’ 19 challenging bond determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” Marroquin Ambriz v. Barr, 20 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 21 988 (9th Cir. 2017). A district court may require prudential exhaustion when: “(1) agency 22 expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a 23 proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass 24 of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency 25 to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Hernandez, 872 26 F.3d at 988. However, a district court may waive the exhaustion requirement if 27 “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative 28 1 remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative 2 proceedings would be void.” Id. 3 Based on Mukhamediev’s Petition, the Court finds that the government should have 4 the opportunity to adjudicate Mukhamediev’s appeal under DHS’ administrative scheme. 5 The Court also finds that waiver would be improper as there is currently no indication that 6 administrative remedies would be inadequate, pursuit would be futile, irreparable injury to 7 Mukhamediev would result, or that any bond determination hearings would be void. 8 Third, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Mukhamediev’s Petition so long 9 as he fails to name as respondent the warden of the detention facility where he is being 10 detained, here the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. Mukhamediev’s Petition is a core 11 habeas petition because he is “challenging his present physical confinent.” Doe v. 12 Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2024). “[C]ore habeas petitioners challenging 13 their present physical confinement [must] name their immediate custodian, the warden of 14 the facility where they are detained, as the respondent to their petition.” Id. at 1197. The 15 warden is the one “who has day-to-day control of the petitioner . . . , even if that warden 16 does not have the legal authority to decide whether to keep the petitioner detained.” Rivera- 17 Trigueros v. Becerra, 720 F. Supp. 3d 80, 812 (N.D. Cal. 2024). Because Mukhamediev 18 names DHS and not the warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Facility as the 19 respondent in his Petition, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over his writ of habeas 20 corpus. 21 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Mukhamediev’s petition for a writ of habeas 22 corpus. Because the deficiencies identified in Mukhamediev’s Petition can be easily cured 23 with time or simple amendment, this dismissal shall be with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall 24 have thirty (30) days from the date of this order to refile an amended petition for a writ of 25 habeas corpus. 26 27 28 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 ||Dated: April 25, 2025 3 2 ins yw. 44) 4 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28