Muffin Miles v. Robert Dickson, Jr.

Fifth Circuit

Muffin Miles v. Robert Dickson, Jr.

387 F.2d 716, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1201, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4104

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedDecember 19, 1967

Docket24223_1

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 387 F.2d 716 (Muffin Miles v. Robert Dickson, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Muffin Miles v. Robert Dickson, Jr., 387 F.2d 716, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1201, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4104 (5th Cir. 1967).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a memorandum opinion reported in 40 F.R.D. 386-391, the district court rendered summary judgment for the defendants, and taxed the court costs against the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

The voluminous record and the many depositions convince us that the district court was clearly correct in concluding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that each of the defendants was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.

We are equally convinced that the plaintiffs’ attorneys acted in good faith, upon written authorization from their clients, and that the taxation of the court costs against the plaintiffs’ attorneys was erroneous. To assess the costs against the attorneys without notice and a hearing was, of course, wrong. We do not, however, base our ruling on that procedural ground. Nor do we rule on whether the court had power, either inherent or under the statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927, to require the attorneys personally to pay the court costs. We simply hold that the facts and circumstances do not present such an extreme case as would permit the court to tax the costs against the attorneys.

That part of the judgment which taxes costs is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The costs of appeal are taxed against the appellants.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.

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PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a memorandum opinion reported in 40 F.R.D. 386-391, the district court rendered summary judgment for the defendants, and taxed the court costs against the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

The voluminous record and the many depositions convince us that the district court was clearly correct in concluding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that each of the defendants was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.

We are equally convinced that the plaintiffs’ attorneys acted in good faith, upon written authorization from their clients, and that the taxation of the court costs against the plaintiffs’ attorneys was erroneous. To assess the costs against the attorneys without notice and a hearing was, of course, wrong. We do not, however, base our ruling on that procedural ground. Nor do we rule on whether the court had power, either inherent or under the statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927, to require the attorneys personally to pay the court costs. We simply hold that the facts and circumstances do not present such an extreme case as would permit the court to tax the costs against the attorneys.

That part of the judgment which taxes costs is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The costs of appeal are taxed against the appellants.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.

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387 F.2d 716, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1201, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/muffin-miles-v-robert-dickson-jr-ca5-1967.

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