Morris v. United States

171 Ct. Cl. 220, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 123, 1965 WL 8270
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 11, 1965
DocketNo. 324-61
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 171 Ct. Cl. 220 (Morris v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morris v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 220, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 123, 1965 WL 8270 (cc 1965).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

During World War I, plaintiff served as a second lieutenant in the Infantry Officers Reserve Corps from November 27, 1917, until he was honorably discharged on July 6, 1920. He did not thereafter have any creditable federal service. Since July 1928, he has been on the World War I Emergency Officers’ Retired List by reason of physical disability, and has received disability retirement pay at the rate of 75 percent of the active duty pay of a second lieutenant with over two years of service. In this action he claims en[223]*223titlement to such retired pay computed on the basis of an additional three years’ service which, he says, he had in the Kentucky National Guard from March 1907 to March 1910. He asserts that such an additional period would raise his retired pay because it would give him a total of more than five years of creditable service.

This claim was rejected, in 1952, by the Adjutant General of the Army on the ground that no record of such 1907-1910 National Guard service could be found. In 1959 the Army Board for Correction of Military Records also denied the claim for lack of proof. This suit was then begun on August 16, 1961. The defendant’s motion to dismiss the petition was denied, in November 1963, in a per euriam opinion, 163 Ct. Cl. 259, which held that (a) the proceedings before the Correction Board were immaterial to the resolution of plaintiff’s conventional cause of action for military pay; (b) the plaintiff should have an opportunity to prove his case at a court trial, independently of the Board proceedings; and (c) this is a “continuing claim” on which the plaintiff would be entitled, if he succeeded, to a judgment running back no more than sis years from the filing of his petition. The case was returned to the trial commissioner.

After a trial, the commissioner reported the evidence, pro and con, on the controverted issue of plaintiff’s National Guard service, and concluded that “plaintiff has not produced dear and convincing evidence that he served in the Kentucky National Guard from March 1907 to March 1910.” Plaintiff objects to this result, arguing that he is entitled to prevail on the preponderance of the evidence found by the commissioner and now before the court. Defendant maintains that the commissioner’s conclusion is correct.

Before reaching this factual dispute, we must consider whether, even if plaintiff is right on the facts, there is a statutory foundation for increasing his retirement pay. Rather late in the day but nevertheless in time, the defendant contends that there is no legislative basis for taking account, in computing the disability retirement pay of a World War I ex-serviceman in plaintiff’s position, of pre-World War I National Guard service (other than service under federal [224]*224auspices) so as to raise Ms retired pay. We first consider that threshold question.1

Plaintiff, as a World War I nonregular Army officer, became entitled, for the first time, to disability retired pay under Section 1 of the Act of May 24,1928, 45 Stat. 735, giving such compensation to World War I emergency officers who incurred physical disability in line of duty during their service and were rated at not less than 30 percent permanently disabled. See Tall v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 251 (1934); Perkins v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 778 (1950); Broche v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 784, 303 F. 2d 939 (1962). The Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 359 — generally raising the pay of Army officers, including those previously retired — was construed as inapplicable to officers on the World War I Emergency Officers’ Retired List (see Perkins v. United States, supra, 116 Ct. Cl. at 787-88). But Section 6 of the Act of June 29,1946, 60 Stat. 343,345, modified the 1942 Act to give persons like plaintiff the right to have their retirement pay computed on the new and higher rates. Id. at 788. There was, however, no “change in the type or class of service which may be counted in computing retirement pay * * Id. at 788-89. For plaintiff, credit could only be given for his years of active service during World War I since that was all he was entitled to count at the time of his discharge in July 1920. See Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 759, 785; 1 Comp. Gen. 75 (1921); of. 4 Comp. Gen. 660 [225]*225(1925).2 The Act of May 24,1928, supra, granted “retired pay at the rate' of 75 per centum of the pay to which” the officer was “entitled at the time of * * * discharge * * *” (emphasis added) .3

Plaintiff’s major position is that Section 402 (i) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949,68 Stat. 802,820,87 U.S.C. § 272(i) (1952 Ed.) (now 10 U.S.C. § 1215), gave him the right, from the effective date of that statute (October 1, 1949), to credit the three years of (alleged) pre-World War I Kentucky National Guard enlisted service in the computation of the retired pay originally granted him by the 1928 Act. Section 402(i) declares:

All members of the reserve components heretofore or hereafter retired or granted retirement pay because of physical disability shall be entitled to the same pay, rights, benefits and privileges provided by law or regulation for retired members of the regular services.

This provision, plaintiff asserts, accords him the same retired pay as an officer of the Begular Army similarly situated. Such an officer, the argument continues, is entitled to credit, for disability retirement pay purposes under the Pay Eeadjustment Act of 1942 (as amended), any National Guard enlisted service he had at the time of retirement. Defendant does not deny that Section 402 (i) applies to plaintiff, but disagrees that a regular officer similarly situated would have this right.

We think that plaintiff is correct — that a regular World War I officer, with prior enlisted service in the National [226]*226Guard, wbo was retired for disability in 1920 (and not thereafter recalled) would be entitled (for some years prior to October 1,1949, and thereafter) to count Ms enlisted service, if necessary, in the computation of his retired pay. The chain-of-reasoning, as in so many military pay cases, is somewhat long and complex, but the links seem strong.

At the beginning of tMs country’s participation in World War II, Section 1 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 359, gave higher permanent pay rates to regular officers. The eleventh paragraph of section 1, as amended by the Act of December 2,1942,56 Stat. 1037, provided that “in computing the service for all pay purposes of officers paid under the provisions of this section” — including lieutenants in the Regular Army — “such officers shall be credited with full time for all periods during which they have held commissions as officers” (emphasis added) of the National Guard and National Guard Reserve (among other entities). Section 3A of the Pay Readjustment Act (also as added by the Act of December 2, 1942, supra) gave similar credit for enlisted

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Bluebook (online)
171 Ct. Cl. 220, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 123, 1965 WL 8270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morris-v-united-states-cc-1965.