Morgenstern v. Beard (In re Beard)

177 B.R. 74, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20792
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 25, 1993
DocketBankruptcy No. 91-03786; Nos. C-2-92-107, C-2-92-176
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 177 B.R. 74 (Morgenstern v. Beard (In re Beard)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morgenstern v. Beard (In re Beard), 177 B.R. 74, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20792 (S.D. Ohio 1993).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

KINNEARY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court to consider the consolidated appeals of the United States Trustee, Conrad J. Morgen-' stern, taken from the orders of the bankruptcy court denying confirmation of a Chapter 12 reorganization plan and confirming an amended Chapter 12 plan. District courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy judges. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).

On May 16, 1991, Bill and Peggy Beard filed a bankruptcy petition seeking relief under the family farmer provisions of Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231. Subsequently, the Beards submitted a plan for confirmation by the bankruptcy judge. The Chapter 12 standing trustee opposed confirmation on several grounds. Specifically, the trustee objected to provisions in the plan allowing the Beards to pay certain claims directly to creditors instead of through the Chapter 12 trustee. On November 4, 1991, the bankruptcy court denied confirmation but nonetheless permitted direct payments to two secured creditors: Farm Credit Services (“FCS”) and Farmers’ Home Administration (“FmHA”). Further, the bankruptcy court invited the trustee to apply to the court for additional compensation if he believes his compensation is otherwise inadequate. The bankruptcy code does not expressly authorize compensation by means of application to the court. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court claimed that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which grants considerable discretionary power, enabled it to award compensation in this manner.

On December 3, 1991, the United States Trustee filed a notice of appeal from the November 4, 1991 Order. The Beards then submitted an amended plan, and on February 4, 1992, the bankruptcy court entered an Order Confirming Chapter 12 Plan As Amended. The United States Trustee filed a notice of appeal from the confirmation order issued on February 5, 1991. These appeals were consolidated pursuant to an order issued by this Court on March 5, 1992.

FCS is a fully secured creditor, and 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) specifically permits payments of secured claims by either the debtor or the trustee. Accordingly, the trustee does not object to the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow direct payments to FCS. The trustee, however, does object to direct payments to FmHA, an undersecured creditor. Additionally, the trustee objects to the bankruptcy court’s method for awarding compensation. Thus the issues presented for this Court’s consideration are as follows:

1. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in confirming Debtor’s amended Chapter 12 plan of reorganization which permitted the Debtors to pay directly an impaired secured claim; and
2. Whether the Bankruptcy Court may invoke its powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to compensate a Chapter 12 standing trustee appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 586(b).

The Court will consider each of these issues in turn.

Direct Payment to FmHA

FmHA is an unsecured creditor whose rights are modified under the Chapter 12 plan. This Court has previously ruled that direct payment of impaired claims are permissible under the language of Chapter 12. In re Overholt, 125 B.R. 202, 206 (S.D.Ohio 1990). Notwithstanding, the trustee requests that Overholt be modified or overruled.

The trustee argues that, because of the manner in which Chapter 12 trustees are compensated, direct payments on impaired claims improperly deprive him of the statutory fee to which he is entitled. To understand the trustee’s argument, a brief overview of trustee compensation is necessary. The trustee’s maximum fee in family farm cases is 10% on payments up to $450,000 and 3% on payments in excess of $450,000. 28 U.S.C.' § 586(e)(l)(B)(ii). The trustee’s fee may be assessed on “all payments received [76]*76by [the trustee].” 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2). This provision can be interpreted to mean that “the standing chapter 12 trustee ... cannot collect a percentage fee with regard to payments under a plan made directly by the debtor to a creditor rather than through the United States trustee.”1 Thus, a fee would not be assessed on those payments made directly to FmHA.

“If debtors could pay their modified secured claims directly and avoid the trustee’s fee all together, they would always do so.” Appellant Br. at 11. As a result, the fiscal viability of the trustee system would be threatened. Thus, the trustee requests this Court to reverse Overholt and rule that impaired claims must always be paid through the trustee.

In support of his request, the trustee cites to In re Fulkrod, 126 B.R. 584 (9th Cir. BAP 1991), where the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order directing impaired claims to be paid through the Chapter 12 trustee. The BAP relied upon the language in 11 U.S.C. § 1226(c)2, and found that

Congress intended to use the term “under the plan” to mean those payments which result from the operation of Chapter 12 bankruptcy law. Those payments should be made by the trustee, and the trustee’s fee should be assessed against the funds received from the debtor for that purpose. Typically, those payments will involve impaired claims which the debtor could not insist upon but for the protections of Chapter 12. To have those protections, the Chapter 12 debtor must support the trustee’s office which is so integral a part of the Chapter 12 statutory scheme.

Id. at 588.

Notably, the argument made by the Ful-krod court was considered and rejected by this Court in Overholt.

The trustee ... argues that impaired claims are those for which the courts have judicially altered the rights of the creditor, and by so doing have placed the payments under the reorganization plan. The trustee relies on several cases which have held that “modified” claims were claims that were “under the plan,” and were thus subject to the statutory fees, (citations omitted). But examination of these cases reveals that they are inapposite to the present controversy, yielding little of value upon which to base any conclusion as to the correct interpretation of the disputed statutes.

Overholt, 125 B.R. at 210. Similarly, Ful-krod also fails to sufficiently account for the differences between the various provisions of Chapter 12. To buttress its conclusion, the Fulkrod court did not cite to a case, a statute, or legislative history. Instead, the court simply concludes that, while “there appears to be no distinction ... between impaired and unimpaired claims among the statutes authorizing the debtor to disburse payments,”

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Related

Miller v. United States Trustee (In Re Miller)
288 B.R. 879 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
177 B.R. 74, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morgenstern-v-beard-in-re-beard-ohsd-1993.