In Re Fulkrod

126 B.R. 584, 91 Daily Journal DAR 5718, 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3592, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1807, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 653, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1091, 1991 WL 75243
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 29, 1991
DocketBAP No. NV-89-1919-ORMe, Bankruptcy No. 88-0707
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 126 B.R. 584 (In Re Fulkrod) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Fulkrod, 126 B.R. 584, 91 Daily Journal DAR 5718, 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3592, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1807, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 653, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1091, 1991 WL 75243 (bap9 1991).

Opinion

126 B.R. 584 (1991)

In re John McGregor FULKROD, Debtor.
John McGregor FULKROD, Appellant,
v.
Edmund R. BARMETTLER, Trustee, Appellee.

BAP No. NV-89-1919-ORMe, Bankruptcy No. 88-0707.

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted January 24, 1991.
Decided April 29, 1991.

*585 Daniel S. Corder, Reno, Nev., for appellant.

John White, Jr., Reno, Nev., for appellee.

Before OLLASON, RUSSELL, and MEYERS, Bankruptcy Judges.

OPINION

OLLASON, Bankruptcy Judge:

Mr. Fulkrod petitioned for relief under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 2, 1988. His plan of reorganization provided that three impaired creditors would be paid directly by him and not by the trustee. In confirming the plan, the bankruptcy court held that payments to impaired creditors must be made by the trustee. Mr. Fulkrod appeals from that order, claiming that it improperly increases the statutory fee payable to the trustee. We affirm.

Whether payments to creditors who are impaired by a Chapter 12 plan of reorganization must be made by the trustee, and which payments should be used to compute the trustee's fees, are questions of statutory construction which we review de novo. Three divergent views have emerged from substantial judicial contemplation of these issues.

The first holds that all payments to impaired creditors must be collected and disbursed by the trustee and that he is paid a fee based upon the aggregate of those collections and payments. The second holds that the trustee or the debtor may disburse the payments but that, regardless of who actually disburses, the trustee's fee *586 is computed as a percentage of the aggregate impaired claims. The third view holds that the trustee need not disburse payments on impaired claims, and is entitled to a fee only on the payments actually collected and disbursed.

The first view is exemplified by Matter of Finkbine, 94 B.R. 461, 463-64 (Bankr.S. D.Ohio 1988). Noting general agreement that certain claims may be paid directly by a reorganizing debtor, Finkbine cited Matter of Sutton, 91 B.R. 184 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 1988), Matter of Logemann, 88 B.R. 938 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1988), and In re Hagensick, 73 B.R. 710 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 1987), for the proposition that only unimpaired claims fit that category. The Finkbine court reasoned that:

In the absence of a clear Congressional directive, it is inconsistent with a statutory scheme that offers debtors opportunities to eliminate substantial obligations, to authorize debtors to avoid the responsibility of paying the statutory trustee fee, since the trustee's office is part of the Congressionally created system that enables Chapter 12 debtors to propose a reorganization.

94 B.R. at 466. Finkbine cautioned that routine payment of impaired claims outside a reorganization plan would shift Congressionally assigned administrative duties, and jeopardize the continuing operation of the trustee's office. The court also observed that trustee's fees, though apparently disproportionate in a given case, are reasonable in the aggregate when awarded in accordance with the code. See id.

The bankruptcy court appears to have followed Finkbine in the case before us. The court acknowledged that "[s]ections 1225 and 1226 . . . contemplate direct payments by Debtor" but found an implied restriction limiting such direct payments "to secured creditors whose claims are unaltered and consequently are unaffected by the Plan. . . ."

The second view, exemplified by Matter of Sutton, 91 B.R. 184 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 1988), reaches a similar conclusion without addressing whether the act of disbursement amounts to encroachment on the trustee's administrative authority. Citing Matter of Logemann, 88 B.R. 938 (Bankr. S.D.Iowa 1988), the Sutton court held that "the standing Chapter 12 trustee is entitled to collect a percentage fee on all payments made under the plan on impaired claims." 91 B.R. at 186. Logemann focused on 28 U.S.C. section 586(e)(1)(B)(ii)(I), which provides for trustee compensation in an amount not more than ten percent "of the payments made under the plan of such debtor," and concluded that the language "under the plan" makes the trustee's fee turn upon impairment rather than upon who makes the payment. 88 B.R. at 941.

In re Hagensick, 73 B.R. 710 (Bankr.N. D.Iowa 1987), arrived at the same conclusion from a survey of analogous Chapter 13 cases,[1] noting that when a defaulted mortgage was to be cured, or when a claim was limited to the value of the security, all payments on such claims were "under the plan" for purposes of determining trustee compensation. Conversely, payments were not deemed "under the plan" where the rights of creditors were not impaired, where the mortgage payments were never delinquent and there was no default to cure, and where current, fully secured automobile payments were made by automatic wage deduction. Id. at 713.

The common inquiry among these cases regards impairment to creditors' rights by operation of bankruptcy law. They do not consider the identity of the payor. This view thus concludes that the trustee's fee is computed from the payments on all impaired claims, regardless of who writes the checks.

The third view focuses on yet another statutory subsection. In In re Erickson Partnership, 77 B.R. 738 (Bankr.D.S.D. 1987), aff'd., 83 B.R. 725 (D.S.D.1988), reversed *587 on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.1988), the court directed attention to 28 U.S.C. section 586(e)(2), which provides in part that the trustee "shall collect such percentage fee from all payments received by such individual under plans in cases under chapter 12 or 13 of title 11 for which such individual serves as standing trustee." See 77 B.R. at 749-751; 83 B.R. at 727-728. The Executive Office for United States Trustees has opined that section 586(e)(2) "clearly precludes the standing trustee from receiving the statutory percentage fee on payments not actually received by the standing trustee." 77 B.R. at 751 n. 15. Erickson and other courts that follow this view allow impaired claims to be paid outside the plan with no fee payable to the trustee for such payments. Accord, In re Crum, 85 B.R. 878 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1988); Matter of Pianowski, 92 B.R. 225 (Bankr.W.D.Mich. 1988); In re Heller, 105 B.R. 434 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989). The district court in Erickson, 83 B.R. 725, imposed no restriction upon the debtor's election to pay all secured creditors outside the plan without compensating the trustee, while Heller required that the court exercise its discretion to require sufficient trustee disbursements as will assure adequate compensation. 105 B.R. at 437-38 and n. 1.

Resolution of the conflicting interpretations of the Code requires an examination of the various statutory provisions and the contexts of their application. Statutory provision for direct payment from the debtor to the creditor under Chapter 12 derives from three separate provisions of Title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a) provides that:

(a) The plan shall —

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126 B.R. 584, 91 Daily Journal DAR 5718, 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3592, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1807, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 653, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1091, 1991 WL 75243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fulkrod-bap9-1991.