Morgan v. Silver Financial Capital, Inc.

2026 IL App (1st) 241488-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-1488
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 241488-U No. 1-24-1488 Order filed March 17, 2026 Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JOSEPH MORGAN, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) 23CH7073 ) SILVER FINANCIAL CAPITAL, INC., ) Honorable ) Allen Price Walker, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: Circuit court’s denial of motion to vacate arbitration award affirmed where the arbitrator did not exceed his authority.

¶2 Plaintiff, Joseph Morgan, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to vacate an

arbitrator’s decision in favor of defendant, Silver Financial Capital, Inc. (Silver).

¶3 The record shows that Silver, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business

in Utah, is a consumer lender offering loans online through its website. In April 2022, Morgan, an No. 1-24-1488

Illinois resident, completed an application on Silver’s website for a $1000 short term consumer

loan. Silver’s website contained the following message:

“We are registered with Utah’s Department of Financial Institution to provide

Consumer Credit. If you submit this application via the internet to us, we will

receive and process it the same as if you submitted it to us in person thereby making

Utah the place of negotiation, execution and performance of all applications and/or

agreement. If we approve your application, the funds will be disbursed from our

account in Utah. Utah law governing consumer loan agreements may differ from

the laws of the state where you reside. Applicant is responsible for complying with

all statutory obligations regarding obtaining loans by internet that may exist in their

state of residence. This service may or may not be available in your particular

state.”

¶4 The loan agreement entered by the parties further provided that Silver would finance a

$1000 loan to Morgan, who would make biweekly payments to Silver over the course of

approximately six months. The loan agreement further provided that the total finance charge for

the loan was $1426, and the annual percentage rate (APR) for the loan was 482.6197%. The

agreement also provided that it was “deemed to be made in the State of Utah,” that it was “governed

by the laws of the state of Utah” when funded. The loan agreement contained an arbitration

agreement, reiterating that “the law of the State of Utah will govern this Agreement,” and that “any

dispute arising out of” the loan agreement would be subject to an arbitration agreement, governed

by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Morgan agreed that “any claims that directly or indirectly

arise from [the] Loan Agreement” would be resolved “in binding and mandatory arbitration.”

2 No. 1-24-1488

¶5 On June 23, 2022, two months after completing the loan application, Morgan filed a

demand for arbitration, acknowledging that the loan agreement entered by the parties contained an

arbitration clause and seeking to “submit the following dispute to final and binding arbitration.”

Morgan alleged that the loan agreement between him and Silver was “predatory and unlawful”

and that the interest rate charged exceeded the amount allowed by Illinois law. Morgan sought a

declaratory award that the loan was void, damages pursuant to the Illinois Interest Act, (815 ILCS

205/6 (West 2022)), and damages and injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the Illinois

Predatory Loan Prevention Act, (815 ILCS 123/15-1-1 et seq. (West 2022)).

¶6 On April 11, 2023, Silver filed a motion to dismiss Morgan’s claims. Silver alleged that

the executed loan agreement contained “multiple recitations that Utah law applies to the Loan

Agreement and any claims related to it.” Silver maintained that the parties’ choice of law is given

effect unless it would violate fundamental Illinois public policy and Illinois has a materially greater

interest in the litigation than the chosen state. Silver argued that enforcing the contract’s Utah’s

choice of law provision did not offend Illinois public policy because he could still seek redress of

claims in arbitration under Utah law, and that Illinois did not have a materially greater interest in

the litigation because

“Silver is licensed by the state of Utah and is subject to the regulation of and audit

by the Utah Department of Financial Institutions–as the Loan Agreement expressly

makes clear. [Morgan] knowingly reached out to a Utah lender to obtain his loan,

and his Loan Agreement clearly and repeatedly specifies that Utah law appl[i]es.”

¶7 Accordingly, Silver argued that the parties’ choice of law controlled, that the arbitrator was

required to apply Utah substantive law to Morgan’s claims, and that Morgan’s claims should be

dismissed as they were based solely on Illinois law.

3 No. 1-24-1488

¶8 Morgan responded to Silver’s motion to dismiss on May 3, 2023. Among other things,

Morgan asserted that the Predatory Loan Prevention Act applied by its terms to “any person or

entity that offers or makes a loan to a consumer in Illinois” and that the Act “expressly negated the

ability of consumers to waive the protections” of the Act. Accordingly, Morgan maintained that

“a choice of law clause that has the effect of making the Act inapplicable is both a prohibited

waiver or evasion of the Act and invalid as contrary to public policy.” Morgan cited the United

States Supreme Court case of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639, 653 (2022), for

the statement that an “arbitration agreement *** does not alter or abridge substantive rights,” and

contended that there was “no basis for disregarding controlling Illinois statutory law.”

¶9 The arbitrator heard oral argument on May 31, 2023, and entered an order granting Silver’s

motion to dismiss on June 30, 2023. The arbitrator explained that there was no dispute that the

subject loan agreement contained an arbitration clause which gave the arbitrator authority to decide

the matter. The arbitrator concluded that the choice of law provision in the contract applied to

govern Morgan’s claims, that no public policy exception existed to modify that choice of law, and,

accordingly, Illinois law did not apply. The arbitrator specifically found that Viking River Cruises,

Inc., 596 U.S. 639 (2022) was “not on point” because it “dealt with federal pre-emption of a

California state law.” The arbitrator noted that his authority arose,

“not from state or federal law, but from the parties in their arbitration agreement.

The arbitrator is bound by their choice of law. The arbitrator finds that the terms of

the arbitration agreement control and he must apply Utah law. Therefore, because

4 No. 1-24-1488

[Morgan]’s Statement of Claim is based on Illinois law, [Silver]’s motion to dismiss

is granted.” 1

¶ 10 On August 2, 2023, Morgan filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit

court. Morgan alleged that, under Viking River Cruises, Inc., 596 U.S. 639, an arbitration clause

does not deprive a plaintiff of any “substantive statutory rights.” Morgan asserted that applying

Utah law effectively waived Morgan’s statutory rights under the Predatory Loan Prevention Act,

“which cannot be enforced under Illinois law and the FAA.” Morgan contended that the “arbitrator

exceeded his authority by refusing to follow” Viking River Cruises, Inc. Morgan also contended

that an arbitration award could be vacated if “enforcement of the award would violate public

policy.” Morgan stated that it would violate Illinois public policy to “allow a lender to avoid the

prohibition of the [Predatory Loan Prevention Act] by inserting in the form contracts signed by

necessitous borrowers an arbitration clause and a choice of law clause selecting the law of a state

that does not cap interest rates.”

¶ 11 Silver responded to Morgan’s motion to vacate the arbitration award on May 29, 2024.

Silver asserted that the arbitrator correctly concluded that his power stemmed solely from the

parties’ arbitration agreement which provided that Utah law governed any disputes, and that the

“public policy exception” to vacate an arbitration award was limited to cases involving collective

bargaining agreements.

¶ 12 On July 19, 2024, the circuit court entered an order denying Morgan’s motion to vacate the

arbitration award. The court agreed with the arbitrator that he “gets his authority, not from state or

federal law, but from the parties in their arbitration agreement,” and found “no basis to apply the

1 Thereafter, Silver filed a motion for award of arbitration fees. The arbitrator entered a final order on October 23, 2023, denying Silver’s motion. 5 No. 1-24-1488

public policy exception to arbitration agreement.” The court further found that the “arbitrator was

bound by the choice of law that was stated in the arbitration agreement,” and that “Utah law

governs.” Nonetheless, the circuit court noted that it could only vacate an arbitration award where

“the arbitrator exceeds their powers,” and “even if the arbitrator incorrectly applied the law, his

alleged error does not rise to the level of exceeding his powers.”

¶ 13 Morgan filed a timely notice of appeal from that order. In this court Morgan maintains that

the arbitrator’s decision must be vacated because his rights under the Predatory Loan Prevention

Act are “non-waivable,” and the United States Supreme Court decision of Viking River Cruises,

Inc., 596 U.S. 639 (2022) provides that “an arbitration agreement that purports to waive non-

waivable statutory rights *** is invalid and unenforceable.” Morgan also contends that the

arbitrator “exceeded his authority” by issuing an award that “declares valid and enforceable a loan

declared void by the Predatory Loan Prevention Act,” by “refusing to follow” the Viking River

Cruises, Inc. decision, and by “issuing an award that violates a party’s non-waivable statutory

rights.” Finally, Morgan contends that the arbitration award violates public policy, and should be

vacated on that basis.

¶ 14 It is well established that judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill. 2d 246,

254 (1988). The award must be construed as valid whenever possible. Id. “ ‘Limited judicial review

fosters the long-accepted and encouraged principle that an arbitration award should be the end, not

the beginning of litigation.’ ” Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hospital, 359 Ill. App. 3d 554, 564

(2005), quoting Perkins Restaurants Operating Co. v. Van Den Bergh Foods, Co., 276 Ill. App.

3d 305, 309 (1995). “ ‘When parties agree to submit a dispute to arbitration for a binding and

nonappealable decision, they bargain for finality.’ ” First Health Group Corp. v. Ruddick, 393 Ill.

6 No. 1-24-1488

App. 3d 40, 48 (2009), quoting Yorulmazoglu, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 564. “The point of arbitration is

to provide a quick and economical alternative to litigation, not to add yet another round before

entering the district and appellate courts.” First Health Group Corp., 393 Ill. App. 3d at 48.

¶ 15 The parties agree that the Federal Arbitration Act governs this matter, as set out in the

parties’ agreement. Under the FAA, a reviewing court can vacate or modify an arbitration award

in the following limited circumstances:

“(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of

them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the

hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and

material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any

party have been prejudiced; or

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them

that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not

made.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 2022).

¶ 16 Here, Morgan invokes only the fourth ground as the basis to vacate the arbitration award,

asserting that the arbitrator exceeded his power.

¶ 17 Arbitrators “derive their “powers from the parties’ agreement to forgo the legal process

and submit their disputes to private dispute resolution.’ ” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176,

178 (2019), quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 682

(2010); see also Village of Posen v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 2014 IL App

(1st) 133329, ¶ 37. “On judicial review, there is a presumption the arbitrator did not exceed his

7 No. 1-24-1488

authority.” Decatur Police Benevolent and Protective Association Labor Committee v. City of

Decatur, 2012 IL App (4th) 110764, ¶ 21. An arbitrator exceeds his authority when he decides

matters that were not submitted to him for resolution. Board of Trustees of Community College

District No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 419 (1979)

(District No. 508). Further, the scope of an arbitrator’s power is dependent upon what the parties

agreed to submit to arbitration. Id. Because the parties agreed to have disputes settled through

arbitration, the court may not overrule an award simply because it would interpret the contract

differently. Everen Securities, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 268, 273

(1999).

¶ 18 Morgan asserts that he has been deprived of substantive Illinois consumer protection rights

under the Predatory Loan Prevention Act, relying on Viking River Cruises, Inc. for the proposition

that “[a]n arbitration agreement *** does not alter or abridge substantive rights; it merely changes

how those rights will be processed.” Id. at 653. Silver agrees that the agreement to arbitrate does

not affect Morgan’s substantive rights, but asserts that no substantive right to which Morgan was

entitled has been altered or abridged, because Morgan was never entitled to the application of

Illinois law when he agreed that the loan agreement was governed by Utah law. We agree with

Silver.

¶ 19 In arbitration, Morgan had the same substantive rights that he would have had otherwise,

including the right to seek redress under the laws of Utah, which he agreed governed the parties’

contract. Although Morgan could not raise claims based only on Illinois law, he is not without

recourse under the law he agreed to. Morgan contends that Utah law does not limit interest rates,

citing Utah Code Ann. § 70C-2-101—“parties to a consumer credit agreement may contract for

payment by the debtor of any finance charge and other charges and fees.” He omits, however, the

8 No. 1-24-1488

introductory portion of that sentence—”Except where restricted or otherwise covered by

provisions of this title.” In particular, Utah law provides that a court may refuse to enforce an

unconscionable contract in whole, or in part by removing the unconscionable clause. Utah Code

Ann. § 70C–7–106(1) (2009); see also Knight Adjustment Bureau v. Lewis, 228 P.3d 754, 756

(Utah 2010); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996). And where a Utah court finds the

consumer credit agreement to be unconscionable, the court may impose a penalty between $100

and $5000, plus attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 70C–7–106(4) (2009). Having agreed that Utah

law, including the above provisions, governs any disputes under the loan agreement, we agree with

the arbitrator that Morgan cannot raise claims solely based on Illinois law.

¶ 20 We also find Viking River Cruises, Inc., 596 U.S. 639, and much of the other authority

invoked by Morgan, distinguishable because the posture of this case is very different. In those

cases, the validity of an arbitration agreement, and the arbitrability of the dispute, was in question.

Here, by contrast, Morgan filed a demand for arbitration, seeking to submit his dispute “to binding

arbitration.”

¶ 21 For example, in Viking River Cruises, Inc., 596 U.S. 639, a former employee filed an action

against her former employer, alleging both individual and representative violations of the

California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The employer, however, moved to

compel arbitration, asserting that the parties’ contract contained an arbitration clause. The

employee argued, and the trial and appellate court agreed, that the arbitration clause was invalid

under a California Supreme Court case invalidating contractual waivers of the right to bring

representative claims under PAGA. The United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that

the FAA preempted that California Supreme Court decision, that the former employer was entitled

to enforce the arbitration agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of former employee's

9 No. 1-24-1488

individual PAGA claim, and that the former employee lacked statutory standing to maintain the

representative PAGA claims.

¶ 22 Here, however, Viking River Cruises, Inc., 596 U.S. 639 does not apply, as Morgan has

never challenged the validity of the arbitration agreement or disputed the arbitrability of the

questions brought before the arbitrator. Morgan demanded arbitration over his claims that the loan

agreement violated Illinois law. Moreover, when Silver moved to dismiss those claims based on

the parties’ contractual choice of law, Morgan never disputed the arbitrator’s authority to resolve

that question.

¶ 23 Morgan, however, contends that the arbitrator “exceeded his powers” by “issuing an award

that declares valid and enforceable a loan declared void by the Predatory Loan Prevention Act”

and holding “that an agreement made illegal by statute should be given effect.” Although the

arbitrator dismissed Morgan’s claims on the basis that the arbitrator was “bound by [the parties’]

choice of law” in the arbitration agreement, the question resolved by the arbitrator was not whether

the loan agreement was “valid and enforceable” or if it “should be given effect.” Rather, the

arbitrator resolved which state’s law applied under the parties’ arbitration agreement, a question

that was clearly within the arbitrator’s authority to answer.

¶ 24 Furthermore, even if we did find that the arbitrator made an error of law in determining

that Utah law applied, “[a]n error of law does not provide a basis for overturning an arbitration

decision.” Munizzi v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 201237, ¶ 46. “[A]n

arbitration award will not be overturned or set aside because it is illogical, inconsistent, or contains

errors in judgment or a mistake of law or fact.” Beatty v. Doctors’ Co., 374 Ill. App. 3d 558, 563

(2007) (citing Galasso v. KNS Cos., 364 Ill. App. 3d 124, 130 (2006)). Because the parties

bargained to have their disputes settled by an arbitrator, and not a judge, and they agreed to have

10 No. 1-24-1488

the arbitrator decide Morgan’s Illinois law claims, including whether the contract’s choice of law

provision applied, we do not disturb the arbitrator’s decisions on those issues. Ismie Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Michaelis Jackson & Associates, LLC, 397 Ill. App. 3d 964, 970 (2009) (“Even

if the appellate court determines that the arbitrator made an error in judgment on a legal issue, that

error does not create grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s decision when the interpretation of the

law is entrusted to the arbitrator.”). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, and our

supreme court has endorsed:

“ ‘Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters

submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling

disputes it should receive every encouragement from courts of equity. If the

award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the

arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will

not set it aside for error either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a

substitution of the judgment of the Chancellor in place of the judges chosen

by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end,

of the litigation.’ ” Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1979), quoting

Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).

¶ 25 Morgan further asserts that an arbitrator exceeds his power when he “appreciates the

existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.”

This argument implicates the “manifest disregard of the law” standard, which provides that a court

may vacate an arbitration award where it is shown that the arbitrator deliberately disregarded what

they knew to be the law. TruServ Corp. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 376 Ill. App. 3d 218, 225 (2007)

11 No. 1-24-1488

(“an arbitration award may be subject to vacatur for misapplication of the law where it is shown

that the arbitrators deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law.”)

¶ 26 As the appellate court has previously noted, the “manifest disregard of the law” standard

provides an “almost nonexistent standard of review” that is “virtually impossible to meet.” Tim

Huey Corp. v. Global Boiler & Mechanical, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 100, 106 (1995).

“[T]o vacate an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law, there must be

something beyond and different from mere error in law or failure on the part of the

arbitrators to understand or apply the law; it must be demonstrated that the majority

of arbitrators deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law in order to

reach the result they did.” (Citations omitted) Id. at 107.

¶ 27 Even assuming that the arbitrator resolved the question erroneously—that Morgan’s

characterization of the law is accurate and that under Viking River Cruises, Inc., the arbitrator

should have found that Morgan “had a non-waivable right to void the *** loan under the [Predatory

Loan Prevention Act] and other Illinois statutes”—there is no evidence that the arbitrator’s

decision was based on a deliberate disregard of the law. To the contrary, in ruling in favor of Silver,

the arbitrator explicitly considered Morgan’s arguments under Viking River Cruises, Inc., but

found the case to be inapplicable. The decision does not evidence a deliberate disregard of the law,

but rather the arbitrator’s interpretation of the language of the agreement within the context of

what he understood the law to be.

¶ 28 Finally, Morgan contends that the arbitration award should be vacated because it “violates

public policy” as set out in the Predatory Loan Prevention Act.

¶ 29 Illinois courts have generally recognized a rationale, grounded in common law, to vacate

arbitration awards that are “repugnant to *** public policy.” See American Federation of State,

12 No. 1-24-1488

County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Department of Central Management Services, 173

Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1996) (AFSCME). Applying the public policy exception requires a two-step

analysis in which the reviewing court must determine (1) “whether a well-defined and dominant

public policy can be identified” and, if so, (2) “whether the arbitrator’s award, as reflected in his

interpretation of the agreement, violated the public policy.” Id. at 307-08. In addition to being well-

defined and dominant, the public policy identified must also be ascertainable “by reference to the

laws and legal precedents and not from generalized considerations of supposed public interests.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766

(1983).

¶ 30 This court, however, has previously expressed skepticism that the public policy exception

is applicable in cases that do not arise from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). See Munizzi,

2021 IL App (1st) 201237, ¶¶ 26-35. In Munizzi, this court explained that the Arbitration Act

specifies different treatment for awards arising from a CBA, that the public policy exception has

only been utilized in cases arising from a CBA, and that no cases outside of the CBA context have

found the exception applicable. Id.; see also AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 307 (“the historical context

of the [public policy] exception is grounded in common law” and, therefore, “a court will not

enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is repugnant to established norms of public policy.”

(Emphasis added)).

¶ 31 Although Morgan does not explicitly reference this court’s decision in Munizzi, he

contends that the public policy exception does not only apply to cases involving a CBA. Morgan

asserts that there is no basis for such a limitation, listing five cases as other “examples” of when

arbitration awards have been voided as contrary to public policy. We note that four of the five

cases cited by Morgan are from other states and federal courts, and accordingly, they are not

13 No. 1-24-1488

binding on this court. See Travel 100 Group, Inc. v. Mediterranean Shipping Co. (USA) Inc., 383

Ill. App. 3d 149, 157 (2008) (“a decision from another jurisdiction is not binding on this court.”).

As for the remaining case, AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 307, Morgan characterizes the case as finding

that “[a]n [arbitration] award reinstating a Department of Children & Family Services employee

who provided a false report regarding the well-being of three children” to be contrary to public

policy. Morgan omits, however, that AFSCME involved a CBA. See id. at 306 (“Courts have

crafted a public policy exception to vacate arbitral awards which otherwise derive their essence

from a collective-bargaining agreement.”). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Morgan’s

argument that the public policy exception extends beyond the collective bargaining agreement

context.

¶ 32 Nevertheless, even if we did apply the public policy exception, we would not find a basis

to vacate the arbitration award here. Morgan contends that the Predatory Loan Prevention Act

specifies the public policy of Illinois when it “declares contracts for interest in excess of 36% void”

and expressly states that its “purpose *** is to protect consumers from predatory loans.” See 815

ILCS. 123/15-1-5 (West 2022). As noted above, however, Morgan was aware that the loan

application would be “receive[d] and process[ed] *** the same as if [Morgan] submitted it to

[Silver] in person” in Utah, and agreed that Utah law would govern the parties’ loan agreement.

And Morgan is still “protect[ed] *** from predatory loans,” by the Utah consumer protection law,

under which he may ask the Utah court to declare the agreement unenforceable and seek penalties.

In these circumstances, we do not find that the arbitration award should be vacated as violative of

Illinois public policy.

¶ 33 Following our entry of the above decision, Morgan petitioned for leave to appeal to the

supreme court. The supreme court initially denied Morgan’s petition, and Morgan moved to

14 No. 1-24-1488

reconsider the denial. In Morgan’s motion for reconsideration, he stated that subsequent to his

initial filing of the petition for leave to appeal, the Illinois Department of Financial and

Professional Regulation (IDFPR) issued an order to cease and desist against Silver on May 19,

2025. Morgan stated that this court had held that Silver’s loans “did not violate Illinois public

policy,” but the IDFPR’s order held “the opposite.”

¶ 34 Thereafter, the supreme court again denied Morgan’s petition for leave to appeal, but

instructed this court to vacate our judgment, “reconsider the matter in light of” the IDFPR’s order,

and “determine if a different result is warranted.” Accordingly, this court vacated our prior

judgment, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the significance of the

IDFPR’s order.

¶ 35 In Morgan’s supplemental brief, he contends that this court should reconsider our prior

judgment in light of the IDFPR’s order. Morgan contends that this court wrongly “held that public

policy was not violated because Mr. Morgan agreed to application of Utah law,” and this court

should “follow the IDFPR decision as stating Illinois public policy against predatory internet

lending.”

¶ 36 In the IDFPR’s order, the IDFPR found that Silver’s loan to Morgan violated the Predatory

Loan Prevention Act “because contracted charges on the loan exceeded a 36% annual percentage

rate.” The IDFPR further found that the contractual loan terms “including but not limited to terms

relating to Utah law governing the loan and that the loan was ‘made’ in Utah” were “prohibited

waivers” and accordingly, those terms were “null and void for all loans made in violation of” the

Predatory Loan Prevention Act. The IDFPR explained, however, that “[t]his conclusion of law is

not intended to address the validity of the purported arbitration agreement which is not relevant to

this Order to Cease and Desist.” Finally, the IDFPR concluded that Silver had “no right to collect,

15 No. 1-24-1488

attempt to collect, receive or retain any principal fee, interest, or charges related to the loans made

to consumers in violation of” the Predatory Loan Prevention Act. The IDFPR ordered Silver to

“CEASE AND DESIST from contracting for or receiving charges exceeding a 36% annual

percentage rate” and to “CEASE AND DESIST from collecting, attempting to collect, receiving

any principal, fee, interest or charges related to any loan made to a consumer in Illinois exceeding

a 36% annual percentage rate.”

¶ 37 The cease and desist order that was sent to Silver included a form entitled “RIGHT TO

REQUEST A HEARING” which provided that Silver could request a hearing “in writing within

10 days of the date of service,” and that “[a]bsent a request for a hearing, this Order shall constitute

a final administrative order subject to Administrative Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.”

¶ 38 In Silver’s responsive supplemental brief, it contends that this court should give no weight

to the IDFPR order and should reinstate our prior judgment. Silver states that it was never given

notice of any complaint filed against it with the IDFPR, or an opportunity to respond or otherwise

contest any of the proceedings before the IDFPR. Silver states that it has been unable to obtain a

copy of the complaint that led to that order, and speculates that the administrative proceeding may

have been initiated after Morgan was unsuccessful in arbitration in 2023. Silver argues that Morgan

should not be permitted to “bootstrap the Admin[istrative] Order to overcome established law,” or

to use the administrative process to obtain “another bite of the apple.” Although Silver

acknowledges that it received an email from the IDFPR containing the cease and desist order, it

contends that it had already ceased offering loans to Illinois residents in 2022, and that it has not

“engaged in any lending activity in the state of Illinois for over three (3) years.”

¶ 39 In reply, Morgan does not dispute that Silver did not receive notice of the administrative

action prior to the entry of the cease and desist order. Rather, Morgan suggests that such notice is

16 No. 1-24-1488

not necessary, because a cease and desist order “may be issued prior to a hearing.” 815 ILCS

123/15-10-5(d) (West 2024). Morgan points out that Silver did not timely request a hearing within

10 days of service of the order, and accordingly, the cease and desist order became final.

¶ 40 Before considering the IDFPR order, as we have been directed to do, we must clarify the

scope of this appeal. On this issue, we find guidance in Thompson v. Gordon, 356 Ill. App. 3d 447

(2006), in which the appellate court considered an interlocutory appeal in a wrongful death suit

stemming from a fatal car accident. Plaintiff’s expert, a civil engineer licensed in the District of

Colombia, submitted an affidavit opining that the defendants failed to meet the standard of care in

designing the roadway at or near the site of the accident. Id. at 449. Defendants moved to strike

the affidavit, arguing that plaintiff’s expert was not qualified to render a professional opinion

because he was not licensed as a professional engineer in Illinois. Id. at 449-50. The trial court

granted the motion to strike, relying on Van Breemen v. Department of Professional Regulation,

296 Ill. App. 3d 363 (1998), an administrative review case in which the appellate court affirmed

the Department of Professional Regulation’s conclusion that a different individual had engaged in

unlicensed practice of professional engineering where he offered services as an expert witness.

¶ 41 In the initial interlocutory appeal, the appellate court reversed the order striking plaintiff’s

expert’s affidavit, finding the affidavit admissible because the expert’s lack of an Illinois

professional engineering license “goes to the weight of [the expert]’s testimony, not his

competency.” Thompson v. Gordon, 349 Ill. App. 3d 923, 929 (2004), vacated,- 356 Ill. App. 3d

447 (2005).

¶ 42 Thereafter the supreme court issued a supervisory order directing the court to vacate its

judgment, and reconsider in light of a subsequent cease and desist order issued by the Department

17 No. 1-24-1488

of Regulation, finding that plaintiff’s expert had “engaged in the unlicensed practice of

professional engineering.” Thompson, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 450-51.

¶ 43 On review following the supervisory order, the appellate court explained that the questions

posed in the appeal—whether trial court correctly struck plaintiff’s expert affidavit—and the

question posed in the administrative proceeding—whether the expert was engaged in unlicensed

practice—were distinct. The appellate court stated:

“The present case, however, comes to this court, not on judicial review of an

administrative decision, but, rather, on judicial review of a trial court’s ruling to

strike the affidavit of an expert opinion witness in a civil action. *** Here,

defendants have presented to this court the Department’s cease and desist order,

which contains the Department’s findings and ruminations on the proceedings at

issue. Defendants claim that the Department’s cease and desist order should,

therefore, control the trial court’s decision as well as this court’s. Defendants’

intimation that an administrative body’s decision is an adequate substitute for

judicial review ignores the functional difference between these two types of

procedural rights.” Id. at 455.

¶ 44 The appellate court noted that the Department’s cease and desist order could be “relevant

evidence,” but it was “not binding on the trial court in considering whether to allow [the expert

witness] to testify ***, or on this court in determining whether the trial court properly ruled on

defendants’ motion to strike.” Id. at 456. Rather, the appellate court continued to conclude that

the trial court’s “decision to strike [the expert witness]’s affidavit on the basis that he lacked an

Illinois license reflects that the trial court failed to recognize the legal principles involved in

determining whether [his] testimony would assist the trier of fact or offer knowledge and

18 No. 1-24-1488

application of principles of science beyond the ken of the average juror.” Id. at 461 (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted.)

¶ 45 Like in Thompson, this court is not tasked with the administrative review of the IDFPR’s

cease and desist order. Rather, this appeal concerns a distinct question, which shares little

commonality with that which was addressed by the IDFPR. The question posed in this appeal is

not whether the loan violated the Predatory Loan Prevention Act, but rather whether the arbitration

award should be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his powers in issuing it. As the IDFPR

recognized in its order, its conclusions were not applicable to “the purported arbitration agreement

which is not relevant to this Order to Cease and Desist.”

¶ 46 Even if we could find that the cease and desist order is “relevant evidence” as to whether

the loan violated the Predatory Loan Prevention Act, its conclusion would not be binding on this

court. Id. at 456. In the circumstances here, we are unconvinced that the cease and desist order

entered prior to a hearing, in a proceeding in which Silver did not receive notice or participate, is

relevant evidence here. Importantly, the cease and desist order was entered long after the judgment

that this court was reviewing in this appeal, and there can be no argument that the arbitrator

deliberately disregarded the law based on his failure to predict how the IDFPR would ultimately

conclude on the issue. See TruServ Corp., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 225 (2007) (“an arbitration award

may be subject to vacatur for misapplication of the law where it is shown that the arbitrators

deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law.”).

¶ 47 Nonetheless, even if we agreed that the IDFPR’s order shows that the arbitrator made an

error of law, it would have no bearing on this court’s prior judgment for the reasons previously set

forth. As this court explained, “[a]n error of law does not provide a basis for overturning an

arbitration decision.” Munizzi, 2021 IL App (1st) 201237, ¶ 46; see also Ismie Mutual Insurance

19 No. 1-24-1488

Co., 397 Ill. App. 3d at 970 (a legal “error does not create grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s

decision when the interpretation of the law is entrusted to the arbitrator.”); Garver, 76 Ill. 2d at 9

(“If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a

full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error either in law or

fact.”). We previously determined that the arbitrator made a decision that was within the bounds

of his authority, and we found no evidence that the arbitrator’s decision was based on a deliberate

disregard of the law. Our consideration of the IDFPR order does not alter that conclusion.

¶ 48 Finally, we note that in Morgan’s supplemental brief, he argues for the first time that this

court erred in applying Illinois law to find that the public policy exception applies only to collective

bargaining cases, and that we should have applied federal authority under the FAA, which he

contends is not so limited. Morgan did not raise this argument in his petition for rehearing, and the

supreme court’s supervisory order was not an invitation for Morgan to raise new arguments,

unrelated to the supreme court’s mandate, to challenge this court’s decision. See Bond Drug Co.

of Illinois v. Amoco Oil Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d 190, 196 (2001) (“Precise and unambiguous directions

in a mandate must be obeyed.”). The supreme court’s supervisory order unambiguously instructed

this court to “reconsider the matter in light of” the IDFPR’s order, and we have done so.

¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 50 Affirmed.