Morgan v. Rohr, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATHANIEL MORGAN, an individual; Case No.: 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG MICHAEL BEVAN, an individual; 12 individually and on behalf of all others ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 13 similarly situated, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND VACATING 14 Plaintiffs, HEARING 15 v. [ECF No. 160] 16 ROHR, INC., a corporation; HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND, d/b/a COLLINS 17 AEROSPACE; UNITED 18 TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, 19 Defendants. 20 21 Plaintiffs’ action is a years’ long dispute involving Defendants’ alleged violations 22 of California labor law. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for 23 Judgment on the Pleadings. ECF No. 160. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition, (ECF No. 170), 24 and Defendants filed a Reply in support, (ECF No. 177). Defendants seek dismissal of 25 Plaintiffs’ eighth claim for relief pursuant to California’s Unfair Competition Law 26 (“UCL”). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. The Court 27 1 DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ UCL claim subject to refiling in a court of competent 2 jurisdiction. 3 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiffs Nathaniel Morgan and Michael Bevan1 brought this class action on 5 behalf of themselves and other individuals employed by Defendants Rohr, Inc.; Hamilton 6 Sundstrand d/b/a UTC Aerospace Systems d/b/a Collins Aerospace; and United 7 Technologies Corporation (collectively “Defendants”) as non-exempt employees in the 8 State of California from March 27, 2015 to March 31, 2022 to seek recovery of unpaid 9 compensation. ECF No. 33, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) at 2-3, 8.2 Plaintiffs 10 allege Defendants engaged in illegal labor and payroll policies and practices, which 11 resulted in “failing to pay overtime premiums; failing to provide rest and meal periods; 12 failing to provide accurate itemized statements for each pay period; failing to properly 13 compensate Plaintiffs and Class Members for necessary expenditures incurred in the 14 discharge of their duties; and requiring, permitting or suffering the employees to work off 15 the clock . . . .” SAC at 7. Plaintiffs allege violations of the California Labor Code, the 16 applicable Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order, and the California 17 Business and Professions Code. SAC at 8-9. 18 Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants are the alter egos of one another and joint 19 employers of all employees, as Plaintiffs claim is demonstrated by their employment 20 records. SAC at 6-7. Defendants exist to “provide[] a broad range of high-technology 21 products and services to the global aerospace and building systems industries.” SAC at 5. 22 23

24 25 1 Plaintiff Michael Bevan was added as a second class representative in the Second Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 33 (“Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”). 26 2 Page citations refer to CM/ECF pagination. 27 1 During the relevant time period, Defendants had two facilities in California, one in 2 Riverside and the other in Chula Vista. SAC at 5. 3 Filed on June 19, 2020, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges eight 4 causes of action: (1) failure to authorize and permit required meal periods (Cal. Labor 5 Code §§ 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 1197; IWC Wage Order No. 9-2001, § 11); (2) failure to 6 authorize and permit required rest periods (Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512; IWC Wage 7 Order No. 9-2001, § 12); (3) failure to pay overtime wages (Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 8 1194, 1198; IWC Wage Order No. 9-2001, § 3); (4) failure to pay minimum wages (Cal. 9 Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197; IWC Wage Order No. 9-2001, § 4); (5) failure to pay all 10 wages due to discharged and quitting employees (Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203); (6) 11 failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements (Cal. Labor Code § 226; IWC Wage 12 Order No. 9-2001, § 7); (7) failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures 13 incurred in discharge of duties (Cal. Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair and unlawful 14 business practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et. seq.). SAC at 9-24. 15 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 16 On March 27, 2019, Plaintiff Morgan filed this action in Solano County Superior 17 Court. ECF No. 1 at 6. On May 6, 2019, Defendants removed to the Eastern District of 18 California pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1332(d) (“CAFA”). See 19 ECF No. 1. On March 26, 2020, the action was transferred to this Court in the Southern 20 District of California. ECF No. 23. 21 Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint in this action on June 19, 2020, and 22 this remains the operative complaint. ECF No. 33. On December 1, 2021, the Court 23 denied Plaintiffs’ request to file a Third Amended Complaint adding an additional named 24 plaintiff and class representative after finding that Plaintiffs had not exercised diligence, 25 in part because they waited too long to file the motion requesting leave to file the 26 proposed amended complaint. See ECF No. 99 at 8-10. 27 1 On March 31, 2022, the Court granted in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 2 Certification. ECF No. 105. In their Motion, Plaintiffs sought to certify the following 3 classes and subclasses: 4 1. Minimum Wage Class: all persons employed by Defendants as non- exempt employees at Defendants’ facilities during the Class Period. 5 a. Shaved Time Subclass: all persons employed by Defendants as 6 unionized, non-exempt employees at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista from March 27, 2015 through October 7 13, 2019 who were not paid by Defendants for all time recorded 8 as worked on at least one shift. b. Automatic Deduction Subclass: all persons employed by 9 Defendants as unionized, non-exempt employees at Defendants’ 10 facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista from March 27, 2015 through October 13, 2019 who worked at least one shift over five 11 hours long in which there was no recorded meal break of at least 12 30 minutes. c. Rounded Meal Break Subclass: all persons employed by 13 Defendants as unionized, non-exempt employees at Defendants’ 14 facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista from October 13, 2019 through the date of class certification who worked at least one shift 15 over five hours in which the employee’s rounded meal time was 16 greater than the employee’s recorded meal break time. d. Off-the-clock Subclass: all persons employed by Defendants as 17 unionized, non-exempt employees at Defendants’ facilities in 18 Riverside and Chula Vista during the Class Period. 2. Overtime Class: all persons employed by Defendants as non-exempt 19 employees at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista during 20 the Class Period who worked at least one shift over eight hours long. a. Shaved Time Subclass: all persons employed by Defendants as 21 non- exempt, unionized employees at Defendants’ facilities in 22 Riverside and Chula Vista from March 27, 2015 through October 13, 2019 who were not paid by Defendants for all time recorded 23 as worked on at least one shift which was over eight hours long. 24 b. Automatic Deduction Subclass: all persons employed by Defendants as unionized, non-exempt employees at Defendants’ 25 facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista from March 27, 2015 26 through October 13, 2019 who worked at least one shift over eight 27 1 hours long in which there was no recorded meal break of at least 30 minutes. 2 c. Rounded Meal Break Subclass: all persons employed as 3 unionized, non-exempt employees at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista from October 14, 2019 through the date 4 of class certification who worked at least one shift over eight hours 5 long in which the employee’s rounded meal time was greater than the employee’s recorded meal break time. 6 d. Regular Rate Subclass: all persons employed by Defendants as 7 non-exempt employees at Defendants’ Riverside and Chula Vista facilities during the Class Period who worked at least one shift 8 over eight hours long and also earned at least one other form of 9 non-discretionary remuneration (such as shift differentials, shift premiums, special awards, and other bonuses) during the same pay 10 period. 11 e. Off-the-clock Subclass: all persons employed by Defendants as non-exempt employees at Defendants’ Riverside and Chula Vista 12 facilities during the Class Period who worked at least one shift 13 over eight hours long. 3. Rest Break Class: all persons employed by Defendants as non- 14 exempt employees at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula 15 Vista during the Class Period who worked at least one shift over five hours long. 16 4. Meal Period Class: all persons employed by Defendants as non- 17 exempt employees at their facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista during the Class Period who worked at least one shift over five hours long. 18 a. First Meal Break Subclass (Union Employees): all persons 19 employed by Defendants as unionized, non-exempt employees at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista during the 20 Class Period who worked at least one shift over five hours long. 21 b. First Meal Break Subclass (Non-Union Employees): all persons employed by Defendants as non-unionized, non-exempt 22 employees at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista 23 during the Class Period who worked at least one shift over five hours long. 24 c. Second Meal Period Subclass: all persons employed by 25 Defendants as nonexempt employees at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista during the Class Period who worked at 26 least one shift over ten hours long. 27 1 5. Wage Statement Class: all persons employed by Defendants at Defendants’ facilities in Riverside and Chula Vista as non-exempt 2 employees during the Class Period, who received at least one wage 3 statement from Defendants. 4 ECF No. 105 (order granting in part class certification) at 7-8. 5 The Court granted class certification only for union employees and only for the 6 following classes and subclasses: the Meal Period Class; the Overtime Class; and the 7 Minimum Wage Class, as well as the related subclasses under the automatic deduction of 8 meal break, rounded meal break, first meal break and second meal break, and wage 9 statement claims. ECF No. 105 at 45-46. The Court further certified for union employees 10 the derivative claims relating to Defendant’s failure to provide accurate and itemized 11 wage statements and unfair and unlawful business practices under California law. Id. 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) states that “a party may move for 15 judgment on the pleadings” once the pleadings are closed “but early enough not to delay 16 trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard to determine a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as 17 the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Upper Deck Co. v. Panini Am., Inc., 18 553 F. Supp. 3d 956, 960-961 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. 19 Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)). A court must accept all 20 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable 21 to the non-moving party. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 22 Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). A court should grant judgment on 23 the pleadings “when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is 24 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor 25 Co., 189 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 1999)). 26 27 1 II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 2 Once a deadline to file an amended pleading has passed, a party’s ability to amend 3 a pleading is initially governed by Rule 16. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 4 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to Rule 16, a party must show good cause for not having 5 amended their complaint before the specified time, and this standard “primarily considers 6 the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Mammoth 7 Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992)). A district court “may modify the 8 pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking 9 the extension.’” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory 10 committee’s notes (1983 amendment)). 11 DISCUSSION 12 I. Plaintiffs’ UCL Claim 13 Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action for unfair and 14 unlawful business practices in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law 15 (“UCL”). ECF No. 160-1 at 6. Plaintiffs seek equitable relief in the form of restitution. 16 SAC at 24. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot seek equitable relief because they 17 have an adequate remedy at law for damages under the Labor Code. ECF No. 160-1 at 6. 18 Under California law, courts lack jurisdiction over a claim for equitable relief if 19 there is an adequate remedy at law. See Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 20 838 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs must establish that they lack an adequate remedy at law 21 before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL. See id. at 844. Here, 22 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint does not allege that class members lack an 23 adequate legal remedy. See id.; see also ECF No. 33. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have an 24 adequate remedy at law vis-à-vis the damages they pursue under the California Labor 25 Code. Plaintiffs’ eighth claim under the UCL is based on the same factual allegations 26 asserted in other portions of the Complaint. See SAC at 24 (“Defendants’ violations of 27 1 California wage and hour laws constitute a business practice because Defendant’s 2 aforementioned acts and omissions were done repeatedly over a significant period of time 3 . . . .”). All of Plaintiffs’ claims constitute monetary harm, which “are ‘exactly’ the type 4 of claim ‘for which legal remedies are appropriate.’” Fan v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 5 2022 WL 16964099, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2022) (quoting Sharma v. Volkswagen AG, 6 524 F. Supp. 3d 891, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2021)). 7 Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not address this point, and appears to concede that as 8 presently pled, their eighth cause of action fails as a matter of law. See ECF No. 170. 9 Plaintiffs respond that prior to dismissing the UCL claim, they should be granted leave to 10 amend their Second Amended Complaint to seek injunctive relief. ECF No. 170 at 4. 11 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim under the UCL, and 12 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 13 II. Leave to Amend 14 In an effort to salvage their UCL claim, Plaintiffs request leave to amend their 15 Second Amended Complaint to include prospective injunctive relief. ECF No. 170 at 4. 16 As stated, because Plaintiffs’ deadline to amend has expired, they must meet the “good 17 cause” standard under Rule 16. See ECF No. 44 (scheduling order); ECF No. 99 at 8 18 (finding the October 2, 2020 deadline to file an amended complaint was the operative 19 deadline). Because Rule 16’s “good cause” standard primarily considers a party’s 20 diligence, the Court first must determine whether Plaintiffs have acted diligently. 21 Four years have passed since Plaintiffs initially filed their lawsuit. Because 22 California state courts do not have Article III standing requirements prohibiting former 23 employees from obtaining injunctive relief, Plaintiffs had the ability to sue for injunctive 24 relief in the lawsuit initially filed in Solano County Superior Court. See Harris v. City of 25 Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 234 (Cal. 2013) (stating terminated employees may be 26 awarded injunctive relief). Further, the Second Amended Complaint was filed in this 27 1 Court in June 2020, and named Michael Bevan, a current employee of Defendants, as a 2 plaintiff. See SAC at 3. At this point, Plaintiffs could have added a claim for injunctive 3 relief in federal court. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 988 (9th Cir. 4 2011) (“As the Supreme Court explained, only current employees have standing to seek 5 injunctive relief.”). Plaintiffs even requested leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, 6 which this Court denied after finding Plaintiffs had not been diligent in seeking 7 amendment, but still did not include a request for injunctive relief. See ECF No. 74 8 (Motion to File Third Amended Complaint); ECF No. 99 (Order Denying Leave to File 9 Third Amended Complaint). 10 In sum, the Court finds this multi-year delay constitutes a lack of diligence on 11 behalf of Plaintiffs and does not support a finding of good cause under Rule 16. Plaintiffs 12 provide no new facts that would allow this Court to find their delay in seeking 13 amendment was justified. “A district court does not ‘abuse its discretion in denying a 14 motion to amend a complaint . . . when the movant presented no new facts but only new 15 theories and provided no satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his 16 contentions originally.’” Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1990) 17 (quoting Vincent v. Trend Western Tech. Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1987)). In 18 addition, “a motion for summary judgment [is] pending and [the] disposition of the case 19 would be unduly delayed by granting the motion for leave to amend.” M/V Am. Queen v. 20 San Diego Marine Const. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1492 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, the Court 21 DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. 22 III. Remand 23 In the alternative, Plaintiffs request that their UCL claim be remanded to state 24 court. ECF No. 170 at 6. Plaintiffs cite to Moriarty v. American General Life Insurance 25 Co., 2022 WL 2959560 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2022), to support this proposition. However, 26 Guzman v. Polaris Industries Inc., 49 F.4th 1308 (9th Cir. 2022), decided two months 27 1 || after Moriarty states that the proper remedy is for the district to dismiss the “UCL claim 2 || without prejudice to refiling the same claim in state court.” 49 F.4th 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 3 ||2022). Thus, this Court declines to remand Plaintiffs’ UCL claims and instead 4 || DISMISSES the UCL claim without prejudice, subject to refiling in a court of 5 || competent jurisdiction. 6 CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on 8 ||the Pleadings and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action without prejudice. 9 || Because the UCL allows a four-year statute of limitations and the California Labor Code 10 || has a shorter, three-year statute of limitations, this ruling will necessarily affect the class 11 || definition by reducing the class period accordingly. The class period now runs from 12 March 27, 2016 to March 31, 2022. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: July 7, 2023 15 Hon. athe Cae 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 10 28 20-cv-574-GPC-AHG