Morcher v. Nash

32 F. Supp. 2d 239, 40 V.I. 256, 1998 WL 928311
District Court, Virgin Islands·Decided December 1, 1998·No. Civ. 1997-124·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

MOORE, Chief Justice

Presently before the Court is defendant Merry Nash's ["Nash"] application for attorney's fees and costs incurred in her defense of this action. After reviewing the parties' submissions, the Court concludes that plaintiff Heidi Morcher ["Morcher"] must compensate the defendant in the amount of $43,074.26 for the reasons set forth below.

*257 FACTUAL SUMMARY

On July 15, 1997, Morcher invoked the Court's admiralty jurisdiction and filed suit against Nash in personam and the vessel "Bismarck" in rem, seeking arrest and possession of the craft as well as damages for conversion. (See Verified Compl. at 4-5.) The United States Marshal seized the Bismarck under an arrest warrant issued by the magistrate judge and placed the vessel with a substitute custodian. Nash then counterclaimed against Morcher in diversity for possession of the craft, among other claims. This Court conducted a hearing in this case on October 8, 1997, and decided that the vessel would be remanded to Nash's custody. At that time, the Court observed that Nash appeared to own title to the craft.

This matter was tried to the Court without a jury in February, 1998. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court adjudged Nash to be the sole owner of the Bismarck, and invited the parties to submit briefs regarding Nash's entitlement to an award of fees and costs as the prevailing party. In its Memorandum Opinion of September 21, 1998, the Court concluded that an award of reasonable legal fees and costs was appropriate in this case.

DISCUSSION

Under the Virgin Islands Code, the Court may award costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing party. See V.I. Code tit. 5, § 541. As the Court has already ruled that Nash is entitled to an award under that section, only "the amount which should in justice and reason be awarded" remains to be determined. See Morcher v. Nash, 26 F. Supp. 2d 758, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 (D.V.I. 1998). In her supplemental application, Nash seeks $47,856.25 in fees and $ 286.53 in costs. The Court will review each request separately.

I. Attorney's Fees

Nash asks for a fee award of $47,856.25, reflecting two hundred and forty-five hours of work expended by four attorneys *258 and one paralegal. 1 Morcher correctly notes that the Court has rarely made a full award of attorneys fees in the past. (See Opp'n at 3.) Nonetheless, there is no "partial reimbursement standard" implicit in section 541, as the plaintiff suggests. The amount of an award rests within the sound discretion of the Court. See Jo-Ann's Launder Ctr., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 31 V.I. 226 (D.V.I. 1995); Bedford v. Pueblo Supermarkets of St. Thomas, Inc., 18 V.I. 275 (D.V.I. 1981). But cf. Lucerne Inv. Co. v. Estate Belvedere, Inc., 411 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1969) (stating in dicta that section 541 was "intended to [indemnify] the prevailing party for a fair and reasonable portion of his attorney's fees incurred . . . and not for the whole amount"). The Court of Appeals has held that a proposed award even may be increased to reflect the contingent nature of the litigant's recovery or the quality of the attorney's work. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973).

Morcher first contends that the requested award must be reduced because "[t]he case law is clear that a client may use multiple lawyers[,] but . . . such use will be reflected in a reduction of a section 541 award." (See Opp'n at 6.) Although plaintiff somewhat overstates the rule, this Court has previously reduced fee awards for duplication of effort among several attorneys. See Jo-Ann's Launder Ctr., Inc., 31 V.I. at 235 (discounting initial valuation for double billing). The Court finds that 10.75 hours of recorded work reflect partial duplication of effort. 2 Those *259 billings, which totaled $1,957.50, will be reduced by twenty-five percent to $ 1,468.13.

Morcher next argues that the requested award must be reduced by $3,188.75 because client meetings and conferences between multiple lawyers are not compensable under the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' statement in Dr. Bernard Heller Foundation that "[a]n award for such expenses would [be] unauthorized as a matter of law because these expenses are unrelated to any reimbursable costs listed in section 541(a)." (See Opp'n at 7-10 (citing Dr. Bernard Heller Foundation v. Lee, 847 F.2d 83, 89 (3d Cir. 1988)).) This declaration proves little, however, because it applies to an award of costs under section 541(a). Attorneys generally charge meetings with clients and other counsel as part of their fees, not as costs. Client meetings are certainly compensable under section 541(b) because attorneys draw upon their legal expertise in advising their clients and charge them accordingly. Single-lawyer conferences with opposing counsel are compensable for the same reason. Multiple-lawyer conferences not involving opposing counsel, on the other hand, involve duplicative work. Prudence requires the Court to agree that prevailing parties are not entitled to recover fees for such conferences under section 541(b).

Applying these conclusions, the Court finds that 28.50 hours of billings submitted by Nash's attorneys include non-compensable *260 co-counsel conferences mixed with other legal work. 3 Since her attorneys failed to itemize these conferences separately from $5,327.50 in billings, 4 the Court will reduce billings for these hours by twenty-five percent to $3,995.63.

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Morcher v. Nash, 32 F. Supp. 2d 239, 40 V.I. 256, 1998 WL 928311 (vid 1998).

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