1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OMAR MORAN, et al., No. 1:23-cv-01236-KES-CDB 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING GGB LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v.
14 ALTEC INDUSTRIES, et al., (Doc. 27) 15 Defendant. 16 17 GGB LLC1 (“GGB”) moves for dismissal from this action for lack of personal 18 jurisdiction. Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), Doc. 27. This matter is suitable for resolution 19 without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The Court has considered the parties’ briefs 20 and, for the reasons explained below, will grant GGB’s motion to dismiss. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Omar Moran was injured after falling from an Altec LRV-55 articulating boom 23 lift while performing tree trimming services. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. 23 ¶ 21- 24 25. Altec LRV-55 uses a “walking link drive system” to elevate the upper boom and its attached 25 bucket or platform. Id. ¶ 9. The walking link chain uses self-lubricating bearings to connect the 26
27 1 Defendant GGB LLC indicates that it was incorrectly named in the first amended complaint as “GBB North America.” Motion, Doc. 27 at 2. Plaintiffs do not dispute that GGB LLC is the 28 intended defendant in the first amended complaint. 1 links of the walking link chain. Id. at 10. GGB, formerly known as Garlock, supplied the self- 2 lubricating bearings used in the assembly of the LRV-55. Id. ¶ 16. Altec Industries (“Altec”) 3 delivered the LRV-55 to its customer, Asplundh Tree Expert, Co. in 2008. In 2018, Western Tree 4 Care Corp. purchased the LRV-55 from its then owner, LKQ Heavy Truck. Plaintiff Omar 5 Moran was employed by Western Tree Care when he was injured. 6 On July 11, 2023, Omar Moran and Sandy Moran filed this action against Altec in Kern 7 County Superior Court. Notice of Removal, Doc. 1. Altec removed this action to this Court on 8 August 18, 2023. Id. After conducting discovery and receiving leave to file an amended 9 complaint, plaintiffs filed the FAC naming GGB as an additional defendant. Order, Doc. 22; 10 FAC, Doc. 23. In their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege claims for: (1) Strict Products 11 Liability: Manufacturing Defect; (2) Strict Products Liability: Design Defect; (3) Strict Products 12 Liability: Design Defect – Risk-Benefit; (4) Strict Products Liability: Failure to Warn; (5) 13 Negligence; (6) Loss of Consortium. FAC, Doc. 23. 14 On November 25, 2024, GGB moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Doc. 27. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and 16 request, in the alternative, jurisdictional discovery. Doc. 31. GGB filed a reply. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A party may move for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that the Court has personal 20 jurisdiction over defendant. LNS Enterprises LLC v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 859 (9th 21 Cir. 2022). Where the Court does not hold an evidentiary hearing and the motion is based on the 22 written materials, plaintiffs need only establish a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to 23 withstand the motion to dismiss. Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023). 24 “Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are taken as true, but in the face of a contradictory 25 affidavit, the ‘plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint.’” Id. (quoting 26 Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011)). 27 “A federal district court sitting in diversity has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant 28 to the extent the forum state’s law constitutionally provides.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 1 citation omitted). “California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the 2 full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution,” and is therefore coextensive with federal due 3 process requirements. Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 4 marks and citation omitted). Due process requires nonresident defendants to “have certain 5 minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 6 traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 7 omitted). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 GGB moves to be dismissed from this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that 10 there is no basis for the Court to exercise general or specific jurisdiction over it. See Motion, 11 Doc. 27. Plaintiffs argue that GGB consented to personal jurisdiction in California and, even if 12 there was no consent, there is general jurisdiction over GGB in California. See Opposition to 13 Motion (“Opposition”), Doc. 31. In the alternative, plaintiffs request jurisdictional discovery. Id. 14 at 9. 15 A. Personal Jurisdiction 16 1. Consent to Personal Jurisdiction 17 Plaintiffs argue that personal jurisdiction exists because GGB previously consented to 18 personal jurisdiction in California by filing a breach of contract suit in Orange County Superior 19 Court in February 2011 against Alliance Aerospace. Id. at 5. According to plaintiffs, GGB 20 represented in that case that it was authorized to and did conduct business in California, and GGB 21 sought the benefit of California law and its courts to enforce its rights. Id. at 8. However, those 22 actions are insufficient to establish that GGB consented to personal jurisdiction in California in 23 the present case. 24 As addressed below, GGB is not registered to do business in California. Even if it were, 25 “California courts have concluded that the mere registration to do business in California and 26 appointment of an agent for service of process cannot be construed as constituting broad consent 27 to personal jurisdiction within the state.” Carter v. Round Point Mortg., No. EDCV 20-240 JGB 28 (SHKX), 2020 WL 6032653, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2020). As such, a representation in 2011 1 that GGB was authorized to and did conduct business in California is insufficient to establish that 2 GGB consented to personal jurisdiction in California in the present case. See Bristol-Myers 3 Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 5th 783, 798 (2016), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 4 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. 255 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 5 (the “designation of an agent for service of process and qualification to do business in California 6 alone” are insufficient to permit general jurisdiction absent other transactions necessary to 7 establish personal jurisdiction). 8 The filing of an action in a California Superior Court that is unrelated to the current action 9 is also insufficient to establish consent. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 835-36 10 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that an independent affirmative decision to seek relief in 11 the forum courts was needed to constitute consent and that defendants’ decision to defend a 12 separate suit did not mean that the defendants consented to personal jurisdiction in the later Dow 13 Chemical action. Similarly, in Fidelity Nat. Financial, Inc. v. Friedman, CIV 03-1222 PHX 14 RCB, 2010 WL 960420 (D. Ariz. Mar.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OMAR MORAN, et al., No. 1:23-cv-01236-KES-CDB 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING GGB LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v.
14 ALTEC INDUSTRIES, et al., (Doc. 27) 15 Defendant. 16 17 GGB LLC1 (“GGB”) moves for dismissal from this action for lack of personal 18 jurisdiction. Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), Doc. 27. This matter is suitable for resolution 19 without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The Court has considered the parties’ briefs 20 and, for the reasons explained below, will grant GGB’s motion to dismiss. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Omar Moran was injured after falling from an Altec LRV-55 articulating boom 23 lift while performing tree trimming services. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. 23 ¶ 21- 24 25. Altec LRV-55 uses a “walking link drive system” to elevate the upper boom and its attached 25 bucket or platform. Id. ¶ 9. The walking link chain uses self-lubricating bearings to connect the 26
27 1 Defendant GGB LLC indicates that it was incorrectly named in the first amended complaint as “GBB North America.” Motion, Doc. 27 at 2. Plaintiffs do not dispute that GGB LLC is the 28 intended defendant in the first amended complaint. 1 links of the walking link chain. Id. at 10. GGB, formerly known as Garlock, supplied the self- 2 lubricating bearings used in the assembly of the LRV-55. Id. ¶ 16. Altec Industries (“Altec”) 3 delivered the LRV-55 to its customer, Asplundh Tree Expert, Co. in 2008. In 2018, Western Tree 4 Care Corp. purchased the LRV-55 from its then owner, LKQ Heavy Truck. Plaintiff Omar 5 Moran was employed by Western Tree Care when he was injured. 6 On July 11, 2023, Omar Moran and Sandy Moran filed this action against Altec in Kern 7 County Superior Court. Notice of Removal, Doc. 1. Altec removed this action to this Court on 8 August 18, 2023. Id. After conducting discovery and receiving leave to file an amended 9 complaint, plaintiffs filed the FAC naming GGB as an additional defendant. Order, Doc. 22; 10 FAC, Doc. 23. In their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege claims for: (1) Strict Products 11 Liability: Manufacturing Defect; (2) Strict Products Liability: Design Defect; (3) Strict Products 12 Liability: Design Defect – Risk-Benefit; (4) Strict Products Liability: Failure to Warn; (5) 13 Negligence; (6) Loss of Consortium. FAC, Doc. 23. 14 On November 25, 2024, GGB moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Doc. 27. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and 16 request, in the alternative, jurisdictional discovery. Doc. 31. GGB filed a reply. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A party may move for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that the Court has personal 20 jurisdiction over defendant. LNS Enterprises LLC v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 859 (9th 21 Cir. 2022). Where the Court does not hold an evidentiary hearing and the motion is based on the 22 written materials, plaintiffs need only establish a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to 23 withstand the motion to dismiss. Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023). 24 “Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are taken as true, but in the face of a contradictory 25 affidavit, the ‘plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint.’” Id. (quoting 26 Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011)). 27 “A federal district court sitting in diversity has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant 28 to the extent the forum state’s law constitutionally provides.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 1 citation omitted). “California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the 2 full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution,” and is therefore coextensive with federal due 3 process requirements. Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 4 marks and citation omitted). Due process requires nonresident defendants to “have certain 5 minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 6 traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 7 omitted). 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 GGB moves to be dismissed from this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that 10 there is no basis for the Court to exercise general or specific jurisdiction over it. See Motion, 11 Doc. 27. Plaintiffs argue that GGB consented to personal jurisdiction in California and, even if 12 there was no consent, there is general jurisdiction over GGB in California. See Opposition to 13 Motion (“Opposition”), Doc. 31. In the alternative, plaintiffs request jurisdictional discovery. Id. 14 at 9. 15 A. Personal Jurisdiction 16 1. Consent to Personal Jurisdiction 17 Plaintiffs argue that personal jurisdiction exists because GGB previously consented to 18 personal jurisdiction in California by filing a breach of contract suit in Orange County Superior 19 Court in February 2011 against Alliance Aerospace. Id. at 5. According to plaintiffs, GGB 20 represented in that case that it was authorized to and did conduct business in California, and GGB 21 sought the benefit of California law and its courts to enforce its rights. Id. at 8. However, those 22 actions are insufficient to establish that GGB consented to personal jurisdiction in California in 23 the present case. 24 As addressed below, GGB is not registered to do business in California. Even if it were, 25 “California courts have concluded that the mere registration to do business in California and 26 appointment of an agent for service of process cannot be construed as constituting broad consent 27 to personal jurisdiction within the state.” Carter v. Round Point Mortg., No. EDCV 20-240 JGB 28 (SHKX), 2020 WL 6032653, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2020). As such, a representation in 2011 1 that GGB was authorized to and did conduct business in California is insufficient to establish that 2 GGB consented to personal jurisdiction in California in the present case. See Bristol-Myers 3 Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 5th 783, 798 (2016), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 4 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. 255 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 5 (the “designation of an agent for service of process and qualification to do business in California 6 alone” are insufficient to permit general jurisdiction absent other transactions necessary to 7 establish personal jurisdiction). 8 The filing of an action in a California Superior Court that is unrelated to the current action 9 is also insufficient to establish consent. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 835-36 10 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that an independent affirmative decision to seek relief in 11 the forum courts was needed to constitute consent and that defendants’ decision to defend a 12 separate suit did not mean that the defendants consented to personal jurisdiction in the later Dow 13 Chemical action. Similarly, in Fidelity Nat. Financial, Inc. v. Friedman, CIV 03-1222 PHX 14 RCB, 2010 WL 960420 (D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 2010), the court held that the defendant trust’s prior 15 petition in state court did not establish that it had consented to personal jurisdiction in a 16 subsequent action. Fidelity, 2010 WL 960420 at *4. The Fidelity court concluded that the prior 17 petition sought relief “wholly unrelated to [the] transaction or occurrence” at issue in the later 18 case, and that, based on the rationale of Dow Chemical, the prior petition did not establish that the 19 defendant trust had consented to personal jurisdiction in the subsequent federal court action. Id. 20 The Fidelity court’s reasoning is persuasive and warrants the same result here. 21 Plaintiffs argue that once a plaintiff asks the court to enforce a state’s law, there is no 22 “logical basis to later allow it to start from scratch as if it had never consented to the forum’s 23 jurisdiction.” Opposition, Doc. 31 at 10. However, district courts have rejected plaintiffs’ 24 argument that a defendant’s filing of a prior, unrelated lawsuit in the forum, like GGB’s 2011 25 breach of contract lawsuit against Alliance Aerospace, is an affirmative action that constitutes 26 consent to personal jurisdiction in a subsequently filed case. Brooks v. Y.Y.G.M. SA, No. 2:21- 27 CV-00078-JAM-CKD, 2021 WL 5450232, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2021) (rejecting plaintiff’s 28 proposition “that the mere act of filing a complaint can support a finding of specific personal 1 jurisdiction in an unrelated case”); Clinton v. Boladian, No. CV 11-10062-R, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2 May 2, 2013) (holding there was no general jurisdiction where defendant filed a prior lawsuit on a 3 different distinct issue in the same forum); Stage Nine Design, LLC v. Rock-It Cargo USA, LLC, 4 No. 2:21-CV-00722-WBS-AC, 2021 WL 3565310, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) (defendant’s 5 involvement in six cases in California courts as a plaintiff, and one case in California as a 6 defendant, in unrelated actions over the past twelve years was insufficient to support general 7 jurisdiction). The Court is unpersuaded that it should reach a different conclusion here where 8 GGB filed one unrelated lawsuit in 2011. See AM Trust v. UBS AG, 681 Fed. Appx. 587, 589 9 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and noting plaintiff “cited 10 nothing to support its contention that any consent [defendant] may have given to personal 11 jurisdiction in California in other cases would amount to consent to personal jurisdiction in this 12 case.”). Therefore, the Court finds that GGB has not consented to personal jurisdiction. 13 2. General Jurisdiction 14 Plaintiffs also argue that GGB has sufficient contacts with California to warrant general 15 jurisdiction. Opposition, Doc. 31 at 5. “A court has general jurisdiction over a defendant only 16 when the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so ‘continuous and systematic as to render 17 [them] essentially at home in the forum State.’” LNS Enterprises, 22 F.4th 859 (quoting Daimler 18 AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)). A corporation will primarily be “at home” for the 19 purposes of general jurisdiction in two paradigmatic forums: its place of incorporation and its 20 principal place of business. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. General jurisdiction is not limited to these 21 two forums but will only be available elsewhere in the “exceptional case” where a corporation’s 22 affiliations with a forum are “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at 23 home in that State.” Id. at 139; see also Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th 24 Cir. 2014). 25 GGB is incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in New Jersey and is 26 not registered to do business in California. Motion, Doc. 27 at 7; Decl. of Matthew M. Steiner in 27 support of Motion, Doc. 27-1 ¶ 3. Plaintiffs argue that the Court has general jurisdiction over 28 GGB because GGB supplies all major manufacturers of commercial and military aircraft with 1 bearings, including manufacturers with a large presence in California; Alstom is a representative 2 customer who provides many services to California; GGB has sold bearings in California since at 3 least 2011; GGB targets customers in California; and GGB sells its bearings directly through a 4 webstore and through an extensive network of distributors in California. Opposition, Doc. 31 at 5 11-13. However, these contacts are insufficient to render GGB essentially “at home” in 6 California. It is not enough that a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and 7 systematic course of business” in a state – general jurisdiction requires that the defendant be 8 essentially at home. Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1070. 9 Conducting regular business in California is insufficient to render GGB “at home” in the 10 state. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (“A corporation that operates in many places can 11 scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with 12 ‘doing business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States.”). 13 Plaintiffs do not contend that GGB has offices, operations, or employees in California, only that 14 its bearings are sold throughout California and that it targets customers in California. These 15 contacts are not so substantial and of such nature that they render GGB subject to general 16 jurisdiction in California. See Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1070 (no general jurisdiction where foreign 17 corporation did not have its principal place of business, offices, staff, or other physical presence 18 in California); see also Farrell v. New Millennium Concepts, Ltd., No. 2:21-CV-01691-JAM- 19 JPD, 2022 WL 956882, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2022) (holding that there was no general 20 jurisdiction where defendant was a Texas limited partnership with a Texas principal place of 21 business and defendant did not have offices, operations, or employees in California). 22 Accordingly, based on the present record, the Court concludes it lacks general personal 23 jurisdiction over GGB. 24 3. Specific Jurisdiction 25 GGB argues there is no specific jurisdiction over GGB in California. In its reply, GGB 26 argues that, because plaintiffs failed to address specific jurisdiction in their opposition, plaintiffs 27 have conceded that there is no specific jurisdiction. Reply to Motion, Doc. 32 at 5. Courts 28 construe a party’s failure to address an argument by the opposing party in their briefs as 1 abandonment of that claim. See Dilworth v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 23-1879 JGB 2 (SHKX), 2024 WL 2107731, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2024) (plaintiff concedes an argument by 3 failing to address or oppose the moving party’s argument); see also Conservation Force v. 4 Salazar, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Where plaintiffs fail to provide a defense 5 for a claim in opposition, the claim is deemed waived.”). Consequently, the Court finds that 6 plaintiffs abandoned any argument about specific personal jurisdiction and that plaintiffs have 7 therefore failed to establish specific jurisdiction over GGB in this action. See CRBN Pickleball 8 LLC v. Pickle, No. 8:24-CV-00625-JVS-JDE, 2024 WL 3914670, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2024) 9 (holding there was no general jurisdiction over defendant because plaintiff conceded the 10 argument by not countering or addressing general jurisdiction). 11 B. Request for Jurisdictional Discovery 12 In the alternative, plaintiffs seek jurisdictional discovery to determine whether GGB is an 13 alter ego of its sole member, Timken, and to determine whether there are sufficient contacts to 14 yield general jurisdiction over GGB. Opposition, Doc. 31 at 5. Jurisdictional discovery is 15 appropriate where “pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or 16 where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 17 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “a mere hunch that [discovery] might yield jurisdictionally 18 relevant facts” or “bare allegations in the face of specific denials” are insufficient reasons for the 19 Court to permit jurisdictional discovery. LNS Enterprises, 22 F.4th at 864–65 (quotation marks 20 and internal citation omitted). 21 Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that jurisdictional discovery is 22 warranted. Plaintiffs have not explained how limited discovery would likely reveal continuous 23 and systematic contacts needed for GGB to be essentially at home in California. Even assuming 24 GGB knowingly provided products for Alstom to use in California, that is not sufficient to 25 support general jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue that Ohio Sec. Ins. Co. v. AGCO Corp., No. CV-23- 26 04-GF-BMM, 2024 WL 2781912 (D. Mont. May 30, 2024), supports their request for 27 jurisdictional discovery. However, the Ohio Sec. Ins. court permitted jurisdictional discovery for 28 plaintiffs to ascertain whether there was specific jurisdiction and is therefore inapposite. See Ohio 1 Sec. Ins. Co. v. AGCO Corp., No. 4:23-cv-00004-BMM, Doc. 19 (D. Mont. March 12. 2024). 2 Plaintiffs also argue that jurisdictional discovery is needed to determine whether Timken 3 is an alter ego of GGB, and specifically seek to uncover whether GGB provided bearings to the 4 Imperial Irrigation District and whether Timken market, sells, or arranges for expert engineering 5 advice about GGB products in California. Opposition, Doc. 31 at 15. However, plaintiffs have 6 not provided any evidence that Timken is an alter ego of GGB. “The existence of a parent- 7 subsidiary relationship is insufficient, on its own, to justify imputing one entity’s contacts with a 8 forum state to another for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 9 793 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015). “Total ownership and shared management personnel are 10 alone insufficient to establish the requisite level of control” needed to sustain an alter ego theory. 11 Id. at 1079. Plaintiffs provide no evidence that Timken’s actions can be attributed to GGB. 12 Plaintiffs have not made a showing that jurisdictional discovery will reveal GGB is an 13 alter ego of Timken or that jurisdictional discovery will help yield general jurisdiction. See LNS 14 Enterprises, 22 F.4th at 864–65 (affirming denial of jurisdictional discovery where plaintiffs 15 “sought jurisdictional discovery without providing any affidavit or evidence substantiating their 16 requests or describing with any precision how such discovery could be helpful to the Court, and 17 their request amounted to only a mere hunch.”). Accordingly, plaintiffs request for jurisdictional 18 discovery is denied. 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 | IV. CONCLUSION 2 As set forth above, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GGB in this action. The 3 | Court also denies plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery. 4 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 5 1. The hearing on the motion to dismiss (Doc. 27) is vacated. 6 2. GGB’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. 27) is granted. 7 3. GGB is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 8 9 19 | IT IS SO ORDERED. _ 11 Dated: _ February 5, 2025 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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