Morales v. State

458 S.W.2d 56, 1970 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1303

Opinions

OPINION

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is murder; the punishment, death.

The fact that appellant killed four people and tried to kill a fifth is not questioned. In appellant’s brief the following questions are propounded:

1. Did the Court err in refusing a new trial upon a Motion based on new evidence of insanity as a general defense ?

2. Did the Court err in refusing a new trial where Appellant presented sufficient newly discovered evidence at the time of his Motion to establish that such evidence would be more than sufficient to create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty?

3. Did the Court err in refusing a new trial where the evidence at the New Trial Motion hearing was uncontroverted and established that the Appellant genuinely could not remember at the time of his trial any of the incidents of the crime or crimes for which he was charged, and in particular of the crime for which he is condemned to death, where such conclusive evidence was not available at the time of his trial for presentation and consideration by the jury in determining not only the guilt of the Appellant but especially in assessing his punishment ?

4. Is the imposition of the death penalty in this case violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution in that the same constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in a situation where the evidence is uncontroverted that the Appellant has no memory of the commission of the offense for which the death penalty was imposed?

The answers, as a study of the record reveals, are as follows:

I. Prior to trial with the authorization and approval of trial defense counsel, appellant was given a psychiatric examination by Dr. Hornisher who reported, “no disease found, psychiatric or neurological, functional or organic” at the conclusion of his three page report which was given to appellant’s retained attorney. In such report there appears a rather full account given by appellant of an injury which he received by being shot in the hip, but there is no mention of any injury to his head. At the trial, the defense of insanity was not raised, and the defense interposed was that of alibi. At the hearing, Dr. Ziporyn testified, “However, when Mr. Morales is not under the influence of drugs, he does have enough stability to handle this problem in ways which are socially acceptable.”

Appellant’s first and amended motions for new trial neither mentioned the question of appellant’s sanity. They were overruled and notice of appeal was given. Belatedly and without withdrawing his notice of appeal, a new attorney came into the case and filed still another motion for new trial. This clearly came too late, but the evidence adduced at the hearing which the careful trial judge held will be discussed.

II. The allegedly newly discovered evidence was that “such new testimony was not known to the defendant or his attorneys beforehand and was such as reasonable diligence could not have secured at the trial, for the reason that the same consists of expert testimony exclusively available to only a handful of highly sophisticated psychiatrists throughout the United States, psychiatrists specializing in advanced study of criminal insanity * *

Dr. Ziporyn (who testified by interrogatories at the hearing) stated that he had examined appellant for one hour at the El Paso jail after his conviction, in the case at bar, and his “ * * * diagnosis was that Mr. Morales has a chronic brain syndrome, associated with cerebral trauma, and that at the time referred to in the previous question, he was under the influence of drugs to the point where he had achieved a state of psychosis.” He based his conclusion that appellant had sustained the “cerebral trauma” from appellant’s statement that he had received an injury to his head while in high school in El Paso.

It should first be noticed that Dr. Ziporyn conducted no physical examination of appellant to determine if there was any evidence of his having sustained an injury to his brain. Secondly, “a state of psychosis” is not insanity under Texas law, McGee v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 639, 238 S.W.2d 707.

III. Article 36, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., provides in part that “Neither intoxication nor temporary insanity of mind produced by the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits, intoxicating liquor, or narcotics, or a combination thereof, shall constitute any excuse for the commission of crime.”

Dr. Hernandez, called by appellant, testified that he examined appellant in jail after his conviction, and he also based his opinion as to the “cerebral trauma” from what appellant told him. He admitted that an x-ray of appellant’s skull revealed no such injury. He stated that “none of those tests affirmatively indicated any brain damage.” We quote further from his testimony when he said, “Well, we do know brain damaged individuals react * * * I think the memory can — can be lost because of brain injury, and because of the effects of the — of the medication and what have you.”

Dr. Hornisher called by the state as set forth above testified that he had examined appellant after the trial and found that “ * * * he was sane and responsible for his act.”

Dr. Bennett, also called by the state, testified that he examined appellant after the trial and found him to be sane and expressed the opinion that he had never had any brain injury, and that he was sane at the time of the commission of the offense.

At the hearing neither appellant, his mother, nor his wife was called as a witness though they were shown to be present. If appellant had suffered brain injury while in high school their evidence would have been of great value. It should be noted that the existence of brain injury was a predicate for both Dr. Ziporyn’s and Dr. Hernandez’s opinions. After conviction, the burden is clearly upon the appellant to show insanity. This he failed to do.

IV. We overrule as we have in the past appellant’s contention that death is cruel and unusual punishment for a crime. So long as it is prescribed by the legislature and has not been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, this Court will follow the legislative mandate, Sanchez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 454 S.W.2d 210.

We hold that the court properly exercised his discretion in overruling the motion fbr new trial.

Appellant is not precluded from pursuing the remedies provided by Article 46.02, Sec. 5, V.A.C.C.P., “Insanity as bar to execution of death sentence.”

The judgment is affirmed.