3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 MARTINA MORALES-RIOS, Case No. 3:22-cv-00270-MMD-CSD
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 WAL-MART STORES, INC., 9 Defendant. 10
11 I. SUMMARY 12 Plaintiff Martina Morales-Rios sued Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for injuries 13 she sustained during a slip-and-fall incident at a Reno Wal-Mart store. (ECF No. 1-2.) 14 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26 15 (“Motion”))1 for (1) medical expenses related to Plaintiff’s paraspinal abscess, and (2) 16 medical expenses related to Plaintiff’s hospital visit for an acute urinary tract infection 17 (“UTI”) and high blood sugar. The Court will deny the Motion as to the paraspinal abscess 18 because there are genuine issues of material fact as to causation. The Court will grant 19 the Motion as to the UTI/high blood sugar because there is no genuine dispute that these 20 medical issues are unrelated to and not caused by the slip-and-fall. 21 II. BACKGROUND2 22 On May 10, 2020, Plaintiff slipped on some liquid on the floor of a Walmart store 23 in Reno and sustained injuries. (ECF Nos. 26 at 3, 33 at 4.) As a result of this slip-and- 24 fall, Plaintiff suffered a “concussion and experienced cervical and lumbar spine pain, 25 upper and lower extremity pain, as well as hip pain.” (ECF No. 33 at 4.) Because Plaintiff 26 failed to respond to more conservative treatment methods, Plaintiff received an 27
28 1Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 33), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 35). 2 hospitalized at Renown Medical Center on October 31, 2020, due to a paraspinal abscess 3 she developed from the injection, which had to be drained by a radiologist. (Id.) She was 4 hospitalized from October 31, 2020, to November 23, 2020, and had a post-op 5 appointment on December 5, 2020. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) Plaintiff also visited the Renown 6 emergency room on October 14, 2020, for treatment of a UTI and high blood sugar. (Id.) 7 Plaintiff asserts a single claim for negligence. (ECF No. 1-2.) Defendant seeks 8 summary judgment as to causation on the (1) $116,189.25 in medical expenses for 9 Plaintiff’s hospitalization for her paraspinal abscess, and the (2) $7,355.25 in medical 10 expenses for Plaintiff’s hospital visit for her UTI and high blood sugar. (ECF No. 26 at 3, 11 13.) 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 The Court will deny the Motion as to Plaintiff’s paraspinal abscess and will grant 14 the Motion as to Plaintiff’s UTI/high blood sugar.3 15 A. Paraspinal Abscess 16 Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate for Plaintiff’s paraspinal 17 abscess because the lumbar-spine injection Plaintiff received was an intervening act that 18 caused the abscess and severed the chain of causation. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) Plaintiff 19 counters that the abscess is still causally related to the slip-and-fall because she had to 20 get the injection to treat her injuries from the incident. (ECF Nos. 33 at 6, 9.) The Court 21 agrees with Plaintiff. 22 Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that 23 3“A claim for negligence in Nevada requires that the plaintiff satisfy four elements: 24 (1) an existing duty of care, (2) breach, (3) legal causation, and (4) damages.” Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1175 (Nev. 2008). “Causation has two 25 components: actual cause and proximate cause.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Payo, 403 P.3d 1270, 1279 (Nev. 2017) (citation omitted). “An accident occurring on the premises does 26 not of itself establish negligence.” Sprague v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 849 P.2d 320, 322 (Ne. 1993) (citation omitted). “Yet, a business owes its patrons a duty to keep the premises in 27 a reasonably safe condition for use.” Id. (citation omitted). To establish entitlement to summary judgment for negligence, “defendant need only negate one element of plaintiff's 28 case (i.e., duty, breach, causation, or damages).” Harrington v. Syufy Enters., 931 P.2d 2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. 3 Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). As support 4 for its argument, Defendant primarily relies on a report by Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sep Bady, 5 who opined that “it would be unlikely that [Plaintiff] would have developed an iliopsoas 6 abscess absent the lumbar injection.” (ECF No. 26-20 at 24.) However, in that same 7 report, Dr. Bady also opined that the lumbar injection and hospitalization were “directly 8 related to the subject incident.” (Id.) This is because Plaintiff only received the injection 9 due to her “worsening low back pain and radicular symptoms” caused by the slip and fall 10 “that did not respond to chiropractic treatments and oral medications.” (Id.) 11 Since medical complications are common in slip-and-fall incidents, particularly 12 given the seriousness and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries, a reasonable factfinder could 13 conclude that the abscess was a natural and probable consequence of Defendant’s 14 negligence, and that the botched injection was a foreseeable cause of the injury. (ECF 15 No. 33 at 4.) See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Payo, 403 P.3d 1270, 1279 (Nev. 2017) 16 (explaining that “[p]roximate cause is defined as any cause which in natural [foreseeable] 17 and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the 18 injury complained of and without which the result would not have occurred”) (citations and 19 quotation marks omitted); Huffey v. Phelps, 281 P.3d 1183 (Nev. 2009) (noting that “[t]o 20 establish proximate causation, the injury must appear to be the natural and probable 21 consequence of the negligence, and it ought to have been foreseen in light of the 22 attending circumstances”) (citation omitted); Vallery v. State, 46 P.3d 66, 78 (Nev. 2002) 23 (explaining that an intervening cause “means not a concurrent and contributing cause but 24 a superseding cause which is itself the natural and logical cause of the harm . . . [a]n act 25 can only be a superseding cause if it is unforeseeable”) (citations omitted). 26 Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the issue 27 of proximate causation is a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact. See Nehls 28 v. Leonard, 630 P.2d 258, 260 (Nev. 1981) (citations omitted); Frances v. Plaza Pac. 2 U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 665 (Nev. 1998) (citation omitted). Given that summary 3 judgment on causation is disfavored and genuine disputes of material fact remain as to 4 whether Defendant proximately caused Plaintiff’s abscess, the Court denies Defendant’s 5 Motion on this issue. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 6 The Court also denies Defendant’s alternative request4 for Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) 7 relief5 because, as explained above, whether Defendant caused Plaintiff’s abscess and 8 hospitalization is genuinely in dispute. (ECF No. 26 at 17.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 MARTINA MORALES-RIOS, Case No. 3:22-cv-00270-MMD-CSD
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 WAL-MART STORES, INC., 9 Defendant. 10
11 I. SUMMARY 12 Plaintiff Martina Morales-Rios sued Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for injuries 13 she sustained during a slip-and-fall incident at a Reno Wal-Mart store. (ECF No. 1-2.) 14 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26 15 (“Motion”))1 for (1) medical expenses related to Plaintiff’s paraspinal abscess, and (2) 16 medical expenses related to Plaintiff’s hospital visit for an acute urinary tract infection 17 (“UTI”) and high blood sugar. The Court will deny the Motion as to the paraspinal abscess 18 because there are genuine issues of material fact as to causation. The Court will grant 19 the Motion as to the UTI/high blood sugar because there is no genuine dispute that these 20 medical issues are unrelated to and not caused by the slip-and-fall. 21 II. BACKGROUND2 22 On May 10, 2020, Plaintiff slipped on some liquid on the floor of a Walmart store 23 in Reno and sustained injuries. (ECF Nos. 26 at 3, 33 at 4.) As a result of this slip-and- 24 fall, Plaintiff suffered a “concussion and experienced cervical and lumbar spine pain, 25 upper and lower extremity pain, as well as hip pain.” (ECF No. 33 at 4.) Because Plaintiff 26 failed to respond to more conservative treatment methods, Plaintiff received an 27
28 1Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 33), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 35). 2 hospitalized at Renown Medical Center on October 31, 2020, due to a paraspinal abscess 3 she developed from the injection, which had to be drained by a radiologist. (Id.) She was 4 hospitalized from October 31, 2020, to November 23, 2020, and had a post-op 5 appointment on December 5, 2020. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) Plaintiff also visited the Renown 6 emergency room on October 14, 2020, for treatment of a UTI and high blood sugar. (Id.) 7 Plaintiff asserts a single claim for negligence. (ECF No. 1-2.) Defendant seeks 8 summary judgment as to causation on the (1) $116,189.25 in medical expenses for 9 Plaintiff’s hospitalization for her paraspinal abscess, and the (2) $7,355.25 in medical 10 expenses for Plaintiff’s hospital visit for her UTI and high blood sugar. (ECF No. 26 at 3, 11 13.) 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 The Court will deny the Motion as to Plaintiff’s paraspinal abscess and will grant 14 the Motion as to Plaintiff’s UTI/high blood sugar.3 15 A. Paraspinal Abscess 16 Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate for Plaintiff’s paraspinal 17 abscess because the lumbar-spine injection Plaintiff received was an intervening act that 18 caused the abscess and severed the chain of causation. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) Plaintiff 19 counters that the abscess is still causally related to the slip-and-fall because she had to 20 get the injection to treat her injuries from the incident. (ECF Nos. 33 at 6, 9.) The Court 21 agrees with Plaintiff. 22 Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that 23 3“A claim for negligence in Nevada requires that the plaintiff satisfy four elements: 24 (1) an existing duty of care, (2) breach, (3) legal causation, and (4) damages.” Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1175 (Nev. 2008). “Causation has two 25 components: actual cause and proximate cause.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Payo, 403 P.3d 1270, 1279 (Nev. 2017) (citation omitted). “An accident occurring on the premises does 26 not of itself establish negligence.” Sprague v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 849 P.2d 320, 322 (Ne. 1993) (citation omitted). “Yet, a business owes its patrons a duty to keep the premises in 27 a reasonably safe condition for use.” Id. (citation omitted). To establish entitlement to summary judgment for negligence, “defendant need only negate one element of plaintiff's 28 case (i.e., duty, breach, causation, or damages).” Harrington v. Syufy Enters., 931 P.2d 2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. 3 Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). As support 4 for its argument, Defendant primarily relies on a report by Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sep Bady, 5 who opined that “it would be unlikely that [Plaintiff] would have developed an iliopsoas 6 abscess absent the lumbar injection.” (ECF No. 26-20 at 24.) However, in that same 7 report, Dr. Bady also opined that the lumbar injection and hospitalization were “directly 8 related to the subject incident.” (Id.) This is because Plaintiff only received the injection 9 due to her “worsening low back pain and radicular symptoms” caused by the slip and fall 10 “that did not respond to chiropractic treatments and oral medications.” (Id.) 11 Since medical complications are common in slip-and-fall incidents, particularly 12 given the seriousness and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries, a reasonable factfinder could 13 conclude that the abscess was a natural and probable consequence of Defendant’s 14 negligence, and that the botched injection was a foreseeable cause of the injury. (ECF 15 No. 33 at 4.) See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Payo, 403 P.3d 1270, 1279 (Nev. 2017) 16 (explaining that “[p]roximate cause is defined as any cause which in natural [foreseeable] 17 and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the 18 injury complained of and without which the result would not have occurred”) (citations and 19 quotation marks omitted); Huffey v. Phelps, 281 P.3d 1183 (Nev. 2009) (noting that “[t]o 20 establish proximate causation, the injury must appear to be the natural and probable 21 consequence of the negligence, and it ought to have been foreseen in light of the 22 attending circumstances”) (citation omitted); Vallery v. State, 46 P.3d 66, 78 (Nev. 2002) 23 (explaining that an intervening cause “means not a concurrent and contributing cause but 24 a superseding cause which is itself the natural and logical cause of the harm . . . [a]n act 25 can only be a superseding cause if it is unforeseeable”) (citations omitted). 26 Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the issue 27 of proximate causation is a factual issue to be determined by the trier of fact. See Nehls 28 v. Leonard, 630 P.2d 258, 260 (Nev. 1981) (citations omitted); Frances v. Plaza Pac. 2 U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 665 (Nev. 1998) (citation omitted). Given that summary 3 judgment on causation is disfavored and genuine disputes of material fact remain as to 4 whether Defendant proximately caused Plaintiff’s abscess, the Court denies Defendant’s 5 Motion on this issue. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 6 The Court also denies Defendant’s alternative request4 for Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) 7 relief5 because, as explained above, whether Defendant caused Plaintiff’s abscess and 8 hospitalization is genuinely in dispute. (ECF No. 26 at 17.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g) 9 advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment (explaining that “the court may decide 10 whether to apply the summary-judgment standard to dispose of a material fact that is not 11 genuinely in dispute”). 12 B. UTI/High Blood Sugar 13 Defendant contends that summary judgment is proper for Plaintiff’s UTI/high blood 14 sugar hospital visit because her injuries were the result of her failure to take her diabetes 15 medication, not the result of the slip-and-fall. (Id. at 16.) Because Plaintiff fails to address 16 Defendant’s argument in her response, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute 17 that the UTI/high blood sugar were not caused by the slip-and-fall incident.6 (ECF No. 18 33.) 19 Defendant has satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine 20
21 4In the Motion, Defendant alternatively requests that the Court issue an order “stating 1) that Plaintiff’s $116,189.25 in medical expenses are causally related to 22 Plaintiff’s paraspinal abscess and 2) that Plaintiff’s paraspinal abscess was proximately caused by the lumbar injection she had at Tahoe Fracture & Orthopedic Medical Clinic, 23 Inc., on August 31, 2020.” (ECF No. 26 at 17.)
24 5Rule 56(g) provides that “[i]f the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion, it may enter an order stating any material fact — including an item of damages 25 or other relief — that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case.” 26 6In the reply, Defendant contends that the Court should grant the Motion under LR 27 7-2(d) because Plaintiff failed to address Defendant’s argument in her opposition. (ECF No. 35 at 3.) The Court disagrees, because LR 7-2(d) explicitly excludes “a motion under 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.” 2 Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). As support, Defendant 3 points to Plaintiff’s own medical records, which clearly and unambiguously show that her 4 UTI/high blood sugar were caused by her chronic non-compliance with her diabetes 5 medication. (ECF No. 26 at 7, 16.) The physician’s notes from the visit states that 6 Plaintiff’s hyperglycemia “appears to be related to noncompliance” with her medication 7 and “[h]er sugar is also likely elevated because she has a urinary tract infection.” (ECF 8 No. 26-18 at 6.) Specifically, the provider notes that Plaintiff was supposed to be on her 9 diabetes medication, Metformin, but had not taken her medication for over a year. (Id. at 10 2, 6.) Plaintiff’s other doctor, Javier Rodriguez, similarly disclosed that Plaintiff had a 11 “history of uncontrolled Type 2 diabetes” and a “history of lack of adherence,” where she 12 stopped taking Metformin for four years. (ECF No. 26-20 at 9.) Hence, Defendant has 13 met its initial burden of showing that there is no dispute Plaintiff’s UTI/high blood sugar 14 were caused by her failure to take her diabetes medication—not the slip-and-fall. See id. 15 However, Plaintiff fails to address Defendant’s argument in her response, and has 16 therefore failed to resist the Motion by “set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is 17 a genuine issue for trial.” (ECF No. 33.) Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Accordingly, the Court 18 grants Defendant’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s UTI/high blood sugar hospital visit. Plaintiff is 19 therefore precluded from seeking damages related to the October 14, 2020, hospital visit. 20 The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request for Rule 56(d)7 relief because her request is 21 limited to her paraspinal abscess,8 and she does not explain what the additional discovery 22 would elicit for the UTI/high blood sugar issue. (Id. at 10.) See InteliClear, LLC v. ETC 23 Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 662 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “[t]o prevail on a 24 request for additional discovery under Rule 56(d), a party must show that: (1) it has set 25 7Rule 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, 26 for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or 27 declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”
28 8In her response, Plaintiff only requests Rule 56(d) relief “to demonstrate how [her] 1 || forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts 2 || sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment’) 3 || (citation and quotation marks omitted). || IV. CONCLUSION 5 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 6 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 7 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 8 || issues before the Court. 9 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment (ECF 10 || No. 26) is granted in part and denied in part, as stated herein. 11 It is further ordered that under LR 16-5, the Court finds that it is appropriate to refer 12 || this case to Judge Craig S. Denney to conduct a settlement conference. If the parties do 13 || not settle, the Joint Pretrial Order is due within 30 days of the date that the settlement 14 || conference is held. 15 DATED THIS 18" Day of July 2023. 16 “> 17 A Lo — MIRANDA M. DU 18 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28