UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRITTANY MOORE, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 20-217
MW SERVICING, L.L.C., ET AL. SECTION: “T” (5)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. (Rec. doc. 289). Defendants oppose the motion. (Rec. doc. 294). Plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum and sought additional fees for that reply. (Rec. doc. 296). Having reviewed the pleadings and tIh. e caseB alacwk,g trhoeu Cnodu rt finds and recommends as follows.
This case involves a wage dispute. On January 20, 2020, Plaintiff, Brittany Moore, filed this action against Defendants, MW Servicing, L.L.C.; WBH Servicing, L.L.C.; and Joshua Bruno, as a putative collective action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”). Plaintiffs seek recovery of unpaid wages and relateIdd .pen alties. (Rec. doc. 1). Moore was initially represented by the Stiegler Law Firm only. ( ). In response, Defendants filed a motion for partial dismissal of the collective-action allegations. (Rec. doc. 7). Shortly thereafter, Kenneth C. Bordes, who represented three additional plaintiffs alleging they were underpaid, sought to join the case. (Rec. doc. 10). The parties agreed to withdraw Defendants’ motion to dismiss so that Plaintiffs could file an amended complaint, which added the new claimants and added Bruno, Inc. as a co-
defendant. (Rec. docs. 13, 21). Defendants then re-filed a motion to dismiss the collective-action allegations and filed a motion to dismiss the claim for unjust enrichment. (Rec. docs. 18, 19). The District Court denied the motion to dismiss the collective action and granted the motion to dismiss
the unjust enrichment claim. (Rec. docs. 85, 86). Plaintiffs filed a motion for conditional certification of an FLSA collective action that was opposed, but ultimately granted, on March 15, 2021. (Rec. docs. 40, 44, 87). Several opt-in Plaintiffs joined the collective action; however, Leonardo Rodriguez and Latoya Edwards ultimately withdrew from the case and were dismissed without prejudice. (Rec. docs. 155, 157). Defendants deposed each named Plaintiff and opt-in Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs took depositions of Defendants’ owner and CEO, Joshua Bruno, and CFO, Steve Coffman. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel supplemental responses and
production, which was granted. (Rec. docs. 132, 143). On January 5, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to decertify the collective action. (Rec. doc. 142). The parties then both filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. (Rec. docs. 144, 145, 146). On April 4, 2022, the parties prepared and submitted an initial Pretrial Order and, on the same date, the trial was continued. (Rec. doc. 188). On January 10, 2022, the parties held a telephonic settlement conference with the undersigned, but no resolution was reached. (Rec. doc. 148). On February 16, 2023, counsel appeared for a telephonic pretrial conference before Judge Guidry. (Rec. doc. 233).
Following the pretrial conference, the District Court denied both cross-motions for summary judgment and granted the motion for decertification. (Rec. docs. 238, 240). The opt-in Plaintiffs were dismissed without prejudice and the matter was set for trial with the four named Plaintiffs: Brittany Moore, Jada Eugene, Christopher Willridge, and Dmitry Feller. (Rec. doc. 140). Defendants filed a motion to sever the claims into four separate trials, but that motion was ultimately denied. (Rec. doc. 244). On August 9, 2023, the parties appeared for a pretrial conference, and the District
Judge set a trial date for September 18, 2024. (Rec. doc. 247). On September 13, 2024, Defendants sent individual settlement offers to the four named Plaintiffs. On September 14, 2024, counsel for the parties spoke again with the undersigned regarding settlement, and a settlement was reached the next day. (Rec. doc. 268). The parties negotiated a formal written settlement agreement, but settlement payments were not timely made, so Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement. (Rec. doc. 273). The undersigned issued a report and recommendation granting the motion to enforce settlement, which the District Court adopted in a written judgment. (Rec. docs.
285, 287). In line with that judgment, Plaintiffs’ counsel briefIedd. their entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs as prevailing parties in this FLSA action. ( ). This fee application followed, in which Plaintiffs seek $92,212.50 in attorney’s fees and $2,832.25 in costs on behalf of Stiegler Law Firm, L.L.C., and $67,012.50 in attorney’s fees and $3 ,518.11 in costs oIIn. behaLlaf wof aKnedn nAentha lCy.s Biso rdes, Attorney at Law, L.L.C. (Rec. doc. 289 at 1). A. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees and Costs from Defendants
Under the FLSA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs of the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“[t]he court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of thEes pacatrizoan .”v). . K Polsatimntaifyfesr, hCaovninstgr .r, eLa.cLh.Ce.d a settlement agreement, are the prevailing parties. , No. CV 15-4644, 2017 WL 4621107, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2017) (finding plaintiffs who reached a settlement agreement under the FLSA entitled to attorney fees). Plaintiff’s entitlement to fees is undisputed. However, Defendants argue that fees
should not be assessed against Defendant, Bruno, Inc. (Rec. doc. 294 at 10). That issue, the individual liability of each Defendant, is not before the Court in the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. Bruno, Inc.’s liability was set aside for a later date at the time of settlement. (Rec. doc. 296 at 8). Here, the Court will address only the amount of attorney’s fees and costs owB.e d to TPlhaein Ltoifdfse. s tar Approach
The United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have often re.p e aHteedn stlheya t va. Erecqkuerehsat rtfor attorneys’ fees should Anssootc isapteadw Bnu imldaejrosr & aCnocniltlraarcyt olrist iogfa tLiao.n, Inc. v. Orleans
Par. Schoo, l4 6B1d .U.S. 424, 437 (1983); , 919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990). A court’s discretion in fashi.ieoning a reasonable attorney’s fee is broad and reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, ., it will not be reversed unless there is stronHg eenvsildeyence that it is excessivHeo powr oinoadd ve. qSutaattee , oof rT tehxe amount chosen is clearly erroneous. , 461 U.S. at 436-37; ., 236 F.3d 256, 277 n.79 (5th Cir. 2000). To determine a reasonable fee, the Court must provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award, making subsidiary factual determinations
regarding whether the requested hourly rate is reasonable and whether the tasks reported bHye ncsoleuynsel were duplicativeA, susoncnieacteedss Baruyil, doerr s u&n rCeolantterdac ttoor st hoef Lpau.r, pInocs.es of the lawsuit. , 461 U.S. at 437-39; , 919 F.2d at 379. The Fifth Circuit has noted that its “concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that the findings be complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the cBoruarntt lheays v .u Ssuerdl epsroper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.” , 804 F.2d 321, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1986).
In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the Court must first determine the "lodestar" by multiplying the reasonable Sneuem Hbeenrs olefy hours expended anGdre tehne vr.e Aadsomn’rasb olef thhoeu rTluyl arantee Efodru ce.a Fchu npdarticipating attorney. , 461o Uve.Sr.r uatle 4d3 o3n; other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa F, e2 R8a4i lFw.3ayd C6o4. 2v,. W66h1it e(5th Cir. 2002), Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc La. Po,w 5e4r8 & U L.Sig. 5h3t C(2o0. v0.6 K);ellstrom ., 135 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998); , 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995). The lodestar is presumeJodh rnesaosnonable, bu tF ae scsloeurr vt . mPaoyrc tehlaenna e Cnohraonncae Doer 2 dMeecxriecaos, eS .Ait. aDfete Cr .Vconsidering the twelve factors. Combs v. City of Huntington ., 23 F.4th 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing , 829 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2016)). “‘[T]Choem mbsost critical factor’ in determHineninsgle ay reasonable fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’” , 829 F.3d at 394 (quoting , 461 U.S. at 436). The fee applicant bears the burden of proof on the lode Jsothanr soisns ue, but once calculated, thSee ep aFretsys lseereking modificationR iolef yt hve. Cloitdye osft aJar cuknsodner the factors bears the burKdeelnls. t rom , 23 F.4thI na tr e4 1S6m; ith , 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996); 1. , 50 FR.3eda saotn 3a2b4l;e Hourly Ra, 9te9s6 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1992).
“‘[R]easonable’ hourly rates M‘acrCe ltaoin b ve. cLaulfckuilna tIendd uasc.c, oInrcd.ing to the prevailing market rates in the relevBalnutm c ovm. Smteunnsiotyn.’” , 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir.
2011) (quoting , 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). “[T]he burden is on the fee See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc. abrogated on other grounds by 2Blanchard v. Bergeron applicant to produce satisfactory evidence – in addition to the attorney's own affidavits – that the requested rates are in line with those prevailBinlug min the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill.” , 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. “An
attorney's requested hourly rate is prima facie reasonable when [he] requests that the lodestar be computed at [his] ‘customary billing rateW,’ hthitee vra. Itme pise rwiailt Ahidnju tshtme ernatn Cgoer po.f prevailing market rates and the rate is not contested.” La. Power , No. 99-3804, 2005 WL 1578810, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2005) (citing , 50 F.3d at 328). Plaintiffs seek fees on behalf of Charles J. Steigler of Stiegler Law Firm, L.L.C., and Kenneth C. Bordes of Kenneth C. Bordes, Attorney at Law, L.L.C. Both attorneys seek rates of $375.00/hour and, in support, have each attached a declaration explaining why they are
entitled to the requested rate and a memorandum citing to a number of cases in this district. In 2006, Stiegler graduated from the Paul M. Herbert Law Center where he was a member of the Louisiana Law Review and Order of the Coif. He was admitted to the California Bar that same year where he practiced for three years. Then, in 2009, he returned to Louisiana, where he served as law clerk to former Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Jeannette Theriot Knoll. He was admitted to the Louisiana Bar in 2010. In total, Stiegler has 18 years of experience as an attorney. Stiegler is the founding partner of
Stiegler Law Firm, L.L.C., where his practice focuses on employment litigation, as it has throughout his career. (Rec. doc. 289-3 at 1-2); (Rec. doc. 296 at 2-3). Bordes graduated from Loyola College of Law in 2014. He currently has 10 years of experience as an attorney. He is the owner and managing partner of Kenneth C. Bordes, Attorney at Law, L.L.C., where he focuses his practice on labor and employment litigation. He serves several associations and their corresponding labor and employment sections. (Rec. doc. 289-1 at 1-2).
Plaintiffs point to their counsels’ qualifications, Steigler’s 18 yearSse ea nSmd iBtho rvd. eMse’ t1r0o Syeeca.r, sI nocf. ,experience, and case law in support of the hourly rate sought. No. CV 18-953, 2019 WL 3521923 (E.D. La. July 29, 2019) (approvin gR EaCn Mhoaurirnlye rLaotgei sotfic $s,3 L7.5L..0C0. vin. Rainch FaLrSdA case for an attorney with 15 years of experience); , No. CV 19-11149, 2020 WL 1527766 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2020) (granting an hourly rate of $375.00 for a Texas aCttaojrunne Sye rwvist.h U n1l3im yiteeadr,s Lo.Lf. Ce. xvp. eBreienntocne Eprnaecrtgiyc inSge rivn. tChois district in a personal injury case); ., No. CV 17-491, 2020 WL 375596 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2020) (approving
$350.00/hour for an attorney with 11 years of experience in a patent case). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs requested hourly rate is excessive, not market rate, and that $300.00/hour is the appropriate rate. (Rec. doc. 294 at 3). Defendants assert that the cases P SlaeientBifafsd coint e va. reB einrrayp’sp oRseitliea abnled Rpeosionut rtcoe sa, nLu.Lm.Cb.er of decisions to support their position. , No. CV 19-12317, 2022 WL 18671139, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov 17, 2022) (reducing rate of an attornReoyd wneityh v1. 8E lylieoatr sS eocf. Seoxpluetrioiennsc, eL f.Lro.Cm. $350.00/hour to $300.00/hour in an FLSA case); , No. 19-11890, 2020 WL 4756490, at *3-6 (E.D. La. July 30, 2020)
(awarding an attorney with 17 years of experience in an FLSA action a blended rate of $275.00H fuobre rrto vu.t Cinuer rwenork requiring less skill and $325.00 for all other more complex work); , No. 18-7069, 2018 WL 4963595 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2018) (reducing rate of partner with 17 years of experience from $400.00/hour to $300.00/hour as prevailing rate in district). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed rate should be reduced slightly, to
$350.00/hour. Some of the cases cited by PlaintifSf eaereS meiitthhe r outliers or involve facts that are not particularly analogous to the instant case. ,2019 WL 3521923, at *8a (l“btehiet hono utrhley hraigthees r. e. n. fda lol fw thitahti nra tnhgee range of rates allowed by other courts in this district, ) (emphasis added). And although there is a wide range of prevailing market rates in FLSA cases for attorneys with similar experience, the majorityS eoef rBeacdeonnt case law suggests a reasonable rate is lower than that requested by Plaintiffs. , 2022 WL 18671139, at *3 (reducing rate of an atJotonrense vy. Nweitwh O1r8l eyaenasr sR oegf 'el xPpheyrsiiecniacne fHroosmp . $O3r5g0.00/hour to $300.00/hour in an FLSA case);
., No. CV 17-8817, 2019 WL 6770029 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 2019) (reducing rate of aShttaowrn ve.y A wlpihtha 1A3ir y &ea Hrse aotfi nexgp, Ler.Lie.Cnce from $350.00/hour to $300.00/hour in an FLSA case); ., No. CV 22-3953, 2024 WL 1556861, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2024) (reducDinagn roast ve. oPfa antetol rSnpeeyci awliitshts ,1 I3n-c1.4 years of experience from $500.00/hour to $350.00/hour); inter alia , Civ. A. No. 22-14, 2023 WL 6167152, at *2 (E.D. La. July 24, 2023) (approving, , an hourly rate of $350.00 for an attorney with 16 years of experience). Accordingly, the Court will now calculate attorneys’ fees at $350.00/hour2. . Reasonable Hours Expended
The party seeking the fee bears the burden of documenting and supHpeonrstleinyg the reasonableness of all time expenditures for which compensation is sought. , 461 U.S. at 437. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude Id. from fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, and otherwise unnecessary . . .” at 434. Hours thIda.t are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary. The Supreme IdC.o urt calls on fee applicants to make requests that
demonstrate “billing judgment.” The remedy for faiIldin. g to exeWrcaislek e“rb vil.l iCnigty j uodf gMmeseqnut”it ies to exclude hours that were not reasonably Wexapleknedr evd. H. UD at 434; , 313 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting , 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996)) (“If there is no evidence of billing judgment, however, then the proper remedy is not a denial of fees, but a reduction of ‘the hours awarded by a percentage intended to substitute for the exercise of billing juSdegemGerneet’n”) . Alternatively, tChaism Ceoruornt vc. aGnr ecaotnedr uNcetw a Olirnleea-bnys -Fliende. aCnreadlyits iUsn oifo tnhe time report. ,284 F.3d at 662; , Civ. A. No.16-8514, 2017 WL 1426970, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017).
In summary, Defendants argue that a reduction of attorney fees is warranted because, among other reasons, the hours billed were excessive in comparison to the relative simplicity of the case and low degree of actual success attained. Plaintiffs argue that the hours sought are reasonable considering they wrote off time, satisfying their requirement to exercise billing judgment, and that Defendants fought “tooth and nail” the whole litigation, even past settlement, causing Plaintiffs to expend hours. The details of the parties’ argumie. n ts arIen oaudteliqnueadt bee Dloowcu. mentation
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ attorneys are required to highlight when hours have been reduced in the exercise of billing judgment, and that Steigler has done so, but that Bordes failed to do so. (Rec. doc. 294 at 5). “Ideally, billing judgment is reflWechteadle i nC athpe., fee application, showing not only hours claimed, but also hours written off.” L.P. v. Ridgeway Alberti v. Klev, eNnhoa. gCeVn 22-2570, 2024 WL 640026, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2024) (citing , 896 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1990)). “In reviewing attorney’s fees applications, the court mayL arelldau vc.e C oitry eolifm Nienwat Oe rhleoaunrss if the documentation
of those hours is ‘vasgeuee a olsro inHceonmslpeyle,te.’” , 161 F. Supp. 2d 686, 706 (E.D. La. 2001); 461 U.S. at 437 (“Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordinglyL.a”.) .P oTwheer C&o uLrigt hmt aCyo .a lso reduce hours that are too vague to permit meaningful review. , 50 F.3d at 326. ThHe ebnusrldeye,n of proving the exercise of billing judgment is on the party seeking the fee award. 461 U.S. at 437. Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products Co, Inc. In support of their proposition, Defendants cite 448 F.3d 795, 799-800 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming the District Court’s 10% reduction of
the lodestar in that case due to vagueness, duplicative work, and failure to indicate time written off in the timesheet). However, that opinion does not specifically require highlighting reduced hours on a timesheet, but instead eImd.phasizes the requirement of indicating and documenting time that has been written off. Here, Bordes explains in his declaration that he exercised billing judgment by cutting 110.5 hours that were unproductive, arguably clerical, related to tasks of lesser importance, involved unsuccessful motions, and related to opt-in Plaintiffs that were dismissed (Rec. doc 289-5 at 2). Further, he purpIodr.ts to have worked closely with co-counsel to avoid unnecessary duplication of
work. ( ). The depth of Bordes’ description is sufficient, as it does not completely lack in explanatory detail andSe ies cLoemropyl etve. enCiotuy gho ft o Haolluoswto nth eI ,Court a meaningful review of the work performed. 831 F .2d 576, 585–86 (5th Cir.1987) (reducing the fee award where entries “were often ‘scanty,’ some were never Hagan v. MRS Assocs., Inc., kept at all, and many lacked explanatory detail.”); No. 99-3749, 2001 WL 531119, at *4 (E.D. La. May 15, 2001) (finding 10% reduction in total hours in part because time entries did not contain sufficient explanation to allow the court a
meaningful review of the work performed). Considering Bordes’ description of hours written off, the instant case is not one demonstrating inadequate billing judgment for failure to show hours written off, and therefore does not warrant a fee reduction for that reason. ii. Time Spent on Other Claims and Matters
Defendants assert that several specific time entries related to other claims and matters should be deducted from coni.seideration, including: (1) time related to Plaintiffs whose claims were later dismissed ( ., the opt-in Plaintiffs), the collective action, and
decertification efforts, (2) a separate matter filed in state court on behalf of Christopher Willridge, and (3) other matters involving Josh Bruno that are unrelated to the instant case. (Rec. doc. 294 at 5-6). ThWe ahtkoiunrss, that are compensable should be those “reasonably expended on the litigation.” 7 F.3d at 457. An award to a prevailing party requires that any “unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separaHteen lsalweysuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.” , 461 U.S. at 435. However, when claims involving multiple parties share a “common core of facts” or “related legal Itdh.eories,” a fee applicant may claim all hours reasonably necessary to litigate
those issues. at 434-5. In such a case, “the district court should focus on the significance of the overall reliefI do. btained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” at 435. Again, in dIedt.ermining a proper fee award, “the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” at 436. As to the first set of contested time entries, as explained above, the action at issue was initially certified as an FLSA collective action that included several opt-in Plaintiffs, but it was later decertified, and the opt-in plaintiff’s claims were dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiffs do not seek compensation for time devoted exclusively to the opt-in Plaintiffs. However, they do seek compensation for time devoted to overlapping claims of the opt-in and prevailing Plaintiffs. The overlapping time and work spent on the prevailing and opt-in Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily share a common core of facts, as employees must be “similarly situated” for a certified collective action. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216. As to the next relevant inquiry, the degree of success obtained, Plaintiffs were not entirely successful. Although Plaintiffs prevailed, they were unsuccessful in certain aspects of the case, including Stehee Jmohontisoonn fvo. rB dige cLeorttsif iSctaotrieosn, Ianncd., the dismissal without prejudice of
the opt-in Plaintiffs. 639 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (E.D. La. 2009) (considering plaintiffs’ limited success in their aim to certi f y a collective action and their multiple unsuccessful motions in determining a fee award). However, Plaintiffs state that they account for the degree of success obtained by writing off time. (Rec. Doc. 296 at 5). Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc. involves facts similar to the instant case. In that case individual plaintiffs prevailed in a FLSA action following decertification of the coJlolehcntsiovne action and then sought attorney’s fees. 639 F. Supp. 2d at 699. Defendants in
contested fees related to time spent on the collectiIvde. action, work unrelated to the individual plaintiff’s claims, and decertification efforts. at 702-3. The court reduced two attorney’s hours significantly for failing to write off any hours unrelateIdd. to plaintiff’s individual claims outside of work on a failed summary judgment motion. Additionally, the court reduced another attorney’s hours for wIodr.k on the collective action that was not connected to the claims of individual plaintiffs. at 703-4. However, the court did not reduce fees for work performed when the case was still a collective action, so long as that
work contributed to the victory of inIddi.v idual plaintiffs’ claims, including certain work on discovery, research, and depositions. at 703. Here, Plaintiffs wrote off extensive time. However, this Court’s review of the timesheets did reveal a few entries that did not contribute to the claims of the individual Plaintiffs. Two entries related to the conditional certification and one related to communications with an opt-in plaintiff, totaling 3.5 ho)u; rsse,e d Jiodh nnosot ncontribute to the claims of the individual Plaintiffs. (Rec. doc. 289-4 at 5, 10, 15 , 639 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (reducing hours in part for time spent on conditional certification that did not benefit
individual plaintiffs). For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ time should be reduced by 3.5 hours, bringing Stiegler’s total down from 245.9 to 242.4. The second set of contested time entries involve the separate matter filed in state court on behalf of Christopher Willridge, a Plaintiff in the instant case. That matter was based on the same facts underlying this action, and thus, shares a common core of facts. Because that action involved the same parties and the same facts, it was time reasonably expended in the instant litigation. Finally, Defendants appear to contest time expended in relation to Defendant Josh
Bruno’s bankruptcy proceedings. (Rec. doc. 294 at 6). Any objection to inclusion of these hours is without merit – indeed, it ignores the procedural history of this case, including post-settlement litigation occasioned in part by Bruno’s bankruptcy. Even after a settlement was reached in the case, the litigation continued. When Defendants funded some of the Plaintiffs’ settlements but failed to fund two of them (Christopher Willridge and Dmitry Feller), those individuals were forced to file a motion to
enforce the settlement agreement. (Rec. doc. 276). The defendants responded to that motion by agreeing that a judgment should be entered against them, arguing, in part Unfortunately, as counsel for Plaintiffs are well aware, due to circumstances beyond the control of Mr. Bruno, many of his assets and the assets of these related entities, were strongly disrupted by not only Covid, but Hurricane Ida and ultimately the ensuing bankruptcy of the majority of many companies in which he had an interest.
(Rec doc. 281). Considering that Defendants relied on Bruno’s bankruptcy as justification for failing to fund a settlement they had agreed to – and still have not funded today – it would be incongruous to disallow the meager amount of time billed (2.1 hours) in connection with that bankruptciiyi.. Clerical Work Defendants argue that a review of Plaintiffs’ timesheets reveals that “much of their time” was spent on clerical and secretarial costs, including reviewing service and summons on Defendants and filing returned summons. “It is well established that ‘when an attorney performs a task that could beR hicahnadrlde dv .b Syt .c Tlearmicmal asntayf Pf, atrh.e S ohperpioffn’se Dnte psh’to, uld not be charged the attorney's hourly rate.’” Kuperman v. ICF Int'l No. 17-9703, 2022 WL 4534728, at *8 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2022); , No. 08-565, 2009 WL 10737138, at *9 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2009). Tasks that are Ipdu. rely clerical in nature include faxing, mailing, filing, and delivering legal documents. Furthermore, the service of Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc. v. sJeufmfermsoonns is an administrative activity, not “legal work.” , 547 F. Supp. 2d 568, 575 (E.D. La. 2008). In support of their argument, Defendants cite the first three pages of MW Services’
timesheet. However, this Court identified only two time entries that are potentially clerical, totaling 0.4 hours. (Rec. doc. 294) (citing Rec. doc. 289-4 at 1-3). The first page of MW Services’ timesheet includes an entry labeled “attn to service of summons on defendants” and another labeled “file returned summons,” each amounting to 0.2 hours. (Rec. doc. 289 at 1). As stated above, filing is purely clerical, so the entry, “file returned summons,” should not be charged to Defendants. Similarly, the service of summons is administrative, thus clerical, and should not be charged to Defendants. Notably, these two entries total
$150.00, less than one percent of the attorney’s fees that Plaintiffs seek to recover. On its own review of the billing sheets, the Court finds no other billing for clerical tasks. There is no widespread billing for clerical tasks. Accordingly, only the 0.4 hours ideSneetifRieodd naerye disallowed as clerical, bringing Stiegler’s hours down from 240.3 to 239.9. , 2020 WL 4756490, at *11 (reducing Plaisnetei fafsls’ otoPtrailm bei lIlnabs.l Sey hnoduicrast be,y I n1c.3. hours for clerical work performed by plaintiffs’ attorney); 547 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (reducingi cvl. e ricaEl exncetrsiseisv efr oBmill tinheg u ltimate amount to be awarded).
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ time entries, totaling $159,225.00 in fees, amount to excessive billing compared to the degree of success attained, and they note the disproportionality between attorney’s fees sought and Plaintiffs’ settlement. Plaintiffs maintain that they exercised billing judgment by writing off a total of 200.6 hours related to claims exclusive to opt-in Plaintiffs, clerical work, the motion for conditional certification, smaller tasks of lesser importance, unsuccessful motions, and duplicative work. Additionally, Plaintiffs point to Defendants’ earlier opportunities to settle where they
instead chose to continue to litigate. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to excluBdaed ofrno m fee request hours that are excessivHee, nrseldeuyndant, and otherwise unnecessary . . .” , 2022 WL 18671139 at *4 (citing , 461 U.S. at 434). The “Hmeonsstl ecyritical factor” in determining an award of fees is the “degree of success obtained.” , 461 U.S. at 436. “While a low damages award is one factor which the court may consider in set t iBnag dtohne amount of fees, this factor alone shSoinuglder n vo. tC lietayd o tf hWe accoou,r Tt etxo reduce a fee award.” , 2022 WL 18671139 at *6 (citing ., 324 F.3d 813, 830 (5th Cir.
2003)). Finally, the Fifth Circuit has emphasizFedle mthiantg “vt.h Eerlleio itst nSeoc .p Seor lss.e, LrLeCq,uirement of proportionality in an award of attorney fees.” Branch-Hine sN vo.. HCeVb 1er9t- 2348, 2021 WL 4908875, at *15 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2021) (quoting , 939 F.2d 1311, 1322 (5th Cir. 1991)). As noted previously, Plaintiffs here prevailed. However, they were not entirely successful considSeereinJgo htnhseoinr unsuccessful motions and ultimate decertification of the collective action. , 639 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (considering plaintiffs’ limited success in their aim to certify a colBleacdtoivne v.a Bcteirorny 'sa nRdel iathbeleir R mesu., lLti.Lp.lCe. unsuccessful motions in
determining a fee award). In , Plaintiffs won their FLSA jury trial on 20 of the 21 claims asserted, recovered $32,269.60, and sought attorney fees of $241,987.32. 2022 WL 18671139, at *6. In that case, the court found that despite the low damage award in comparison to the fees sought, a reduction of the lodestar was not Id.3 warranted. BHaedroen, Plaintiffs settled for $35,000.00 and seek attorney fees of $159,225.00. The plaintiffs had a higher degree of success than Plaintiffs in the instant case, Bbaudto nPlaintiffs in the instant case seek significantly lower fIede. s than the
attorneys in sought and somewhat less than they were awarded. For these reasons, no deduction of fees for excessive billing in proportion to degree of success is warranted. 3. The Johnson Factors
After calculating the lodJeoshtnasro, nthe court Smeea Jyo hmnsaokne va. nG au. pHwigahrwd ayo rE xdporwesnsw, Ianrcd. adjustment if warranted by tahber ogated o nfa octtohresr. g rounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron , 488 F.2d 714 (5th CJiorh. 1n9so7n4), , 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989). The factors are
(1) time and labor required, (2) novelty and difficulty of the issues, (3) skill required to perform the legal services properly, (4) preclusion of other employment, (5) customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by client or circumstances, (8) amount involved and results obtained, (9) experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) See id. undesirability of the case, (11) nature and length of theL ap. rPoofwesesri o&n Lailg ht Co. relationship with the client, and (12) award in similar cases. at 717-19. The lodestar is presumed to yield a reasonable fee. , F5l0e mF.i3ndg at 324. Additionally, the lodestar Wshaotuklidn sb ve. mFoorddiifcieed only in exceptional cases. , 2021 WL 4908875, at *1 (ci tJionhgn son , 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993)). Lastly, “to the extent that any factors are subsumed in the lodestar, they should not Mbieg irseconsidered when determining whether an adjustment to the lodestar is required.” , 135 F.3d at 1047.
3 Id. Defendants make arguments based on factor eight. However, that factor has been subsumed in the lodestar, as have factors one, three, five, and nine. (Rec. doc. 294 at 9). Factor six, the type of fee, which here is contingent, leans in favor of Plaintiffs, as they have
not yet received any reimbursement for years of work. Factor seven is not applicable here. DIedf.en dants briefly argue that factors two and four support a reduction of the lodestar. ( ). Defendants’ arguments that the issues here were not particularly novel or complex and that this case could not have precluded other employment do not warrant a downwaSrede aBdajduosntm, ent of the lodestar in light of the presumptive reasonableness of the lodestar. 2022 WL 18671139, at *6 (finding downward adjustment of the lodestar unnecessary despite plaintiffs’ experience in FLSA litigation and the arguable preclusion of other employment). No downward adjustment is merited here.
Name Accordingly, the disHtroibuurtsion of fees is as foHlloouwrsl:y rate Amount
Charles J. Stiegler 242 $350.00 $84,700.00 K e n n e t h C . B o r d e s 1 7 8 . 7 T otal Re c o m m e n $d3e5d0 .00 $6124,574,254.050.0 0 $ III. Costs
The Stiegler Law Firm seeks costs in the amount of $2,832.25, which is comprised of
$400.00 in court filing fees, $95.00 in service of process, $64.50 to court reporters for transcripts of court hearings, and $2,272.75 to court reporters for transcripts of the depositions of Joshua Bruno (Defendants’ owner and CEO) and Steve Coffman (Defendants’ CFO). The Law Offices of Kenneth Bordes seeks costs in the amount of $3,518.11, which is comprised of $599.50 for court costs and copying, $225.97 for service, and $2,732.64 in transcript costs. Defendants do not challenge any of the requested costs. The applicable law is that costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as a
matter of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 provides a list of fees that a judge may tax as costs, including: “fees for … transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case” and “fees for … costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the cSahsaew.” Furthermore, filing fees and fees for service of process are generally recoverable. , 2024 WL 1556861 at, *6. The Court will therefore award all costs sought for a total oIVf .$6,35C0o.n36cl iuns cioonsts.
IFTo rI Sth Re EfoCrOeMgoMinEgN rDeaEsDons, GRANTED IN PART that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (rec. doc. 289) be and Plaintiffs be awarded a total of $153,595.36 ($147,245.00 + $6,350.36) in attorneys’ fees aNndO TcoICstEs .O F RIGHT TO OBJECT
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error,
from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the partyD ohuagsl absese vn. Usneritveedd S wtaittehs nAouttioc.e A tshs’ant such consequences will result from a fa ilure to object. , 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 12th November New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2024. ____________________________________________________ MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE