Moore v. Keller

District Court, N.D. New York·Decided November 22, 2021·No. 5:16-cv-01230·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

LISE Y. MOORE, SABRIA MOORE, and JALIA GRAHAM,

Plaintiffs,

-v- 5:16-CV-1230

MICHAEL KELLER, MICHAEL JORGENSEN, and JOSEPH NAPPO,

Defendants.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

SIDNEY P. COMINSKY, LLC SIDNEY P. COMINSKY, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiffs SYLVIA BODE KRAUS, ESQ. 1500 State Tower Building Syracuse, NY 13202

HON. LETITIA JAMES AIMEE COWAN, ESQ. New York State Attorney General Ass’t Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants 300 South State Street, Suite 300 Syracuse, NY 13202

DAVID N. HURD United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION On September 19, 2016, plaintiffs Michael Moore (“Michael”), Lise Y. Moore (“Lise”), Sabria Moore (“Sabria”), and Jalia Graham (“Jalia”) filed this civil rights action in Supreme Court, Onondaga County, against defendants SUNY Upstate University police officers Michael Keller (“Officer Keller”),

Paul Daugherty (“Officer Daugherty”), Michael Jorgensen (“Officer Jorgensen”), Joseph Nappo (“Officer Nappo”), public safety officer Stephen Mauser (“Officer Mauser”), and registered nurse Julie Sunser (“Nurse Sunser”). Dkt. No. 1. According to the complaint, these individuals violated

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law when they forcibly prevented Michael from leaving the hospital and arrested Lise, Sabria, and Jalia. Dkt. No. 2. On October 11, 2016, the defendants removed the case to federal court and answered the complaint.1 Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. After the plaintiffs’ motion to

remand was denied, Moore v. Keller, 2017 WL 3822053 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017), the parties completed discovery and then stipulated to the dismissal of Officer Daugherty, Officer Mauser, and Nurse Sunser. Dkt. Nos. 63, 67, 68. On April 22, 2020, Officer Keller, Officer Jorgensen, and Officer Nappo

(collectively “defendants”) moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 for summary judgment on all of the remaining claims. That motion was granted in part and denied in part on October 29, 2020. Moore v. Keller, 498 F. Supp. 3d 335 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). As relevant here, Lise, Sabria,

and Jalia’s § 1983 false arrest and excessive force claims remained for trial.

1 Officer Mauser answered the complaint at a later time. Dkt. No. 30. A suggestion of death was filed for this defendant on September 16, 2019. Dkt. No. 55. The claims against him were later dismissed by stipulation. Dkt. Nos. 63–64. On April 29, 2021, a jury found that Officer Keller had falsely arrested Jalia and awarded her $30,000 in damages.2 Court’s Ex. No. 6. However, the

jury rejected Lise and Sabria’s § 1983 claims against Officers Nappo and Jorgensen. Court’s Ex. Nos. 4 and 5. Both parties sought post-trial relief, which was denied in all respects on September 7, 2021. Moore v. Keller, 2021 WL 4066541 (N.D.N.Y.).

On October 7, 2021, Jalia (“plaintiff”) moved for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Dkt. No. 145. Defendants opposed the motion in part. Dkt. No. 146. The motion has been fully briefed and will be decided on the basis of the submissions without oral argument.

II. DISCUSSION In her opening brief, plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $158,624.00 plus litigation costs of $10,797.93. Pl.’s Mem., Dkt. No. 145-7 at 13.3 Both of these figures are broken down into line-item detail

in plaintiff’s various supporting submissions. See Exs. A–C to Cominsky Decl., Dkt. Nos. 145-2–145-4. In opposition, defendants acknowledge that plaintiff is entitled to some amount of fees and costs as a result of the jury’s favorable award but argue

2 The jury also found that Officer Keller had used excessive force against Jalia, but it concluded that this force was not the proximate cause of any injury she suffered.

3 Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF. that (1) a reduction of the hourly rates is appropriate; (2) time entries related to defendant Mauser should be struck; and (3) some of plaintiff’s litigation

costs are excessive or otherwise inappropriate. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 146 at 6–15. In reply, plaintiff explains that her counsel “has already excluded much billable time, including multiple client meetings and client telephone

conferences, from the fee request because of the loss of the firm’s calendar prior to 2015.” Pl.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 149 at 4. Plaintiff also opposes a reduction in fees related to defendant Mauser. Id. A. Attorney’s Fees

“A court may award reasonable attorney fees to the ‘prevailing party’ in a § 1983 action.” Brooks v. Roberts, 501 F. Supp. 3d 103, 110 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). “Determining whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate requires a two-step inquiry.” Pino v. Locascio,

101 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1996). First, the party must be a “prevailing party” in order to recover. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 3d at 110. “A party is considered a prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees under § 1988 if the party ‘succeed[ed] on any

significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’” Osterweil v. Bartlett, 92 F. Supp. 3d 14, 23 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (D’Agostino, J.) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992)).4

Second, “the requested fee must also be reasonable.” Pino, 101 F.3d at 237. “To determine a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees, courts use the lodestar method—the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the hours reasonably spent on the case.” Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 3d at 111 (citation

omitted). Under the lodestar approach, the “reasonable hourly rate” is determined by reference to “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany

(“Arbor Hill”), 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2008). As the Second Circuit has explained, “the reasonable, paying client” is one “who wishes to pay the least amount necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Id. To make that determination, courts must consider a number of factors,

including but not limited to: the complexity and difficult of the case, the available expertise and capacity of the client’s other counsel (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case effectively (taking account of the resources being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether an attorney might have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends

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