UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _____________________________________________
ELIZABETH CHARLENE MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v. 1:10-CV-632 (FJS) CHUCK HAGEL, Secretary of Defense,
Defendant. _____________________________________________
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
ROSE LEGAL ADVOCATES DAVID L. ROSE, ESQ. 1900 l Street, NW Suite 610 Washington, D.C. 20036 Attorneys for Plaintiff
OFFICE OF THE UNITED MARINA UTGOFF BRASWELL, AUSA STATES ATTORNEY 555 Fourth Street, NW Room E4818 Washington, D.C. 20530 Attorneys for Defendant
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss some of Plaintiffs' claims and
for summary judgment on the remainder of her claims. See Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiff opposes the
motion. See id. On December 11, 2012, the Court heard oral argument in support of, and in
opposition to, Defendant's motion. At the close of argument, the Court reserved decision on
Defendant's motion. The following is the Court's written resolution of Defendant's motion. II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has worked for Defendant since 1979. She filed an internal EEO class complaint
on July 1, 1993, which Defendant denied on June 11, 1996. Plaintiff, together with four other
African-American employees, filed a Title VII putative class action lawsuit against Defendant in
1999, in which she alleged that Defendant's management was predominantly Caucasian and that
Defendant discriminated against African-American employees with respect to promotions,
training, opportunities, and awards. That lawsuit was settled in 2000.
In the present action, Plaintiff alleges that Thomas Mann, her second level supervisor,
retaliated against her for her prior EEOC activity, i.e., the first law suit, when he did not select
her for a promotion in connection with three Assignment Opportunity Notices ("AON") and
when he did not support her.
Defendant contends that, with respect to two of the three non-selection decisions AON
070080 and AON 070624, Plaintiff failed to contact the EEO Office within forty-five days of not
being selected for those positions. Defendant also states that the same is true of her claim that
Mr. Mann did not support her. Therefore, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss these
claims for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Alternatively, Defendant contends that, with respect to AON 070624 and Plaintiff's claim
that Mr. Mann did not support her, the Court should dismiss these claims because Plaintiff has
not shown an adverse action. Specifically, Defendant notes that Plaintiff never applied for AON
070624; and, therefore, her non-selection could not have been an adverse action against her.
Finally, Defendant contends that he is entitled to summary judgment with respect to all of
Plaintiff's claims. Specifically, he asserts that two of the AONs to which Plaintiff applied were
-2- cancelled without the positions being filled, based on the decision to move the positions to where
there was a greater need. As to the third AON, Plaintiff did not apply and, thus, could not be
considered for selection. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim of retaliation fails
because there is simply too much time between her prior EEO activity and the actions about
which she complains.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary matters
1. Whether the mixed motive theory applies to claims of retaliation under Title VII
Plaintiff's counsel conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), and the district court's thorough analysis of that decision
in Hayes v. Sebelius, 762 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2011), Plaintiff may not rely on a mixed-motive
theory to support her retaliation claim.
2. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that Plaintiff withdrew her claim
regarding AON 070080 during the administrative process and that, therefore, she had not
exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to any retaliation based on that claim.
In addition, the record is clear that Plaintiff never raised the claim that Mr. Mann had not
supported her in her position in the administrative proceedings. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to any retaliation based on that
claim.
-3- B. Summary judgment standard
A court may grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that, under the applicable law, is capable of affecting the
outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue is
genuine where the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party" rather than evidence that is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law." Id. at 248, 252.
C. Plaintiff's claims based on her non-promotion for AON 070624 and AON 071133
To prevail on a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that "'(1) [s]he engaged in protected activity; (2) [s]he was
subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action.'" Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(quoting Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). For purposes of a retaliation
claim, "[a] materially adverse action is one that 'could well dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'" Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S. Ct. 2405,
165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006)) (other citation omitted).
With respect to AON 070624, Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not apply for the
position. Not being selected for a position for which she did not apply cannot be considered an
adverse employment action. Moreover, the selection officer for that position was Gail Betts-
-4- Anderson and the approving officer was Percival Jacobs, neither of whom Plaintiff claims
retaliated against her. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show that there is any causal connection
between her protected activity in the 1990s and the year 2000 and this allegedly adverse
employment action. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation with respect to AON 070624.
Plaintiff's claim based on her non-selection for AON 071133 suffers from the same
deficiencies. Mr.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _____________________________________________
ELIZABETH CHARLENE MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v. 1:10-CV-632 (FJS) CHUCK HAGEL, Secretary of Defense,
Defendant. _____________________________________________
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
ROSE LEGAL ADVOCATES DAVID L. ROSE, ESQ. 1900 l Street, NW Suite 610 Washington, D.C. 20036 Attorneys for Plaintiff
OFFICE OF THE UNITED MARINA UTGOFF BRASWELL, AUSA STATES ATTORNEY 555 Fourth Street, NW Room E4818 Washington, D.C. 20530 Attorneys for Defendant
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss some of Plaintiffs' claims and
for summary judgment on the remainder of her claims. See Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiff opposes the
motion. See id. On December 11, 2012, the Court heard oral argument in support of, and in
opposition to, Defendant's motion. At the close of argument, the Court reserved decision on
Defendant's motion. The following is the Court's written resolution of Defendant's motion. II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has worked for Defendant since 1979. She filed an internal EEO class complaint
on July 1, 1993, which Defendant denied on June 11, 1996. Plaintiff, together with four other
African-American employees, filed a Title VII putative class action lawsuit against Defendant in
1999, in which she alleged that Defendant's management was predominantly Caucasian and that
Defendant discriminated against African-American employees with respect to promotions,
training, opportunities, and awards. That lawsuit was settled in 2000.
In the present action, Plaintiff alleges that Thomas Mann, her second level supervisor,
retaliated against her for her prior EEOC activity, i.e., the first law suit, when he did not select
her for a promotion in connection with three Assignment Opportunity Notices ("AON") and
when he did not support her.
Defendant contends that, with respect to two of the three non-selection decisions AON
070080 and AON 070624, Plaintiff failed to contact the EEO Office within forty-five days of not
being selected for those positions. Defendant also states that the same is true of her claim that
Mr. Mann did not support her. Therefore, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss these
claims for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Alternatively, Defendant contends that, with respect to AON 070624 and Plaintiff's claim
that Mr. Mann did not support her, the Court should dismiss these claims because Plaintiff has
not shown an adverse action. Specifically, Defendant notes that Plaintiff never applied for AON
070624; and, therefore, her non-selection could not have been an adverse action against her.
Finally, Defendant contends that he is entitled to summary judgment with respect to all of
Plaintiff's claims. Specifically, he asserts that two of the AONs to which Plaintiff applied were
-2- cancelled without the positions being filled, based on the decision to move the positions to where
there was a greater need. As to the third AON, Plaintiff did not apply and, thus, could not be
considered for selection. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim of retaliation fails
because there is simply too much time between her prior EEO activity and the actions about
which she complains.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary matters
1. Whether the mixed motive theory applies to claims of retaliation under Title VII
Plaintiff's counsel conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), and the district court's thorough analysis of that decision
in Hayes v. Sebelius, 762 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2011), Plaintiff may not rely on a mixed-motive
theory to support her retaliation claim.
2. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that Plaintiff withdrew her claim
regarding AON 070080 during the administrative process and that, therefore, she had not
exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to any retaliation based on that claim.
In addition, the record is clear that Plaintiff never raised the claim that Mr. Mann had not
supported her in her position in the administrative proceedings. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to any retaliation based on that
claim.
-3- B. Summary judgment standard
A court may grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that, under the applicable law, is capable of affecting the
outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue is
genuine where the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party" rather than evidence that is "so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law." Id. at 248, 252.
C. Plaintiff's claims based on her non-promotion for AON 070624 and AON 071133
To prevail on a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that "'(1) [s]he engaged in protected activity; (2) [s]he was
subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse action.'" Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(quoting Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). For purposes of a retaliation
claim, "[a] materially adverse action is one that 'could well dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'" Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S. Ct. 2405,
165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006)) (other citation omitted).
With respect to AON 070624, Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not apply for the
position. Not being selected for a position for which she did not apply cannot be considered an
adverse employment action. Moreover, the selection officer for that position was Gail Betts-
-4- Anderson and the approving officer was Percival Jacobs, neither of whom Plaintiff claims
retaliated against her. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show that there is any causal connection
between her protected activity in the 1990s and the year 2000 and this allegedly adverse
employment action. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation with respect to AON 070624.
Plaintiff's claim based on her non-selection for AON 071133 suffers from the same
deficiencies. Mr. Mann, who is the only person whom Plaintiff claims retaliated against her, had
nothing to do with this position. He was not the selecting officer and he was not the person who
cancelled this position opening without filling it in October 2007. Plaintiff did not suffer an
adverse employment action because there was no position to be filled. Furthermore, she has
failed to show that there is any causal connection between her protected activity in the 1990s and
her lawsuit which settled in 2000 and this alleged adverse action, which occurred in 2007.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of retaliation based
on AON 071133.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, having reviewed the entire file in this case, the parties' submissions and oral
arguments, and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant's motion to dismiss some of Plaintiff's claims and for summary
judgment on the remainder of her claims is GRANTED; and the Court further
-5- ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant and
close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 24, 2013 Syracuse, New York
-6-