Moore v. Freeman

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: January 13, 2004
• Docket: 01-6536
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Moore v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 01-6372/6536 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0014P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0014p.06 _________________ COUNSEL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ARGUED: Michael A. McMahan, NELSON, McMAHAN FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT & NOBLETT, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Defendants. _________________ Reuben N. Pelot IV, EGERTON, McAFEE, ARMISTEAD & DAVIS, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Plaintiff. ON BRIEF: CHARLES W. MOORE , X Michael A. McMahan, Kenneth O. Fritz, NELSON, Plaintiff-Appellee (01-6372); - McMAHAN & NOBLETT, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for - Defendants. Reuben N. Pelot IV, Ronald T. Hill, EGERTON, Plaintiff-Appellant (01-6536), McAFEE, ARMISTEAD & DAVIS, Knoxville, Tennessee, - Nos. 01-6372/6536 - for Plaintiff. v. > , _________________ - MOSES FREEMAN, in his - OPINION individual and official - _________________ capacities, and THE CITY OF - CHATTANOOGA , - MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. The Defendants-Appellants - defendants, Moses Freeman and the City of Chattanooga, - appeal from a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff, Charles (01-6372); - Moore, back pay and damages for emotional and mental Defendants-Appellees - distress, based on his claim of retaliation under the Fair Labor (01-6536). - Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 – 219 (FLSA). The - defendants claim (1) that there was insufficient evidence to - support the jury’s finding that they retaliated against Moore, N (2) that damages for emotional and mental distress are not Appeal from the United States District Court recoverable under the applicable provision of the FLSA, and for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga. (3) that the verdict was excessive. Because we conclude that No. 00-00072—R. Allan Edgar, Chief District Judge. the evidence of retaliation was sufficient to support the verdict and that damages for emotional and mental distress Argued: October 21, 2003 were properly recovered under the Act, we affirm the district court’s judgment sustaining the jury verdict in the plaintiff’s Decided and Filed: January 13, 2003 favor.

Before: KEITH, DAUGHTREY, and GILMAN, Circuit On cross-appeal, the plaintiff contends that the district court Judges. erred in reducing his request for attorney’s fees by five-sixths on the theory that he had prevailed on only one of his six

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claims. This use of a mathematical formula constituted an allegations. Thomas did so but concluded to his own abuse of discretion under existing Sixth Circuit precedent and satisfaction that the work environment was not hostile. will require a remand for correction. The plaintiff also contends that the damages should be doubled as liquidated According to Freeman, by April 1998 the office was in damages, but we conclude that this issue is not properly such turmoil that he felt compelled to take some action to before us on appeal. regain control. Concluding that the problems had begun about the time that Moore, Hutson, and Sheats had started I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND working in the housing department, Freeman decided to fire all three of them. Before he could carry out this plan, Plaintiff Charles Moore was hired by the City of however, Hutson told Freeman she was quitting, and Freeman Chattanooga in October 1997 as a code inspector in the city’s placed her on two weeks paid administrative leave. He later housing division. His initial annual salary, and that of Joseph testified that he took this action because he wanted to Sheats, who started in the same position on the same day as terminate all three employees collectively and because he was Moore, was $20,777. Also hired as a code inspector on that worried Hutson was “building a case against the city.” day was Mary Hutson, at a starting salary of $26,751. Hutson Around the same time, Freeman directed Thomas to extend is a white woman; Moore and Sheats are both black men. The the probationary periods for Moore, Sheats, and Hutson an defendant, Moses Freemen, who was the department’s additional 90 days beyond the normal six-month period administrator at the time the three new hires began, claimed imposed on new employees. Freeman apparently accepted that Hutson was paid more because of her prior work Hutson’s resignation on April 28, 1998. Two days later, he experience and training and because she had turned down the fired Moore, who then remained unemployed for job at the original salary. On the other hand, plaintiff Moore approximately four months before securing a new, better- later testified that when he asked whether the salary was paying job. negotiable, he was told it was not. At trial, Moore testified that the experience of being fired Several months later, when Moore learned of the disparity was “demoralizing,” like being “slapped in the face.” He said between his and Hutson’s salaries, he raised the issue with that he had worried about paying the family’s bills and that he Freeman at a February 1998 staff meeting and was told by lost his health insurance and had to pull his children out of Freeman that he would work to get Moore’s salary raised. their soccer league because he feared that they might get Before that meeting, Hutson had complained to Freeman that injured at a time when he had no insurance coverage. He also she was being mistreated by some of her co-workers. She testified that the stress of having lost his job affected his complained again after the meeting and also reported to her relationship with his children – one of whom drew a picture direct supervisor, Dan Thomas, that she felt that other people of him as a monster – and with his wife. Moore’s wife in the office resented her and that she was caught in a hostile testified that Moore had trouble sleeping during the period he work environment. In particular, she complained of some was between jobs, and a friend of his testified that Moore interactions she had had with some of her black co-workers, became short-tempered, lost his appetite, and began having including both Moore and Sheats, that she felt were negative. neck pains. Thomas reported the latter conversation to Freeman, who directed Thomas to conduct an investigation into Hutson’s Moore and Sheats had originally filed a joint complaint in federal court against the City of Chattanooga and several city Nos. 01-6372/6536 Moore v. Freeman, et al. 5 6 Moore v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 01-6372/6536

officials under the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. therefore awarded Moore one-sixth of the attorney’s fees and § 206(d), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. costs he had requested, on the theory that he had prevailed on § 2000e – 2000e-17, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, only one of the six claims he brought in the original Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101 – 1004. However, Sheats complaint. The defendants have appealed the jury verdict and entered a voluntary dismissal, and Moore proceeded to trial the damage award approved by the district court. The alone. At its conclusion, the district court granted the plaintiff has cross-appealed the calculation of attorney’s fees defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law in part, and costs. and the only claims that went to the jury were Moore’s claims against Freeman in his official capacity and against the City II. DISCUSSION under the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act for sex discrimination. The jury found A. Sufficiency of the Evidence that defendants did not violate the Equal Pay Act or discriminate against Moore based on sex. It did find, The defendants assert that the plaintiff did not sufficiently however, that the defendants violated the FLSA by prove that he engaged in statutorily-protected activity, that his discharging Moore in retaliation for his complaints about dismissal was related to the protected activity, or that the unequal pay and awarded him $10,232 in back pay and defendants’ proffered reason why the plaintiff was dismissed $40,000 for mental and emotional distress. was pretextual, addressing each of these contentions under the burden-shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. The City then filed a motion for remittitur on the back pay v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and urging that we find that award and asked that the remainder of the award be set aside, the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of contending that mental and emotional damages are not retaliation. We have held, however, that “after a trial on the authorized by the FLSA. Moore filed a request for attorney’s merits, a reviewing court should not focus on the elements of fees and costs and moved to alter or amend judgment by the prima facie case but should assess the ultimate question of doubling the compensatory damages as liquidated damages. discrimination.” Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d The district court reduced the back-pay award to $7,200 but 806, 821 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing EEOC v Avery Dennison denied the rest of the defendants’ motion, holding that Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 862 (6th Cir. 1997)). We have, damages for mental and emotional distress due to retaliation nevertheless, recognized that whether the plaintiff made out can be recovered under the FLSA and finding that the damage a prima facie case may be “relevant to our review of that award of $40,000 was not excessive. The court also denied ultimate question.” Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Moore’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, noting that Inc., 263 F.3d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 2001). an award of damages to employees who suffered from retaliation was compensatory in nature and that liquidated Moore was clearly engaged in statutorily-protected activity, damages would not further this purpose. Finally, the court given the fact that the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA reserved ruling on the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees can be triggered by informal complaints, see EEOC v. Romeo and asked for further documentation, specifically on the Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992), and that amount of time spent on legal issues and whether the work the defendants do not dispute that Moore protested to was expended on behalf of Moore or Sheats. Moore Freeman about his unequal pay. Although the defendants submitted more information, but the district court found that continue to argue that the issue of Moore’s pay was resolved it was still not sufficiently specific. The district judge by the time Moore was fired, that argument goes to whether Nos. 01-6372/6536 Moore v. Freeman, et al. 7 8 Moore v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 01-6372/6536

the complaint was the cause of the termination, not to whether The question here is whether this broad provision, which was it was statutorily protected. added to the FLSA in 1977, see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, §10, 91 Stat. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Moore, 1245, 1252, allows for damages for mental and emotional we conclude that a jury could reasonably have found that he distress. We conclude that it does. was discharged in retaliation for his complaints. Moore was fired less than three months after protesting his unequal pay Although the provision does not explicitly allow damages in spite of the fact that his immediate supervisor found him for emotional injuries, a plain reading of the text of the competent at his job and opposed his dismissal. The jury may provision indicates that it does not limit the type of damages have interpreted Freeman’s calling Moore “incorrigible” at that are available. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in trial, as well as testimony that Freeman asked police to be on Travis v. Gary Community Health Center, Inc., 921 F.2d 108, standby when he fired Moore, to mean that he thought Moore 112 (7th Cir. 1990), “the 1977 amendment does away with was a troublemaker due to his complaints about his unequal the old limitations without establishing new ones.” It allows pay. The jury may also have found Freeman’s explanation any legal or equitable relief that is appropriate to further the that he intended to fire Moore, Sheats, and Hutson purposes of § 215(a)(3), one of which is to ensure that collectively to be pretextual, based on evidence that Freeman employees feel free to report grievances under the FLSA. See had placed Hutson on paid leave when she first tried to resign Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 and that Hutson had complained about a number of (1960) (“Plainly, effective enforcement could . . . only be employees besides Moore and Sheats, yet those other expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their employees were not terminated. In short, although the grievances. This [is the end that] the prohibition of evidence to support the jury’s verdict was not overwhelming, [§215)a)(3)] against discharges and other discriminatory we cannot say that it was legally insufficient. practices was designed to serve.”). The statutory scheme contemplates compensation in full for any retaliation B. The Availability of Damages for Mental and employees suffer from reporting grievances, and there is no Emotional Distress indication that it would not include compensation for demonstrable emotional injuries, as well as economic ones. Damages for violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA are controlled by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which The delineation within § 216(b) of potential forms of relief provides in pertinent part: that are compensatory – “employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost” – further supports Any employer who violates the provisions of section the conclusion that “the evident purpose of section 216(b) is 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or compensation.” Snapp v. Unltd. Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the 928, 934 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 975 (2001); purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including see also Lanza v. Sugarland Run Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 97 without limitation employment, reinstatement, F.Supp.2d 737, 740 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“This scheme makes promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an clear that § 216(b) is designed to compensate the aggrieved additional equal amount as liquidated damages. employee . . . .”). The defendants contend that damages for emotional distress are not similar in type to the listed forms of relief and argue that under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, Nos. 01-6372/6536 Moore v. Freeman, et al. 9 10 Moore v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 01-6372/6536

such damages should not be found to be recoverable under There is no claim here that the verdict resulted from § 216(b). However, like the forms of relief mentioned, passion, bias, or prejudice. The question thus becomes damages for mental anguish are intended to compensate the whether the verdict was so clearly excessive as to ”shock the injured party for harm suffered. judicial conscience.” Though the award could be reasonably described as fulsome, we cannot say that it is clearly As noted by the Seventh Circuit, which is the only other excessive. The plaintiff in this case submitted evidence that circuit to address at length the question of whether the the stress of losing his job demoralized him, strained his provision of §216(b) at issue here provides for damages for relationships with his wife and children, and negatively emotional distress, the provision allows for “appropriate” affected his sleeping habits and appetite. relief, and “compensation for emotional distress . . . [is] appropriate for intentional torts such as retaliatory discharge.” D. Liquidated Damages Travis, 921 F.2d at 112. In addition, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have allowed damages for emotional distress The plaintiff claims that the plain language of § 216(b) to stand without directly addressing the issue. See Broadus requires that he be awarded an equal additional amount over v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 238 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2001); and above his back pay and compensatory damages as Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999). liquidated damages. He thus asks the court to reverse the Although the circuits are divided on the question of whether district court’s order on liquidated damages and amend the the statute permits punitive damages, compare Travis , 921 judgment as a matter of law to award him $94,400 rather than F.2d at 111-12, with Snapp, 208 F.3d at 934, consensus on the $47,200. The defendants, on the other hand, argue that, at issue of compensatory damages for mental and emotional most, the plaintiff would be entitled to liquidated damages distress seems to be developing. We now join our sister only on the back pay award, since the doubling of any award circuits in finding that the damages awarded by the jury in for mental and emotional injuries would be punitive and this case fall within the ambit of § 216(b). contrary to the purpose of the FLSA.

C. The Size of the Jury’s Award for Mental and We conclude that this issue is not properly before this Emotional Distress court. Moore’s notice of appeal indicates that Moore is appealing from the order of the district court entered on The district court upheld the jury’s award of $40,000 for November 9, 2001. The sole issue considered in that order mental and emotional distress, a ruling that we review for was the amount of attorney’s fees Moore was to be awarded. abuse of discretion. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F3d. 868, 880 The issue of whether Moore was entitled to liquidated (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn., 220 damages was decided in a previous order, dated September F.3d 433, 443) (6th Cir. 2000)). “A trial court is within its 25, 2001. Although the defendants appealed from that order, discretion in remitting a verdict only when, after reviewing all Moore did not and, under well-settled precedent, he is barred evidence in the light most favorable to the awardee, it is from now raising this issue: convinced that the verdict is clearly excessive, resulted from passion, bias or prejudice; or is so excessive or inadequate as A party who does not appeal from a final decree of the to shock the judicial conscience of the court.” Sallier, 343 trial court . . . may not attack the decree with a view F.3d at 880, (quoting Gregory, 220 F.3d at 443). either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary, whether what he Nos. 01-6372/6536 Moore v. Freeman, et al. 11 12 Moore v. Freeman, et al. Nos. 01-6372/6536

seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the decree U.S. 424 (1983). First, it is necessary to see whether the with respect to a matter not dealt with below. But it is claims on which the plaintiff won and the claims on which the likewise settled that the appellee may, without taking a plaintiff lost are related. If they employ “a common core of cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter facts or [are] based on related legal theories,” id. at 435, the appearing in the record, although his argument may court should consider “the significance of the overall relief involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it. expended on the litigation.” Id. The Supreme Court noted that there was no “precise formula” for determining a United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 reasonable fee, id. at 436-37, and stressed the district court’s (1924); see also El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 discretion in this area, id. at 437, but it specifically rejected a U.S. 473, 479-80 (1999) (citing to Am. Ry. Express and “mathematical approach” that compared the number of issues discussing whether cross-appeal requirement is on which the plaintiff prevailed to the total number of issues jurisdictional). As we have previously put it, an appellee may in the case, finding that such an approach was not helpful in raise issues as a “shield” but not as a “sword.” Dole v. Briggs setting a reasonable fee. Id. at 435 n.11. The Court noted Constr. Co., Inc., 942 F.2d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1991). that litigants often raise alternative grounds and that rejection of some of those grounds should not lead to a reduced fee if E. Attorney’s Fees the plaintiff has been successful. Id. at 435. The Sixth Circuit has followed suit in finding that attorney’s fees should We review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees for not be reduced by the ratio of successful claims to claims abuse of discretion. See Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, overall. See Phelan, 8 F.3d at 374 (6th Cir. 1994). 1134 (6th Cir. 1994). An abuse of discretion can be found when the lower court “relies on clearly erroneous findings of Under the Hensley analysis, the attorney seeking fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an compensation retains the burden of documenting the number erroneous legal standard” or “when the reviewing court is of hours spent on the case and of maintaining records in a firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Adcock- way that would allow a court to determine how much time Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 348-49 (6th Cir. was spent on each claim. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. At 2000) (quoting Phelan v Bell, 8 F3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. the same time, the district court is required to give a clear 1993)). Attorney’s fees must be set in amount that is explanation of the fee award. See id; see also Wooldridge v. “reasonable,” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and in recent times the Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990) starting point has been a “lodestar” calculation – the product (“A district court should state with some particularity which of the number of hours reasonably spent on the case by an of the claimed hours the court is rejecting, which it is attorney times a reasonable hourly rate. See Adcock-Ladd, accepting, and why.”). 227 F.3d at 349. That amount may then be adjusted upwards or downwards, as the district court finds necessary under the In this case, the district court did not believe the plaintiff circumstances of the particular case. had adequately separated work conducted on successful claims from work conducted on unsuccessful claims. The Supreme Court has given guidance on the extent to However, the district court did not provide a clear explanation which a fee should be adjusted when a plaintiff wins on some of the hours it excluded because the plaintiff did not specify claims and loses on others. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 the claims to which they related. Instead, it simply reduced Nos. 01-6372/6536 Moore v. Freeman, et al. 13

the amount of attorney’s fees Moore requested by five-sixths, without considering the extent to which the claims were interrelated or discussing how successful Moore was in the context of the case overall. In doing so, the district court abused its discretion. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment awarding plaintiff back pay and damages for mental and emotional distress, but VACATE the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and REMAND the case for a redetermination on this issue.