Moore v. Cleveland Ry. Co.

108 F.2d 656, 24 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 74, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4108
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 11, 1940
Docket8022
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 108 F.2d 656 (Moore v. Cleveland Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 108 F.2d 656, 24 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 74, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4108 (6th Cir. 1940).

Opinion

SIMONS, Circuit Judge.

Involved in this appeal is the question of interest upon deficiencies in income taxes collected under the authority of § 292, Revenue Act of 1928, 26 U.S.C.A. § 292 notwithstanding a waiver of restrictions permitted by § 272(d), 26 U.S.C.A. § 272(d). The taxpayer paid the full amount of the deficiencies assessed for the years 1922, 1924, 1925 and 1927, including *658 interest from the due date of the taxes to the date of payment. Following denial of a timely application for refund, it brought suit for refund in the District Court. Upon trial, a jury having been waived in writing, the taxpayer had judgment for all interest paid for the period subsequent to the 30th day following the delivery of its waiver to the Revenue Agent. The Collector appeals.

The questions submitted to us are two. The first is whether restrictions upon the Commissioner’s assessment and collection of deficiencies provided by § 272(a) of the Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 272 note, may effectively be waived by the taxpayer in advance of the Commissioner’s determination of its liability, and the second is whether the delivery of a waiver to a Revenue Agent is a filing thereof with the Commissioner.

'In June, 1930, an Internal Revenue Agent audited the taxpayer’s returns for the years 1922 to 1928, inclusive, and submitted to it a report which proposed deficiencies in certain years and overassessments in others, the total of the deficiencies being approximately $329,000, and the over-assessments approximately $174,000. The taxpayer was satisfied with the audit and desired to settle the deficiencies so as to stop accumulation of interest. It was advised to execute a waiver form 874, which the agent had ready for signature, and did so on June 11, 1930. On June 26 the Revenue Agent’s report and the waiver were transmitted by the Internal Revenue Agent in charge, to the Commissioner, by whom they were received on June 30.

By form 874 the taxpayer waived the right to file a petition with the United States Board of Tax Appeals, consented to the assessment and collection of a deficiency for the years 1922, 1924, 1925 and 1927, aggregating $329,000, and accepted as correct the overassessment indicated for the years 1926 and 1928 by the Internal Revenue Agent in charge at Cleveland. There was notation upon the waiver that it did not extend the Statute of Limitations for the refund or assessment of the tax, and was not an agreement as provided by § 1106 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 113, but that its execution and filing at the Revenue Agent’s office at .Cleveland, would expedite the adjustment of income tax liability.

The Commissioner, notwithstanding the taxpayer’s approval of the audit, and its consent to the assessment and collection of the deficiencies, advised the taxpayer by letter of October 14, 1930, that he had increased the deficiencies to $547,000 and reduced the overassessments to $44,000. With this letter was sent a new form of waiver which the taxpayer did not execute. On December 19, 1930, the Commissioner issued a 60 day letter notifying the taxpayer that deficiencies and overassessments had been determined as outlined in the letter of October 14, and again enclosing a waiver form which the 'taxpayer likewise failed to execute. Subsequently, the taxpayer filed its petition with the United States Board of Tax Appeals to review the determination by the Commissioner of increased deficiencies, and seeking adjustment of its tax liability as found by the audit of the Revenue Agent, to which it had consented. Subsequently, conferences between the taxpayer and the Commissioner resulted in the latter abandoning his claim of increased deficiencies, a reduction of the deficiencies reported by the Revenue Agent, and a stipulation adopted by the Board as its final order setting forth the taxpayer’s tax liability for the years involved at approximately $250,000. Deficiencies in this sum were assessed by the Commissioner in 1936 with interest from the due date of the tax for each year to February 28, and the total was collected on March 17, 1936.

To collect deficiencies under the terms of § 272(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, involves the sending of a notice to the taxpayer who may, within 60 days after its mailing, file a petition with the Board of Tax Appeals for a redetermination. Meanwhile, no assessment, distraint or proceeding in court for collection may be made, begun or prosecuted until the expiration of the 60 day period, or, 'if a petition has been filed with the Board, until the decision of the Board has become final.

Section 272(d) of the Act permits the taxpayer to waive the restrictions imposed by § 272(a), and reads: "Waiver of restrictions. The taxpayer shall at any time have the right, by a signed notice in writing filed with the Commissioner, to waive the restrictions provided in subsection (a) of this section on the assessment and collection of the whole or any part of the deficiency.”

The computation and collection of interest upon deficiencies is governed by § 292 of the Act, which reads: “Interest upon the amount determined as a deficiency shall be assessed at the same time *659 as the deficiency, shall be paid upon notice and demand from the collector, and shall be collected as a part of the tax, at the rate of 6 per -centum per annum from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax * * * to the date the deficiency is assessed, or, in the case of a waiver under section 272(d), to the thirtieth day after the filing of such waiver or to the date the deficiency is assessed whichever is the earlier.”

In the interpretation and application of the foregoing sections, the Collector contends that there can be no effective waiver to stop the running of interest upon a tax liability until the deficiency • is determined by the Commissioner; that a waiver taken by the Revenue Agent upon deficiencies proposed by him is merely a tender by the taxpayer conditioned upon the acceptance of the Agent’s audit by the Commissioner; that in any event the taxpayer, by filing its petition to the Board of Tax Appeals, rescinded its waiver, which was thereafter of no avail to it in stopping the running of interest. This view was apparently accepted by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Mutual Lumber Company v. Poe, 66 F.2d 904, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 706, 54 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed. 606, although the question there decided related to the running of the Statute of Limitations. The decision was on the ground that since there can be no review of a deficiency by the Board of Tax Appeals until there has been a determination by the Commissioner, there can be no effective waiver until such determination, and the provisional report of the Revenue Agent cannot be made the basis of an appeal. A purported waiver filed with the Commissioner before the latter had found deficiency, was premature, and powerless to prevent the Commissioner’s resort to a deficiency letter by which alone the running of the Statute is suspended. This case was followed and approved by the same court in McCarthy Co. v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 80 F.2d 618, and in East Bay Water Co. v. McLaughlin, D.C., 24 F.Supp. 222, District Judge Lindley was compelled to apply the rule of the Circuit while sitting by designation as District Judge in the Northern District of California in 1938.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
108 F.2d 656, 24 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 74, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-cleveland-ry-co-ca6-1940.