Montes v. Miller

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 21, 2024·No. 7:24-cv-04141·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK GERMAINE MONTES, Plaintiff, 7:24-CV-4141 (CS) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE MARK MILLER (SUPERINTENDENT), et al., Defendants. CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Germaine Montes, who is appearing pro se and is currently incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility (“GHCF”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. Plaintiff sues GHCF Superintendent Mark Miller, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), as well as other defendants, including “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants, and other unidentified defendants, alleged to be employed at the GHCF. By order dated July 12, 2024, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against DOCCS; (2) directs the Clerk of Court to add as defendants to the caption of this action those individuals whom Plaintiff refers to as unidentified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants but identifies them by name and/or position; (3) directs service on all of the individual identified defendants; and (4) directs the Attorney General of the State of New York to provide the Court and Plaintiff with the identities (and, if appropriate,

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). shield numbers) as well as service addresses of those defendants who are not otherwise identified. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). DISCUSSION A. Claims against DOCCS The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 against DOCCS. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogate[d] the states’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity. . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, second alteration in original). “[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). Congress has not abrogated the States’ immunity for claims under Section 1983, see Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990), and the State of New York has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court, see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). DOCCS is an agency of the State of New York; it is, thus, an arm of that State and enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity. E.g., Gibson v. Pasta City, No. 1:23-CV-9112 (LTS), 2023 WL 8188431, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2023).

The Eleventh Amendment therefore precludes Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 against DOCCS. Accordingly, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 against DOCCS under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a defendant that is immune from such relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless New York waived its immunity, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”); Atl. Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Although the parties do not address the Eleventh Amendment in their briefs, we raise it sua sponte because it affects our subject matter jurisdiction.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2(B)(iii).

B. Identified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 21”), the Court, on its own motion, “may[,] at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; see Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 118 F. Supp. 3d 591, 618-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Rule 21 “afford[s] courts discretion to shape litigation in the interests of efficiency and justice.”). Under this rule, courts have added an individual as a defendant in an action, though that individual is not named as a defendant in the complaint, because he or she is mentioned “throughout the body of the [c]omplaint” as involved in the underlying alleged events. George v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 20-CV-1723 (KMK), 2020 WL 1922691, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020); see Adams v. NYC Dep’t of Corrs., No. 19-CV-5909 (VSB), 2019 WL 2544249, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2019). Plaintiff refers to many of the individual defendants, in the caption of his complaint, as unidentified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” GHCF staff members, but then identifies them by name and/or position within the text of the complaint; they include: (1) “PH Ashonda”; (2) the GHCF

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
465 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Green v. Mansour
474 U.S. 64 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Close v. New York
125 F.3d 31 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.
118 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)