Monroe Jones v. Adult Parole Operation, Sacramento California

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 5:25-cv-04778
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MONROE JONES, Case No. 25-cv-04778-EKL

8 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS 9 v. MOOT, DISMISSING PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK 10 ADULT PAROLE OPERATION, OF EXHAUSTION SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA, Re: ECF No. 2 11 Respondent.

12 13 Petitioner Monroe Jones, a California parolee, filed the instant pro se petition for writ of 14 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the requirement that he wear an ankle monitor 15 as a condition of his parole. His petition for writ of habeas corpus is now before the Court for 16 review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 17 United States District Courts. Jones also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in 18 lieu of prepayment of the filing fee, which the Court DENIES as moot given the Court’s 19 determination that this matter must be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of 20 exhaustion. See ECF No. 2. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Jones appears to allege that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s 23 Adult Parole Operations Division unlawfully ordered him to wear an ankle monitor due to two 24 misdemeanor offenses, violating Jones’ due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment 25 rights, as well as the prohibition against double jeopardy. ECF No. 1 at 18. 26 Jones states that he finished his full sentence and parole in 2013 for a “290 sex offense,”1 27 1 and that he wore an ankle monitor as a parole condition for that offense. Id.; see also Cal. Pen. 2 Code § 290 et seq. (entitled “the Sex Offender Registration Act”). He does not appear to 3 challenge this condition of parole. Rather, Jones alleges that after he was discharged from his 4 parole for the sex offense in 2013, he was arrested and convicted, this time for possession of a 5 controlled substance and for “manuf/poss/sell billy/blackjack.” Id. at 1. Jones further alleges that 6 he was forced to wear an ankle monitor as a parole condition for these offenses, even though they 7 are not subject to Section 290’s requirements. Id. at 2. He states that he pleaded not guilty to 8 tampering with his monitor by allowing it to die because the ankle monitor was “totally illegal,” 9 yet he was found guilty of tampering. Id. 10 The petition does not clarify the length of Jones’ parole term. 11 II. ANALYSIS 12 A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person 13 in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 14 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The 15 court shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ 16 should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained 17 is not entitled thereto.” Id. § 2243. If it appears plainly from the petition that the petitioner is not 18 entitled to relief, the court must summarily dismiss the petition without ordering a responsive 19 pleading. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 20 Even assuming that Jones remains on parole and that his allegations are cognizable habeas 21 claims, the face of the petition shows that the claims are entirely unexhausted. See ECF No. 1 at 22 6-13. In his petition, Jones states that he has not sought appellate or post-conviction relief in any 23 court except this Court. See ECF No. 1 at 6 (answering “no” to form question asking whether 24 Jones raised the issue(s) he is raising in a “post-conviction motion or petition for [writ of] habeas 25 corpus in state court,” and handwriting “only this court” next to his answer); see id. at 7 (stating 26 only that Jones filed a direct appeal to the “Board of Prison Term. Parole Operation” in response 27 to question as to whether he has used any other procedures to exhaust state remedies); see id. at 1 had any proceedings before that court since 1999.2 2 Prisoners in state custody who wish to collaterally challenge either the fact or length of 3 their confinement are required to first exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or 4 through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair 5 opportunity to rule on the merits of the claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 6 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). The exhaustion doctrine “reflects a policy of federal-state comity . . . to 7 give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ 8 federal rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citations and quotation marks 9 omitted). If it is clear from the face of the petition that the claims are unexhausted, a federal court 10 may raise the issue of non-exhaustion sua sponte and summarily dismiss the petition. See Boyd v. 11 Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1998). 12 Additionally, a fully unexhausted federal habeas petition may not be stayed and must be 13 dismissed. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Once a district 14 court determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire 15 further as to the petitioner’s intentions [. . . . and] may simply dismiss the habeas petition for 16 failure to exhaust.”); Jones v. McDaniel, 320 Fed. Appx. 784, 786 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming the 17 dismissal of a fully unexhausted petition and denial of a stay, because a “[Rhines v. Weber, 544 18 U.S. 269 (2005)] stay is only available for a mixed habeas petition where at least some of the 19 claims have been exhausted, and none of [the petitioner’s] claims were exhausted”). 20 III. CONCLUSION 21 The Court orders as follows: 22 1. Jones’ application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot. 23 2. As the face of the petition shows that none of Jones’ claims have been exhausted, 24 the Court DISMISSES the petition without prejudice to Jones re-filing it once his 25 2 The Court takes judicial notice of the California Supreme Court’s electronic appellate court 26 docket for “Monroe Jones.” See California Appellate Courts Case Information, https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/searchResults.cfm?dist=0&search=party (last 27 accessed December 31, 2025); see also Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 1 claims have been exhausted in state court. 2 3. Furthermore, as the question of whether the petition is unexhausted is not 3 reasonably debatable, the Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. See 4 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (in order to 5 obtain a Certificate of Appealability, a petitioner must show: (1) that jurists of 6 reason would find it debatable whether the petition stated a valid claim of a denial 7 of a constitutional right; and (2) that jurists of reason would find it debatable 8 whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.) 9 4. The Clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: January 5, 2026 12

13 4 umi K. Lee United States District Judge 15 16

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