Mondrian v. Trius Trucking, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMarch 11, 2022
Docket1:19-cv-00884
StatusUnknown

This text of Mondrian v. Trius Trucking, Inc. (Mondrian v. Trius Trucking, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mondrian v. Trius Trucking, Inc., (E.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AUGUSTUS MONDRIAN, et al., No. 1:19-cv-00884-DAD-SKO 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DIRECTING THE FILING OF SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 14 TRIUS TRUCKING, INC., (Doc. No. 18) 15 Defendant.

16 17 This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of a class 18 action settlement and conditional certification of a settlement class filed on November 13, 2020.1 19 (Doc. No. 18.) 20 In conducting its review of the pending motion, the undersigned has identified numerous 21 potential deficiencies with the parties’ settlement agreement and the pending motion, thereby 22

23 1 The undersigned apologizes for the excessive delay in the issuance of this order. This court’s overwhelming caseload has been well publicized and the long-standing lack of judicial resources 24 in this district long-ago reached crisis proportion. That situation has now been partially addressed by the U.S. Senate’s confirmation of a new district judge for this court on December 17, 2021. 25 Nonetheless, for over twenty-two months the undersigned was left presiding over approximately 1,300 civil cases and criminal matters involving 735 defendants. Unfortunately, that situation 26 sometimes results in the court not being able to issue orders in submitted civil matters within an 27 acceptable period of time and that remains the case as the undersigned works through the predictable resulting backlog. This has been frustrating to the court, which fully realizes how 28 incredibly frustrating it is to the parties and their counsel. 1 necessitating this order requiring the parties to provide the court with supplemental briefing. The 2 court briefly summarizes the relevant facts below. 3 On May 10, 2016, plaintiff Mondrian, on behalf of himself and all others similarly 4 situated, commenced this wage-and-hour class action against defendant Trius Trucking, Inc. in 5 the Fresno County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2.) On January 5, 2017, plaintiff Mondrian, 6 joined by plaintiff Jones, filed a first amended complaint in that court. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 45.) On 7 March 27, 2017, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, and on May 29, 2019, plaintiffs 8 filed a third amended complaint in state court. (Doc. Nos. 1-3 at 45; 1-5 at 4.) Plaintiffs’ third 9 amended complaint asserts wage, hour, and other labor-related claims in violation of the 10 California Labor Code, California Business and Professions Code, and federal Fair Labor 11 Standards Act (“FLSA”), which plaintiffs claim give rise to penalties under California’s Private 12 Attorney’s General Act (“PAGA”). (Doc. No. 1-5 at 4.) 13 On June 27, 2019, defendant filed a notice of removal in this court on the basis of federal 14 question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to plaintiffs’ FLSA claim and supplemental 15 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) as to plaintiffs’ state law claims. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) 16 On November 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed the pending motion for conditional certification 17 and preliminary approval of the class action settlement, which does not explicitly seek conditional 18 certification and preliminary approval of the collective action settlement. (Doc. No. 27.) 19 Accordingly, as detailed below, the undersigned will order the parties to provide 20 supplemental briefing addressing the court’s concerns as identified below. 21 Despite plaintiffs’ FLSA claim being the sole basis for federal jurisdiction over this 22 action, and despite plaintiffs referring to and asserting claims on behalf of a separate putative 23 FLSA collective, the pending motion does not seek to certify the putative FLSA collective. (See 24 Doc. No. 18-1 at 9–10.) Indeed, in the pending motion, plaintiffs address only the Rule 23 class 25 certification and preliminary approval of class action standards; they do not address the standards 26 for the certification of an FLSA collective at all, let alone provide any analysis as to whether 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 those standards are met here.2 See Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th 2 Cir. 2018) (“Collective actions and class actions are creatures of distinct texts—collective actions 3 of section 216(b), and class actions of Rule 23—that impose distinct requirements.”); id. at 1109 4 (“Preliminary certification [of an FLSA collective] refers to the dissemination of notice to 5 putative collective members, conditioned on a preliminary determination that the collective as 6 defined in the complaint satisfies the “similarly situated” requirement of section 216(b).”); see 7 also Millan v. Cascade Water Servs., Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593, 601 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 8 Also of concern to the court, although the parties’ proposed settlement agreement requires 9 FLSA members to affirmatively opt-in to the FLSA portion of the settlement, the settlement 10 agreement itself does not differentiate between released class claims and released FLSA claims. 11 (Doc. No. 18-2 at 24.) Indeed, the settlement agreement provides that upon the effective date of 12 the settlement, “each and every Participating Class Member” will “release[], discharge[], and 13 agree[] to hold harmless Defendant . . . from any and all” of the released claims, which include 14 “claims [that] arise under federal, state and/or local law . . . during the Class Period.” (Id. at 22, 15 49.) According to the instructions to class members set forth in the proposed class notice, “[i]f 16 you do nothing, you will be a Participating Class Member, a settlement check will automatically 17 be mailed to you, and you will release all claims you may have related to the allegations in the 18 case.” (Id. at 59.) Therefore, on the face of the settlement agreement and proposed class notice, 19 even class members who do not opt-in to the FLSA portion of the settlement would apparently 20 release defendant from liability as to all FLSA claims. 21 Accordingly, the parties are directed to file supplemental briefing addressing the 22 following issues: 23 1. On what basis can the court conclude that the parties’ settlement agreement is fair, 24 reasonable, and adequate, when it includes (i) a broad release of FLSA claims, 25 even as to class members who do not opt-in to the FLSA portion of the settlement, 26 2 Although plaintiffs reference that federal district courts have granted preliminary approval of 27 class actions involving similar FLSA payment structures, they advance no arguments regarding whether the standards for certification of an FLSA collective are met in this case. (See Doc. No. 28 18-1 at 7–8, 9–10.) 1 and (ii) there is no showing that the settlement agreement satisfies the 2 requirements to resolve an FLSA claim by way of settlement?3 3 2. On what basis can the court conclude that the proposed class notice and the 4 proposed FLSA consent form satisfy the notice requirements of FLSA collective 5 action settlements? Indeed, the class notice does not even mention the FLSA other 6 than stating that “FLSA Opt-In Members shall receive an increase of 10% as to 7 their work weeks in the calculation” of their settlement amounts. (Doc. No. 18-2 8 at 59.) 9 3. The court is also concerned that the proposed class notice may not sufficiently 10 inform putative class members as to the claims that are being released under the 11 proposed settlement agreement.4 For example, the proposed class notice refers 12 putative class members to section XXI.B of the settlement agreement to review the 13 “full release language” under the settlement, but the settlement agreement does not 14 even include a section XXI.B. (Doc. No.

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Bluebook (online)
Mondrian v. Trius Trucking, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mondrian-v-trius-trucking-inc-caed-2022.