Moncion v. Stephen Sondheim Theater

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 25, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-01025
StatusUnknown

This text of Moncion v. Stephen Sondheim Theater (Moncion v. Stephen Sondheim Theater) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moncion v. Stephen Sondheim Theater, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BETTY M. MONCION, Plaintiff, 22-CV-1025 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND STEPHEN SONDHEIM THEATER, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action alleging that that she was discriminated against and underpaid. By order dated February 14, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept,

however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this complaint on February 4, 2022, against the Stephen Sondheim Theater. In it, she alleges the following facts. In September 2018, an unidentified company sent Plaintiff to clean the theater. After “about two month[s],” the “boss from the company” told Plaintiff that the supervisor at the theater did not want her working there anymore, and she was fired. (ECF 2 at 8.) Plaintiff asserts that she did the work that she was asked to do, and therefore the only explanation for what occurred is that someone at the company or the theater discriminated

against her. (Id.) Plaintiff does not specify the basis for the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff also claims that she was not paid all of the money to which she was entitled. Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in damages. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Discrimination claim Federal antidiscrimination statutes prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), which may include the individual’s race, color, sex, age, or disability. Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, a plaintiff must plausibly

allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against her, and (2) a protected trait, such as her race, color, sex, age, or disability was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). As to the second element, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must also allege “that the relevant protected trait ‘was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.’” Mazzeo v. Mnuchin, 751 Fed. Appx. 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff may state a claim by “alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87. The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting an employment discrimination action. Plaintiff alleges that her firing after two months of work must have been discriminatory

because she did all the work she was asked to do. While being fired constitutes an adverse employment action, Plaintiff does not provide facts showing that her firing was in fact discriminatory. Plaintiff does not allege the basis for the discrimination (for example, her race or age), and she makes no allegations suggesting that she was fired because of a protected characteristic such as her race or age. Accordingly, the facts alleged do not give rise to a plausible claim of employment discrimination under Rule 8. See Hedges v. Town of Madison, 456 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying the plausibility standard to employment discrimination complaints and suggesting that “at a minimum, employment discrimination claims must meet the standard of pleading set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, even if pleading a prima facie case is not required”). The Court grants Plaintiff leave to submit an amended complaint to provide facts in support of her discrimination claim.1

B. Wage claim The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegation that she was underpaid as arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The FLSA seeks to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). It does so in part by setting substantive wage, hour, and overtime standards. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 11 (2011). The statute requires all employers to pay each of their employees “not less than” the prevailing minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Tracy v. Freshwater
623 F.3d 90 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc.
643 F.3d 352 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Hedges v. Town of Madison
456 F. App'x 22 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Sledge v. Kooi
564 F.3d 105 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Walters v. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
651 F.3d 280 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Moncion v. Stephen Sondheim Theater, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moncion-v-stephen-sondheim-theater-nysd-2022.