J-E01003-19
2019 PA Super 270
DANIEL MOHN, CHAD WALLACE AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF IRENE SILVEUS : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : BUCKS COUNTY REPUBLICAN : COMMITTEE : No. 2694 EDA 2018 : : APPEAL OF: DANIEL MOHN :
Appeal from the Order Dated December 14, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-03560
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 03, 2019
Daniel Mohn appeals from the order granting summary judgment in
favor of the Bucks County Republican Committee (“the BCRC”), and denying
his cross-motion for summary judgment on his claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief based on alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Election Code.
Mr. Mohn directed his appeal to the Commonwealth Court, which has
jurisdiction over Election Code violations pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 762(a)(4)(i)(c). However, the Commonwealth Court sua sponte transferred
the appeal to this Court based on Gordon v. Philadelphia County
Democratic Exec. Committee, 80 A.3d 464 (Pa. Super. 2013), wherein a
three-Judge panel of this Court determined that it had jurisdiction over an J-E01003-19
appeal involving an alleged Election Code violation. We granted en banc
review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals involving alleged Election Code violations such that
Gordon should be overruled. After careful consideration, we conclude that
Gordon was incorrectly decided, and should be overruled. We additionally
conclude that the issues raised by Mr. Mohn’s appeal fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. Accordingly, we transfer the instant
appeal back to the Commonwealth Court to decide its merits.
We briefly summarize the relevant factual and procedural history
underlying the appeal as follows. Mr. Mohn was elected as a Republican
committeeperson in Yardley Borough, Bucks County, in 2014 and again in
2016. After the 2016 election, the Bucks County Republican Party filed ethics
complaints with the BCRC regarding Mr. Mohn’s actions during the election,
including campaigning against Republican-endorsed candidates and failing to
fulfill his responsibility to cover the polls on the day of the primary election.
Following a hearing, the BCRC Executive Committee disqualified Mr. Mohn
from his position based on his violations of the Rules of the Republican Party
of Bucks County (“the Local Party Rules”).
Thereafter, Mr. Mohn, along with two co-plaintiffs who have since
discontinued their claims, filed a complaint against the BCRC in the Court of
Common Pleas of Bucks County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Mr.
Mohn alleged that the BCRC improperly removed him from his position as
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elected committeeperson for his voting precinct. Specifically, he claimed that
the actions of the BCRC violated the Pennsylvania Election Code, namely 25
P.S. § 2837,1 by disqualifying him as a committeeperson for reasons that did
not constitute grounds for disqualification under the Local Party Rules. The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
On December 18, 2017,2 the trial court denied Mr. Mohn’s motion for
summary judgment, and granted the BCRC’s motion for summary judgment
on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the internal
operations of a political party pursuant to section 2842 of the Election Code.3
See Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/18, at 5 (“This is a purely intra-party disciplinary
matter that the [United States] Constitution has reserved to the [BCRC] to
address free from government intervention.”).
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1 Section 2837 provides, in relevant part, “There may be in each county a county committee for each political party within such county, the members of which shall be elected at the spring primary, or appointed, as the rules of the respective parties within the county may provide. The county committee of each party may make such rules for the government of the party in the county, not inconsistent with law or with the State rules of the party, as it may deem expedient, and may also revoke, alter or renew in any manner not inconsistent with law or with such State rules, any present or future county rules of such party.” 25 P.S. § 2837.
2 The trial court signed its order on December 14, 2017; however, the order
was not entered on the docket until December 18, 2017.
3 Section 2842 provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen acting in the capacity
of a political committee, such duly elected or appointed members shall be subject to the control, direction and supervision of the political committee of which they are members.” 25 P.S. § 2842.
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As indicated above, Mr. Mohn appealed the trial court’s rulings to the
Commonwealth Court. However, the Commonwealth Court, relying on
Gordon, supra, sua sponte transferred the appeal to this Court. Mr. Mohn
now seeks appellate review to determine (1) whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine if the BCRC violated the Election Code by
disqualifying him as a committeeperson under the Local Party Rules; and (2)
whether the BCRC was authorized by the Election Code to disqualify him for
alleged violations of the Ethics Code of the Local Party Rules, and misconduct
on the day of the primary election.
We certified this appeal for en banc consideration to decide the following
two questions:
1. Whether exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal lies in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762?
2. Whether this Court’s prior, three–Judge Panel decision on the issue in Gordon . . . should be overruled?
See En Banc Certification Order, 2/5/19. As we explain below, the answer to
both questions is yes.
The issues for our review concern the scope of this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. Chapter Seven of the Judicial Code sets forth the “legislatively
ordained division of labor” between appellate courts in Pennsylvania. Valley
Forge Indus., Inc. v. Armand Constr., Inc., 374 A.2d 1312, 1316 (Pa.
Super. 1977); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 701 et seq. Pursuant to section 742
of the Judicial Code, this Court’s jurisdiction is limited, and does not extend to
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appeals which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of our Supreme Court or
the Commonwealth Court:
The Superior Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas, regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount involved, except such classes of appeals as are by any provision of this chapter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Commonwealth Court.
Id. (emphasis added).
Notably, the General Assembly consciously removed a group of cases
from this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and committed them to a court of
specialized appellate jurisdiction. See Newman v. Thorn, 518 A.2d 1231,
1235 (Pa. Super. 1986). In this regard, section 762(a) of the Judicial Code
enumerates seven specific categories of appeal from the courts of common
pleas over which the Commonwealth Court has exclusive jurisdiction. In this
case, we are concerned with only one of those categories. Pursuant to section
762(a) of the Judicial Code,
(a) General rule.—Except as provided in subsection (b), [which is inapplicable herein] the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in the following cases:
....
(4) Local government civil and criminal matters.
(i) All actions or proceedings arising under any municipality, institution district, public school, planning or zoning code or under which a municipality or other political subdivision or municipality authority may be formed or incorporated or where is drawn in
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question the application, interpretation or enforcement of any:
(C) statute relating to elections, campaign financing or other election procedures.
42 Pa.C.S.A § 762(a)(4)(i)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to our
statutory scheme, appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas
involving the application, interpretation or enforcement of any statute relating
to elections or election procedures fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth Court. See In re Gen. Election for Dist. Justice, 670 A.2d
629, 631 n.1 (Pa. 1996) (“Although [the Pennsylvania Supreme] Court had
previously entertained appeals from the courts of common pleas in election
matters . . . jurisdiction over such appeals was given to the Commonwealth
Court when that court was created in 1970.”); see also Dayhoff v. Weaver,
808 A.2d 1002, 1006 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“Section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the
Judicial Code provides expressly that the Commonwealth Court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the trial courts in cases involving
elections or election procedures.” (emphasis in original)); In re Nomination
in re Warren, 692 A.2d 1178, 1181 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (“[P]ursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 762(a)(4)(i)(C), this Court has exclusive jurisdiction of election
procedures.”).
Given that the Commonwealth Court transferred Mr. Mohn’s appeal,
which involves election matters, to this Court pursuant to Gordon, an
understanding of that case is essential to our analysis. In Gordon, a 2-1
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Panel Majority of this Court asserted jurisdiction over an appeal factually
similar to the one at bar.4 There, the Fortieth Ward (40B) Democratic
Executive Committee removed Gordon from her elected position as a member
of the Ward Committee using Rule VIII,5 as promulgated by the Democratic
Party of the City and County of Philadelphia. Gordon and co-plaintiff,
Johnson,6 filed a lawsuit against the Philadelphia County Democratic Executive
Committee, the Ward Committee, and related parties. They claimed that
defendants violated section 2842 of the Election Code by using Rule VIII to
remove Gordon from her elected position. The complaint sought Gordon’s
reinstatement to her elected office (Count I), and declaratory and injunctive
relief to prevent future similar actions by defendants (Count II).
While the lawsuit was pending, the Ward Committee reinstated Gordon
to her position. Thereafter, counsel for co-plaintiffs filed a partial
4 Judge Bowes dissented and, as we explain in detail below, concluded in her
Dissenting Opinion that the Superior Court should have transferred the Gordon case to the Commonwealth Court. See Gordon, 80 A.3d at 475-76 (Bowes, J., dissenting).
5 Rule VIII, Article 1, Section E (empowering the Ward Committee to remove
a member and declare a vacancy in the membership “if, in the opinion of the entire Ward Committee, a member is unfaithful to the Democratic party and the best interested [sic] of the party.”).
6 The complaint was initially filed as a class action, with Johnson, who voted
for Gordon, acting as the purported class representative of the majority of voters who had elected Gordon as a committeeperson. However, Johnson later moved to withdraw the petition for class certification.
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discontinuance as to Gordon, and a motion to intervene on behalf of the
Philadelphia Democratic Progressive Caucus (“the PDCP”). While the motion
to intervene was pending, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on the basis that
Johnson lacked standing to litigate the action. The trial court subsequently
dismissed the PDPC’s motion to intervene as moot. Johnson and the PDCP
appealed those orders to this Court.
On appeal, the Gordon Majority first addressed the question of
Johnson’s standing. It ruled that her claim at Count I as to Gordon’s removal
was moot. 80 A.3d at 473. The Majority additionally ruled that Johnson’s
claim at Count II as to prospective use of the Rule was not ripe. Id. As such,
the Gordon Majority affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for
defendants. Applying the same rationale, the Majority affirmed the trial
court’s order denying the PDPC’s motion to intervene. Id. (concluding the
issues were moot and unripe).7
After affirming the trial court’s rulings, the Gordon Majority addressed
“[a]s a final matter” the question of whether the Superior Court had
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Id. The Majority acknowledged that,
7 The Gordon Majority also addressed the appellants’ argument that, “even if
the claims as to Gordon’s removal are moot, this Court should nonetheless consider its merits because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.” 80 A.3d at 473. The Majority agreed that the issues raised by appellants were of public importance, but was unpersuaded that the issues were likely to avoid review if repeated. Id.
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pursuant to section 742 of the Judicial Code, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction
does not extend to “such classes of appeals as are . . . within the exclusive
jurisdiction of . . . the Commonwealth Court.” Id. at 474. The Majority further
acknowledged that pursuant to section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the Judicial Code,
“the Commonwealth Court ‘has jurisdiction to hear appeals involving issues
arising from the election process.’” Gordon, 80 A.3d at 474.
Nevertheless, the Gordon Majority concluded that it had jurisdiction
over the appeal because “we were not required to apply, interpret, or enforce
the Election Code in reaching our holding.” Id. at 474.8 The Majority further
concluded that, even if it was “incorrect[,] and [the] interpretation of the
Election Code was sufficiently at issue to invoke the Commonwealth Court’s
jurisdiction,” it acted within its discretion under [Pa.R.A.P. 7419] in choosing,
in the interests of judicial economy, to consider the appeal.” Id.; see also
8 The Gordon Majority acknowledged that, pursuant to section 722(2) of the
Judicial Code, our Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals in matters challenging a candidate’s right to hold public office. Gordon, 80 A.3d at 474. However, the Majority correctly reasoned that such jurisdiction was not implicated because “the issues involved did not involve the right to hold public office within the meaning of [section] 722(2), as the challenge was to a discharge from office rather than preconditions to the holding of office.” Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(2).
9 Rule 741 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “The failure of an appellee to
file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court on or prior to the last day under these rules for the filing of the record shall, unless the appellate court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court, notwithstanding any provision of law vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another appellate court.” Pa.R.A.P. 741(a).
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id. at 474-75 (“Appellees did not object to this Court’s jurisdiction, and judicial
economy was served by our deciding the case after it was filed, briefed, and
argued before us.”).
Judge Bowes dissented on the basis that section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the
Judicial Code confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Commonwealth Court to
hear appeals involving elections matters and the Election Code. She
explained:
[A]ll cases, since the Commonwealth Court was created, that involve elections[,] emanate from the Commonwealth Court or our Supreme Court on appeal from the Commonwealth Court. The present matter involves an election and election procedures[,] and should be decided by the Commonwealth Court.
When we decide whether to retain an appeal:
we must balance the interests of the parties and matters of judicial economy against other factors such as: (1) whether the case has already been transferred; (2) whether our retention will disrupt the legislatively ordained division of labor between the intermediate appellate courts; and (3) whether there is a possibility of establishing two conflicting lines of authority on a particular subject. Moreover, each transfer should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
[Trumbull Corp. v. Boss Construction Inc., 747 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa. Super. 2000).]
In my opinion, consideration of these factors compels that we transfer this case to the Commonwealth Court. . . . [O]ur retention of it would upset the [L]egislature’s decision to vest exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court over litigation involving elections. Further, this Court has no body of case law concerning election cases and the questions of either standing or mootness in that context. This Court simply has no
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experience with election contests and the majority has risked rendering a decision that may conflict with the body of law existing in the Commonwealth Court as to the issues it addresses. I consider it inappropriate for this Court to decide a case involving an internal rule of the Party and whether it conflicts with the Election Code. I would transfer this appeal to the Court with the experience and skill-set to handle the matter expertly.
Id. at 475-76 (Bowes, J. dissenting) (some citations omitted).
Reconsidering Gordon, this Court, en banc, now concludes that the
Majority Opinion in Gordon was incorrectly decided. First, the panel should
have determined, at the outset, whether the appeal fell within the jurisdiction
of the Superior Court. See e.g., Pennsylvanians Against Gambling
Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 392 (Pa. 2005)
(“Prior to considering the merits of the legal issues before us, we must address
. . . threshold matters. First, we will determine our jurisdiction to entertain
this challenge . . ..”). The Gordon Majority improperly deferred its
jurisdictional determination until after it had affirmed the trial court’s entry
of summary judgment and denial of intervention. This was error. The Majority
should have determined its jurisdiction over the appeal as a threshold matter.
See id.
Moreover, the Majority compounded that error by using its substantive
rulings to justify its acceptance of jurisdiction over the appeal. Importantly,
Johnson claimed that the local Democratic party Rule violated section 2842 of
the Election Code. Rather than considering, initially, whether the election-
related claims brought the appeal within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth
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Court, the Gordon Majority eliminated the basis for that jurisdiction by
deciding the merits on procedural grounds. 80 A.3d at 474 (reasoning that it
could accept appellate jurisdiction because “we were not required to apply,
interpret, or enforce the Election Code in reaching our holding”). In doing so,
the Gordon Majority usurped the General Assembly’s prerogative not to vest
appellate jurisdiction over election matters in the Superior Court by
sidestepping the express provisions of section 762(a)(4)(i)(C) of the Judicial
Code. Because the Legislature vested the Commonwealth Court with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over election matters, it was that Court’s
prerogative and duty to decide the substantive questions of standing,
mootness and ripeness presented in Gordon – not ours.
Finally, the Gordon Majority should not have invoked Rule 741 to assert
jurisdiction over the appeal on the basis that “[a]ppellees did not object to
this Court’s jurisdiction, and judicial economy was served by our deciding the
case after it was filed, briefed, and argued before us.” 80 A.3d at 474-75.
Ordinarily, Rule 741 allows this Court to accept jurisdiction of an appeal that
belongs in another appellate court when the parties do not object. See
Commonwealth v. Smith, 722 A.2d 167, 169 (Pa. Super. 1998). However,
even where no party objects to this Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction,
as was the case in Gordon, we still have discretion under rule 741 to transfer
the matter to the Commonwealth Court. See e.g. Fengfish v. Dallmyer,
642 A.2d 1117, 1120 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1994); Pa.R.A.P.741(a) (providing that
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jurisdiction is not perfected if “the appellate court shall otherwise order.”).
Indeed, we should transfer the appeal where the interests of the parties and
matters of judicial economy are outweighed by other factors, such as whether
our retention will disrupt the legislatively ordained division of labor between
the intermediate appellate courts; or whether there is a possibility of
establishing two conflicting lines of authority on a particular subject. See
Trumbull Corp., 474 A.2d at 399.
Given the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
claims involving election matters, we conclude that “judicial economy” was an
insufficient basis for the Gordon Majority to accept jurisdiction over the
election-related appeal. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627,
630-31 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“the concepts of ‘institutional comity’ and ‘system-
wide efficiency’ should not be relied upon as reasons for this Court’s exercise
of appellate jurisdiction.”). As Judge Bowes warned, “[t]his Court simply has
no experience with election contests and the majority has risked rendering a
decision that may conflict with the body of law existing in the Commonwealth
Court as to the issues it addresses.” Gordon, 80 A.3d at 476 (Bowes, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, by asserting jurisdiction over the appeal, the Gordon
Majority risked establishing two conflicting lines of authority on the Election
Code, which is within the purview and expertise of the Commonwealth Court.
Thus, to the extent that Gordon stands for the proposition that this Court can
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entertain appeals involving matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth Court, it is specifically overruled.
We now hold that, in deciding whether this Court has appellate
jurisdiction, we must consider all of the potential issues underlying the parties’
theories of the case. If any potential substantive issue (or participation of a
particular party) invokes the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction, transfer is
appropriate, and we must transfer prior to reaching the merits of the appeal.
Otherwise, we invade the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to
decide those substantive issues and to develop its own, consistent line of
precedents.
Turning to the case before us, Mr. Mohn seeks appellate review to
address the following two issues:
1. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to address Mohn’s request for a declaration that the [BCRC] violated the Pennsylvania Election Code by disqualifying Mohn from his duly elected position as a Republican Committeeperson for alleged misconduct that did not constitute a basis for disqualification under the [L]ocal [P]arty [R]ules?
2. Is Mohn entitled to summary judgment where: (i) the [BCRC] did not have authority to disqualify Mohn as a publically elected committeeman serving his Republican constituents, for alleged violations of [L]ocal [P]arty Ethics Rules, and (ii) allegations of misconduct on the day of the primary election immediately preceding the term from which he was disqualified cannot constitute a basis for disqualification.
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Mr. Mohn’s issues on appeal require a determination of the scope of the
trial court’s jurisdiction under the Election Code to address the application,
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interpretation, and enforcement of the Local Party Rules, and whether such
jurisdiction is affected by our Supreme Court’s holding in Bentman v.
Seventh Ward Democratic Executive Committee, 218 A.2d 261 (Pa.
1966), a case involving election matters that was decided before the
Commonwealth Court was created and vested with exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals involving election matters.
Mr. Mohn’s issues on appeal also require a determination of whether, in
disqualifying Mr. Mohn from his position, the BCRC violated the Local Party
Rules, which the BCRC is required to follow under section 2837 of the Election
Code, and whether those Rules are inconsistent with the by-laws of the
Republican Party of Pennsylvania, in violation of section 2837. Additionally,
the appeal requires a determination as to whether the BCRC had the right to
direct and discipline Mr. Mohn pursuant to section 2842 of the Election Code.
These issues involve election matters that “draw[] in question the application,
interpretation or enforcement of . . . statute[s] relating to elections, . . . or
other election procedures.” 42 Pa.C.S.A § 762(a)(4)(i)(C). Consequently, the
subject matter of this appeal directly implicates the Election Code and the
Commonwealth Court’s precedents applying the Code’s provisions.
As the Legislature has designated the Commonwealth Court as the
exclusive forum for election-related appeals, we must defer the instant matter
to its expertise.
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Appeal transferred to the Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
President Judge Panella, President Judge Emeritus Bender, President
Judge Emeritus Gantman, and Judges Lazarus, Dubow, Murray and
McLaughlin join this Opinion.
Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/3/19
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