Mohit M. and Himanshu H. v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-00241
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MOHIT M. AND HIMANSHU H.1,

11 Petitioners, No. 1:26-cv-00241-TLN-SCR

12 13 v. ORDER CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 17 This matter is before the Court on Petitioners Mohit M. and Himanshu H.’s (“Petitioners”) 18 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 5.) For the reasons set forth 19 below, Petitioners’ Motion is GRANTED and Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE 20 why a preliminary injunction should not issue. 21 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 22 Petitioners are citizens of India who fled their country due to religious persecution and 23 they now seek asylum in the United States. (See ECF No. 5-1 at 2.) 24 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of 25 the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits Petitioners’ full names, using only their first name and last initial, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum Re: 26 Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court 27 Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. The Clerk of Court 28 is directed to update the docket to reflect this change accordingly. 1 Petitioner Mohit M. entered the United States around May 28, 2023, without inspection 2 and he approached immigration officials to claim asylum. (Id. at 2–3.) Immigration officials 3 detained Petitioner Mohit M. for approximately one day. (Id. at 3.) He was released on May 29, 4 2023, on conditional parole, after a determination that he was neither a flight risk nor danger to 5 the community. (Id.) Petitioner Mohit M. was provided with notice that stated he was released 6 on his own recognizance, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 C.F.R. Part 236, “pending a final 7 administrative determination in [his] case.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner Mohit M.’s immigration 8 case is still pending. 9 Petitioner Himanshu H. entered the United States around June 2, 2024, without inspection 10 and he also approached immigration officials to claim asylum. (ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) Immigration 11 officials detained Petitioner Himanshu H. for approximately one day. (Id.) He was released on 12 June 3, 2024, on conditional parole, after a determination that he was neither a flight risk nor 13 danger to the community. (Id.) Petitioner Himanshu H. was provided with notice that stated he 14 was released on his own recognizance, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 C.F.R. Part 236, 15 “pending a final administrative determination in [his] case.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner 16 Himanshu H.’s immigration case is still pending. 17 During their years of parole, Petitioners state they developed community ties in the United 18 States, obtained work authorization and supported their families, obeyed all laws, and complied 19 with all conditions of their release. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5–7; 5-1 at 3.) Petitioners attended all of their 20 court hearings, timely filed their applications for asylum, attended their biometrics appointments, 21 and have never been arrested. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5–7; 5-1 at 3.) 22 Nevertheless, on December 10, 2025, Petitioners were stopped by U.S. Department of 23 Homeland Security (“DHS”) officials. (ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) The DHS officers inquired about 24 their immigration status, and when Petitioners disclosed they were asylum applicants and showed 25 officers their identification, the officers arrested them. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Petitioners contend they 26 were arrested despite following all laws and despite showing officers valid work permits and 27 driver’s licenses. (Id.) Petitioners allege DHS has not identified any changed circumstances to 28 justify cancelling Petitioners’ parole. (ECF No. 1 at 3–4.) Petitioners were detained without any 1 notice or an opportunity to be heard. (ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) 2 Petitioners have now been detained for over a month without a hearing. Petitioners jointly 3 challenge the lawfulness of their civil detention and seek immediate release. (See ECF Nos. 1, 5.) 4 II. STANDARD OF LAW 5 For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established “[1] that he is likely to 6 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 7 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 8 interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a 9 showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 10 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh petitioner’s showings on 12 the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the 13 hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner shows that there are “serious 14 questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of 15 irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a petitioner 16 must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of 17 hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a TRO. 18 Id. at 1134–35. 19 III. ANALYSIS2 20 The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioners’ motion. 21 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 22 Petitioners have established a likelihood of success on their claims that their detentions 23 violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Fifth Amendment Due Process 24

25 2 The Court finds Petitioners have sufficiently met the requirements for issuing a TRO without notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioners notified Respondents via email that he 26 would be filing the motion. (See ECF Nos. 5-1 at 2; 5-2.) See R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25- 27 CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (similarly finding requirements for TRO were met without notice); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 2025 28 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (same). 1 Clause.3 The Court discusses each claim in turn. 2 i. Violation of the INA 3 Under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) “provides the general process for 4 arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for 5 removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Section 1226(a) 6 provides the Government broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual and it 7 provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination. Id. It also confers “an 8 initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel 9 and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when 10 circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. 11 Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (“§ 1225(b)”) mandates detention during removal 12 proceedings for applicants for admission and does not provide for a bond hearing. 13 Until the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) changed its policy in July 2025 14 (“DHS’s July Policy”), the Government consistently applied § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), to 15 noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained by immigration authorities and 16 subject to removal. 17 Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected the Government’s 18 new legal position and have found DHS’s July Policy unlawful. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 19 No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining 20 this Court’s reasons for taking this position and collecting cases); see also Maldonado Bautista v. 21 Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (issuing vacatur of unlawful 22 DHS July Policy for a nationwide certified class). 23 Petitioners assert they are unlawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2) when § 1226(a) should 24 govern. (ECF No. 1 at 36.) This Court agrees. Section 1225(b)(2) applies only to “applicants for 25 admission” “seeking admission” –– a category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioners 26

27 3 Petitioners also assert a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (ECF No. 1), however, the Court need not address cumulative violations where relief is warranted on 28 Petitioners’ other claims. 1 who have already entered the United States and are residing here at the time of their re-detention. 2 See Morales-Flores, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3. This Court has made its position on this statutory 3 question clear. Id. Absent new argument, case law, or distinguishable facts, this Court will not 4 reconsider its position. 5 Thus, Petitioners are not applicants for admission subject to mandatory detention under 6 § 1225(b)(2). Petitioners are instead subject to § 1226(a) and are entitled to the process that 7 statute requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. Yet, Respondents have not provided 8 any such hearing to either Petitioner in over a month of detention. Accordingly, Petitioners are 9 likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Respondents have violated the INA and 10 improperly subjected them to mandatory detention without a hearing. 11 ii. Violation of Procedural Due Process 12 The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or 13 property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 14 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 15 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 16 These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. at 693–94. 17 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 18 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 19 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 20 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 21 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 22 the question remains what process is due.”). 23 a) Liberty Interest 24 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioners have established protectable liberty 25 interests. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. 26 Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by 27 statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he 28 government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon 1 which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to 2 the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 3 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a 4 noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in 5 remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 6 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional 7 release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific 8 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 9 Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. 10 Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 11 Here, Petitioners each gained a liberty interest in their continued freedom when they were 12 granted their conditional parole pending final determinations in their immigration cases. (ECF 13 No. 1 at 5–6.) Under Morrisey, their releases implied promises that they would not be re- 14 detained, during the pendency of their immigration proceedings, if they abided by the terms of 15 their releases. During that time, Petitioners complied with all the conditions of their release. 16 Petitioners state they obeyed all laws, attended all of their court hearings, timely filed their 17 applications for asylum, attended their biometrics appointments, and have never been arrested. 18 (ECF Nos. 1 at 5–7; 5-1 at 3.) As this Court has found previously, along with many other courts 19 in this district when confronted with similar circumstances, Petitioners have clear interests in their 20 continued freedom as they await the outcome of their immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Doe v. 21 Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the Government’s actions in 22 allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five years strengthened petitioner’s 23 liberty interest). 24 b) Procedures Required 25 As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three 26 factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 27 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 28 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including 1 the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 2 procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set 3 forth below, the Court finds Petitioners have established their due process rights were likely 4 violated. 5 First, Petitioners have substantial private interests in remaining free from detention. 6 During their periods of release, Petitioners have built lives, obtained gainful employment to 7 support their families, and fostered extensive community ties. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5–7; 5-1 at 3.) 8 Despite that, Petitioners have now been detained for over a month without any opportunity to be 9 heard. (ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioners’ 10 private interests have been impacted by their detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV- 11 01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly). 12 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioners have not 13 received any hearings, either pre- or post-detention. Thus, the Court finds there is a serious 14 likelihood Petitioners could be erroneously deprived of their liberty interests. Without any 15 procedural safeguards to determine whether their detention was justifiable, the probative value of 16 additional procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. 17 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide 18 Petitioners with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- 19 TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Where removal is not imminent 20 under a final order of removal, “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining 21 individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose 22 appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or 23 alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994; see also R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 24 (“Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect is justified when a 25 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”) (cleaned up). 26 Here, Petitioners’ asylum applications are pending and neither have a final order of 27 removal. Additionally, before Petitioners were released on parole, immigration authorities found 28 they were not a danger to the community nor a flight risk. (ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) This finding has 1 only been strengthened by Petitioners’ conduct over the period of their releases as they have 2 complied with all laws, all conditions of their release, and they have no criminal history. 3 Therefore, on this record, the Court cannot find any legitimate interest for Respondents to detain 4 Petitioners. 5 Moreover, the cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal here. Notice and 6 custody determination hearings are routine processes for Respondents. Indeed, these are the very 7 processes owed to Petitioners under § 1226(a). Any delay in detention (if justified) for the time 8 to provide notice and a hearing would be minimal. It would also be less of a fiscal and 9 administrative burden for the Government to return Petitioners home to await a determination on 10 their immigration proceedings than to continue to detain them. See Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV- 11 05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has recognized 12 that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.”). 13 The Court finds that, under these circumstances, Respondents are required to provide 14 notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. The United States Supreme Court “usually has held that the 15 Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or 16 property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). The Court 17 describes post-deprivation remedies as the “special case” where those are “the only remedies the 18 State could be expected to provide.” Id. at 129. Here — where Petitioners have complied with 19 the conditions of their parole, have been previously determined not to be a flight risk or a danger, 20 have never been arrested, and removal is not reasonably foreseeable — the Court finds pre- 21 deprivation notice and a hearing are possible and valuable to preventing erroneous deprivation of 22 liberty. 23 On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioners were entitled to 24 pre-deprivation notice and hearing to determine whether detention was warranted. Respondents 25 have not provided either. Nor did they provide post-deprivation hearings. Accordingly, with 26 respect to their procedural due process claim, Petitioners have shown they are likely to succeed 27 on the merits. 28 /// 1 B. Irreparable Harm 2 Petitioners have also established they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a 3 TRO. The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to 4 immigration detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention 5 facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, 6 and the collateral harms to [family.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. 7 Without relief, Petitioners face the prospect of significant additional time in detention and 8 continued harm while they await decisions on their asylum applications. Petitioners report 9 experiencing lack of sleep and significant mental health issues including sadness, anxiety, 10 irritability, hopelessness, constant worry, and loss of appetite. (ECF Nos. 5-3; 5-4.) They are 11 also unable to financially support themselves and their families resulting in economic harm. 12 (ECF No. 5-1 at 9.) Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 13 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th 14 Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Thus, Petitioners have 15 sufficiently established irreparable harm. 16 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 17 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 18 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 19 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 20 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioners. First, the balance of 21 equities tips decidedly in Petitioners’ favor as the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is 22 harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” 23 Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Second, “it is always in 24 the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d 25 at 1002. Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration 26 detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. 27 Cal. June 14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). 28 Any burden imposed by requiring Respondents to release Petitioners from unlawful 1 custody and refrain from re-detention unless and until they comply with constitutionally required 2 process is both de minimis and clearly outweighed by the substantial harm Petitioners will suffer 3 if they continue to be detained. In sum, these last two factors weigh in Petitioners’ favor. 4 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioners’ request for a TRO and orders Petitioners’ 5 immediate release on the same terms as they were released prior to their current detention. See 6 Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 7 2025) (status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 10 1. Petitioners’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED. 11 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioners Mohit M. and Himanshu H. 12 from custody under the same conditions they were released prior to their current 13 detention. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on them, unless such 14 restrictions are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. 15 3. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 16 Petitioners absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ 17 notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents 18 show material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of the 19 Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate 20 by clear and convincing evidence that the Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a 21 flight risk. At any such hearing, the Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 22 4. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not issue a 23 preliminary injunction continuing this Order. Respondents shall file responsive papers by 24 January 23, 2026. Petitioner may file a reply, if any, by January 28, 2026. The parties 25 shall indicate in their briefing whether they waive a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3). 26 The Court will consider any stipulation and proposed order filed by the parties if they 27 agree to a less demanding briefing schedule. 28 5. Petitioners are ORDERED to immediately serve this Order on Respondents, including a 1 copy via email to: usacae.ecf2241-imm @usdoj.gov. 2 6. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for modification or 3 dissolution of the TRO on two days’ notice to Petitioners. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4). 4 7. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 5 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 6 (9th Cir. 2011). 7 8. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket to only list Petitioners’ first names 8 and last initials. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 | Date: January 16, 2026 7, 12 TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11