Miziel Remolona v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 21, 2024
DocketNY-1221-23-0057-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Miziel Remolona v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Miziel Remolona v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miziel Remolona v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MIZIEL REMOLONA, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, NY-1221-23-0057-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: August 21, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Christopher Forasiepi , Esquire, Bobby Devadoss , Esquire, and Maya Glaspie , Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.

Georgette Gonzales-Snyder , Esquire, Syracuse, New York, for the agency.

Shelly S. Glenn , Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction without a hearing. On petition for review, the appellant challenges the denial of 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to supplement the administrative judge’s analysis and findings on exhaustion and regarding the appellant's alleged protected disclosures , we AFFIRM the initial decision.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure. ¶2 We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure. 2 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 7-13. We supplement the administrative judge’s conclusion with the following discussion. ¶3 A protected disclosure is a disclosure that an appellant reasonably believes evidences one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (A). Turner v. Department of Agriculture, 2023 MSPB 25, ¶ 14. A reasonable belief exists if a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the appellant could reasonably conclude 2 We thus do not reach the question of whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her protected disclosures were a contributing factor in her removal. 3

that the actions of the Government evidence one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in section 2302(b)(8)(A). Id. ¶4 Disclosures must be specific and detailed, not vague allegations of wrongdoing. Gabel v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 4, ¶ 6. Vague, conclusory, unsupported, and pro forma allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading standard needed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal. El v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, in Mc Corcle v. Department of Agriculture, 98 M.S.P.R. 363, ¶¶ 21-22, 24 (2005), the Board found that an appellant’s bare allegations of discrimination and broad and nonspecific claims of managerial “irregularities,” among others, were too vague to constitute nonfrivolous allegations of protected disclosures. In another example, in Padilla v. Department of the Air Force, 55 M.S.P.R. 540, 543-44 (1992), the Board affirmed a jurisdictional dismissal of an IRA appeal, finding that an appellant’s assertions that there was “fraud, waste, and abuse” in certain sections of a military unit, and that various conditions were caused by “poor organization, discipline, and management,” were vague allegations regarding broad and imprecise matters that did not constitute whistleblowing. ¶5 The appellant’s alleged disclosures in this appeal were similarly defective. During the appeal, the administrative judge notified the appellant—who was represented by attorneys throughout her appeal—that to establish jurisdiction, she must make a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity. IAF, Tab 6 at 2. The notice also provided the appellant with the relevant legal standards, including the definition of a protected disclosure. Id. at 2-7. With her notice, the administrative judge ordered the appellant to file a statement describing her protected disclosures, explaining that a nonfrivolous allegation was a “detailed, factual allegation,” while conclusory, vague, or unsupported allegations would not suffice. Id. at 3-4, 7-8. 4

¶6 In response, the appellant claimed she was removed in reprisal for disclosing to her supervisors and preceptors that she was receiving “contradictory and inconsistent instructions regarding her job duties” from them and that the instructions were incorrect, violated agency policy, and could harm patients. IAF, Tab 8 at 8-9, 13. The appellant further alleged that her disclosures regarding her inconsistent instructions evidenced, among other things, an “abuse of power” and “perceived waste, fraud, and/or abuse” by her supervisors and preceptors. Id. at 9, 11. Nowhere below, however, did the appellant describe what these “contradictory and inconsistent instructions” were, why they were incorrect, what policy they allegedly violated, 3 or how they could harm patients. 4 The vagueness of the appellant’s alleged disclosures precludes any determination of whether she reasonably believed they evidenced one of the forms of wrongdoing listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), as required for protection under the whistleblower

3 Ordinarily, to make a protected disclosure of a violation of law, rule, or regulation, an employee must identify the specific law, rule, or regulation that was violated, though an individual need not identify a statutory or regulatory provision by a particular title or number when the statements and the circumstances surrounding the making of those statements clearly implicate an identifiable violation of law, rule, or regulation. Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 24 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the appellant’s descriptions of her alleged disclosures did not clearly implicate an identifiable violation of law, rule, or regulation.

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Related

El v. Merit Systems Protection Board
663 F. App'x 921 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Renate Gabel v. Department of Veterans Affairs
2023 MSPB 4 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)
Dwyne Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security
2022 MSPB 8 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)
Calvin Turner v. Department of Agriculture
2023 MSPB 25 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Miziel Remolona v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miziel-remolona-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.