Mizell v. State

38 Fla. 20
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 38 Fla. 20 (Mizell v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mizell v. State, 38 Fla. 20 (Fla. 1896).

Opinion

Taylor, J.:

Morgan B. Mizell, the plaintiff of error, was tried and convicted at the Spring term, 1896, of the Circuit Court of Lee county for the larceny of a cow and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary, and asks a reversal of such sentence by writ of error. The indictment upon which he was tried was found at the Pall term, 1895, of said Circuit Court, and is as follows, omitting its formal parts: “That Morgan B. Mizell, late of the county of Lee, aforesaid, in the Circuit and State aforesaid, laborer, on the thirtieth (30th) day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three, with force and arms at and in the county of Lee, aforesaid, unlawfully, one cow, of the property, goods, and chattels of one A. Través Gr. Parkinson, then and there being found, did feloniously and unlawfully take, steal and carry away, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made ■and provided,” etc.

At the trial the defendant moved to quash this in • ■dictment upon the following grounds: 1st. Because said indictment fails to allege the value of the property charged to have been stolen. 2d. Because it contains no sufficient description of the property alleged to have been stolen. 3d. Because said indictment is vague, uncertain and indefinite, in that it does not •sufficiently describe the property alleged to have been stolen to put the party on notice of the offense, and to protect him against a new prosecution for the same offense. This motion was overruled, and such ruling [22]*22is the first assignment of error. There was no error in this ruling. Section 2449 of the Revised Statutes, under which this indictment was found, is as follows: “Whoever commits larceny by stealing any horse, mare, filly, colt, cow, bull, ox, steer, heifer or calf, hog,, sheep or goat, the property of another, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding two years, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.” It will be observed that under this statute-the larceny of any of the different animals mentioned receives the same punishment, regardless of its value. The same penalty is prescribed thereby for the larceny of the blooded horse worth $5,000 as for the common calf worth perhaps but $2. The law is well-settled that in those cases where the grade of the offense, or the punishment prescribed therefor, is not measured by or dependent upon the value of the property stolen, but is determined entirely by the class or species of' such property, it is not necessary, in an indictment charging its larceny, to allege or prove any value. Wells vs. State, 11 Neb. 409, 9 N. W. Rep. 552; Williams vs. State, 10 Texas App. 8; McDowell vs. State, 61 Ala. 172; State vs. Pedigo, 71 Mo. 443; Maynard vs. State, 46 Ala. 85; Sheppard vs. State, 42 Ala. 531; Walker vs. State, 50 Ark. 532; Bishop on Statutory Crimes (2d. ed.), sec. 427; Rapalje on Larceny and Kindred Offences, secs. 109-110. The property stolen is described in the indictment simply as being “one-cow.” The contention here is that a more certain and detailed description should have been given, such as its color, marks or brands, etc. This contention is not sustained by the adjudications upon similar statutes; but, on the contrary, it is held that indictments are sufficient under such statutes that simply allege the [23]*23number and kind or species of animals stolen, in a general way, without any further or more definite description of the particular animal. Grant vs. State, 3 Texas App. 1.

The defendant moved for a new trial upon the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, but the motion was overruled, and this ruling is assigned as error. The evidence in the case was as follows: A. T. G. Parkinson for the State testified that he lived on the Caloosahatchee river, in Lee county, in 1893 and 1894, and at that time owned several head of cattle — four cows and three yearlings — that ranged near his place; that his mark was bolt in one ear, under-slope and upper bit in the other, branded in diamond P; that he last saw those cattle early in December, 1893; that he went away at that time for a little while and never saw them any more; that he never saw any of them outside his pasture fence; that he never sold any of them to the defendant or anyone else. Ziba King for the State testified that his occupation was cattle raising, and that he had been engaged in it for twenty-five years or more; that he was familiar with the marks and brands of cattle in this country; that he knew Parkinson’s mark and brand; that he gave the diamond P brand; that in May or June, 1895, he was on the bay cow hunting and saw a yellow heifer in defendant’s mark and brand, that is, upper-slope and under-bit in one ear, and sharp in the other, and branded diamond K, which is a brand that looks like Ks turned face to face. The brand appeared to be a rather new brand. The heifer also has a diamond P brand on her, which is the brand of Parkinson. The defendant’s brand appeared to 'be newer than the other one. The diamond P brand had not [24]*24been defaced, but the defendant’s brand had been put on in a different place. I do not know whose heifer it was. I only judged by the brand that it belonged to Parkinson. I do not know of any one else in this country giving the diamond P brand. I don’t recollect anyone but the defendant giving the diamond K brand. The mark appeared to be an altered mark. Richard Bass for the State testified that his occupation was cow hunting; that he was in the employ of Ziba King; that he was familiar with the marks and brands of cattle in Lee county, and knew the mark and brand of Parkinson, and some of the marks of the defendant; that the defendant gives upper-slope and under-bit in one ear, sharp in the other, and brands diamond K — two Ks facing each other. In May, 1895, I saw some cattle in this mark and brand. We penned some cattle in pens on the bay. There were two head of cattle in the bunch in the defendant’s mark and brand — a yellow cow and a brindle steer yearling. The marks was over-slope and under-bit in one ear, sharp in the other, branded with a diamond P. brand on the hip, and a diamond K brand on the side.. The defendant claimed to give that mark and brand. The marks on the cow’s ears were not very plain, but it was an altered mark. I don’t know anyone else in this country who gives the diamond P brand except Parkinson, and no one who gives the diamond K brand except the defendant. . I do not know of the defendant making any changes in his marks and brands. I recognized this cow and yearling to be the property of Parkinson because of the diamond P brand. I could not tell what the original mark was, but the mark seemed to have been altered. L. 0. McNeill for the State testified as follows: I was [25]*25formerly recorder of the marks and brands of Lee county for about two years. I know Parkinson’s mark and brand; have marked and branded his cattle ever since he owned cattle. I branded a yellow calf in 1892 or 1893 in Parkinson’s mark and brand, the mark being bolt in one ear, under-slope and upper-bit in the other; the brand diamond P. I have recorded cattle for the defendant in the diamond K brand, but am not positive about the marks. I know of no one else that gives the diamond P brand but Parkinson. This constituted the State’s evidence in chief.

Bascom S. Johnson for the defendant testified as follows: I live in DeSoto county. My business is cow hunting. I am pretty familiar with cattle in DeSoto and Lee counties. I know a man in DeSoto county who gives the Diamond P brand; his name is Wesley Waldron. I do not know the line between Lee and DeSoto counties.

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Bluebook (online)
38 Fla. 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mizell-v-state-fla-1896.