EAGLES, Judge.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the liquid remained on the floor for such a length of time that defendant knew or should have known of its existence. We agree.
Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c), defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [defendant] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Defendant, as the party moving for summary judgment, has the burden of establishing the absence of any triable issue of fact. Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 200, 271 S.E.2d 54 (1980). When a trial court rules on a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C.App. 561, 563, 343 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1986).
[573]*573Since summary judgment “provides a somewhat drastic remedy, it must be used with due regard to its purposes and a cautious observance of its requirements in order that no person shall be deprived of a trial on a genuine disputed factual issue.” Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971). Our courts have repeatedly stated that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because “it ordinarily remains the province of the jury to apply the reasonable person standard.” Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 624, 295 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1982) (citing Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419 (1979)). After careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, raises a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand for trial.
In order to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment, “plaintiff must allege a prima facie case of negligence — defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care, defendants’ conduct breached that duty, the breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, and damages resulted from the injury.” Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. 412, 416, 395 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1990). Plaintiff was an invitee on defendant’s premises because his purpose for entering defendant’s store was to purchase merchandise. Morgan v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 266 N.C. 221, 145 S.E.2d 877 (1966). Because the plaintiff was an invitee, defendant has a duty “to keep ‘entrances to his business in a reasonably safe condition for the use of customers entering or leaving the premises.’ ” Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. at 416, 395 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 145, 146, 379 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1989).
Additionally, defendant “has a duty to warn invitees of hidden dangers about which [defendant] knew or should have known.” Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. at 416, 395 S.E.2d at 115. Where an unsafe condition is created by a third party, or where there is no evidence of its origin, an invitee cannot recover “unless he can show that the unsafe or dangerous condition had remained there for such length of time that the inviter knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of its existence.” Long v. National Food Stores, Inc., 262 N.C. 57, 60, 136 S.E.2d 275, 278 (1964).
[574]*574Defendant contends that plaintiff’s forecast of evidence fails to show “how long the liquid was on the floor.” We disagree.
Here, plaintiff presented the affidavit of a customer, Charles Gates, who sat approximately 20 feet from where plaintiff fell. Gates stated that he had an unobstructed view of patrons walking through the vestibule for approximately 20 minutes prior to plaintiff’s fall. He further stated that nothing was spilled there during that period of time.
From this evidence, the jury could infer that the liquid had remained on the floor for at least 20 minutes. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence raises a jury question on the issue of defendant’s negligence. Here, there are two factual questions for the jury. The first question pertains to the length of time the liquid was on the floor. The second question pertains to whether this period was long enough to lead to the conclusion that defendant was negligent in failing to notice and remove the liquid or warn its customers. Warren v. Rosso and Mastracco, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 163, 336 S.E.2d 699 (1985).
In an attempt to sustain its position, defendant relies on France v. Winn-Dixie Supermarket, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 492, 320 S.E.2d 25 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 329, 327 S.E.2d 889 (1985). France is distinguishable. In France, the plaintiff slipped in pickle juice on defendant’s floor. Plaintiff presented no evidence establishing exactly when the witness had seen the broken jar of pickles on the floor. Accordingly, this Court held that the jury could only speculate as to how long the broken jar had been on the floor. Unlike France, this is not a case calling for jury speculation. Here, plaintiff has a witness who was looking directly at the area for at least 20 minutes prior to the fall, who saw nothing being spilled and who was present when the fall occurred. The jury could reasonably find from the evidence that the liquid had been on the floor for at least 20 minutes.
We also note that defendant in its answer alleged that plaintiff was contributorily negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout. Defendant argues that the liquid would have been obvious to plaintiff if he had looked down as he walked. Our Supreme Court has addressed this issue as follows:
The basic issue with respect to contributory negligence is whether the evidence shows that, as a matter of law, plaintiff [575]*575failed to keep a proper lookout for her own safety. The question is not whether a reasonably prudent person would have seen the [object] had he or she looked but whether a person using ordinary care for his or her own safety under similar circumstances would have looked down at the floor.
Norwood v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 303 N.C. 462, 468, 279 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1981). See Rives v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 68 N.C. App. 594, 598, 315 S.E.2d 724
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
EAGLES, Judge.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the liquid remained on the floor for such a length of time that defendant knew or should have known of its existence. We agree.
Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c), defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [defendant] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Defendant, as the party moving for summary judgment, has the burden of establishing the absence of any triable issue of fact. Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 200, 271 S.E.2d 54 (1980). When a trial court rules on a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C.App. 561, 563, 343 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1986).
[573]*573Since summary judgment “provides a somewhat drastic remedy, it must be used with due regard to its purposes and a cautious observance of its requirements in order that no person shall be deprived of a trial on a genuine disputed factual issue.” Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971). Our courts have repeatedly stated that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because “it ordinarily remains the province of the jury to apply the reasonable person standard.” Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 624, 295 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1982) (citing Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419 (1979)). After careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, raises a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand for trial.
In order to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment, “plaintiff must allege a prima facie case of negligence — defendants owed plaintiff a duty of care, defendants’ conduct breached that duty, the breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, and damages resulted from the injury.” Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. 412, 416, 395 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1990). Plaintiff was an invitee on defendant’s premises because his purpose for entering defendant’s store was to purchase merchandise. Morgan v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 266 N.C. 221, 145 S.E.2d 877 (1966). Because the plaintiff was an invitee, defendant has a duty “to keep ‘entrances to his business in a reasonably safe condition for the use of customers entering or leaving the premises.’ ” Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. at 416, 395 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 145, 146, 379 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1989).
Additionally, defendant “has a duty to warn invitees of hidden dangers about which [defendant] knew or should have known.” Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. at 416, 395 S.E.2d at 115. Where an unsafe condition is created by a third party, or where there is no evidence of its origin, an invitee cannot recover “unless he can show that the unsafe or dangerous condition had remained there for such length of time that the inviter knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of its existence.” Long v. National Food Stores, Inc., 262 N.C. 57, 60, 136 S.E.2d 275, 278 (1964).
[574]*574Defendant contends that plaintiff’s forecast of evidence fails to show “how long the liquid was on the floor.” We disagree.
Here, plaintiff presented the affidavit of a customer, Charles Gates, who sat approximately 20 feet from where plaintiff fell. Gates stated that he had an unobstructed view of patrons walking through the vestibule for approximately 20 minutes prior to plaintiff’s fall. He further stated that nothing was spilled there during that period of time.
From this evidence, the jury could infer that the liquid had remained on the floor for at least 20 minutes. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence raises a jury question on the issue of defendant’s negligence. Here, there are two factual questions for the jury. The first question pertains to the length of time the liquid was on the floor. The second question pertains to whether this period was long enough to lead to the conclusion that defendant was negligent in failing to notice and remove the liquid or warn its customers. Warren v. Rosso and Mastracco, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 163, 336 S.E.2d 699 (1985).
In an attempt to sustain its position, defendant relies on France v. Winn-Dixie Supermarket, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 492, 320 S.E.2d 25 (1984), disc. review denied, 313 N.C. 329, 327 S.E.2d 889 (1985). France is distinguishable. In France, the plaintiff slipped in pickle juice on defendant’s floor. Plaintiff presented no evidence establishing exactly when the witness had seen the broken jar of pickles on the floor. Accordingly, this Court held that the jury could only speculate as to how long the broken jar had been on the floor. Unlike France, this is not a case calling for jury speculation. Here, plaintiff has a witness who was looking directly at the area for at least 20 minutes prior to the fall, who saw nothing being spilled and who was present when the fall occurred. The jury could reasonably find from the evidence that the liquid had been on the floor for at least 20 minutes.
We also note that defendant in its answer alleged that plaintiff was contributorily negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout. Defendant argues that the liquid would have been obvious to plaintiff if he had looked down as he walked. Our Supreme Court has addressed this issue as follows:
The basic issue with respect to contributory negligence is whether the evidence shows that, as a matter of law, plaintiff [575]*575failed to keep a proper lookout for her own safety. The question is not whether a reasonably prudent person would have seen the [object] had he or she looked but whether a person using ordinary care for his or her own safety under similar circumstances would have looked down at the floor.
Norwood v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 303 N.C. 462, 468, 279 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1981). See Rives v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 68 N.C. App. 594, 598, 315 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1984) (customer slipped and fell on grapes in grocery store). Furthermore, “[t]he issues of proximate cause and contributory negligence are usually questions for the jury.” Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327 N.C. at 418, 395 S.E.2d at 116.
Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that the liquid might not have been obvious to a customer exercising ordinary care. Plaintiff stated at his deposition that the floor and the liquid were similar in color. Gates stated at his deposition that he did not see the liquid until he actually came over to help the plaintiff after the fall. Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, these statements could reasonably lead to the conclusion that the liquid was difficult to discern. Hicks v. Food Lion, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 85, 90, 379 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1989).
Furthermore, a jury could reasonably find that a person using ordinary care might not have been looking at the floor in these circumstances. Defendant, carrying two large bags and following other customers, had just opened one door, passed through the doorway, and was only a few feet from the second door. A jury might find that a reasonably prudent person under these circumstances might be looking straight ahead and preparing to go out through the next door. “If different material conclusions can be drawn from the evidence, summary judgment should be denied.” Spector United Employees Credit Union v. Smith, 45 N.C. App. 432, 437, 263 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1980). We conclude that defendant has failed to establish that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant and remand this matter for a jury trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Judge WELLS concurs.
[576]*576Chief Judge HEDRICK dissents.